Buddha Buck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
If I had your definition (of voting method) in your language (formal or
not), I might be able to give a definition (to your satisfaction) of what
I consider a voting system to be in the same (or similar
Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I've been thinking about two bit ballot design.
Can anybody think of another combination of symbols with this property,
that they are both easily altered into a common third symbol by a stroke
or two of a pencil?
Well, any symbol that consists of
Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
If I had your definition (of voting method) in your language (formal or
not), I might be able to give a definition (to your satisfaction) of what
I consider a voting system to be in the same (or similar) language, so
that you could, for example, see
Craig Carey [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Subject was: Re: [EM] CR style ballots for Ranked Preferences
At 01.09.26 11:06 -0700 Wednesday, Forest Simmons wrote:
On Tue, 25 Sep 2001, Richard Moore wrote in part:
.. what is Approval but Condorcet forced into
two
Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I'm falling asleep, I'll answer the rest tomorrow...
Pretty good post for a sleepy poster!
Thanks...
Here's a weaker version that might be called the Humble Consistency
Criterion, because it requires methods that don't satisfy the regular CC
Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
On Mon, 24 Sep 2001, Jobst Heitzig wrote:
On 24 Sep 2001, Buddha Buck wrote:
Hmm... I'd love to see an example of this, since I fail to see how it
could happen.
Therefore, the Condorcet Criterion is not
inconsistant.
Sorry
A message on another list reminded me of something -- an old,
well-established psychology paper entitled The Magical Number Seven,
Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing
Information by George A. Miller (The Psychology Review, 1956, vol 63,
pp. 81-97, republished at
At 03:22 PM 09-04-2001 +, Roy wrote:
One implementation would be to have a bit-vector of one bit per
candidate in some predetermined order. When examining a ballot, look
at each candidate and determine which candidates are ahead of her.
Set the bits in the bit vector to represent that, and
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
D- As usual I ask ---
Does ANY choice have a YES majority (46 YES) ???
Impossible to tell from the ballots. IRV doesn't provide that
information. As far as IRV is concerned, that information is not
necessary or useful. As such, I feel that the question is
As a demonstration as to how easy it is to come up with a new election
method, here's a technique that popped into my head in reaction to Roy's
questions concerning elimination ballots and monotonicity. I'm not
claiming that this method is monotonic -- I'm not quite good enough to
prove it
Roy One [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
It's always nice to hear that the strategic case of Range voting
optimizes some desirable quantity, since the strategic case of
Range voting is equivalent to Approval.
Why? It seems to me that strategic voting would
Blake Cretney [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
R On Mon, 6 Aug 2001 12:26:25 -0700 (PDT)
Forest Simmons [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
An ordinary Approval ballot has important relevant information
that cannot be deduced from a preference ballot.
Although a preference ballot may have a greater
At 11:23 PM 07-05-2001 -0700, Richard Moore wrote:
Especially since the rules were in place before the election. I think
Demo's being a bit heavy-handed here.
Actually, I think he's attacking a strawman. Changing ballots and
reporting incorrect vote tallies are of course major election
At 02:27 PM 07-05-2001 -0400, you wrote:
Mr. Schulze wrote in part-
Due to Condorcet, when one eliminates a proposition of
an opinion then one still has an opinion. Therefore, it
is clear that eliminating can only mean inverting.
---
D- As usual, I must note that changing ballots is a major
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
In a message dated 7/5/01 3:42:44 PM, Buddha wrote:
(34:65) Anderson over Cleveland) (*)
***
Or some such. Please point out the election fraud in such a report.
D- The fraud - the rather obvious and blatantly false *Anderson over
Cleveland* conclusion
At 08:23 AM 06-18-2001 -0700, you wrote:
I just wanted to respond to Craig before asking about Borda, Nanson, and
Crosscut methods in my next post (I'm going to call my method the
Crosscut method -- at least until I find out who was the original inventor
-- since it calculates from the top
LAYTON Craig [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
The problem is that step C requires examining every ballot at least
once. If this is a public election, that could require examining and
recounting possibly millions of ballots. With large numbers of candidates,
the number of possible rankings
At 03:35 PM 05-17-2001 -0400, you wrote:
Mr. Schulze wrote in part-
On the other side, Condorcet methods are criticized very frequently
because the winner depends only on the pairwise matrix while
other information is ignored.
--
D- Which is why I suggest an *absolute* YES/NO vote on each choice
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Responding to Buddha Buck ---
Many areas have rotated names on the ballots in various precincts for the
various offices (to reduce the well known *donkey* top of ticket vote) ---
which affects how the ballots would be marked (using whatever method--
*absolute
At 03:00 PM 04-10-2001 -0500, you wrote:
Demorep,
34 ABC
33 BCA
32 CAB
99
By the reasonable assumption that voters put the most energy into their
first rank choice, and lower ranks demonstrate cyclic preferences, I'm
completely willing to abandon majority rule and give victory to A with
Condorcet if there is a candidate that beats all
others in pairwise elections and otherwise use plurality among the top set
of mutually pair-defeatable candidates.
That may be a reasonable method, but I'd like to see it compared to
other Condorcet-based methods.
Tom
From: "Buddha Buck&qu
At 07:32 AM 04-05-2001 -0400, I Like Irving wrote:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 04/05/01
Harper, you wrote: "A ranking of ABCDE does not equate to an approval
vote which approves all five candidates."
Davison: I know this and you know this, but if and when there is ever
MIKE OSSIPOFF [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
First we find out which polling topic wins. Then we take nominations
for options for that topic, and then we between those options.
Yes, the Pizza Toppings nomination specified pizza topping options.
That's good, because it means that if that polling
"MIKE OSSIPOFF" [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I like the idea of a demonstration poll, but voting on which months
are best is difficult, it seems to me. It's something that many
people don't have an opinion on.
If we want to hold a demonstration poll, I suggest that we first
vote on what the
At 11:26 AM 02-15-2001 +1100, you wrote:
Forest,
you wrote:
I would like to see that example. You must have submitted it before my
time.
I posted it only a few days ago, but it was jammed in at the bottom of a
verbose message, so I'm not surprised if people didn't get to it. Here it
is
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