Jobst,
You wrote (Thur.Mar.24):
First, I'd like to emphasize that DMC, AWP, and AM
can be thought of as being essentially the same method
with only different definition of defeat strength, so
it seems quite natural to compare them in detail as
you started.
Recall that the DMC winner is the
Dear Chris!
You wrote:
I like this table.
Thanks.
Doesn't AM look like the most natural and balanced?
Yes, but that's only an aesthetical judgement...
I was wondering if it is possible in AM for a
candidate who is both the sincere CW and sincere AW to
successfully Buried, and I've come
Jobst,
You and Marcus are (often) very quick responders!
Unfortunately Democratic Fair Choice incorporates
more than one feature to which I'm allergic. As I put
it in a previous post:
I am strongly of the view that as far as possible,
the result of the election should be determined purely
by the
Dear Chris!
You wrote:
Jobst,
You and Marcus are (often) very quick responders!
Unfortunately Democratic Fair Choice incorporates
more than one feature to which I'm allergic.
Sorry to hear of your allergies...
I am strongly of the view that as far as possible,
the result of the election
On 30 Mar 2005 at 06:51 UTC-0800, Chris Benham wrote:
Jobst,
You wrote (Thur.Mar.24):
First, I'd like to emphasize that DMC, AWP, and AM
can be thought of as being essentially the same method
with only different definition of defeat strength, so
it seems quite natural to compare them in
Chris,
I wonder if the following Approval Margins Sort (AMS) is equivalent to
your Approval Margins method:
1. List the alternatives in order of approval with highest approval at the
top of the list.
2. While any adjacent pair of alternatives is out of order pairwise ...
among all such
On 30 Mar 2005 at 10:51 UTC-0800, Forest Simmons wrote:
Chris,
I wonder if the following Approval Margins Sort (AMS) is equivalent to
your Approval Margins method:
1. List the alternatives in order of approval with highest approval at the
top of the list.
2. While any adjacent pair of
On Wed, 30 Mar 2005, Forest Simmons wrote:
Chris,
I wonder if the following Approval Margins Sort (AMS) is equivalent to your
Approval Margins method:
1. List the alternatives in order of approval with highest approval at the
top of the list.
2. While any adjacent pair of alternatives is out
Dear Ted!
You wrote:
Chris Jobst: Please take careful note -- the DMC defeat strength
assertion has not been proved rigorously, to my knowledge! It is
worth a very careful look before basing any other assumptions on it.
The following proves that the only immune candidate is the least
Dear Forest!
You wrote:
I wonder if the following Approval Margins Sort (AMS) is equivalent to
your Approval Margins method:
1. List the alternatives in order of approval with highest approval at
the top of the list.
2. While any adjacent pair of alternatives is out of order pairwise
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2005 01:00:12 +
From: Gervase Lam
Subject: Re: [EM] Sincere methods
If you want something a bit more strategic resistant, Reynaud(Margins)
might be a good step up.
Schulze(Margins) (also known as Cloneproof Schwartz Sequential Dropping
and Beatpath etc...) is possibly
Dear Friends,
Some of you might enjoy looking at this abstract for a talk that Noga
Alon gave at the Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences last night.
http://www.math.nyu.edu/~pach/geom_seminar/spring_2005/alon032905abs.ps
You can find the papers related to this talk on the web at Noga
Markus--
You said:
BeatpathWinner _is_ SSD _is_ CSSD in so far as all of them
share this property:
If p(z)[A,B] p(z)[B,A], then candidate B must be
elected with zero probability.
If you don't agree with this then please post an example
where this is not true.
I reply:
If sharing a property
Forest:
You were the first proponent of the Approval strategy that I call
Better-Than-Expectation. It's certainly one of the best, maybe the best
unless the voter has a strong opinion about 2 frontrunners, or about
whether, for a particular candidate, the threat of someone worse winning is
On Mar 30, 2005, at 02:53, Gervase Lam wrote:
Should I thus read your comment so that you see MinMax (margins) as a
sincere method (the best one, or just one good sincere method) whose
weaknesses with strategic voting can best be patched by using Raynaud
(Margins)?
Roughly speaking yes, but not
Date: Sun, 27 Mar 2005 19:24:00 +0200 (CEST)
From: Kevin Venzke
Subject: [EM] LNHarm performance: CDTT and Schulze
I wrote a simulation to measure the rate of LNHarm failures under
certain circumstances. I've used it to compare a CDTT method,
Schulze(wv), Schulze(margins), and
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