Thanks to Martin Harper and Craig Layton for valuable critiques.
In particular, Martin is right. The voters should be able to make
distinctions among their unapproved candidates, too.
Here's a more ideal version of a compromise between Condorcet and
Approval, which could be considered a dyadic
One other thing. In a zero information election, start by expressing your
utilities in binary rounded to three binary digits, this takes you
directly to the second representation of the dyadic refined approval
ballot below, bypassing the strategic , , and boundary
calculations.
Forest
On
For this zero information direct utility conversion to work best, all
utilities should be between zero and .99, and after the conversion to
binary, truncate to three binary digits (instead of rounding).
It's hard to say whether this method is more in the spirit of Approval or
the spirit of
I would like to make a suggestion for a multiple winner proportional
method that is as good or better than any I have heard proposed so far,
short of the Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) that Michael Welford and I
proposed several weeks ago. (Full strength PAV would involve checking all
of the
111 ABC
110 DE
101 F
100 GHIJ
011 KLMNOP
010 QRS
001 TUVW
000 XYZ
In the second representation, the score would be the place
of the most significant digit in which the two binary
labels differ.
Oops, this means that there's a whopping difference between
100 and 011, merely because of
If you solve circular ties by Approval, where candidates whom you've
ranked get an Approval vote from you, then you have to worry about
strategy, how far to extend you ranking, even if there's no danger
of anyone using offensive order-reversal strategy. With Condorcet,
in the form of PC,
