On 07 Dec 2012 08:13:09 -0800, Jameson Quinn wrote:
I tend to favor letter grades for MJ. Since the MJ (or CMJ)
tiebreaker itself assigns plusses and minuses, you can simply use
the letters A,B,C,D,F. That's only 5 categories; if you wanted 6,
you could add an explicit A+ option, because
On 16 Nov 2012 07:29:52 -0800, Chris Benham wrote:
It isn't a big deal if Ranked Pairs or River are used instead of
Schulze. Losing Votes means that the pairwise results are weighed
purely by the number of votes on the losing side. The weakest
defeats are those with the most votes on the
Hi Chris,
You discuss Winning Votes vs. Margins below.
What do you think about using the Cardinal-Weighted Pairwise array in
conjunction with the traditional Condorcet array?
In other words, either WV or Margins is used to decide whether there
is a defeat, but the CWP array is used to determine
On 11 Sep 2012 13:18:23 -0700, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
Ted:
You said:
Majority Judgment (MJ) and Continuous Majority Judgment (CMJ) are both
Median Ratings methods.
No sh*t ! :-)...But wait, isn't that explicit in their definition?
As is ER-Bucklin(whole). You're probably most
Michael, you are stepping naively into an area that has been very well
studied. I include a couple of points below you may want to consider.
On 04 Jun 2012 22:18:06 -0700, Michael Ossipoff wrote:
About gerrymanmdering;
PR would be a solution to gerrymandering, but certainly not the only one:
On 27 Apr 2012 12:26:11 -0700, Richard Fobes wrote:
Recently I realized that in our Declaration, and in our discussions,
we have failed to explain and explore the amplification effect that
occurs as a result of, for a lack of a better term at the moment,
layering.
Here is how I explained it
It is my impression that the only situations in which IIAC fails is
when there is no majority.
Would it be possible to get around IIAC by adding a two-candidate
runoff?
Ted
On 29 Mar 2012 05:35:47 -0700, Jameson Quinn wrote:
The Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives criterion (IIA, also
Hi Kristofer,
I am very interested in PR multiwinner methods, especially those that
use ER-Bucklin.
However, I have a hard time following your logic.
Would it be possible to work out a relatively simple example using a 3
winner election, a Droop-like quota of 25% (just to make things easy),
and
On 30 Jan 2012 23:51:56 -0800, Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 01/31/2012 01:48 AM, Ted Stern wrote:
I've been thinking that one way to spread information about
alternative voting systems might be to gamify one or more systems.
[...]
Has anyone out there in the EM communities thought
On 03 Feb 2012 16:07:59 -0800, Kevin Venzke wrote:
Personally I don't understand why one would want to spend time on a
method that you have to defend by saying it might work anyway,
even if as built the incentives are wrong.
I like the idea of being able to test things, so I may be biased
I have a simple request for those posting to this list:
If you use abbreviations for voting methods, please include a small
glossary at the end of your message. For example,
... here I'm saying something about DMC, GATV, and IBIFA ...
[... rest of text ...]
Glossary:
DMC: Definitive Majority
I've been thinking that one way to spread information about
alternative voting systems might be to gamify one or more systems.
Wikipedia explains gamification better than I could:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gamification
Basically, it's a form of crowd-sourcing where you give game-like
On 17 Jan 2012 10:35:25 -0800, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
These are the ballotings in the poll. If you participate, try to vote a
ballot for each of these ballotings.It won't take
long,due to the small number of parties nominated. But if there isn't
sufficient time to vote all 6 of the
Consider Enhanced DMC as defined in this message from Forest Simmons,
dated July 12, 2011:
http://old.nabble.com/-EM--Enhanced-DMC-td32048790.html
I prefer the name Strong Preference Approval Round Robin (SPARR),
following from the idea that this is a form of Condorcet (Instant
Round Robin) that
Hi Mike,
May I suggest that you also include a 3-slot ballot option? I.e.,
Preferred, Acceptable, Reject. You could call it a Fallback Approval
ballot if you like.
Many methods (e.g., most Condorcet methods, ER-Bucklin) that don't
meet the Participation criterion will do so when restricted to
-add-top is the same as Participation, because there is no way to
add A B rankings without A having the maximum rating.
Okay, thanks to both of you! That is encouraging ... that means that
2-level ER-Bucklin gets Steven Brams's seal of approval :-).
Ted
Jameson
2012/1/3 Ted Stern
I've seen examples in which Bucklin (with equal ratings) fails the
Participation criterion, AKA Woodall's mono-add-top criterion for
deterministic methods:
the participation criterion says that the addition of a ballot,
where candidate A is strictly preferred to candidate B, to an
existing
On 16 Dec 2011 13:29:30 -0800, David L. Wetzell wrote:
-- Forwarded message --
From: Kathy Dopp kathy.d...@gmail.com
To: election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Cc:
Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2011 09:11:11 -0500
Subject: Re: [EM] Egg or Chicken.
Date: Wed, 14 Dec 2011 14:59:14 -0600
The simplest PR system: open list Approval Transferable Vote.
ATF for multiwinner elections:
Quota (easy): Q = (Nballots + 1)/(Nseats + 1)
A voter may approve any number of candidates.
Each ballot is initially weighted as 1.0.
Count weighted approval totals. At same time, count weighted
On 05 Dec 2011 12:46:41 -0800, Ted Stern wrote:
The simplest PR system: open list Approval Transferable Vote.
ATF for multiwinner elections:
Correction, ATV. Blame it on Monday ...
-- Ted
Quota (easy): Q = (Nballots + 1)/(Nseats + 1)
A voter may approve any number of candidates
On 02 Dec 2011 13:05:04 -0800, David L. Wetzell wrote:
On Fri, Dec 2, 2011 at 2:49 PM, Jameson Quinn jameson.qu...@gmail.com wrote:
There is a fundamental difference between two-party dominance, which will
probably not change any time soon, and a two-party duopoly. 45%, 40%, 8%,
On 28 Nov 2011 20:24:37 -0800, Chris Benham wrote:
Matt Welland wrote (26 Nov 2011):
Also, do folks generally see approval as better than or worse than IRV?
To me Approval seems to solve the spoiler problem without introducing
any unstable weirdness and it is much simpler
On 23 Nov 2011 17:51:45 -0800, Forest Simmons wrote:
MMCWPO is the method that elects the candidate whose maximal
weighted pairwise opposition is minimal. It solves the ABE problem
as well as the FBC.
To clarify, MMCWPO is MinMax (MMPO) combined with James
Green-Armytage's Cardinal Weighted
Hi,
Say I have a pairwise array that looks like
| A | B | C | D |
===+=+=+=+=+
A | 60 | 45 | 46 | 60 |
---+-+-+-+-+
B | 55 | 55 | 55 | 49 |
---+-+-+-+-+
C | 54 | 45 | 54 | 52 |
---+-+-+-+-+
D | 40 |
Droop
proportionality? If so, how do you deal with elevating preferences if
no candidate achieves a quota?
Ted
From: Ted Stern araucaria.arauc...@gmail.com
To: Election Methods election-methods@lists.electorama.com
Cc: Ted Stern araucaria.arauc...@gmail.com
Sent: Monday, 3 October 2011, 19
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