Lomax's example has a fallacy:
Lomax said that the Republican and the Democrat were considered equally
likely to win.
We can assume from that that the Republican isn't believed to haves a
majority.
From the above, the Green should approve the Democrat, by the
better-than-expectation strategy.
2012/6/2 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
On 2.6.2012, at 18.19, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2) Approval method and its strategies were once more discussed. My
understanding is simply that Approval works quite fine as long as there are
only one or two winnable candidates, but when there are three
On 3.6.2012, at 22.52, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2012/6/2 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
On 2.6.2012, at 18.19, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2) Approval method and its strategies were once more discussed. My
understanding is simply that Approval works quite fine as long as there are
only one or
P.S. In Soda the Approval related problems with more than three potential
winners might be easier to handle than in Approval. In Soda we may have all
information of the voter approvals and the candidate preferences available, and
this may lead to negotiations and consensus decision on how the
But what if what voters expect of the outcome isn't influenced by the
special 3-candidate defection strategy that I spoke of--What if voters
merely assumed that the Democrat and the Republican both had .5 probability
of winning?
Then, as Lomax said, his Green Democrat would have reason to approve
On 6/3/12 5:08 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 3.6.2012, at 22.52, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2012/6/2 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk mailto:juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
...
One difference is that Approval is a compromise oriented method
while Plurality aims at electing from (and forming) large
2012/6/3 robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
On 6/3/12 5:08 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 3.6.2012, at 22.52, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2012/6/2 Juho Laatu juho4...@yahoo.co.uk mailto:juho4...@yahoo.co.uk
...
One difference is that Approval is a compromise oriented method
When I said that, with 3 candidates, Middle's preferrers have no reason to
approve anyone else, Lomax posted his example. Though I told of its fallacy,
what if we suppose that the voters _do_ believe as Lomax said--that the
Democrat and Republican have equal probability of winning, and that that
