Dear Steve Eppley,
the following criterion has been discussed several
times in the Election Methods mailing list:
Suppose a majority of the voters prefers candidate A
to candidate B. Then candidate B must not be elected,
unless there is a sequence of candidates from
candidate B to
At 08:13 AM 7/5/2013, Jameson Quinn wrote:
IMC seems to me to be too narrow to be a general criterion, if only
one custom-built voting system passes it. WIMC is an interesting
refinement of Condorcet and Smith. But neither belongs on Wikipedia
without a reliable citation.
2013/7/5
IMC seems to me to be too narrow to be a general criterion, if only one
custom-built voting system passes it. WIMC is an interesting refinement of
Condorcet and Smith. But neither belongs on Wikipedia without a reliable
citation.
Jameson
2013/7/5 sepp...@alumni.caltech.edu
FairVote wrote
On 07/05/2013 02:47 PM, sepp...@alumni.caltech.edu wrote:
Only one voting method satisfies IMC: Maximize Affirmed Majorities (MAM).
Can other methods satisfy IMC too, or does IMC imply MAM?
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Kristofer Munsterhjelm wrote:
On 07/05/2013 02:47 PM, sepp...@alumni.caltech.edu wrote:
Only one voting method satisfies IMC: Maximize Affirmed Majorities (MAM).
Can other methods satisfy IMC too, or does IMC imply MAM?
Only MAM and some methods so extremely similar to MAM that they select
