Hi guys, I'm still here, still pondering, but now I have another question.
I've been thinking about score voting, approval voting, and plurality (FPTP)
voting, and I have a concern.
Say we have a situation where we have three candidates, say Gore, Nader, and
Bush. Say we have a voter, Abe
As I have had it explained to me, the Plurality Criterion is: If there are
two candidates X and Y so that X has more first place votes than Y has any
place votes, then Y shouldn't win.
Which I think means that if X has, for example, 100 votes, then B would have
to appear on less than 100
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Message: 3
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2013 10:10:36 -0400
From: Benjamin
I took Warren's example and ignored all of the voter information except the
top 3 choices, tallied up (with Excel) the number of votes each got so that
A, B and E were identified as the finalists. I then sorted each of the
votes into one of ten categories based on preferences between the three
To ignore the simple upgrade to IRV that I have proffered
and defended at length on this list-serve,
when you argue against IRV?
dlw
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
I am not sure who is ignoring your upgrade, but I am curious - can you
remind me how your voting system works again?
-Benn Grant
eFix Computer Consulting
mailto:b...@4efix.com b...@4efix.com
603.283.6601
From: election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com
To: Benjamin Grant b...@4efix.com
Most IRV in real world limits the rankings to 3 candidates per voter.
In my approach, I treat the rankings as approval votes in the first round
and tally up the number of times each candidate gets ranked to determine
3 finalists.There are 10 ways to rank 3
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 11:08 AM, Stephen Unger un...@cs.columbia.eduwrote:
Regarding the plurality criterion:
The Plurality Criterion is: If there are two candidates X and Y so
that X has more first place votes than Y has any place votes, then Y
shouldn't win.
It is NOT worthy of
So if I understand you:
You have a single election. You permit people to rank up to 3 candidates,
no more. You eliminate form consideration all but the top 3 people who
were ranked, regardless of what rank they got. Then, with only those three
left, you proceed to process them with standard IRV
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 11:08 AM, Stephen Unger un...@cs.columbia.eduwrote:
One point overlooked here is that any new party has to go thru an
incubation period during which it has virtually no chance of
winning. Voting for such a party helps strengthen it, and makes it
more likely that others
Most non-conservative are intelligent enough to see that Gore and Bush are
equally bad from their point of view.
was supposed to be
Most non-conservative are intelligent enough to see that Gore and Bush are
NOT equally bad from their point of view.
My typing sucks and always has. You
David L WetzellSent: Monday, June 24, 2013 4:19 PM
Most IRV in real world limits the rankings to 3 candidates per voter.
In real world? Evidence please - on a WORLD basis..
I have never encountered such limits in any IRV election. But then, I don't
live in the USA.
Some 3-only
I limit the collection of ranking info to up to 3 rankings per voter, which
is useful for practical purposes, and then treat the up to 3 rankings per
voter as approval votes to determine which three of the umpteen candidates
proceed. I then process those three with the standard IRV to find the
Isn't that what I said? If not, where did I get it wrong?
-Benn Grant
eFix Computer Consulting
mailto:b...@4efix.com b...@4efix.com
603.283.6601
From: election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com
[mailto:election-methods-boun...@lists.electorama.com] On Behalf Of David L
Wetzell
Jame Gilmour: In real world? Evidence please - on a WORLD basis..
dlw: I mistyped, I know things are done differently in different places.
In the US, it's common to have up to 3 rankings. It's not a serious
limitation for most single-winner political elections. Once again, it
depends on the
Hi,
(Benjamin wrote:)
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 11:08 AM, Stephen Unger un...@cs.columbia.edu wrote:
Regarding the plurality criterion:
The Plurality Criterion is: If there are two candidates X and Y so
that X has more first place votes than Y has any place votes, then Y
shouldn't win.
It
Ben: You eliminate form consideration all but the top 3 people who were
ranked, regardless of what rank they got.
dlw: This was unclear about how the top 3 were chosen.
dlw
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 11:27 AM, Benjamin Grant b...@4efix.com wrote:
Isn’t that what I said? If not, where did I get
Let me try again, because I want to make sure I get what you are trying to
communicate.
1) People vote from the pool of all candidate, for their top 3, ranked.
For example, Candidate 1: 1st place, Candidate 2, 3rd place, C3, no place,
C4, no place, C5, 2nd place, and the rest of the cnadidates,
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 12:28 PM, Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr wrote:
But you can change the scenario so that Plurality would be failed:
51: C1 rated 5, C2 unrated
49: C2 rated 10, C1 unrated
Kevin
A little confused again. What voting system are we using above? Lost track
of that.
Hi Benn,
De : Benjamin Grant panjakr...@gmail.com
À : Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
Cc : em election-meth...@electorama.com
Envoyé le : Lundi 24 juin 2013 11h45
Objet : Re: [EM] [CES #8922] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically
substantially
Hi Ben, 1) they get to vote or rank up to 3 candidates. If someone only
wants one candidate to win they need not rank others or if they only had
time to learn about two or three and only really liked one or two of those
candidates then they could rank one or two of them.
2 and 3 are right.
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 12:50 PM, Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr wrote:
But you can change the scenario so that Plurality would be failed:
51: C1 rated 5, C2 unrated
49: C2 rated 10, C1 unrated
Kevin
A little confused again. What voting system are we using above? Lost
track of
Please forward to the appropriate list for me. Thank you.
From: electionscie...@googlegroups.com
[mailto:electionscie...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Benjamin Grant
Sent: Monday, June 24, 2013 11:40 AM
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 11:08 AM, Stephen Unger un...@cs.columbia.edu
Ben,
MinMax(Margins) fails the Plurality criterion. It elects the candidate with the
weakest pairwise loss as measured by the difference between the two
candidates' vote tallies.
An alternative definition is that it elects the candidate who needs the fewest
number of extra bullet-votes to
Hi Benn,
De : Benjamin Grant panjakr...@gmail.com
À : Kevin Venzke step...@yahoo.fr
Cc : em election-meth...@electorama.com
Envoyé le : Lundi 24 juin 2013 12h11
Objet : Re: [EM] [CES #8922] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically
substantially
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 1:28 PM, Kathy Dopp kathy.d...@gmail.com wrote:
Please forward to the appropriate list for me. Thank you.
From: electionscie...@googlegroups.com
[mailto:electionscie...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Benjamin Grant
Sent: Monday, June 24, 2013 11:40 AM
On Mon, Jun
Thanks for the note - squirreling this away for future study. :)
-Benn
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 1:38 PM, Chris Benham cbenha...@yahoo.com.auwrote:
Ben,
MinMax(Margins) fails the Plurality criterion. It elects the candidate
with the weakest pairwise loss as measured by the difference
Ben Grant wrote:
- Approval Voting tends to result in irrelevant approval votes being given to
weak candidates – which is pointless, or slightly stronger (but still losing)
candidates can once again present a spoiler effect where a person’s
least preferred choice is elected because they cast
Bejamin,
I think we fundamentally agree about most things except for one statement
you made (I think you're seeing some disagreement where there is none),
which is why I'll only respond to this.
You said Since this isn't fixed, tell me what the benefit of Approval is
in the real world over
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 3:06 PM, Kathy Dopp kathy.d...@gmail.com wrote:
Bejamin,
I think we fundamentally agree about most things except for one statement
you made (I think you're seeing some disagreement where there is none),
which is why I'll only respond to this.
You said Since this
There should be a few more fewer ranks in the red in his example.
http://rangevoting.org/IrvIgnoreExample.html
Also, I don't think voters care that much if their deeper preferences
aren't consulted when their top prefs get elected or come in 2nd place and
so it seems contrived to make a big deal
On 06/24/2013 05:08 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
To ignore the simple upgrade to IRV that I have proffered
and defended at length on this list-serve,
when you argue against IRV?
Yes, for many reasons. Among them: because other simple upgrades give
way greater bang for the buck.
Consider
On 06/24/2013 09:33 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
There should be a few more fewer ranks in the red in his example.
http://rangevoting.org/IrvIgnoreExample.html
Also, I don't think voters care that much if their deeper preferences
aren't consulted when their top prefs get elected or come in 2nd
On 06/24/2013 04:10 PM, Benjamin Grant wrote:
As I have had it explained to me, the Plurality Criterion is: If there
are two candidates X and Y so that X has more first place votes than Y
has any place votes, then Y shouldn't win.
Which I think means that if X has, for example, 100 votes, then
Another might add, This is why the number of competitive candidates and
the extent of low-info voters matters in the comparison.
dlw
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 3:31 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 06/24/2013 09:33 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
There should be a few more
The short-cut in my hybrid has been used in some elections and it had
potential to coopt the momentum of IRV, but I think that FairVote's upgrade
to top-two might take its place...
Now, The same might be true of BTR-IRV, the main draw-back is that seems to
work best with voters ranking the
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 4:45 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 06/24/2013 04:10 PM, Benjamin Grant wrote:
As I have had it explained to me, the Plurality Criterion is: If there
are two candidates X and Y so that X has more first place votes than Y
has any place
Just a quick note to all, if I seem to be going after or down on whatever
system of voting you prefer, don't take it personally. It's not that I have
a better one in mind, it's just that I have a drive to truly know each
system top to bottom, no holds barred. And just because I find an aspect of
a
On 06/24/2013 03:06 PM, Benjamin Grant wrote:
Hi guys, I’m still here, still pondering, but now I have another
question. I’ve been thinking about score voting, approval voting, and
plurality (FPTP) voting, and I have a concern.
Say we have a situation where we have three candidates, say Gore,
On 06/24/2013 11:22 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
Another might add, This is why the number of competitive candidates and
the extent of low-info voters matters in the comparison.
Alright, then tell me what kind of evidence would change your mind as to
whether the scarcity of competitive
On 06/24/2013 11:28 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
The short-cut in my hybrid has been used in some elections and it had
potential to coopt the momentum of IRV, but I think that FairVote's
upgrade to top-two might take its place...
Now, The same might be true of BTR-IRV, the main draw-back is that
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 6:19 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
Scenario 1: Voters don't rank now, but will rank when they see it's worth
it. Here IRV will eventually crash but BTR-IRV is, well, better.
Scenario 2: Voters rank, contrary to your assumptions (but suggested
KM:Alright, then tell me what kind of evidence would change your mind as to
whether the scarcity of competitive candidates is an artifact of Plurality
or inherent to single-winner elections. (If no such evidence can exist,
then there's no point in discussing.)
dlw:Let's switch to IRV + American
It's a good argument.
1. What if candidates/parties are inherently fuzzy and rankings are
tenuous? It can be done, I just don't put a lot of faith in them.
A. If I'm wrong and IRV proves defunct then IRV can be used to upgrade IRV.
B. If I'm right then the switch to an upgrade might make it
On Mon, Jun 24, 2013 at 6:06 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km_el...@lavabit.com wrote:
On 06/24/2013 03:06 PM, Benjamin Grant wrote:
So strategically speaking, Abe reasons that although he supports a less
likely candidate more, he strategically should score the front-runner
Gore at full
Hi,
De : Benjamin Grant
Cc : EM election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Envoyé le : Lundi 24 juin 2013 17h53
Objet : Re: [EM] Score Voting and Approval Voting not practically
substantially different from Plurality?
The only way to avoid this, I *think*, is
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