Hi Bastien,
On 11 Dec 2011 at 15:55Z, Bastien wrote:
When I set #+OPTIONS: H:1, I get what I expect: \section{} is the
only heading used and second level outline levels are converted to
whatever my org-export-lower-levels is set to, and the table of
contents just has the \section{}s in it.
When I set EXPORT_OPTIONS to H:1, I get \section{} and \subsection{}
in the body text, but the table of contents only lists \section{}s.
EXPORT_OPTIONS is for a tree, while #+OPTIONS is for the whole doc.
Ah perhaps I should have been clearer when describing what I did, sorry.
I set #+OPTIONS at the top of the file, and EXPORT_OPTIONS in the
properties drawer for the tree I actually want, as you describe, as two
cases, and then exported just the tree with C-c C-e 1 d in both cases,
to get the behaviour described.
The point is that I require the #+OPTIONS to get what I want, when it
ought to just work with the EXPORT_OPTIONS since I am just exporting
that tree.
I want the first behaviour myself, but in any case, shouldn’t this
be consistent between the two?
Maybe you can send an org file as an example?
Certainly, you’ll find a stripped down file attached.
Thanks!
S
#+OPTIONS: H:1
* Lectures MT11—R Walker—Kant’s Ethics
:PROPERTIES:
:EXPORT_FILE_NAME: lectures-kantsethics-walker
:EXPORT_TITLE: Kant’s ethics lectures
:EXPORT_AUTHOR: Lecturer: Ralph Walker
:EXPORT_DATE: MT11
:EXPORT_OPTIONS: H:1 todo:nil :nil
:END:
** Lecture 1
*** Kant’s general philosophy
A problem how to fit his moral philosophy with his general philosophy,
in particular his views on freedom. We need to be free in a very
strong sense for his moral system. Pure practical reason doesn’t
belong to the causal order yet it must influence us. Theoretical
philosophy says that we don’t have this freedom.
Most people say this is unresolvable nowadays (not all of them).
Kant’s crazy metaphysics
Kant’s solution is separating world of free agents from world of space
and time. We can know a lot about this world as we rely on both sense
experience and principles we know independently of experience: we
apply /a priori/ concepts like the concept of cause (disagrees with Hume
here). Kant thinks he can prove that this must be true of the world
as we can know it.
Where he’s coming from
Kant is reacting first against the rationalists (CD) and reacting to
(British) empiricists.
At one stage Kant accepted Hume’s view ∵ he wasn’t happy with
rationalists grasping principles out of the air (they all got
different things). I say CD this, you say CD that. This won’t do
because Hume and co. end up in untenable scepticism. Can’t account
for indispensible notions like causality, senses objectivity.
Geometry and arithmetic tell us truths about space and time, that Hume
says we can’t have.
* Example of incongruent counterparts
Left and right hand gloves: problem with empirical philosophy is that
it makes sense that there could consist of a universe with just a left
hand glove and one with a right hand glove and these would be
different. Yet how can they be different without knowledge of space
itself? The experiential data is the same in both cases.
* Unsatisfactory alternatives
Obvs. not happy with Descartes’ a priori knowledge of the world due to
god argument failing—also, Kant doesn’t think you can ever prove the
existence of god using reason.
Metaphysics again
Only way to explain things like this is that the world as knowable by
humans is dependent on the way that we know it, dependent on us.
There is a reality of things as they in themselves beneath this, but
we can never know what it is like.
Isn’t this a bit of a truism? Neurath’s
boat.**
Some kind of faith possible about the real world. Distinguished from
knowledge of sensory world.
Moral truths
Doesn’t give a parallel account. He seems to think that moral truths
take us beyond the realm of what we can know, and they give us some
kind of contact with reality itself—disputed interpretation.
Why can we be so confident in our a priori principles (e.g. induction)
that govern our experience? They are innate but that’s no guarantee
of their reliability.
*** The Groundwork itself
Written as a semi-popular book. Kant was surprised that first
Critique didn’t go down well with the public. Review said Kant was
reheating Berkeley’s idealism. Therefore wrote Prolegomena,
semi-popular, intended to make everybody understand exactly what he
was saying. Failed ofc…
On ethics he does the popular work first. Kant introduces an idea,
doesn’t go into complexities but doesn’t say that there even are
complexities. This has caused almost all problems of with
understanding the Groundwork.
Three formulations do come to the same thing but it’s very hard to see
how they come together as he’s suppressed detail on his initial
formulation. Could have put a lot of philosophers out of work if he
hadn’t done this.
*** Methodology
Starting ethics
