Re: [EM] (MA-2) Societal institution of communicative action
Raph Frank wrote: It might also be worth discussing possible renormalisation of votes here to cancel out participation bias. Also, it might be worth adding in actual participation bias in the final election. OK. This would mean that if a segment of the population tends to vote, then this could be reflected in one of the results. Yes. It'll be interesting to compare those results side by side. The second requirement is that the voters must faithfully carry their votes over to the principal polls on election day (step 2)... Also, this protects against corruption of the system. If voters vote due to intimidation or vote buying, then they can still vote the other direction in the final election. Like a safety valve. Under pressure it doesn't break. It fails gracefully. OTOH, there is risk of people defecting. One of the first things that the person elected in such a way might do is change the basic election system so that people are more likely to vote in the same direction as the original communication system. You mean like gerrymandering? Exploiting the voting patterns in the open system? I guess you're right, that's a vulnerablity. It might work in either direction too, for or against the open voters (equally bad in either case). A good system for the final vote might be plurality, but requiring that the winner have 50% or more. If the plurality winner doesn't get 50%+, then a new election must be held. This encourages pre-election pacts. I do not consider changes to state electoral systems (where the final votes occur). I leave that to you experts... The medium of assent can never have a final vote, of course. People are always free to change their minds. So there has to be a kind of slip-clutch between the lifeworld and the state system (if only for that reason). Have you considered the possibility of using encryption to allow anonymous participation. The Chaum digital cash scheme could be used. Each voter could register for 1 digital 'coin'. This coin then allows them to register a user ID. (In practice, Chaum's system may not be required as there would be no offline trading of the coins and also coins would only be handled once, i.e. you withdraw the coin using your public name and then deposit it against your anonymous ID). The coin might give some basic info about the person - age/gender/location. This would allow renormalisation of the polls which keeping identities secret. The advantage is thet some people might not want to admit their political views publically. They would then vote differently in the secret ballot than in the public communication system, which weakens the system. Or many of them will not bother to participate at all. That's another advantage to a secret ballot: higher turnout. A potential problem would be that it allows direct vote selling as votes would be completely transferrable, you could just send your 'coin' to another person. A protection against this would be to reissue the coins every so often (say every 3 months). A sold coin would only last that long. My design strategy (long term) is to allow all methods of authentication. Currently I have only the full disclosure (open cast) method of authentication. But if anyone wanted to design and code a PK-encryption method, I think the architecture will be open to it. My plan is to have a separate, quarantined count for every different kind of vote (open cast, encrypted coin, etc.). People can then choose which count (or combination of counts) they wish to trust. So we can experiment with different methods of authentication and not risk the overall credibility of the system. Any particular method that proved untrustworthy would simply be devalued by the public - much like a currency floating on international exchange markets. -- Michael Allan Toronto, 647-436-4521 http://zelea.com/ Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] (MA-2) Societal institution of communicative action
On 9/25/08, Michael Allan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Raph Frank wrote: It might also be worth discussing possible renormalisation of votes here to cancel out participation bias. Also, it might be worth adding in actual participation bias in the final election. OK. It also has the advantage that it encourages voters turnout in the main election. For example, if the last election was 4 years ago, then the turnout estimate for the 22-25 age group might be determined (at least partly) by the turnout for the 18-21 group in the last election (as they are 4 years older now). Also, this protects against corruption of the system. If voters vote due to intimidation or vote buying, then they can still vote the other direction in the final election. Like a safety valve. Under pressure it doesn't break. It fails gracefully. Right. You mean like gerrymandering? Exploiting the voting patterns in the open system? I guess you're right, that's a vulnerablity. It might work in either direction too, for or against the open voters (equally bad in either case). Not necessarily. For example, if the election system was plurality, then winning at the open voting system gives the person a big boost, as he becomes part of the top 2. OTOH, if the election system was condorcet, then it would be less important to win the open voting 'primary'. Another possibility would be PR by single non-transferrable vote. Again, this gives an advantage to groups who can coordinate outside the system. However, if that is a good or bad idea is open to question. The medium of assent can never have a final vote, of course. Agreed. Have you considered the possibility of using encryption to allow anonymous participation to encourage people to turnout) Or many of them will not bother to participate at all. That's another advantage to a secret ballot: higher turnout. True, in fact, that is more likely to be the response. My design strategy (long term) is to allow all methods of authentication. Currently I have only the full disclosure (open cast) method of authentication. But if anyone wanted to design and code a PK-encryption method, I think the architecture will be open to it. And ofc, individual proxies could also handle use it to decide if they want to do authentication that way. So we can experiment with different methods of authentication and not risk the overall credibility of the system. Any particular method that proved untrustworthy would simply be devalued by the public - much like a currency floating on international exchange markets. Great. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] (MA-2) Societal institution of communicative action
On 9/21/08, Michael Allan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: To compete effectively, however, it must meet two requirements: 1) sufficient voter turnout in the medium; and 2) faithful carriage of votes from the medium to the principal polls. First of all, its voter turnout must be high enough to indicate solid electoral support for the leading candidates. It need not equal the levels of principal turnout, nor perhaps even primary turnout, but it ought to be high enough that the candidates could extrapolate the results, and accurately gauge their support among the wider electorate. It might also be worth discussing possible renormalisation of votes here to cancel out participation bias. Also, it might be worth adding in actual participation bias in the final election. This would mean that if a segment of the population tends to vote, then this could be reflected in one of the results. The second requirement is that the voters must faithfully carry their votes over to the principal polls on election day (step 2). They would have to translate assent from a communicative medium to a mass medium. Figure 7 shows what is involved in the translation. From the perspective of the voter, she recalls the name of the candidate who currently holds her vote in the cascade (a name she knows well enough, or her delegate reminds her) and then she casts a vote for that same candidate at the principal polling station. Also, this protects against corruption of the system. If voters vote due to intimidation or vote buying, then they can still vote the other direction in the final election. OTOH, there is risk of people defecting. One of the first things that the person elected in such a way might do is change the basic election system so that people are more likely to vote in the same direction as the original communication system. A good system for the final vote might be plurality, but requiring that the winner have 50% or more. If the plurality winner doesn't get 50%+, then a new election must be held. This encourages pre-election pacts. Have you considered the possibility of using encryption to allow anonymous participation. The Chaum digital cash scheme could be used. Each voter could register for 1 digital 'coin'. This coin then allows them to register a user ID. (In practice, Chaum's system may not be required as there would be no offline trading of the coins and also coins would only be handled once, i.e. you withdraw the coin using your public name and then deposit it against your anonymous ID). The coin might give some basic info about the person - age/gender/location. This would allow renormalisation of the polls which keeping identities secret. The advantage is thet some people might not want to admit their political views publically. They would then vote differently in the secret ballot than in the public communication system, which weakens the system. A potential problem would be that it allows direct vote selling as votes would be completely transferrable, you could just send your 'coin' to another person. A protection against this would be to reissue the coins every so often (say every 3 months). A sold coin would only last that long. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
