On Jul 10, 2012, at 6:51 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
When runoffs are subjected to criterion analysis, one usually
considers voters to vote in the same order in each round. If they
prefer A to B in the first round, and A and B remain in the second
round, they'll vote A over B in the
On Jul 10, 2012, at 3:49 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good Afternoon, Dave
re: I would not do away with primaries - instead I would do away
with Plurality and leave primaries to any party that still
saw value in them.
I believe the discussion was more about opening primaries to the
public
Time to think.
Primaries are a problem.
Primaries were invented to solve an intolerable problem for Plurality
elections - too easy to have multiple candidates for a party, those
candidates having to share the available votes, and thus all losing.
I would not do away with primaries -
Quoting from today's Demoncracy Chronicles, 6/24/12:
The basic idea is avoid the situation faced today, where many
candidates that are well liked do not get votes because voters
choose the most likely to win candidate instead of their
favorite. Source: Democracy Chronicles
On Jun 24, 2012, at 8:55 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
To Democracy Chronicles, EM, and Dave Ketchum:
On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 12:19 PM, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
wrote:
Quoting from today's Demoncracy Chronicles, 6/24/12:
The basic idea is avoid the situation faced today, where
On May 28, 2012, at 8:05 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
On 27.5.2012, at 22.37, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You know, that's the Condorcetists' and IRVists' objection to
Approval.
The question is what happens when Approval doesn't let you vote
ABC. The
difference is that there is no division to
On May 28, 2012, at 9:17 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
As usual, I don't know what Dave Ketchum means.
Guessing as to what Mike O is assuming, our topic is whether
Approval's inability to indicate such as ABC matters. I read the
words below indicating that voters can estimate, accurately
On May 27, 2012, at 5:12 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 27.5.2012, at 22.37, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You know, that's the Condorcetists' and IRVists' objection to
Approval.
The question is what happens when Approval doesn't let you vote
ABC. The difference is that there is no division to minor
On May 27, 2012, at 7:43 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 28.5.2012, at 1.47, Dave Ketchum wrote:
As soon as ability to vote for A=B is in your future you think of
wanting ability to vote for FavoriteComprmise, as is doable in IRV
- matters only that Favorite is your favorite, not the possibility
Thanks Juho, for working to make this dialog more useful!
DWK
On May 21, 2012, at 7:36 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
[Note: Michael Ossipof's message was not a reply to a mail on this
list but to an offline discussion.]
On 21.5.2012, at 23.13, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I don't know what you mean by
This started as a thread to talk a bit about Condorcet.
That has faded away, and all I see is trivia about Plurality vs
Approval - too trivial a difference between them to support enough
thoughts to be worth writing this much, even less for reading.
DWK
On May 18, 2012, at 9:56 PM,
On May 17, 2012, at 2:09 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Kristofer:
You expressed concern about uncertainty about how to vote in
Approval. Let me re-word what I was trying to say about that:
First, for simplicity let’s say that you belong to a faction that
all prefer and vote as you do. What
Oops - took so long stripping Mike O's zillion words that I forgot to
respond.
On May 16, 2012, at 10:05 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
On May 15, 2012, at 2:55 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 15.5.2012, at 11.11, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Juho and Kristofer:
Just a few preliminary words before I
Responding because you wrote, but with no authority.
On May 12, 2012, at 9:04 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Condorcetists:
You want to quibble forever about which rank-count is the best.
No - we want to move past that.
You object that Approval doesn't let you help your 1st and 2nd
choices
to be used to specify who you are writing to. The subject line
should indicate the topic.)
Good point! Also important to say when they posted it, for readers to
look back to the previous post.
Richard Fobes
Dave Ketchum
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em
On Apr 30, 2012, at 7:02 PM, Paul Kislanko wrote:
On 04/29/2012 04:48 AM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Computers do well at performing the tasks they are properly told to
perform - better than humans given the same directions. Thus it would
make sense to direct the computers and expect them to do what
if this is what it
is. maybe i should un-plonk him, but i dunno why.
--
r b-j r...@audioimagination.com
Dave Ketchum
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
.
Dave Ketchum
On Apr 29, 2012, at 3:09 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
What happened to Richard's promise to not read my postings? :-)
Instead of continuing to repeat that he doesn't read them, maybe it
would be better
if he could actually llve up to that promise.
Given Richard's particularly low
On Apr 28, 2012, at 12:56 AM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
First, my apologies to Paul Kislanko, whom I called by the wrong
name when I replied to his posting, a few minutes ago.
_This_ reply is to Dave Ketchum:
Dave:
I'd said:
How to avoid this problem? Why not repeal the rule that makes
On Apr 28, 2012, at 5:04 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
For one thing, Condorcet discourages honesty, because, even if you
top-rank Compromise, top-ranking Favorite too can cause Compromise
to lose to Worse. when ranking Compromise _alone_ in 1st place
would have defeated Worse. To do
.
The negatives below suggest this is a difficult step. Agreed, but its
value says it is worth trying.
Dave Ketchum
In contrast, when anything more complicated than Approval is
proposed , opponents, media pundits and commentators, magazine
writers, politicians, and some hired academic authorities
On Apr 22, 2012, at 11:14 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I missed the fact that Dave was answering my question here, and so
I'll reply to his answer:
I'd said:
Approved ratings wins. The result? Well, we'd be electing the most
approved candidate, wouldn't we. Who can criticize that?
Dave
Seemed to me Mike left out some important thoughts - can we do better?
On Apr 21, 2012, at 3:41 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote, as:
Article, with the added paragraph and some better wording
Adrian and EM:
Elections are important to many organizations - and important that
they help the
but it is the foundation of modern life.
What do you think?
From: Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
To: election-methods Methods election-meth...@electorama.com
Cc: Adrian Tawfik adriantaw...@yahoo.com
Sent: Sunday, April 22, 2012 8:41 PM
Subject: Election thinking,
Seemed to me Mike left
On Apr 20, 2012, at 5:30 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
You said:
I choke when I see IRV called fine
[endquote]
Have I ever said that, without qualifying it? No.
I've said that IRV would be fine with an electorate different from
the one tht we now have--an electorate completely free of
It pays to be careful when rearranging topics.
Here is a quote from Wikipedia, where they have to be careful:
In voting systems, the Smith set, named after John H. Smith, is the
smallest non-empty set of candidates in a particular election such
that each member beats every other candidate
How do we identify a monster? Ŭalabio‽ seems to think they are
identifiable. I claim not - Ŭalabio‽ says they got excess ranking -
we can see this after a race (deciding excess ranking identifies a
monster - which even then is a problem only if the supposed monster
got ranked by too many,
I choke when I see IRV called fine - it too easily ignores parts of
what the voters say. For example, look at what can happen with A
being much liked, yet IRV not always noticing:
20 A
20 BA
22 CA
Joe ?
Condorcet would see A elected by 62 votes (plus, perhaps, Joe's
63rd). IRV would be
On Apr 12, 2012, at 6:47 PM, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
I said that Plurality only lets you rate one candidate. That isn't
true. You're still rating all of the
candidates in Plurality, but you're required to bottom-rate all but
one of them.
Looking ahead, Plurality lets the voter present a
understanding.
ICT would be a better proposal than Condorcet, since it also meets
FBC and CD (it's
defection-resistant, unlike Condorcet). But ICT share's Condorcet's
problems #1 snd
#2, above.
Mike Ossipoff
Dave Ketchum
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list
for a
particular election, can vote by those rules and have them counted
with the same power by Condorcet rules.
Dave Ketchum
Mike Ossipoff
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
the change wanted and get it voted.
. Somehow avoid others, perhaps due to hearing of these proposed
changes, of making conflicting changes.
Dave Ketchum
The methods that I call defection-resistant do much to alleviate
that problem,
but don't eliminate it. They just push it to a secondary
Many thoughts catch my eye here - I will not attempt to respond to all.
On Mar 22, 2012, at 4:09 PM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 03/22/2012 07:57 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
There are plenty of voters who report having to hold their nose and
vote only for someone they don't like. They'd all
IRV and Condorcet).
Dave Ketchum
Of course one may also adopt different models in the two layers, two-
party system for the rop level and proportonal representation for
some state level representative bodies. Above I also made the
assumption that the strict tw-party approach where
On Feb 9, 2012, at 9:02 PM, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Robert,
De : robert bristow-johnson r...@audioimagination.com
À : election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Envoyé le : Jeudi 9 février 2012 10h07
Objet : Re: [EM] [CES #4445] Re: Looking at Condorcet
On 2/8/12 1:25 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On
How did we get here? What I see called Condorcet is not really that.
On Feb 6, 2012, at 10:02 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
...
Say people vote rated ballots with 6 levels, and after the election
you see a histogram of candidate X and Y that looks like this:
(better)
6:Y X
5: Y X
4: YX
.
. I do not object to such for the purpose of testing methods, but
do object to imposing it on voters in an otherwise normal election -
it adds unneeded complications for those voters.
Dave Ketchum
On Feb 2, 2012, at 8:15 PM, Bruce Gilson wrote:
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 7:45 AM, Jameson Quinn
, as in Condorcet, counts
that look odd are the most likely locations of trouble.
Dave Ketchum
On Feb 2, 2012, at 9:29 AM, Stephen Unger wrote:
A fundamental problem with all these fancy schemes is vote
tabulation. All but approval are sufficiently complex to make manual
processing messy
On Feb 3, 2012, at 12:31 AM, Clay Shentrup wrote:
As far as I can tell, no amount of evidence will change DaveK's
mind. But it's worth pointing out that Score Voting is superior to
Condorcet in essentially every way.
* Lower Bayesian Regret with any number of strategic or honest voters
, as to
winnability.
Dave Ketchum
On Feb 3, 2012, at 2:45 PM, Andy Jennings wrote:
On Thu, Feb 2, 2012 at 10:09 PM, Richard Fobes electionmeth...@votefair.org
wrote:
On 2/2/2012 11:07 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 02/02/2012 05:28 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I honestly think that honest
too late to
attend to with normal nominations. True that voters may do some write-
ins when there is no real need - and I have no sympathy for such
voters - this needs thought.
Dave Ketchum
On Jan 28, 2012, at 3:13 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote
Re: [EM] Propose plain Approval first. Option
Looks like your new system is teaching you properly.
I tried printing with smaller characters - and each line filled out
properly.
I tried making the page wider or narrower - still properly got as many
words on each line as would fit.
On Jan 22, 2012, at 10:30 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
marketing.
I do not understand the above claim about majority winners - true that
FPTP voters cannot completely express their desires, but the counters
can, accurately, read what they say with their votes.
Dave Ketchum
That is debatable. I happen to think that the goal/object of IRV
collections of political parties.
Dave Ketchum
On Dec 12, 2011, at 4:18 PM, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote per: Dave: Re: The
Occupy-Movement:
Dave:
You wrote;
If there is truth in what I read, the US desperately needs
better attention to public safety, including officers, and those
directing them
between Occupy-backing candidates in the Green and
Libertarian parties - if they split the votes of Occupy backers and
thus each lost.
On Dec 11, 2011, at 1:42 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Write-ins can be effective. I hold up proof this year. For
a supervisor race:
111 Rep
On Sun, Dec 11, 2011 at 11:14 AM, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
wrote
per this subject - see at end below.
Leon Smith added reference to http://reformact.org/ - by a group that
offers extensive references and thoughts - worth exploring.
On Dec 11, 2011, at 6:06 PM, James Gilmour
party, as each depends on the other.
More detailed arguments can be found in
http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~unger/articles/twoParty.html
http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/%7Eunger/articles/twoParty.html
Steve
Dave Ketchum
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
(s), and reaches
a tipping point.
dlw:IOW, they need to reinvent what FairVote's been
working hard to build up for some time...
Yep. It's a lot of work. If voting reform were an easy task, we (and
I include Fairvote in that we) would have won already.
JQ
Dave Ketchum
Trying one more time to start a sales pitch for switching from IRV to
Condorcet.
On Dec 1, 2011, at 10:18 PM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On 12/1/11 5:14 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
KM:If the cost of campaigning is high enough that only the two
major parties can play the game, then
-johnson wrote:
The next two are related, though not directly quoted.
On Sat, 2011-11-26 at 1:39 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
On Sat, 2011-11-24 at 10:47 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Initial topic is IRV.
the counterexample, again, is Burlington Vermont. Dems haven't
sat
, but requires little more than that, since
we got there by being near to ties.
Dave Ketchum
--
r b-j r...@audioimagination.com
Imagination is more important than knowledge.
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
.
Passing out abbreviation pages would help if their subject made them
findable.
Note that one detail in this conversation is sorting out the meaning
of the various identifiers such as ABE.
Dave Ketchum
Jameson
2011/11/19 MIKE OSSIPOFF nkk...@hotmail.com
You wrote:
You could of course
that much.
Dave Ketchum
On Nov 13, 2011, at 8:46 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
Ted Stern wrote:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/science/voters-experience-stress-on-election-day-study-finds.html
I remember hearing about other studies showing that making difficult
decisions uses up the energy
On Nov 9, 2011, at 6:26 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
In light of the #OWS statement on electoral reform.
http://anewkindofparty.blogspot.com/2011/11/people-before-parties-electoral-reforms.html
My Thoughts about an alternative possible consensus statement for
non-electoral analytical types.
Agreed I strayed beyond consensus statement. You gave me room to
work on some details that need considering in the overall task.
On Nov 9, 2011, at 9:24 PM, David L Wetzell wrote:
DLW wrote: In light of the #OWS statement on electoral reform.
On Oct 18, 2011, at 10:13 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Quoting Mike Ossipoff: 'to me, our current public political
elections don't require any strategy decisions, other than vote for
acceptable candidates and don't vote for the entirely unacceptable
ones.'
In the discussions of Approval
Quoting Mike Ossipoff: 'to me, our current public political elections
don't require any strategy decisions, other than vote for acceptable
candidates and don't vote for the entirely unacceptable ones.'
In the discussions of Approval and ranking, below, Mke's thought
applies to both. In
for Condorcet, but demand of others comparable
quality.
Dave Ketchum
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
rejection of such methods. Burlington was an example of
IRV failing to read true voter desires.)
Dave Ketchum
On Oct 12, 2011, at 8:57 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
To: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
I believe that you imply, in your message copied below, that you
like the following words in the older
format such as Robert's would be
usable if humans could agree - or even have selectable choices of
formats if enough desire.
Dave Ketchum
On Sep 7, 2011, at 1:12 AM, robert bristow-johnson wrote:
still not sure of the efficacy of trying to persuade voters (or
their elected
it
fail from overweight.
Dave Ketchum
On Sep 5, 2011, at 6:53 AM, Michael Allan wrote:
Fred Gohlke wrote:
I think it's important for people proposing Electoral Methods to
know (and agree upon) the prize they seek - and not lose sight of
it. I fear I've failed to make that point. I have
I finally got around to a bit.
I see both Judgment and Judgement - can one be a typo?
Declaration of Election-Method Experts and Enthusiasts
Contents
When there is a list of items, some taking more than one line,
something, such as indentation, should show start of each item.
I see
into that yet.
Via http://public.leginfo.state.ny.us/menuf.cgi I looked up NY
election law (ELN). It gets deeply involved in voters nominating
candidates by petition - voters who do not spend all their time at
this complex task - but nothing glaring about party control.
Dave Ketchum
On Sep 3
it all
done in a reasonable number of days.
party nomination relates to primary,, independent nomination
relates to independence ignoring party, and designating petition
relates to primary - are all used in our law on this.
Dave Ketchum
On Sep 2, 2011, at 4:25 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Good
these
paragraphs and let the readers investigate each method without us
offering any high-level perspective.
--- A voter's view by Dave Ketchum ---
Mark on a ruler those you would be willing to promote toward winning,
assuming those that you prefer drop out for some reason
On Aug 31, 2011, at 11:11 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
Thank you Dave Ketchum and Peter Zbornik for your excellent
responses to my first draft of the multiple rounds of voting
section! I have tried to incorporate your requested improvements,
while attempting to keep it short.
Here is what
Too late this night for fancy words, but hopefully I can express some
useful thoughts.
On Aug 30, 2011, at 4:52 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
Here is what I've just written for the new section titled Multiple
rounds of voting:
--- begin
In highly competitive elections,
no useful effect on the outcome
of the election, or on anything else in the objective world.
Again it follows:
(a) What the individual voter thinks is of no importance; or
(b) The election method is flawed.
Which of these statements is true? I think it must be (b).
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Agreed
must receive a majority of votes.
I question two or three - there is no need to dump losers - we care
about winners.
Dave Ketchum
Almost all of us signing this declaration recommend that an
organization formally adopt a rule that specifies that one of our
supported election methods
On Aug 27, 2011, at 4:22 PM, Michael Allan wrote:
But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote
will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose
otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you agree?
Dave Ketchum wrote:
TRULY, this demonstrates lack
On Aug 27, 2011, at 9:23 PM, Michael Allan wrote:
Dave Ketchum wrote:
Conditions surrounding elections vary but, picking on a simple
example, suppose that, without your vote, there are exactly nR and
nD votes. If that is the total vote you get to decide the election
by creating a majority
.
Claim that what I wrote about simplifying Condorcet voting August 24,
2011 3:05:19 PM EDT needs to be seen by more at this point.
Dave Ketchum
Looking at proportional elections:
4) Aren't we in a position to
a) recommend Meek's method ahead of IRV-STV, when it comes to a
better proportional
A SAD weakness about what is being said.
On Aug 24, 2011, at 12:55 PM, Fred Gohlke wrote:
Michael Allan wrote:
But not for voting. The voting system guarantees that my vote
will have no effect and I would look rather foolish to suppose
otherwise. This presents a serious problem. Do you
not counted as method
differences.
Dave Ketchum
On Aug 24, 2011, at 5:34 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/24 Markus Schulze markus.schu...@alumni.tu-berlin.de
Hallo,
I wrote (24 Aug 2011):
In my opinion, the Voting Reform Statement
endorses too many alternative election methods.
Opponents
On Aug 23, 2011, at 9:06 PM, Richard Fobes wrote:
I very much agree with Jameson Quinn that the time has come to
write, sign, and widely distribute a formal statement of the
election-method principles that we agree upon. Yet instead of just
providing a checklist of what we approve, I
On Aug 16, 2011, at 9:16 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I understand your arguments, though you've neglected MJ and SODA.
But as I keep arguing, this statement isn't about finding the right
answer, it's about finding the best answer that we can all agree on.
JQ
2011/8/15 Dave Ketchum da
Strategy thoughts:
Assuming as candidates, Good, Soso, and lice: My preference is G but
S is better than any lice. Thus I desire to vote for both G and S
with G preferred.
Plurality - can not vote for both. On days when I expect G to
certainly lose I vote for S to protect, as best I
On Aug 13, 2011, at 11:31 PM, Greg Nisbet wrote:
On Sat, Aug 13, 2011 at 6:21 PM, Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
wrote:
Glad to see thinking, though we part company on some details.
On Aug 13, 2011, at 5:25 PM, Greg Nisbet wrote:
All current forms of party list proportional
are too weak to deserve a seat.
Dave Ketchum
On Aug 14, 2011, at 4:24 PM, Greg Nisbet wrote:
Message: 2
Date: Sun, 14 Aug 2011 09:31:55 +0100
From: James Gilmour jgilm...@globalnet.co.uk
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Preferential Party List Method Proposal
Message
the search is for the strongest remaining candidate in the
amended matrix.
On Aug 14, 2011, at 10:03 PM, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
On Aug 14, 2011, at 6:51 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Why transfers?
At least, when I said do a CW type search for the strongest
remaining candidate, I thought
hosts like Rachael
Maddow and ask them to do a segment on different voting systems. If
we organize to tweet pundits at the same time, maybe they'll get the
message.
dunno who Rachel Maddow is. guess i better google her. how about
Chris Matthews?
On 8/4/11 9:16 PM, Dave Ketchum
On Aug 5, 2011, at 10:22 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/5 Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
Brought out for special thought:
rating is easier than ranking. You can express this
computationally, by saying that ranking requires O(n²) pairwise
comparisons of candidates (or perhaps for some
On Aug 5, 2011, at 11:13 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/5 Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
On Aug 5, 2011, at 10:22 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/8/5 Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
Brought out for special thought:
rating is easier than ranking. You can express
of these differences
decides which wins their race.
. In Condorcet they count how many rank AB vs how many rank BA.
Politicians may hesitate in moving up to more powerful methods. Range
or Condorcet can cost more, but getting a truer reading as to voter
choices can be worth the pain.
Dave
I assume this is from Colorado, and have no idea who else has seen it.
I see it as worth considering the thinking, although I AM NOT signing
on as backing any of it.
On Jul 23, 2011, at 11:32 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Knowing of IRV and Condorcet methods of counting ballots, the first
:
. Has counting that awards to deserving candidates.
. Can easily handle equal ranking.
. Can learn to award to write-ins (when they are deserving).
Dave Ketchum
I agree with that (as one reason). It is a bit like natural
selection, or a like fight of strong men where the weakest
What I see:
.. Condorcet - without mixing in Approval.
. SODA - for trying, but seems too complex.
. Reject Approval - too weak to compete.
Dave Ketchum
On Jul 8, 2011, at 6:56 AM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
First, I'd ask people on this list to please stop discussing tax
policy here
:
2011/7/8 Dave Ketchum da...@clarityconnect.com
What I see:
. Condorcet - without mixing in Approval.
You need some cycle-breaker. Implicit approval is the only order-N
tiebreaker I know; fundamentally simpler than any order-N²
tiebreaker like minimax. You don't have to call it approval
hand, it just goes to
show that a fundamentally flawed system can be sold in such enclaves.
Above you said selling would be undoable; here you say what should
never get bought has demonstrated possibility of selling such?
Dave Ketchum
Sorry if I'm coming across as negative. I'm just trying
.
Recommend you study this description of CIVS and consider what it
offers: http://www.cs.cornell.edu/andru/civs.html
Dave Ketchum
On Jul 7, 2011, at 10:25 AM, Sand W wrote:
I hope everyone is interested in a new online survey site intended
to prove how much better IRV-enabled surveys
bristow-johnson wrote:
On Jul 7, 2011, at 7:26 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Ouch!
i missed it.
. As Kristofer just wrote, Condorcet is a much better method
than IRV for what you are promising - Interesting that Condorcet
offers (more than) the same voter ranking capabilities as IRV, but
does
.
Dave Ketchum
--Bob Richard
On 7/7/2011 3:43 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
I actually already touched this question in another mail. And the
argument was that (in two-party countries) IRV is not as risky
risky from the two leading parties' point of view as methods that
are more compromise
election, so that seems like a good
prospect. Hochul's win makes her deserve a full term, so look
elsewhere.
Dave Ketchum
On Jun 14, 2011, at 10:33 AM, Warren D. Smith (CRV cofounder, http://RangeVoting.org
) wrote:
I think Justin Levitt's view of optimal districting, is basically
On Jun 15, 2011, at 5:12 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
- Original Message -
From: Kristofer Munsterhjelm
Date: Wednesday, June 15, 2011 1:41 pm
Subject: Re: [EM] Best use of two bit ballots?
To: fsimm...@pcc.edu
Cc: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
So far
On Jun 15, 2011, at 2:05 PM, Juho Laatu wrote:
On 15.6.2011, at 14.46, Kevin Venzke wrote:
It's better if explaining the method's
rules is enough (or close) to understand the strategy.
...
No, I am (almost) saying that if you have to explain the strategy
separately then that's bad. I think
of assigning higher numbers to candidates liked best.
Or ranked pairs which will matter only when the voter gets a lot of
sophistication.
I do not talk of strategy because it is a big topic and I am covering
only the basics.
On Jun 12, 2011, at 8:56 PM, Dave Ketchum wrote:
Somehow this drifted away
Somehow this drifted away from being usable for someone with literacy
weakness.
On Jun 12, 2011, at 5:42 PM, fsimm...@pcc.edu wrote:
Kristofer,
I think the following complete description is simpler than anything
possible for ranked pairs:
1. Next to each candidate name are the bubbles
margins is the
more plurality like in the sense that the winner's first preference
count will probably be greater.
Truncation is often useful, apart from possibly being called a defense.
Dave Ketchum
I do believe that rough information on the
frontrunners is enough to
tell you *who* to bury
approved of.
. Candidates each provide a list of those they will vote for and
voter votes for candidate whose list attracts.
Dave Ketchum
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
(and having full
value within its capability) for those preferring to avoid actual
ranking.
On Jun 6, 2011, at 2:51 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
2011/6/6 fsimm...@pcc.edu
- Original Message -
From: Jameson Quinn
2011/6/5 Dave Ketchum
I see this as Approval with a complication - that Jameson
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