...but wouldn't it be better not to have the disadvantags?
As you suggested, if Condorcet were proposed municipally, maybe (as was the
case with IRV
in some municipalities) big outside money won't come in to emphasize
rank-balloting methods
complete novelty, unknown-ness, unfamiliarity and
Recently I realized that in our Declaration, and in our discussions, we
have failed to explain and explore the amplification effect that
occurs as a result of, for a lack of a better term at the moment,
layering.
Here is how I explained it in the proposal I referred to earlier:
Winning an
On 27 Apr 2012 12:26:11 -0700, Richard Fobes wrote:
Recently I realized that in our Declaration, and in our discussions,
we have failed to explain and explore the amplification effect that
occurs as a result of, for a lack of a better term at the moment,
layering.
Here is how I explained it
Mike Ossipoff wrote in part:
But here's something that many people seem to miss: Even when it isn't shown
that a count is fraudulent, the
count is still non-legitimate if it isn't vefifiable. A political system's
use of a non-verifiable machine-count
is ridiculous.
Maybe it could be
Whatever the election method, voters are concerned with three groups
of candidates:
. Favorite: Desire electing one of these.
. Compromise: Not desired, but can help to avoid electing Worse.
. Worse: Want to avoid these getting elected.
Not covered here, seeing to better
Dave:
You said:
And that gets to why I think hand counting is no longer useful as
verification - what is there to hand count when there are no paper
ballots except those printed by the machines that we're auditing?
[endquote]
Handcounting was used even before there were voting machines!
I
