Hello Dave et al,
On Aug 13, 2005, at 06:16, Dave Ketchum wrote:
I __do__ get to express my n x (n-1) / 2 pairwise preferences (part or
all, as I as a voter choose). I just am forced to be consistent. If
I vote AB and BZ, then I have voted AZ. If there is a C for which
I have given no
On the probability that insincerely ranking the two frontrunners max and min, is
optimal voter-strategy in a Condorcet election.
--Warren D. Smith Aug 2005--
MATHEMATICAL MODEL: 3-candidate V-voter Condorcet elections
with random voters (all
On the probability that insincerely ranking the two frontrunners max and min, is
optimal voter-strategy in an IRV (Instant Runoff Votng) election.
--Warren D. Smith Aug 2005--
MATHEMATICAL MODEL: 3-candidate V-voter IRV elections
with random
Warren,
I believe it's safe to say that all deterministic rank methods which disallow
equal ranking must fail the favorite betrayal criterion. You don't have to
prove that for individual rank methods.
You started your message like this:
--- Warren Smith [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
On the
OK, I can see I'm hitting a wall of opposition here. This whole issue is
a red herring (i.e. distraction from my main point) so let us not be
too distracted by it. The central issue which we had started from is the
question of which is better - range voting or Condorcet methods?
So instead of
Thanks to Juho for discussing some details.
While there have to be voters who would be tempted by each, if available,
they share a serious problem, and I will comment on each below. They
complicate the rules:
Voters must understand what is permitted, and what each facility means.
In a message dated 8/13/05, Warren Smith writes:
Given that this is the case, we now can take it to be 100% certain that
Condorcet voting methods will lead to 2-party domination, just like the
flawed plurality system those methods were supposed to fix, and just
like experiemntlly is true
Title: Re: [EM] 0-info approval voting, repeated polling, and adjusting priors
As usual, Jobst has given us lots of food for
thought.
First I would like to compare Joe Weinstein's approval
strategy with its marginal version based on tie probabilities.
The marginal version is to approve
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In a message dated 8/13/05, Warren Smith writes:
Given that this is the case, we now can take it to be 100% certain that
Condorcet voting methods will lead to 2-party domination, just like the
flawed plurality system those methods were supposed to fix, and just
like
Hi Warren,
I'm not following your theorem. Can you give an example of what you are
referring to, showing a set of sincere preferences, followed by a set of
tactical ballots which illustrate your point?
E.g.:
Sincere preferences:
Group 1 - 18 votes: ABC
Group 2 - 18 votes: ACB
Group 3 - 16
Hi Dave,
I think I agree with you on that in normal elections (e.g. presidential
elections) and for normal voters the described additional voting
options are not needed and probably even harmful. The standard rules
(of allowing voters to give one linear list of candidates, maybe
allowing
NOT at all clear that 2-party domination is as evil as some claim.
I claim for Condorcet that it is adequate - CERTAINLY:
Better than Plurality, Approval, IRV, for it lets voters approve of
more than one candidate, and indicate preference among those approved.
Better than those for
In a message dated 8/13/05, Warren Smith writes:
Given that this is the case, we now can take it to be 100% certain that
Condorcet voting methods will lead to 2-party domination, just like the
flawed plurality system those methods were supposed to fix, and just
like experimentally is true
It was recently claimed on EM that condorcet had simpler rules than
range. I dispute that. I challenge people to write computer
programs to perform condorcet and range elections. I have so
far never encountered anybody who produced a shorter program for condorcet.
Not even close.
For any
Shortest computer program is not a criterion that any voter would care
about.
Rules for voters and specification for counting programs are two
different things.
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
] On Behalf Of Warren Smith
Sent: Saturday,
On Sat, 2005-08-13 at 18:48 -0400, Dave Ketchum wrote:
NOT at all clear that 2-party domination is as evil as some claim.
This is a really good point to consider. We probably need to discuss
the specific characteristics of the two-party system we rail about in
order to judge if a system is bad
On Sat, 2005-08-13 at 19:13 -0500, Paul Kislanko wrote:
Shortest computer program is not a criterion that any voter would care
about.
Rules for voters and specification for counting programs are two
different things.
In fairness, the specification for counting votes is something that
Rob Lanphier wrote:
In fairness, the specification for counting votes is something
that voters will probably care about, and it is one of the
biggest liabilities of Condorcet. Part of the uphill battle for
Condorcet advocates is to convince people that even if they don't
understand exactly
On Sun, 14 Aug 2005 01:11:32 +0300 Juho Laatu wrote:
Hi Dave,
I think I agree with you on that in normal elections (e.g. presidential
elections) and for normal voters the described additional voting options
Generally best to ignore US presidential elections, unless your topic
includes
A Summary of the Actions of the CAV Board Meeting of August 12, 2005
The Board of Citizens for Approval Voting (CAV) has decided against
a major reorganization of CAV and Americans for Approval Voting
(AAV). But it has broadened the mission statement to allow other
groups to work with CAV/AAV
On Sat, 13 Aug 2005 17:35:19 -0700 Rob Lanphier wrote:
On Sat, 2005-08-13 at 19:13 -0500, Paul Kislanko wrote:
Shortest computer program is not a criterion that any voter would care
about.
Rules for voters and specification for counting programs are two
different things.
In fairness,
On Sat, 13 Aug 2005, Warren Smith wrote:
I challenge people to write computer programs to perform condorcet and
range elections. I have so far never encountered anybody who produced a
shorter program for condorcet. Not even close.
I find this an interesting point as I have implemented quite
The problem with range voting and other methods that attempt to capture voter
utility is that voters have no incentive not to lie by amplifying their claimed
utility to the maximum extent allowed, causing the method to become approval in
most cases.
If you want voters who understand the system to
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