Hi Mike,
Replies follow on the subject of strategy terms...
Apparently we aren't interested in the same distinctions, that's all.
By the way, I often use the word bury or burial, meaning to vote a
candidate lower than you would if you voted your preferences and didn't
falsify any
Participants,
I've had a request from John Hodges, who used to
subscribe and contribute to EM.
could you ask the EM folk for an evaluation of the
properties of CNTT,QLTD?
That stands for Condorcet(Net) Top Tier,
Quota-Limited Trickle-Down, which means order the
candidates using the QLTD
Dear Mike,
you wrote (27 March 2005):
I told Markus that I was going to define majority
rule soon. My definition of majority wishes is
similar, and I guess that I'd better state that
definition now, instead of being vague about what
I mean by majority wishes and majority rule.
If a
Chris,
--- Chris Benham [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Participants,
I've had a request from John Hodges, who used to
subscribe and contribute to EM.
could you ask the EM folk for an evaluation of the
properties of CNTT,QLTD?
In short, it satisfies Condorcet and Smith but fails everything
Dear Markus,
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I suggest that (for the sake of completeness) you should also
indicate in how many cases ranking the additional candidate A
changed the winner from one of the other unranked candidates
to candidate A.
That will be easy enough to find. The only
Markus,
--- Kevin Venzke [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I don't remember you mentioning this set again. I wonder if that's because the
Smith//Truncation set is not necessarily a subset of the Smith set.
I immediately realize why you might not need to mention the Smith//Truncation
set
again:
I would just like to point out that median rating is to range voting as
Bucklin is to Borda.
This was noted back in the days when we first considered Majority Choice
Approval (Bucklin based on CR ballots of resolution 3), and were exploring
to see if there might be any fruitful generalization
Dear Folks!
Under the working title Democratic Fair Choice, I described on our
Wiki a detailed voting procedure composed from ideas by Forest (most)
and me (some):
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Imagine_Democratic_Fair_Choice
I tried to make it more interesting by writing it as a fictitious
On 26 Mar 2005 at 04:05 UTC-0800, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Hi Juho,
Some replies follow, on the subject of voter strategy and
approval-weighted pairwise. These comments should also be helpful for
others who don't understand why I consider AWP to be clearly better than
DMC and AM.
Hello,
--- [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I suggest that (for the sake of completeness) you should also
indicate in how many cases ranking the additional candidate A
changed the winner from one of the other unranked candidates
to candidate A.
I found these numbers, although I got them by just
On Tue, 29 Mar 2005, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
Dear Folks!
Under the working title Democratic Fair Choice, I described on our
Wiki a detailed voting procedure composed from ideas by Forest (most)
and me (some):
http://wiki.electorama.com/wiki/Imagine_Democratic_Fair_Choice
I tried to make it more
Approval's weakness is that it is vulnerable to media manipulation.
To counteract this we could look at all of the approval winners under all
possible media manipulations, and then choose by random ballot from these.
Less ambitious, but feasible and adequate:
Choose by random ballot from among
Ted, Russ, Forest, James,Juho and others,
I think that Ted's draft public Definite Majority Choice proposal is
excellent, in the sense that anything that might be slightly better
would be more complicated and/or less intuitive.
Two contending methods that use the same style of ballot are James
You said:
Burying means one thing in the context of funereal
services.
I reply:
No, I didn't say that Blake uses burying differently from its usage in
funerals, or even that he uses it differently from its physical meaning. I
said
that he uses it differently from the meaning that it always has,
Hello James and All,
On Mar 26, 2005, at 14:05, James Green-Armytage wrote:
Yes, but you've not yet understood the virtue of cardinal-weighted
pairwise and approval-weighted pairwise. I request that you read my
cardinal pairwise paper, as most of the arguments used therein apply to
AWP as well.
I'd said:
If a majority prefer X to Y, that's a majority pairwise preference (MPP).
The strength of that MPP is measured by the number of voters who prefer X
to Y.
You say:
Well, obviously that's one way to define the strength of a pairwise
defeat. Margins provides another way, and
Markus--
You said:
Then I proposed the following criterion in 1997:
If p(wv)[A,B] V/2 and p(wv)[B,A] V/2,
then candidate B must be elected with zero
probability.
Steve Eppley proposed the following criterion in 2000:
If d[A,B] V/2 and p(wv)[B,A] V/2,
then candidate B must be elected
This isn't complicated:
CR is better received by people than Approval is.
...even if someone tells us that he can't imagine it in use.
If people later realize that the greater resolution is unnecessary, that
would be great. Then they'll switch toi Approval. In the meantime, though,
people are a
Dear Mike,
I wrote (28 March 2005):
Suppose V is the number of voters.
Suppose d[X,Y] is the number of voters who
strictly prefer candidate X to candidate Y.
Suppose p(z)[X,Y] is the strength of the strongest
path from candidate X to candidate Y when the strength
of a pairwise defeat is
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