The IESG has approved the following document:
- 'EAP Session-Id Derivation for EAP-SIM, EAP-AKA, and PEAP'
(draft-ietf-emu-eap-session-id-06.txt) as Proposed Standard
This document is the product of the EAP Method Update Working Group.
The IESG contact persons are Benjamin Kaduk and Roman Danyl
On Sep 2, 2020, at 2:18 PM, Jorge Vergara wrote:
> After some more thought a concern came to me about reaching into TLS 1.3 and
> using the HKDF. These dependencies on TLS versions are why all the EAP
> methods are currently needing updates. Would using the HKDF directly create a
> similar situ
>>[Joe] Moving away from SHA-1 is a good idea as it will only raise questions
>>moving forward. For TLS 1.3 I think you could use the same text, but I would
>>look to Jorge to make sure we get it correct for PEAP. TEAP should also use
>>the Hash from HKDF in TLS 1.3.
>I am not a TLS terminol
On Sep 1, 2020, at 10:23 AM, John Mattsson wrote:
>
> If the ability to send a descriptive TLS Fatal Alert back to the peer is a
> requirement, changing to close_notify seems like a bad idea.
It's fine for EAP Success. But having two different code paths is a little
surprising.
> My unders
>[Joe] Moving away from SHA-1 is a good idea as it will only raise questions
>moving forward. For TLS 1.3 I think you could use the same text, but I would
>look to Jorge to make sure we get it correct for PEAP. TEAP should also use
>the Hash from HKDF in TLS 1.3.
I am not a TLS terminology e
On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 7:54 AM Alan DeKok wrote:
> On Sep 2, 2020, at 3:30 AM, John Mattsson
> wrote:
> >> I can tell you what Windows is doing for TLS 1.2; and Windows interops
> with all the TEAP implementations that I know of, so others are likely
> doing the same. We're using the MAC functio
On Sep 2, 2020, at 3:30 AM, John Mattsson wrote:
>> I can tell you what Windows is doing for TLS 1.2; and Windows interops with
>> all the TEAP implementations that I know of, so others are likely doing the
>> same. We're using the MAC function in the case of a CBC block cipher suite,
>> or PRF
>>> This raises the question what TEAP TLS 1.2 implementations do today? Are
>>> they only using outdated and non-secure cipher suites or are they doing
>>> something unspecified to derive Compound-MAC with an AEAD cipher suite?
>> It's not clear. I'd have to double-check hostap, which is th
