By the way, for the mathematically inclined, I think I was mistaken --
I believe the term I meant is Linfinity-normalized. In case I'm still wrong
(it's getting late) I'll clarify this: I mean that the utilities in each set are
shifted to center on the origin and then scaled by a factor equal to
Forest Simmons wrote:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]">In the unlikely case that all candidates are approved by all voters andthere is no "beats all" candidate, then the winner shall be chosen fromthe Smith set by random ballot.Since none of these candidates were disapproved by any voter, all votersshould be
Richard wrote:
Given your SU rankings (A C D B), it strikes me that you are using a
different definition of SU than I am. When I speak of SU, I am referring to
an L1-normalized SU. Does this contradict an accepted definition of SU?
If we calculate SUs according to this method, then we get (D
Dear Mike,
you wrote (18 Apr 2001):
Markus wrote (18 Apr 2001):
Your definition of WDSC looked as follows:
If a majority of all the voters prefer A to B, then they should
have a way of voting that will ensure that B cannot win, without
any member of that majority voting a less-liked
Elections regarding public offices and issues are obviously subjective.
I beat the dead political horse some more --
Desired (liberal, conservative, etc.) Compromise Unacceptable
(conservative, liberal, etc.)
For lots of folks the sequence is reversed.
Determining the *value of each
In my conversations with fellow Greens I've learned that they can live
with non-monotonicity, they can live with elimination of Condorcet
Winners, and they can live with low average social utility.
The one feature that they cannot live with is the spoilage problem. They
don't want ever again to
This is more of a query about Lori Cranor's method than anything else.
If it really gives no strategic incentive for distorting ratings, it
sounds like the ideal way to use CR ballots.
Here's what puzzles me. On the one hand, it seems like any method like Ms
Cranor's that uses CR ballots to
From: Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [EM] IRV Psychology
When you tell them that there are other situations in
which IRV would give them strategic incentives to vote
Gore above Nader, and that Approval would never do that,
they tend to think of those situations as rare, if not
LAYTON Craig wrote:
29DC67DED1118912F87A36500211CB4A@ADD-EX1">The reason I use absolute SU calculations is because absolute utility iswhat is actually important. It is important to note that absolute candiverge significantly from weighted utilities. I am suspicious of theassumption that
I'm nominating Ranked-Pairs(wv). Actually this was probably in the
original nominations list that I apparently inadvertantly lost,
because I thought I was replying to EM when I was just sending an
individual reply.
I nominate RP(wv) because, in spite of not being as good as
Cloneproof SSD, or
WV vs margins:
All along, I've been referring people to the electionmethods website
for the defensive strategy criteria that justify my method arguments.
I might as well restate it here: http://www.electionmethods.org
Two people have pointed out that, though margins has strategy
problems that
RP is nearly as good as Cloneproof SSD. In public elections it
is nearly as good as ordinary SSD.
Here are some differences:
RP can choose outside the initial Schwartz set. SSD Cloneproof SSD
will never do that. Choosing outside the initial Schwartz set isn't
serious. I'm not aware of it
Here's the ballot for the Voting Systems poll. The balloting period
begins tonight, the midnight that ends April 19th in California.
But I hope you check out everyone's latest campaign arguments first.
This a Voter's Choice election. For the final Approval count, you
give an Approval vote to
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