Charlie DeTar wrote:
Howdy,
I'm on the board of a small non-profit, and have been tasked with
revising the portion of the bylaws that defines how to elect the board
of directors. Having had some exposure to better election methods
through a colleague, I'm interested in exploring how we might
Brandon Wiley wrote:
While I think Range Voting would work great here, if for some reason it
doesn't go over (sometimes people think it seems complicated) then
Approval Voting would also be very easy to use. Again just rank
candidates by number of approvals and take the top X.
Both bloc
James Green-Armytage wrote:
Dear Election Methods Fans,
I've been working on a paper entitled Four Condorcet-Hare hybrid
methods for single-winner elections, which I'd like to submit to Voting
Matters sometime in the near future, and I'd really appreciate your
comments and feedback.
Here
Another way to elect a variable number of seats is to use Monroe's method.
Here's the overview for a fixed number of winners, N. Every voter gives
every candidate a score on a numeric scale. Then we find the optimal way to
choose the N winners AND divide up the voters equally and assign them to
On Sat, Feb 19, 2011 at 5:21 AM, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no wrote:
Brandon Wiley wrote:
While I think Range Voting would work great here, if for some reason it
doesn't go over (sometimes people think it seems complicated) then Approval
Voting would also be very easy to
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Sam 19.2.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no a
écrit :
Some other observations: it seems that adding a Smith
constraint (Smith, or Smith//) limits the vulnerability to
compromising, and that having the base method satisfy LNHarm
greatly limits
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Sam 19.2.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no a
écrit :
Some other observations: it seems that adding a Smith
constraint (Smith, or Smith//) limits the vulnerability to
compromising, and that having the base method satisfy LNHarm
As far as iterative methods go, I like RRV. It seems to be the natural way
to extend the divisor methods to work with range-style inputs.
But I feel like the combinatorial methods will give better proportionality
than iterative methods. If there are lots of candidates, the best
four-winner set
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Sam 19.2.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no a
écrit :
Well actually it's LNHelp that gives you immunity to
burial. (DSC, QR, and
MMPO are vulnerable in varying ways.) And sadly it
seems to me that the desirability of having other voters
doubt
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Sam 19.2.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no a
écrit :
It also seems possible to bury using Bucklin. Say that your
sincere preference is A B C D, and that B
wins in the second round, but if you could somehow keep B
from winning, then A would win
2011/2/19 Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no
Kevin Venzke wrote:
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Sam 19.2.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm
km-el...@broadpark.no a écrit :
Some other observations: it seems that adding a Smith
constraint (Smith, or Smith//) limits the vulnerability to
Hi Kristofer,
--- En date de : Sam 19.2.11, Kristofer Munsterhjelm km-el...@broadpark.no a
écrit :
However, if the method passes
LNHarm, then, to quote Woodall's definition, adding a later
preference should not harm any candidate already listed. In
other words, because later ranks can't harm
Hi Kristofer,
Thank you very much for the thoughtful comments. Some replies follow.
Kristofer wrote:
?Regarding most strategies being burial or compromising: I seem to recall
that in your previous paper, that was the case for most methods, but not
for Hare (IRV) and top-two runoff. For the
Dear election methods fans,
After reading the last few messages on this topic, my feeling is that
immunity to burying should be its own criterion. I?m not quite sure
what the relationship is to later-no-help and later-no-harm, but it
doesn?t seem like it?s quite equivalent to either of
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