Re: [PSES] Tamper-proof Hardware

2019-04-09 Thread Richard Nute
Hi John: Your example is, as described by Doug Nix, defeat resistance, not tamperproof (see the definitions). Tampering cannot be safeguarded, except, maybe, with a safe (which is also defeat resistant).  Best regards, Rich From: John Woodgate Sent: Tuesday, April 9,

Re: [PSES] Tamper-proof Hardware

2019-04-09 Thread Richard Nute
Hi Doug: Defeat resistance is not tamperproof. I agree that defeat resistance is a legitimate safety requirement, but not so for tamperproof (at least not with the definitions I provided). Best regards, Rich From: Douglas Nix Sent: Tuesday, April 9, 2019 11:23 AM To:

Re: [PSES] Tamper-proof Hardware

2019-04-09 Thread Douglas Nix
Rich, Respectfully, I have to disagree. ISO 14119, Safety of machinery — Interlocking devices associated with guards — Principles for design and selection, specifically addresses defeat resistance in interlocking devices. This is vital, since defeat resistance is an important aspect of

Re: [PSES] Tamper-proof Hardware

2019-04-09 Thread John Woodgate
'Tamperproof' is like 'fireproof' or 'foolproof' - a pure illusion; misplaced human ingenuity knows no bounds. But measures against successful tampering are surely not outside the scope of safeguarding. For example, a soda-machine has parts designed so that they can be assembled together with

Re: [PSES] Tamper-proof Hardware

2019-04-09 Thread Richard Nute
Standards need not – indeed should not -- address nefarious activity on the part of the user. And, standards need not address tampering (defined previously) as there can be no end to the extent of tampering. The requirement for “tamperproof” is beyond the scope of safeguarding a user

Re: [PSES] Tamper-proof Hardware

2019-04-09 Thread John Allen
Yes, that might the point of fitting such screws, but the standard would then have to define both such screws and the specific assessments/tests that would be necessary for them to be deemed acceptable/certifiable - but, of course, it actually says nothing about either of those matters. John E

Re: [PSES] Tamper-proof Hardware

2019-04-09 Thread Larry Merchell
Per: 3 to engage secretly or improperly in something. Wouldn't improperly be the key word, as it may expose a hazard? Larry Merchell From: John Woodgate Sent: Tuesday, April 9, 2019 2:36:47 AM To: EMC-PSTC@LISTSERV.IEEE.ORG Subject: Re: [PSES] Tamper-proof

Re: [PSES] Tamper-proof Hardware

2019-04-09 Thread John Woodgate
Yes, that is clearly the point of fitting t-p screws. Best wishes John Woodgate OOO-Own Opinions Only J M Woodgate and Associates www.woodjohn.uk Rayleigh, Essex UK On 2019-04-09 15:56, Larry Merchell wrote: Per: 3 to engage secretly or improperly in something. Wouldn't improperly be the key

Re: [PSES] Tamper-proof Hardware

2019-04-09 Thread Gert Gremmen
IR-3 Internal Regulations for writing standards issued by CENELEC (which is roughly the same as IR2 in IEC) gives information on how to write standards, and shows clearly that the Introduction should be informative: From IR-3  Introduction 13.1 Purpose or rationale The introduction provides

Re: [PSES] Tamper-proof Hardware

2019-04-09 Thread John Woodgate
We are not so far apart. You say that the text should not have appeared in a numbered clause that might be assumed to be normative. I say that it would be better not to have a numbered clause because it might seem to be normative. I think that few would assume that the normal INTRODUCTION

Re: [PSES] Tamper-proof Hardware

2019-04-09 Thread John Allen
John W When something that ambiguous, and which that could be construed as being a requirement, is placed in a prominent position in a standard, regardless or not of whether the clause in question is numbered, then it is obvious that it will (as it has done) raise issues and questions as to

Re: [PSES] Tamper-proof Hardware

2019-04-09 Thread John Woodgate
I think that the major point is that Clause 0 is purely advisory. It seems reasonable in an advisory text to mention means to deter operations that might compromise safety, without going into exhaustive detail.  It would seem harmless, so not worthy of suppression. I wouldn't have given the

Re: [PSES] Tamper-proof Hardware

2019-04-09 Thread John Allen
Rich Thanks for laying out the main definitions of “tamperproof”, and for your view on why my “story” is not an example thereof (it was only the one that I had “to-hand” at the time, and there must be many others J) . Maybe, therefore, similar definitions/explanations should have been