[EM] Range-Approval hybrid
Yet another version of this Approval Strong Sincere Defense, Range method occurs to me: uses ratings ballots with more available slots than there are candidates and on each ballot interpret the highest empty slot as the approval threshold. This is simpler than my previous automatic version which on each ballot interpreted rating above mean as approval, but can still use the same type of ballot as highish-resolution Range/Score/CR. Chris Benham Chris Benham wrote: I have an idea for a FBC complying method that I think is clearly better than the version of Range Voting (aka Average Rating or Cardinal Ratings) defined and promoted by CRV. http://rangevoting.org/ I suggest that voters use multi-slot ratings ballots that have the bottom slots (at least 2 and not more than half) clearly labelled as expressing disapproval and all others as expressing Approval. The default rating is the bottom-most. Compute each candidate X's Approval score and also Approval Opposition score (the approval score of the most approved candidate on ballots that don't approve X). All candidates whose approval score is exceeded by their approval opposition (AO) score are disqualified. Elect the undisqualified candidate that is highest ordered by Average Rating. I suggest many fewer slots than 99 and no no opinion option, so I think the resulting method is not more complex for voters. Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (Monday, 29 September, 2008): One way of making it less complex would be to have a cardinal ratings (Range) ballot with both positive and negative integers. The voter rates every candidate, and those candidates that get below zero points are considered disapproved, while those that get above zero are considered approved. This idea doesn't specify where those rated at zero (or those not rated at all) would appear. CB: Thinking about this method idea more, as a practical proposition either a very simple way of handling the zero on a scale that includes negative and positive numbers or not having a zero would be better. One tidy relatively simple version would use a A B C | D E F graded ballot with ABC shown on the ballot as taken to signify approved or acceptable and DEF not. This could perhaps be promoted as Graded Approval. My technical name for the method is I suppose Approval Strong Minimal Defense, CR. Chris Benham Make the switch to the world#39;s best email. Get Yahoo!7 Mail! http://au.yahoo.com/y7mail Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Range-Approval hybrid
Kristofer Munsterhjelm: Normalization could be used if required, with either the voter specifying absolutely worst and absolutely best (setting the range), or by the lowest and highest rated candidate having those positions. So if a voter wants to say that he likes all the candidates, but some are better than others, he could vote all positive integers, whereas a McCain/Obama/Clinton voter could vote McCain less than zero and the other two greater than zero. With normalization, the contribution of A: 1 pts. B: -1 pts. to the raw scores would be the same as A: 3 pts. B: 1 pt. but would have a different effect regarding the approval component (only A approved in the first case, both approved in the second). Chris Benham: I don't think I'm that keen on normalization, but I don't really object to 'automating' the approval cutoff, so that ballots are interpreted as approving the candidates they rate above the mean of the ratings they've given (and half-approving those exactly at that mean). I can imagine that others would object on various grounds, and the US voting reform enthusiasts who like FBC-complying methods like Range and Approval generally seem to prefer their voting methods to have 'manual transmission'. Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote (Wednesday, 1 October, 2008): The advantage of having zero set the boundary between approved and disapproved, instead of the mean doing so, is that you could express a general favor (or dislike) of politicians. For instance, if you think only one person's mostly decent and the rest are all corrupt (but some are more corrupt than others), you could vote the favored candidate above zero and the others below zero, whereas above mean would include some of the corrupt candidates as well. CB: I don't see why it would. If the voter max rates her favourite and gives all the other candidates a much lower, near or absolute bottom rating then the 'automated' version will only approve her favourite. KM: I can understand that some would prefer the ballot to have, to use your own words, a manual transmission, but I think the concept of an explicit approval cutoff would be confusing to most. With the boundary at 0, you can just say, implicitly, give those who you like points, and take points away from those you don't like. When Approval voting has better strategies than plain commonsense approval, that's going to be a suboptimal strategy, but hopefully the voters are going to be mostly honest so that that's not much of a problem. CB: With Approval cutoffs my basic assumption is that voters will be strategic and I'm happy for them to be so. I generally like to try to minimise the advantage of good strategists over poor ones and non-strategists, so I'm not interested in expanding voters' options to use poor strategy. Chris Benham Make the switch to the world#39;s best email. Get Yahoo!7 Mail! http://au.yahoo.com/y7mail Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Range-Approval hybrid
Chris Benham wrote: I have an idea for a FBC complying method that I think is clearly better than the version of Range Voting (aka Average Rating or Cardinal Ratings) defined and promoted by CRV. http://rangevoting.org/ I suggest that voters use multi-slot ratings ballots that have the bottom slots (at least 2 and not more than half) clearly labelled as expressing disapproval and all others as expressing Approval. The default rating is the bottom-most. Compute each candidate X's Approval score and also Approval Opposition score (the approval score of the most approved candidate on ballots that don't approve X). All candidates whose approval score is exceeded by their approval opposition (AO) score are disqualified. Elect the undisqualified candidate that is highest ordered by Average Rating. I suggest many fewer slots than 99 and no no opinion option, so I think the resulting method is not more complex for voters. One way of making it less complex would be to have a cardinal ratings (Range) ballot with both positive and negative integers. The voter rates every candidate, and those candidates that get below zero points are considered disapproved, while those that get above zero are considered approved. This idea doesn't specify where those rated at zero (or those not rated at all) would appear. Normalization could be used if required, with either the voter specifying absolutely worst and absolutely best (setting the range), or by the lowest and highest rated candidate having those positions. So if a voter wants to say that he likes all the candidates, but some are better than others, he could vote all positive integers, whereas a McCain/Obama/Clinton voter could vote McCain less than zero and the other two greater than zero. With normalization, the contribution of A: 1 pts. B: -1 pts. to the raw scores would be the same as A: 3 pts. B: 1 pt. but would have a different effect regarding the approval component (only A approved in the first case, both approved in the second). Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Range-Approval hybrid
I have an idea for a FBC complying method that I think is clearly better than the version of Range Voting (aka Average Rating or Cardinal Ratings) defined and promoted by CRV. http://rangevoting.org/ I suggest that voters use multi-slot ratings ballots that have the bottom slots (at least 2 and not more than half) clearly labelled as expressing disapproval and all others as expressing Approval. The default rating is the bottom-most. Compute each candidate X's Approval score and also Approval Opposition score (the approval score of the most approved candidate on ballots that don't approve X). All candidates whose approval score is exceeded by their approval opposition (AO) score are disqualified. Elect the undisqualified candidate that is highest ordered by Average Rating. I suggest many fewer slots than 99 and no no opinion option, so I think the resulting method is not more complex for voters. This method would work much better than normal RV in avoiding a split-vote problem in a '2 sub-factions confront a big faction' scenario (such as Obama and Clinton versus McCain). In this method if Obama and Clinton supporters all approve both candidates and not McCain, then if there are more of them voting than McCain supporters McCain must be disqualified, so Obama and Clinton can compete with each other more meaningfully and with much less risk of a McCain win. Minor party supporters can make approval distinction between the front-runners and then rate their sincere favourites exclusive-top with very little added risk (compared with rating their preferred front-runner equal-top) of allowing their greater evil candidate to win. It meets a sort of Approval Strong Minimal Defense that says that if more voters approve X and not Y than approve Y, Y can't win. And a sort of Approval Majority for Solid Coalitions that says that if more than half the voters rank/rate a subset S of candidates above all others, and approve all the members of S and none of the non-members, then the winner must come from S. (This of course is only worth mentioning because the voters supporting the S candidates can still make meaningful preference distinctions among them, unlike in plain Approval.) Like normal Range it clearly meets Favourite Betrayal, because if X wins with some voters insincerely down-rating Y, then if Y is raised to the top slot alongside X; X will still be qualified (because X's approval score will not be reduced and X's AO score can only be reduced), no non-XY candidate can have a reduced PO score so no previously disqualified non-XY candidate will become undisqualified; and of course only Y's Average Ratings score will be changed so if there is a new winner it can only be Y. Like normal Range and unlike methods such as Bucklin, it meets Independence from Irrelevant Ballots (IIB). This wouldn't be the case if the rule regarding the approvals specified for example that candidates need to be disapproved by a majority to be disqualified. I can't see that this method fails any desirable criterion that normal Range meets. Comments? Chris Benham Make the switch to the world#39;s best email. Get Yahoo!7 Mail! http://au.yahoo.com/y7mail Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
