Richard Moore wrote:
>
> MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>
> > >I would like to share perhaps the simplest majority-empowered reform over
> > >our current election problems.
> > >
> > >I'll call this system: Unranked-IRV. It works like IRV but doesn't allow
> > >voters to rank preferences, only list them
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
> >I would like to share perhaps the simplest majority-empowered reform over
> >our current election problems.
> >
> >I'll call this system: Unranked-IRV. It works like IRV but doesn't allow
> >voters to rank preferences, only list them like approval, however unlike
> >approv
Dear Friend,
Let me ask you a very straightforward question and before you answer,
think about it for a moment. When you have trouble making ends meet
on today's income, how do you expect to retire and live on less money
than you earn now? Read the question again before you go on - it is a
v
I'm not that fond, in general, of past/fail criterion. Surely it would be
better to know the /extent/ to which a method fails, if it fails.
Qualitative Reverse Symmetry Test
--
Generate a large number of sets of votes, according to some appropriate model
of the electorate. For each of these, dete
Tom, I am curious about something that doesn't quite add up in my mind.
You know about recursive, iterative methods for improving IRV (as well as
other methods).
You agree with me that each iteration is an improvement.
You are aware that with each iteration the method has a greater chance of
pi
Consider the following summary of 90 preference ballots:
40 C > A > B
20 A > B > C
30 B > C > A
IRV gives the win to B. Reverse all of the preferences and IRV still
gives the win to B. However, we cannot fault IRV in this case because
the candidates form a Condorcet cycle: C beats A beats B be
Besides the excellent points made by Anthony I would like to add a couple
of others.
In the second round of a runoff, the voters get to either repeat their
first vote or vote for someone else, all for the same office in the same
election. So if IRV doesn't violate the slogan, then neither does
Ap
On Fri, 23 Mar 2001, Tom Ruen wrote:
> Anthony,
>
> I appreciate your defense for approval. I'm not surrendering full-vote
> Approval as a good concept. I agree with your defense for one vote per
> candidate in approval.
>
> Plurality and approval are different systems and I don't think you c
Anthony Simmons wrote:
> This brought up a question for me. Suppose a
> purely hypothetical Approval election in which
> there are two major parties, with candidates
> Mickey and Goofy. A third party candidate,
> Roadrunner, is very popular, but is not expected
> to win.
>
> Roadrunner voters f
>> From: Tom Ruen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> Subject: Re: [EM] One vote per voter
>> Anthony,
>> I appreciate your defense for approval. I'm
>> not surrendering full-vote Approval as a good
>> concept. I agree with your defense for one
>> vote per candidate in approval.
Well, I'm not sure I was def
>> From: "Tom Ruen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>> Subject: [EM] Election results and analysis:
>> What are your favorite months?
>> Without runoffs, our elections with 3 or more
>> choices often have a "spoiler candidate" where
>> if people vote for a 3rd party favorite, this
>> may help their least f
MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>
> Here's the ballot for that poll:
>
> What method do you designate for determining your Approval votes, for
> the Voter's Choice count?
Approval.
> The first column is for the rank number that you assign. The 2nd
> column is for your Approval vote. The 3rd column is
12 matches
Mail list logo
