The purpose of this posting is to answer Demorep's concerns (see below)
about the complexity of the Five Slot Ballot, and to advocate another use
for it (simpler than my median method that he refers to) as our best
chance of making Approval psychologically palatable to citizens of the IRV
Forest Simmons wrote:
In any case, if Cranor's method were used in public elections, there
should be a little check box on the ballot that asks if you want your
ballot Cranor optimized or not. If you check yes, then your ballot is
supplemented with the Cranor optimized ballot. The original
You're right, Martin, just like Bush winning when Gore got the popular
vote.
I think that it would be extremely rare that the two winners would be
different; grading pass/fail probably wouldn't change who graduates at
the top of the class. The law of large numbers works for discrete random
Mr. Simmons wrote in part-
Give the win to the candidate with the highest median score, i.e. the
candidate whose list of scores has the highest median.
D- There is more than a minor problem involving public education regarding
*ANY* *complex* reform method.
In other words -- there is a
Yes, I keep coming back to the five slot method too. It really gives ten
choices if you count AB as half way between A and B, and you count no
grade as below F. That should be plenty of choices for any single winner
election.
I'm beginning to like Cranor's method which starts with CR ballots,
