Re: [EM] (MA-1) A medium of communicative assent

2008-09-24 Thread Raph Frank
On 9/24/08, Michael Allan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 True, the translation barrier (from open to secret ballots) is another
  protection.  It's partial.  On its own, it cannot protect an open vote
  from purchase for its signalling value (like a paid endorsement, or a
  meeting stuffed with a paid audience).  And it cannot protect norms,
  which are acted on by a different pathway.  The fallback defence for
  these is recasting.

Right, it is like currently, where control of the nomination process
is powerful, even if it doesn't control the voters.

 You are thinking of using approval/range voting to provide an
  indicator of compromise *paths*?  Interesting.  It might be useful,
  especially for norms.  Knowing that 2 candidate norms A and B *shared*
  assent (many approving of both) would reveal an opportunity to create
  a variant C that somehow combined the content of A and B.  Assent
  might then shift to C.  (It need not be a compromise document,
  technically speaking.  If A and B are mutually compatible, then C
  might be purely an aggregate.)

True.

Also, lower level clients could approve multiple proxies.  The end
result might be that to many proposals are approved.

  It might be less useful for official elections, like for executives.
  The only way to combine executive candidates A and B would be for
  them to vote for each other as a team.  Usually a team cannot occupy a
  single office.  They occupy a power structure, usually with a clear
  chain of command.

Well, candidate C might be the compromise.

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Re: [EM] (MA-1) A medium of communicative assent

2008-09-22 Thread Raph Frank
On 9/20/08, Michael Allan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  Variant acts may be proposed.  Variant acts are acts that differ from
  the originally proposed act.  When a variant act is proposed, the
  participants do not gain another vote to cast.  Instead they gain a
  choice of which act to cast their vote for.

I wonder if approval vote might be better here.  Approval gives a
better indication of concensus than plurality.

Perhaps both would be helpful.  Plurality shows the support for a
specific proposal, but approval shows potential compromise options.

   [9] A secret ballot is a defence against vote buying because it
  prevents the buyer from verifying compliance.  The voter may take
  the money, then vote as she pleases.  This makes it a poor
  investment.

  It will also be a poor investment when the vote is recastable, as in
  a delegate cascade.  The vote might be public and compliance might be
  verified, but there is no guarantee of continued compliance.  The
  voter may take the money from one side, then shift her vote and take
  it from the other.

Also, if the system is just for communication and doesn't have the
final say on things, then the secret ballot can still be used for
final ratification.

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[EM] (MA-1) A medium of communicative assent

2008-09-20 Thread Michael Allan
(Draft section 1 of A medium of assent for the support of large scale
communicative action.) http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/theory.xht

Communicative assent is the expression of agreement, particularly of
agreement that arises from discussion.  I describe a medium in which
communicative assent is formalized through voting.  The voting
mechanism is a delegate cascade that is open to recasting.  In a
delegate cascade, a delegate is any participant who both receive
votes (like a candidate), and casts a vote of her own (like a voter).
But when a delegate casts a vote, it carries with it those received.
And so on...  Passing from delegate to delegate, the votes flow
together and gather in volume - they cascade - like raindrops down the
branches of a tree.^[4]

FIGURE 1.  Cascades in tree form.  The measure of assent for each
participant is the quantity of votes currently received (circled
number).  Vote flow is depicted by arrows, with volume shown for
each.  The votes flow together until they pool at the bottom
(red), where they are held by the leading candidates.  (The
depiction is unrealistic.  Actual cascades would likely be
bushier, with perhaps 5-20 voters per candidate on average.)

http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/_/cascade.png

Every participant has a single vote.  She may either cast it or
withold it.  If she casts it, she may cast it for anyone.  There are
no pre-declared candidates.  All participants are eligible to receive
votes.  All non-participants are also eligible.  A non-participant who
receives a vote is thereby made a participant.

Votes are open to recasting.  If a voter changes her mind about a
candidate, she is free to withdraw her vote, or to recast it for
another candidate.  Polls are intended to remain open indefinitely,
year round, with the votes shifting as new information becomes
available to the voters.  There is never a final result that cannot be
undone by recasting.

Votes are public.  There are no secret ballots.  For every vote that
is cast, the identities of the voter and the candidate are visible.
Anyone may trace the flow of a vote from its original caster, through
all intermediate delegates, to the final candidate who holds it.^[9]

Assent for each candidate is measured as the quantity of votes
received (circled numbers in figures 1 and 2).  Note that a single
vote may be received by multiple delegates before it is received by
the final candidate.  As each delegate or candidate receives the vote,
her measure of assent is incremented.  When the vote finally reaches
the candidate from whom it can flow no further, it is held by that
candidate.  The total of votes held by a candidate (red numbers) has
no bearing on the measure of assent.

The typical structure of a delegate cascade is a tree.  As shown in
figure 1 (above), it has a single candidate at the root; voters at the
leaves (top); and delegates among the branches in between.  The
general structure however is a cyclic graph, as shown here in figure
2.

FIGURE 2.  Cyclic cascade.  Depicts a cascade that has formed into
a nearly perfect ring structure.  A single voter outside of the
ring has injected a vote.  It carries nearly full circle until it
comes to rest with a candidate who consequently holds two votes
(bottom left).  Nevertheless the assent within the ring is equal,
at 6 for each candidate.

http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/_/cascade-cyclic.png

A vote never actually cycles.  It flows through every candidate
exactly once, but stops before it encounters a candidate for a second
time.  It then remains held where it is.  Consequently assent is
equalized in a cycle.  A vote also stops before it encounters its
original caster.  Consequently a vote for oneself has no effect.

FIGURE 3.  Tight cycles.  The tightest cycle is actually between
two voters (left).  A cycle with a single voter (right) is a null
cycle, equivalent to a withheld vote.

http://zelea.com/project/votorola/d/_/cascade-cyclic-tight.png

Assent is an expression of agreement.  Assent is formalized in the
medium by casting a vote.  The vote is cast for the person who best
represents the thing agreed to.  Of all the things that might be ageed
to, I wish to consider only acts.  For example, Juanita may propose to
build a sandbox for children in the neighbourhood park.  Samantha may
formally express her agreement to that act by voting for Juanita.

A person has a single vote for every act that could possibly be
proposed.  If Juanita also proposes that Rajiv should be appointed as
Park Superintendent, then Samantha could vote for Juanita on this act,
too.  The two votes - one to build the sandbox, and one to appoint
Rajiv - would have no formal connection to each other.  They would be
cast in separate elections, so to speak.

Variant acts may be proposed.  Variant acts are acts that differ from
the originally proposed act.  When a variant act is proposed, the