Re: Margins, majority, strategy
> I got my copy of the conclusion of my reply to this letter, and noticed that netcom's mailer has found a new trick: it left my comments out of the letter, probably resulting from one of its garbage-character eruptions. This concludes my reply to this letter. Regrettably I can't delete the intervening lines, so my reply is far down at the bottom of the letter: > I am going to attempt to reply to some of the points Mike has made with > regard to the Margins vs. Votes-Against issue. > > First, I would like to admit that Votes-Against is indeed more > truncation resistant. In effect, it penalizes voters for insincerely > leaving candidates unranked. It also penalizes voters for sincerely > leaving candidates unranked. I think if you really think the harm of > truncation is so great you have to penalize all voters who leave > candidates unranked, it would be more honest to simply ban leaving > candidates unranked, as the Australians do. > > > > Votes-Against fails this criterion because if your sincere preference > > > is A > B=C, it is more likely to your advantage to rate A > B > C or > > > A > C > B. It can back-fire, but the insincere vote is more likely > > > to get you what you want, so unless you have detailed knowledge about > > > how everyone else is voting, the insincere vote is better. > > But that isn't really what I'd call a serious strategy > > dilemma. No one is being strategically forced to do other > > than vote their favorite alone in 1st place. > > > > I don't like it when people have to rank a less-liked alternative > > equal to or over a more-liked one. But if I'm indifferent between > > B & C, and if I estimate that I could benefit by ranking B over > > C, then that doesn't bother me. If I'm indifferent between them > > why should I care if I rank one over the other? > > Well, I guess you could complain that you have been forced to waste your > time unnecessarily filling out a ballot randomly. However, I am more > concerned with the people who do not random-fill than those who do. > > Their votes are not worth as much, for reasons almost everyone would > call unfair. In a sense, I am not so much concerned that people will be > encouraged to random-fill as that many will choose not to. > > > I don't know how meaningful it is to say that Margins > > meets a Sincere Expression Criterion which Votes-Against > > doesn't meet, when Margins requires, as defensive strategy, > > the most extreme forms of insincere expression. And when > > that isn't the case with Votes-Against. > > Actually, its the Sincere EXPECTATION Criterion. In short, it > says that a sincere vote should be justified by its expected result, > assuming no knowledge of how others are voting. Of course, we know that > if a voter knows how others are voting, strategy does play a role. > But should there be strategies even if you have no such knowledge? > > When there are, it should force us to question whether our definition of > a sincere vote matches our method of vote tabulation. Why do we define > voting > 1. A > 2. B C > as a sincere vote for the opinion A > B = C, if either > 1. A > 2. B > 3. C > or > 1. A > 2. C > 3. B > will both on average get better results for this opinion? There have to > be some limits on our ability to arbitrarily define what constitutes a > sincere vote. Votes-Against and Approval are the only methods I know > of with this problem. > > > > I notice that when you say X has a majority over Y, you mean a majority > > > of all voters, not just those expressing a preference between X and Y. > > > So, it is in effect, a three way race between X, Y, and the abstainers. > > > Some people might want to use the word majority to mean a majority of > > > eligible voters, or of the population as a whole, etc. I do not > > > consider any of these uses of "majority" necessarily right or wrong, but > > > > > I tend to use it to mean a majority of those expressing a preference > > > between X and Y. > > > > > In a multicandidate election, the universally-used meaning for > > "majority" is more than half of all of the voters who particpated > > in the election. You can use the word differently, and say > > that Jones has a majority over Smith anytime Jones beats Smith > > pairwise. But the word then has less meaning. And we already > > have terminology for that meaning: pairwise defeat. > > I wonder what you mean by "universally-used". I suspect that many > people will actually be confused by this use of "majority". I know I > was, when I first started reading this list. Certainly all those MPV > advocates who say that the winning candidate gets a majority in the > final round are implicitly assuming my use of the word majority. Not > that MPV advocates are always right, but since there are so many of > them, I would consider their opinion before considering something as > universally accepted. To me, it seems natural to view those people who > do not express a preference be
Re: Margins, majority, strategy
> > I am going to attempt to reply to some of the points Mike has made with > regard to the Margins vs. Votes-Against issue. > > First, I would like to admit that Votes-Against is indeed more > truncation resistant. In effect, it penalizes voters for insincerely > leaving candidates unranked. It also penalizes voters for sincerely > leaving candidates unranked. I think if you really think the harm of > truncation is so great you have to penalize all voters who leave > candidates unranked, it would be more honest to simply ban leaving > candidates unranked, as the Australians do. > > > > Votes-Against fails this criterion because if your sincere preference > > > is A > B=C, it is more likely to your advantage to rate A > B > C or > > > A > C > B. It can back-fire, but the insincere vote is more likely > > > to get you what you want, so unless you have detailed knowledge about > > > how everyone else is voting, the insincere vote is better. > > But that isn't really what I'd call a serious strategy > > dilemma. No one is being strategically forced to do other > > than vote their favorite alone in 1st place. > > > > I don't like it when people have to rank a less-liked alternative > > equal to or over a more-liked one. But if I'm indifferent between > > B & C, and if I estimate that I could benefit by ranking B over > > C, then that doesn't bother me. If I'm indifferent between them > > why should I care if I rank one over the other? > > Well, I guess you could complain that you have been forced to waste your > time unnecessarily filling out a ballot randomly. However, I am more > concerned with the people who do not random-fill than those who do. > > Their votes are not worth as much, for reasons almost everyone would > call unfair. In a sense, I am not so much concerned that people will be > encouraged to random-fill as that many will choose not to. > > > I don't know how meaningful it is to say that Margins > > meets a Sincere Expression Criterion which Votes-Against > > doesn't meet, when Margins requires, as defensive strategy, > > the most extreme forms of insincere expression. And when > > that isn't the case with Votes-Against. > > Actually, its the Sincere EXPECTATION Criterion. In short, it > says that a sincere vote should be justified by its expected result, > assuming no knowledge of how others are voting. Of course, we know that > if a voter knows how others are voting, strategy does play a role. > But should there be strategies even if you have no such knowledge? > > When there are, it should force us to question whether our definition of > a sincere vote matches our method of vote tabulation. Why do we define > voting > 1. A > 2. B C > as a sincere vote for the opinion A > B = C, if either > 1. A > 2. B > 3. C > or > 1. A > 2. C > 3. B > will both on average get better results for this opinion? There have to > be some limits on our ability to arbitrarily define what constitutes a > sincere vote. Votes-Against and Approval are the only methods I know > of with this problem. > > > > I notice that when you say X has a majority over Y, you mean a majority > > > of all voters, not just those expressing a preference between X and Y. > > > So, it is in effect, a three way race between X, Y, and the abstainers. > > > Some people might want to use the word majority to mean a majority of > > > eligible voters, or of the population as a whole, etc. I do not > > > consider any of these uses of "majority" necessarily right or wrong, but > > > > > I tend to use it to mean a majority of those expressing a preference > > > between X and Y. > > > > > In a multicandidate election, the universally-used meaning for > > "majority" is more than half of all of the voters who particpated > > in the election. You can use the word differently, and say > > that Jones has a majority over Smith anytime Jones beats Smith > > pairwise. But the word then has less meaning. And we already > > have terminology for that meaning: pairwise defeat. > > I wonder what you mean by "universally-used". I suspect that many > people will actually be confused by this use of "majority". I know I > was, when I first started reading this list. Certainly all those MPV > advocates who say that the winning candidate gets a majority in the > final round are implicitly assuming my use of the word majority. Not > that MPV advocates are always right, but since there are so many of > them, I would consider their opinion before considering something as > universally accepted. To me, it seems natural to view those people who > do not express a preference between two candidates as not participating > in the simulated vote between them. So, a candidate can have a majority > in the simulated vote just by beating the other side. > > But of course, this is just a semantic argument. The real argument is > whether a pairwise victory where the winning side constitutes a majority > of all voters should always take precedenc
Re: Margins, majority, strategy
> Sorry, but I've found out that deleting lines is much slower than spacing down in the letter, and I usually don't get to the part I'm replying to before netcom has its problem. And so I've got to return to spacing down. Each installment replies to a different part of this letter, farther down: > I am going to attempt to reply to some of the points Mike has made with > regard to the Margins vs. Votes-Against issue. > > First, I would like to admit that Votes-Against is indeed more > truncation resistant. In effect, it penalizes voters for insincerely > leaving candidates unranked. It also penalizes voters for sincerely > leaving candidates unranked. I think if you really think the harm of > truncation is so great you have to penalize all voters who leave > candidates unranked, it would be more honest to simply ban leaving > candidates unranked, as the Australians do. > > > > Votes-Against fails this criterion because if your sincere preference > > > is A > B=C, it is more likely to your advantage to rate A > B > C or > > > A > C > B. It can back-fire, but the insincere vote is more likely > > > to get you what you want, so unless you have detailed knowledge about > > > how everyone else is voting, the insincere vote is better. > > But that isn't really what I'd call a serious strategy > > dilemma. No one is being strategically forced to do other > > than vote their favorite alone in 1st place. > > > > I don't like it when people have to rank a less-liked alternative > > equal to or over a more-liked one. But if I'm indifferent between > > B & C, and if I estimate that I could benefit by ranking B over > > C, then that doesn't bother me. If I'm indifferent between them > > why should I care if I rank one over the other? > > Well, I guess you could complain that you have been forced to waste your > time unnecessarily filling out a ballot randomly. However, I am more > concerned with the people who do not random-fill than those who do. > > Their votes are not worth as much, for reasons almost everyone would > call unfair. In a sense, I am not so much concerned that people will be > encouraged to random-fill as that many will choose not to. > > > I don't know how meaningful it is to say that Margins > > meets a Sincere Expression Criterion which Votes-Against > > doesn't meet, when Margins requires, as defensive strategy, > > the most extreme forms of insincere expression. And when > > that isn't the case with Votes-Against. > > Actually, its the Sincere EXPECTATION Criterion. In short, it > says that a sincere vote should be justified by its expected result, > assuming no knowledge of how others are voting. Of course, we know that > if a voter knows how others are voting, strategy does play a role. > But should there be strategies even if you have no such knowledge? > > When there are, it should force us to question whether our definition of > a sincere vote matches our method of vote tabulation. Why do we define > voting > 1. A > 2. B C > as a sincere vote for the opinion A > B = C, if either > 1. A > 2. B > 3. C > or > 1. A > 2. C > 3. B > will both on average get better results for this opinion? There have to > be some limits on our ability to arbitrarily define what constitutes a > sincere vote. Votes-Against and Approval are the only methods I know > of with this problem. > > > > I notice that when you say X has a majority over Y, you mean a majority > > > of all voters, not just those expressing a preference between X and Y. > > > So, it is in effect, a three way race between X, Y, and the abstainers. > > > Some people might want to use the word majority to mean a majority of > > > eligible voters, or of the population as a whole, etc. I do not > > > consider any of these uses of "majority" necessarily right or wrong, but > > > > > I tend to use it to mean a majority of those expressing a preference > > > between X and Y. > > > > > In a multicandidate election, the universally-used meaning for > > "majority" is more than half of all of the voters who particpated > > in the election. You can use the word differently, and say > > that Jones has a majority over Smith anytime Jones beats Smith > > pairwise. But the word then has less meaning. And we already > > have terminology for that meaning: pairwise defeat. > > I wonder what you mean by "universally-used". I suspect that many > people will actually be confused by this use of "majority". I know I > was, when I first started reading this list. Certainly all those MPV > advocates who say that the winning candidate gets a majority in the > final round are implicitly assuming my use of the word majority. Not > that MPV advocates are always right, but since there are so many of > them, I would consider their opinion before considering something as > universally accepted. To me, it seems natural to view those people who > do not express a preference between two candidates as not participating > in the simulated vote betw
Re: Margins, majority, strategy
> I'm replying farther down in this letter, a different part in each installment: > I am going to attempt to reply to some of the points Mike has made with > regard to the Margins vs. Votes-Against issue. > > First, I would like to admit that Votes-Against is indeed more > truncation resistant. In effect, it penalizes voters for insincerely > leaving candidates unranked. It also penalizes voters for sincerely > leaving candidates unranked. I think if you really think the harm of > truncation is so great you have to penalize all voters who leave > candidates unranked, it would be more honest to simply ban leaving > candidates unranked, as the Australians do. > > > > Votes-Against fails this criterion because if your sincere preference > > > is A > B=C, it is more likely to your advantage to rate A > B > C or > > > A > C > B. It can back-fire, but the insincere vote is more likely > > > to get you what you want, so unless you have detailed knowledge about > > > how everyone else is voting, the insincere vote is better. > > But that isn't really what I'd call a serious strategy > > dilemma. No one is being strategically forced to do other > > than vote their favorite alone in 1st place. > > > > I don't like it when people have to rank a less-liked alternative > > equal to or over a more-liked one. But if I'm indifferent between > > B & C, and if I estimate that I could benefit by ranking B over > > C, then that doesn't bother me. If I'm indifferent between them > > why should I care if I rank one over the other? > > Well, I guess you could complain that you have been forced to waste your > time unnecessarily filling out a ballot randomly. However, I am more > concerned with the people who do not random-fill than those who do. > > Their votes are not worth as much, for reasons almost everyone would > call unfair. In a sense, I am not so much concerned that people will be > encouraged to random-fill as that many will choose not to. > > > I don't know how meaningful it is to say that Margins > > meets a Sincere Expression Criterion which Votes-Against > > doesn't meet, when Margins requires, as defensive strategy, > > the most extreme forms of insincere expression. And when > > that isn't the case with Votes-Against. > > Actually, its the Sincere EXPECTATION Criterion. In short, it > says that a sincere vote should be justified by its expected result, > assuming no knowledge of how others are voting. Of course, we know that > if a voter knows how others are voting, strategy does play a role. > But should there be strategies even if you have no such knowledge? > > When there are, it should force us to question whether our definition of > a sincere vote matches our method of vote tabulation. Why do we define > voting > 1. A > 2. B C > as a sincere vote for the opinion A > B = C, if either > 1. A > 2. B > 3. C > or > 1. A > 2. C > 3. B > will both on average get better results for this opinion? There have to > be some limits on our ability to arbitrarily define what constitutes a > sincere vote. Votes-Against and Approval are the only methods I know > of with this problem. Exactly what problem do you refer to? The need for insincere voting? I've showed that Margins requires degrees of insincere voting not even required by Approval. Approval offers half as much as Votes-Against, in terms of strategic guarantees. Margins offers nothing, and, unlike Approval, can require voting a less-liked alternative over your favorite. But there'll never be agreement among all the types of rank-count theorists that Approval is a good compromise--no reason to expect their various theories to agree on anything. But Approval is veryk easy to ask for, an un-arbitray, being merely a big but obvious improvement on Plurality. done > > > > I notice that when you say X has a majority over Y, you mean a majority > > > of all voters, not just those expressing a preference between X and Y. > > > So, it is in effect, a three way race between X, Y, and the abstainers. > > > Some people might want to use the word majority to mean a majority of > > > eligible voters, or of the population as a whole, etc. I do not > > > consider any of these uses of "majority" necessarily right or wrong, but > > > > > I tend to use it to mean a majority of those expressing a preference > > > between X and Y. > > > > > In a multicandidate election, the universally-used meaning for > > "majority" is more than half of all of the voters who particpated > > in the election. You can use the word differently, and say > > that Jones has a majority over Smith anytime Jones beats Smith > > pairwise. But the word then has less meaning. And we already > > have terminology for that meaning: pairwise defeat. > > I wonder what you mean by "universally-used". I suspect that many > people will actually be confused by this use of "majority". I know I > was, when I first started reading this list. Certainly all those MPV > advocates who say th
Re: Margins, majority, strategy
> Replying farther down in this letter: > I am going to attempt to reply to some of the points Mike has made with > regard to the Margins vs. Votes-Against issue. > > First, I would like to admit that Votes-Against is indeed more > truncation resistant. In effect, it penalizes voters for insincerely > leaving candidates unranked. It also penalizes voters for sincerely > leaving candidates unranked. I think if you really think the harm of > truncation is so great you have to penalize all voters who leave > candidates unranked, it would be more honest to simply ban leaving > candidates unranked, as the Australians do. > > > > Votes-Against fails this criterion because if your sincere preference > > > is A > B=C, it is more likely to your advantage to rate A > B > C or > > > A > C > B. It can back-fire, but the insincere vote is more likely > > > to get you what you want, so unless you have detailed knowledge about > > > how everyone else is voting, the insincere vote is better. > > But that isn't really what I'd call a serious strategy > > dilemma. No one is being strategically forced to do other > > than vote their favorite alone in 1st place. > > > > I don't like it when people have to rank a less-liked alternative > > equal to or over a more-liked one. But if I'm indifferent between > > B & C, and if I estimate that I could benefit by ranking B over > > C, then that doesn't bother me. If I'm indifferent between them > > why should I care if I rank one over the other? > > Well, I guess you could complain that you have been forced to waste your > time unnecessarily filling out a ballot randomly. However, I am more > concerned with the people who do not random-fill than those who do. > > Their votes are not worth as much, for reasons almost everyone would > call unfair. In a sense, I am not so much concerned that people will be > encouraged to random-fill as that many will choose not to. > > > I don't know how meaningful it is to say that Margins > > meets a Sincere Expression Criterion which Votes-Against > > doesn't meet, when Margins requires, as defensive strategy, > > the most extreme forms of insincere expression. And when > > that isn't the case with Votes-Against. > > Actually, its the Sincere EXPECTATION Criterion. In short, it > says that a sincere vote should be justified by its expected result, > assuming no knowledge of how others are voting. Of course, we know that > if a voter knows how others are voting, strategy does play a role. > But should there be strategies even if you have no such knowledge? There shouldn't, but it isn't a serious problem, compared to the failures & violations permitted by Margins. But of course what's important to you could easily, & not wrongly, be different from what's important to me. So, to you, Margins' violations might be less serious. The issue of choosing a rank-balloting count rule can be a hopeless mess when different people want different things. I suggest that the extremelyk simple Approval rule is the answer then. Sure, various types of rank-count theorists will say that according to their standards Approval isn't good enough. Sure, and neither are the other rank-methods either. But Approval has something that none of the rank-methods have: Simplicity, extreme ease of implementation, and being nothing other than Plurality done right, rather than a completely new method based on a controversial new theory. done > > When there are, it should force us to question whether our definition of > a sincere vote matches our method of vote tabulation. Why do we define > voting > 1. A > 2. B C > as a sincere vote for the opinion A > B = C, if either > 1. A > 2. B > 3. C > or > 1. A > 2. C > 3. B > will both on average get better results for this opinion? There have to > be some limits on our ability to arbitrarily define what constitutes a > sincere vote. Votes-Against and Approval are the only methods I know > of with this problem. > > > > I notice that when you say X has a majority over Y, you mean a majority > > > of all voters, not just those expressing a preference between X and Y. > > > So, it is in effect, a three way race between X, Y, and the abstainers. > > > Some people might want to use the word majority to mean a majority of > > > eligible voters, or of the population as a whole, etc. I do not > > > consider any of these uses of "majority" necessarily right or wrong, but > > > > > I tend to use it to mean a majority of those expressing a preference > > > between X and Y. > > > > > In a multicandidate election, the universally-used meaning for > > "majority" is more than half of all of the voters who particpated > > in the election. You can use the word differently, and say > > that Jones has a majority over Smith anytime Jones beats Smith > > pairwise. But the word then has less meaning. And we already > > have terminology for that meaning: pairwise defeat. > > I wonder what you mean by "universally-used". I suspect
Re: Margins, majority, strategy
> My reply is a little farther down in this letter. No time to delete the parts I'm not replying to, since I must finish before the keyboard freezes-up. > I am going to attempt to reply to some of the points Mike has made with > regard to the Margins vs. Votes-Against issue. > > First, I would like to admit that Votes-Against is indeed more > truncation resistant. In effect, it penalizes voters for insincerely > leaving candidates unranked. It also penalizes voters for sincerely > leaving candidates unranked. I think if you really think the harm of > truncation is so great you have to penalize all voters who leave > candidates unranked, it would be more honest to simply ban leaving > candidates unranked, as the Australians do. > > > > Votes-Against fails this criterion because if your sincere preference > > > is A > B=C, it is more likely to your advantage to rate A > B > C or > > > A > C > B. It can back-fire, but the insincere vote is more likely > > > to get you what you want, so unless you have detailed knowledge about > > > how everyone else is voting, the insincere vote is better. > > But that isn't really what I'd call a serious strategy > > dilemma. No one is being strategically forced to do other > > than vote their favorite alone in 1st place. > > > > I don't like it when people have to rank a less-liked alternative > > equal to or over a more-liked one. But if I'm indifferent between > > B & C, and if I estimate that I could benefit by ranking B over > > C, then that doesn't bother me. If I'm indifferent between them > > why should I care if I rank one over the other? > > Well, I guess you could complain that you have been forced to waste your > time unnecessarily filling out a ballot randomly. However, I am more > concerned with the people who do not random-fill than those who do. > > Their votes are not worth as much, for reasons almost everyone would > call unfair. In a sense, I am not so much concerned that people will be > encouraged to random-fill as that many will choose not to. I fully admit that VA has the property, which we'd all rather avoid, that, with no knowledge of the other voters' votes, one can sometimes gain by insincere extension, and can't lose by it. But, as I've repeatedly said, all methods have undesired properties, and we have to choose which we'll accept. The problem you refer to is quite trivial compared to the gross LO2E problem, which, as I said, dominates so many voters here. done > > > I don't know how meaningful it is to say that Margins > > meets a Sincere Expression Criterion which Votes-Against > > doesn't meet, when Margins requires, as defensive strategy, > > the most extreme forms of insincere expression. And when > > that isn't the case with Votes-Against. > > Actually, its the Sincere EXPECTATION Criterion. In short, it > says that a sincere vote should be justified by its expected result, > assuming no knowledge of how others are voting. Of course, we know that > if a voter knows how others are voting, strategy does play a role. > But should there be strategies even if you have no such knowledge? > > When there are, it should force us to question whether our definition of > a sincere vote matches our method of vote tabulation. Why do we define > voting > 1. A > 2. B C > as a sincere vote for the opinion A > B = C, if either > 1. A > 2. B > 3. C > or > 1. A > 2. C > 3. B > will both on average get better results for this opinion? There have to > be some limits on our ability to arbitrarily define what constitutes a > sincere vote. Votes-Against and Approval are the only methods I know > of with this problem. > > > > I notice that when you say X has a majority over Y, you mean a majority > > > of all voters, not just those expressing a preference between X and Y. > > > So, it is in effect, a three way race between X, Y, and the abstainers. > > > Some people might want to use the word majority to mean a majority of > > > eligible voters, or of the population as a whole, etc. I do not > > > consider any of these uses of "majority" necessarily right or wrong, but > > > > > I tend to use it to mean a majority of those expressing a preference > > > between X and Y. > > > > > In a multicandidate election, the universally-used meaning for > > "majority" is more than half of all of the voters who particpated > > in the election. You can use the word differently, and say > > that Jones has a majority over Smith anytime Jones beats Smith > > pairwise. But the word then has less meaning. And we already > > have terminology for that meaning: pairwise defeat. > > I wonder what you mean by "universally-used". I suspect that many > people will actually be confused by this use of "majority". I know I > was, when I first started reading this list. Certainly all those MPV > advocates who say that the winning candidate gets a majority in the > final round are implicitly assuming my use of the word majority. Not > that MPV advocates
Re: Margins, majority, strategy
> This reply to Blake's recent letter will, again, have to be in short installments, due to the problem with netcom. And it would be inadvisable to take the time to delete the parts of the message that I haven't gotten to yet, and so, at the end of my reply, I'll have a line that just says "done'. > I am going to attempt to reply to some of the points Mike has made with > regard to the Margins vs. Votes-Against issue. > > First, I would like to admit that Votes-Against is indeed more > truncation resistant. In effect, it penalizes voters for insincerely > leaving candidates unranked. It also penalizes voters for sincerely > leaving candidates unranked. I think if you really think the harm of > truncation is so great you have to penalize all voters who leave > candidates unranked, it would be more honest to simply ban leaving > candidates unranked, as the Australians do. > VA penalizes truncators? What we have here is a difference in terminology. What I call avoiding majority rule violations and avoiding forcing people to use drastic defensive strategy, when truncation occurs, you call "penalizing truncators". I penalize burglars by having a lock on my door. You might penalize scateboarders by having a fence so that they won't scateboard into your flower-garden. And I'd penalize truncators by not letting them cause the violations & LO2E problems I described. But ask yourself if they're actually losing anything that you can really claim is rightfully theirs in those examples. done > > > Votes-Against fails this criterion because if your sincere preference > > > is A > B=C, it is more likely to your advantage to rate A > B > C or > > > A > C > B. It can back-fire, but the insincere vote is more likely > > > to get you what you want, so unless you have detailed knowledge about > > > how everyone else is voting, the insincere vote is better. > > But that isn't really what I'd call a serious strategy > > dilemma. No one is being strategically forced to do other > > than vote their favorite alone in 1st place. > > > > I don't like it when people have to rank a less-liked alternative > > equal to or over a more-liked one. But if I'm indifferent between > > B & C, and if I estimate that I could benefit by ranking B over > > C, then that doesn't bother me. If I'm indifferent between them > > why should I care if I rank one over the other? > > Well, I guess you could complain that you have been forced to waste your > time unnecessarily filling out a ballot randomly. However, I am more > concerned with the people who do not random-fill than those who do. > > Their votes are not worth as much, for reasons almost everyone would > call unfair. In a sense, I am not so much concerned that people will be > encouraged to random-fill as that many will choose not to. > > > I don't know how meaningful it is to say that Margins > > meets a Sincere Expression Criterion which Votes-Against > > doesn't meet, when Margins requires, as defensive strategy, > > the most extreme forms of insincere expression. And when > > that isn't the case with Votes-Against. > > Actually, its the Sincere EXPECTATION Criterion. In short, it > says that a sincere vote should be justified by its expected result, > assuming no knowledge of how others are voting. Of course, we know that > if a voter knows how others are voting, strategy does play a role. > But should there be strategies even if you have no such knowledge? > > When there are, it should force us to question whether our definition of > a sincere vote matches our method of vote tabulation. Why do we define > voting > 1. A > 2. B C > as a sincere vote for the opinion A > B = C, if either > 1. A > 2. B > 3. C > or > 1. A > 2. C > 3. B > will both on average get better results for this opinion? There have to > be some limits on our ability to arbitrarily define what constitutes a > sincere vote. Votes-Against and Approval are the only methods I know > of with this problem. > > > > I notice that when you say X has a majority over Y, you mean a majority > > > of all voters, not just those expressing a preference between X and Y. > > > So, it is in effect, a three way race between X, Y, and the abstainers. > > > Some people might want to use the word majority to mean a majority of > > > eligible voters, or of the population as a whole, etc. I do not > > > consider any of these uses of "majority" necessarily right or wrong, but > > > > > I tend to use it to mean a majority of those expressing a preference > > > between X and Y. > > > > > In a multicandidate election, the universally-used meaning for > > "majority" is more than half of all of the voters who particpated > > in the election. You can use the word differently, and say > > that Jones has a majority over Smith anytime Jones beats Smith > > pairwise. But the word then has less meaning. And we already > > have terminology for that meaning: pairwise defeat. > > I wonder what you mean by "universall
Re: Margins, majority, strategy
Mr. Cretneys posting of Sep 22, 1998 shows again why I suggest a YES/NO vote be done for all executive, judicial and issue (laws, constitutional amendments) choices along with number votes. Only the choices getting a YES majority of ALL the voters would go head to head using the number votes (e.g. minority YES choices due to truncated votes automatically would lose). Anybody who thinks that laws should be passed in legislative bodies by a minority of the members of the body is dangerously anti-democratic (e.g. a bill supposedly *passes* by 2 YES to 1 NO with 97 members not voting (i.e. truncating) --- what a joke !). How about having the voters vote 2 ballots -- a *sincere* ballot and an *insincere* ballot (that exploits the election method's defect(s)) ? Or even more *insincere* ballots -- insincere ballot A (based on strategy A), insincere ballot B (based on strategy B), etc. ? I note again that (1) thanks to Mr. Arrow that ALL election methods with 3 or more choices have defects and (2) there will be polling (in free countries). Once upon a time the *common law* on various subjects (such as murder, robbery, assault, etc.) was *common enough* to be known by average illiterate folks. Byzantine *New Age* election reform methods are not needed (noting that one of the dictionary definitions of Byzantine is *resembling the government or politics of the Byzantine Empire in structure, spirit, etc.; specif. characterized by complexity, deviousness, intrigue, etc.*).
Re: Margins, majority, strategy
I am going to attempt to reply to some of the points Mike has made with regard to the Margins vs. Votes-Against issue. First, I would like to admit that Votes-Against is indeed more truncation resistant. In effect, it penalizes voters for insincerely leaving candidates unranked. It also penalizes voters for sincerely leaving candidates unranked. I think if you really think the harm of truncation is so great you have to penalize all voters who leave candidates unranked, it would be more honest to simply ban leaving candidates unranked, as the Australians do. > > Votes-Against fails this criterion because if your sincere preference > > is A > B=C, it is more likely to your advantage to rate A > B > C or > > A > C > B. It can back-fire, but the insincere vote is more likely > > to get you what you want, so unless you have detailed knowledge about > > how everyone else is voting, the insincere vote is better. > But that isn't really what I'd call a serious strategy > dilemma. No one is being strategically forced to do other > than vote their favorite alone in 1st place. > > I don't like it when people have to rank a less-liked alternative > equal to or over a more-liked one. But if I'm indifferent between > B & C, and if I estimate that I could benefit by ranking B over > C, then that doesn't bother me. If I'm indifferent between them > why should I care if I rank one over the other? Well, I guess you could complain that you have been forced to waste your time unnecessarily filling out a ballot randomly. However, I am more concerned with the people who do not random-fill than those who do. Their votes are not worth as much, for reasons almost everyone would call unfair. In a sense, I am not so much concerned that people will be encouraged to random-fill as that many will choose not to. > I don't know how meaningful it is to say that Margins > meets a Sincere Expression Criterion which Votes-Against > doesn't meet, when Margins requires, as defensive strategy, > the most extreme forms of insincere expression. And when > that isn't the case with Votes-Against. Actually, its the Sincere EXPECTATION Criterion. In short, it says that a sincere vote should be justified by its expected result, assuming no knowledge of how others are voting. Of course, we know that if a voter knows how others are voting, strategy does play a role. But should there be strategies even if you have no such knowledge? When there are, it should force us to question whether our definition of a sincere vote matches our method of vote tabulation. Why do we define voting 1. A 2. B C as a sincere vote for the opinion A > B = C, if either 1. A 2. B 3. C or 1. A 2. C 3. B will both on average get better results for this opinion? There have to be some limits on our ability to arbitrarily define what constitutes a sincere vote. Votes-Against and Approval are the only methods I know of with this problem. > > I notice that when you say X has a majority over Y, you mean a majority > > of all voters, not just those expressing a preference between X and Y. > > So, it is in effect, a three way race between X, Y, and the abstainers. > > Some people might want to use the word majority to mean a majority of > > eligible voters, or of the population as a whole, etc. I do not > > consider any of these uses of "majority" necessarily right or wrong, but > > > I tend to use it to mean a majority of those expressing a preference > > between X and Y. > > In a multicandidate election, the universally-used meaning for > "majority" is more than half of all of the voters who particpated > in the election. You can use the word differently, and say > that Jones has a majority over Smith anytime Jones beats Smith > pairwise. But the word then has less meaning. And we already > have terminology for that meaning: pairwise defeat. I wonder what you mean by "universally-used". I suspect that many people will actually be confused by this use of "majority". I know I was, when I first started reading this list. Certainly all those MPV advocates who say that the winning candidate gets a majority in the final round are implicitly assuming my use of the word majority. Not that MPV advocates are always right, but since there are so many of them, I would consider their opinion before considering something as universally accepted. To me, it seems natural to view those people who do not express a preference between two candidates as not participating in the simulated vote between them. So, a candidate can have a majority in the simulated vote just by beating the other side. But of course, this is just a semantic argument. The real argument is whether a pairwise victory where the winning side constitutes a majority of all voters should always take precedence over a pairwise victory where it does not. I think it is a big stretch to believe that this is a direct result of the principle of Majority Rule, as you imply. > A genuine majority has the powe
Re: Margins, majority, strategy
> Blake writes: > > I have made some comments on your example. > On Mon, 14 Sep 1998 23:05:24 Mike Ositoff wrote: > > > >Hi-- > > > >When I posted 2 Margins truncation bad-examples the other day, > >I didn't accompany them with any comment, and so I'd like > >to point out a few things about them. > > > >In both examples, the A voters, by truncating, succeeded in > >gaining the election of A, by defeating a Condorcet winner, > >in violation of the expressed wishes of a majority. > > > >In example 1, Margins, by electing A, elected the only > >candidate with a majority against him. > I notice that when you say X has a majority over Y, you mean a majority > of all voters, not just those expressing a preference between X and Y. > So, it is in effect, a three way race between X, Y, and the abstainers. > Some people might want to use the word majority to mean a majority of > eligible voters, or of the population as a whole, etc. I do not > consider any of these uses of "majority" necessarily right or wrong, but > I tend to use it to mean a majority of those expressing a preference > between X and Y. In a multicandidate election, the universally-used meaning for "majority" is more than half of all of the voters who particpated in the election. You can use the word differently, and say that Jones has a majority over Smith anytime Jones beats Smith pairwise. But the word then has less meaning. And we already have terminology for that meaning: pairwise defeat. A genuine majority has the power to get whatever its members all want. They should be able to do so without insincere voting. When they need insincere voting to get a result that they all want, I call that "defensive strategy". The need for extreme degrees of defensive strategy is very undesirable. When it's necessary to insincerely rank a less-liked alternative equal to or over a more-liked one I call that "drastic defensive strategy". As I said, that's what we don't like about FPTP (1-Vote-Plurality). Obviously, when the more-liked of those 2 is your favorite, that's even worse. And when it's necessary to rank a less-liked alternative _over_ your favorite--can a method get any worse than that? (I've deleted the parts of my earlier message that weren't replied-to). > >Example 3: > > > >100 voters. > > > > 44 28 28 > > A B C > > C B > > > >The A voters are using order-reversal against B. It succeeds, > >using Margins, but is thwarted, in the votes-against versions, > >by the B voters declining to list a 2nd choice. > > I do not think your example is very realistic. It assumes that > B voters have no preference between A and C. For example, if the I made no such assumption. Maybe the B voters are using the non-drastic defensive strategy of truncation, to thwart possible order-reversal by A voters or C voters. >[If the] true preferences were > > 44 A B C > 14 B C A > 14 B A C > 28 C B A > > The insincere would be > 44 A C B -- order reversal > 14 B C A > 14 B -- defensive truncation > 28 C B A > > That is, I think it more likely that B voters will have preferences > between A and C. If this is the case, and the B voters who prefer > A to C truncate, this can have the effect of order reversal. So, the > B voters are not likely quite as helpless as you suggest, even under > Margins. > In Votes-Against, the defensive truncation thwarts order-reversal, but not in Margins. In Votes-Against, if offensive order-reversal isn't tried, and if there's a Condorcet winner, then no one has any need for _any_ defensive strategy, not even defensive truncation. But in Margins, even if some voters truncate, maybe with strategic intentions, maybe just out of laziness or feelings of principle--in Margins that truncation can force the use of the drastic defensive strategy of ranking a less-liked alternative over a more-liked one. > Furthermore, if they truly have no preference between A and C, then > they will not mind ranking C over A, if A is trying order > reversal. This is unlikely to even be insincere. B voters will > be genuinely outraged by A's tactics. Look what you're saying the B voters would have to do to defend against order-reversal. The defense that they have in Margins is just the general pairwise defensive strategy. Whereas in Votes-Against, they can defeat the truncation by merely not voting for A or B, in Margins they have to vote the other extreme over the extreme whose voters they expect to use order-reversal. For 1 thing, maybe they don't know which extreme will try order-reversal. Also, anytime defensive strategy requires you to insincerely raise someone in your ranking, that can give away the election when you misjudge and do so when you didn't need to. That's the trouble with drastic defensive strategy. In a public election, if you organized the B voters to vote C in 2nd place, whether sincerely or not, do you think that the C voters wouldn't hear about that? You'd be setting B up for offensive strategy by
Re: Margins, majority, strategy
> > > Votes-Against fails this criterion because if your sincere preference > is A > B=C, it is more likely to your advantage to rate A > B > C or > A > C > B. It can back-fire, but the insincere vote is more likely > to get you what you want, so unless you have detailed knowledge about > how everyone else is voting, the insincere vote is better. But that isn't really what I'd call a serious strategy dilemma. No one is being strategically forced to do other than vote their favorite alone in 1st place. I don't like it when people have to rank a less-liked alternative equal to or over a more-liked one. But if I'm indifferent between B & C, and if I estimate that I could benefit by ranking B over C, then that doesn't bother me. If I'm indifferent between them why should I care if I rank one over the other? Votes-against, & the GMC criterion are for avoiding the much worse strategic problems I've named. > > So, why is violating SEC a problem? > 1. It divides voters into the naive vs. those who know how to play the > system. The votes of those who know the trick will be worth more. > 2. It is embarrassing. Eventually campaign organizers will start to > inform voters about the random preferences strategy. Voters will feel > that they were deceived in elections where they left candidates unranked > and will be embittered towards the method. Furthermore, many will dislike > the idea that they are being encouraged to vote randomly, and suspect that > this will cause random results. > 3. It encourages voters to think strategically. Once voters are inured > to the idea that a sincere vote is sometimes a bad idea, and that > random preferences should be marked, they will be more likely to > accept other strategies like order-reversal. > 4. Eventually, when everybody knows about the trick, and nobody sincerely > leaves candidates unranked, the method will be equivalent to Margins, with > the exception of the ability to use truncation for some complicated > strategies. No question about it: There's no perfect method. To get complianced with one criterion you have to accept noncompliance with other criteria. Any method will do undesirable things, things that we'd prefer that it not do. We simply have to choose which we consider worse. The extreme kinds of defensive strategy that Margins forces seem worse to me than the temptation that Blake has described, for voters in Votes-Against, to try a little offensive strategy by expressing a preference between two alternative between which the voter is indifferent. I'm going to mail this now, & subsequently reply to the 2nd part. Mike > > > > -== Sent via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==- > http://www.dejanews.com/ Easy access to 50,000+ discussion forums > >
Re: Margins, majority, strategy
> > Simple Approval voting is defective. If number votes were being used, a > Condorcet winner can lose using simple Approval votes. > > Simple Approval voting is defective because it fails to distinguish among > choices using number votes. So Approval is defective because it isn't rank-balloting? If, to you, rank-balloting is absolutely essential, then, for you, Approval won't do. Again, you have a right to whatever standards you believe in, and they aren't wrong, though they differ from mine. But it isn't clear to me what you mean when you say that a method is defective. Not as good as some other method? Of course. I've always asserted that Approval isn't as good as the votes-against Condorcet versions we've discussed. Or inadequate in some absolute sense? That depends on what you want. Look, Demorep, the best rank-balloting count rules, for all practical purposes, guarantee that you won't have strategic reason to rank a less-liked alternative equal to or over a more-liked one. Approval guarantees that you'll never have strategic reason to rank a less-liked alternative over a more-liked one. Therefore I claim that Approval is fully half as good as the best rank-methods, in regards to strategic guarantees. *** But it seems to me that, when it comes to the actual democratic benefit gotten from that guarantee, Approval is much more than half as good as the best rank-methods. I claim that, just having the guarantee that Approval offers would bring tremendous benefit, with respect to voter freedom of expression, ability of candidates to enter the race without fear of being spoilers, etc. Adding the further benefit of rank-balloting would be better still, and of course I'd rather have one of our best rank-methods. But the democratic benefit of the simple & modest Approval reform would be nearly as good. > Simple Condorcet voting is defective because it fails to have a YES majority > Approval-type vote on each choice. You're using that word "defective" quite freely. What you mean is that Condorcet without Y/N voting isn't acceptable to you. There are many times when we have to vote between several alternatives. Absolute Y/N votes aren't really meaningful in that kind of election (though they'd be fun). It's a _relative_ choice. > The range of choices are-- > desired compromise opposed > > The desired choices of minorities will lose using YES/NO votes. The > compromise choices of such minorities will move up using the number votes. > Probably a compromise choice will be a Condorcet winner. > > I note again that laws get passed by YES majorities in legislative bodies -- > and not by YES minorities. I fail to see why YES majorities should not be > required in a single winner election method to elect executive and judicial > officers. Let's not use current practices as a justification. > > Mr. Ossipoff apparently thinks that voting YES on one or more compromise > choices along with one's desired choice(s) is somehow bad. I would suggest As I said, when you add Y/N voting you add a strategy problem. You complicate a method that otherwise has simple strategy, an and you add strategy problem to methods that are otherwise virtually strategy-free. Further, it complicates the count rule, and can cause embarrassment when it vetoes all of the candidates. I talked about that in the letter to which you're replying. > > How many real public elections will have 3 or more choices getting YES > majorities (such as Kennedy, Carter, Clinton or Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan or > Kennedy, Clinton, Reagan) with such 3 or more choices in a circular tie ? If you like Nader better than Clinton, do you give Clinton a strategy "Yes" because you need him? Or maybe a strategic "No" because you believe that Nader can win, and you want to eliminate a rival. We don't need problems like that. > > Mike
Re: Margins, majority, strategy
In order to argue in favor of marginal Condorcet, I am going to suggest a standard that it passes, but Votes-Against fails. Sincere Expectation Standard Given that a voter has no knowledge about how others will vote, a sincere vote must be at least as likely as any insincere vote to give results that are in some way better in the eyes of the voter. Or expressed as a more rigid criterion: - Sincere Expectation Criterion (SEC) Consider a voter with a preference order between the possible outcomes of the election. Let us call his sincere ballot, X. Now, assuming that every possible legal ballot is equally likely for every other voter, there must be some justification for the vote X over any other way to fill out the ballot, which I will call Y. This justification is given by the following comparisons: The probability of X electing one of the voter's first choices vs. the probability of Y electing one of these choices The probability of X electing one of the voter's first or second choices vs. the probability of Y electing one of these. The probability of X electing one of the voter's first, second or third choices vs. the probability of Y electing one of these. ... And so on through all the voter's choices X must either do better in one of these comparisons than Y, or equal in all. Otherwise the sincere vote can not be justified. In other words, there must be some justification for voting sincerely even if the voter does not know how any one else is voting. Votes-Against fails this criterion because if your sincere preference is A > B=C, it is more likely to your advantage to rate A > B > C or A > C > B. It can back-fire, but the insincere vote is more likely to get you what you want, so unless you have detailed knowledge about how everyone else is voting, the insincere vote is better. So, why is violating SEC a problem? 1. It divides voters into the naive vs. those who know how to play the system. The votes of those who know the trick will be worth more. 2. It is embarrassing. Eventually campaign organizers will start to inform voters about the random preferences strategy. Voters will feel that they were deceived in elections where they left candidates unranked and will be embittered towards the method. Furthermore, many will dislike the idea that they are being encouraged to vote randomly, and suspect that this will cause random results. 3. It encourages voters to think strategically. Once voters are inured to the idea that a sincere vote is sometimes a bad idea, and that random preferences should be marked, they will be more likely to accept other strategies like order-reversal. 4. Eventually, when everybody knows about the trick, and nobody sincerely leaves candidates unranked, the method will be equivalent to Margins, with the exception of the ability to use truncation for some complicated strategies. I have made some comments on your example. On Mon, 14 Sep 1998 23:05:24 Mike Ositoff wrote: > >Hi-- > >When I posted 2 Margins truncation bad-examples the other day, >I didn't accompany them with any comment, and so I'd like >to point out a few things about them. > >In both examples, the A voters, by truncating, succeeded in >gaining the election of A, by defeating a Condorcet winner, >in violation of the expressed wishes of a majority. > >In example 1, Margins, by electing A, elected the only >candidate with a majority against him. I notice that when you say X has a majority over Y, you mean a majority of all voters, not just those expressing a preference between X and Y. So, it is in effect, a three way race between X, Y, and the abstainers. Some people might want to use the word majority to mean a majority of eligible voters, or of the population as a whole, etc. I do not consider any of these uses of "majority" necessarily right or wrong, but I tend to use it to mean a majority of those expressing a preference between X and Y. > >That sort of thing is predictable for a method that ignores >majority wishes by not scoring by how many people rank the >defeater over the defeated. > >To defend against that result, the C voters would have to vote >B equal to C, insincerely voting a less-liked alternative equal >to a more-liked one. A form of drastic defensive strategy. > >*** > >Example 3: > >100 voters. > > 44 28 28 > A B C > C B > >The A voters are using order-reversal against B. It succeeds, >using Margins, but is thwarted, in the votes-against versions, >by the B voters declining to list a 2nd choice. I do not think your example is very realistic. It assumes that B voters have no preference between A and C. For example, if the true preferences were 44 A B C 14 B C A 14 B A C 28 C B A The insincere would be 44 A C B -- order reversal 14 B C A 14 B -- defensive truncation 28 C B A That is, I think it more likely that B voters will have preferences between A and C. If this is the case, and the B voters who prefer A to C truncate, this can have
RE: Margins, majority, strategy
Simple Approval voting is defective. If number votes were being used, a Condorcet winner can lose using simple Approval votes. Example- each vote is an approval vote 51 ABC 45 BC 3 CA Approval votes- A 54 B 96 C 99 C wins using Approval. A has a first choice majority and is an automatic Condorcet winner if number votes were being used. The A candidate, using pre-election poll results, would obviously try to get his/her 51 supporters to truncate in an Approval voting election. Simple Approval voting is defective because it fails to distinguish among choices using number votes. Simple Condorcet voting is defective because it fails to have a YES majority Approval-type vote on each choice. Thus, I have suggested that there should be both a YES/NO vote and the use of number votes. The range of choices are-- desired compromise opposed The desired choices of minorities will lose using YES/NO votes. The compromise choices of such minorities will move up using the number votes. Probably a compromise choice will be a Condorcet winner. I note again that laws get passed by YES majorities in legislative bodies -- and not by YES minorities. I fail to see why YES majorities should not be required in a single winner election method to elect executive and judicial officers. Mr. Ossipoff apparently thinks that voting YES on one or more compromise choices along with one's desired choice(s) is somehow bad. I would suggest that the mythical average voter (i.e. all voters) can survive OK by voting YES on his/her desired and compromise choices and number voting his/her desired choices ahead of his/her compromise choices. How many real public elections will have 3 or more choices getting YES majorities (such as Kennedy, Carter, Clinton or Eisenhower, Nixon, Reagan or Kennedy, Clinton, Reagan) with such 3 or more choices in a circular tie ?
