Re: [Emu] 答复: Re: draft-cakulev-emu-eap-ibake

Hi Alan, Tschofenig, Hannes (NSN - FI/Espoo) wrote: Ask yourself: Is there indeed a problem with transferring the “long” public keys (of the client, as you state below)? I've seen this be a problem when the long keys require too many round trips. ~20K of data, or ~20 round trips

Re: [Emu] IETF 83 agenda request: channel binding implementation

I am looking forward to the discussion. I care about implementation specific aspects, particularly if they hide some underlying problems. -Original Message- From: emu-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:emu-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of ext Sam Hartman Sent: Monday, February 06, 2012 5:33 PM

Re: [Emu] draft-cakulev-emu-eap-ibake

Hi Violeta, What problem are you trying to solve with this EAP method? Ciao Hannes -Original Message- From: emu-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:emu-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of ext Cakulev, Violeta (Violeta) Sent: Wednesday, January 11, 2012 10:16 PM To: emu@ietf.org Subject: [Emu]

Re: [Emu] Draft response for ITU-T X.1034 liaison statement

Very nice writeup, Joe. You might want to point out to them that they can develop EAP methods and publish them as informational documents without any special reaon or new set of requirements even if other EAP methods already provide similar functionality. -Original Message- From:

Re: [Emu] New Liaison Statement, Draft revised Recommendation ITU-T X.1034, Guideline on extensible authentication protocol based authenticationand key management in a data communication network

Hi Bernard, here is my guess of the background of all this work. Imagine a company has worked on strong password based authentication and key exchange protocols. That company might also believe that they have some IPRs in this field. Now, some folks in that company would like to get their

Re: [Emu] Impersonation and Lying NAS problem: two distinctissues (with different solutions)

There are 3 parties in the AAA/EAP exchange. Not every party is authenticated in the exchange (e.g. the NAS/AAA client is not authenticated by the EAP peer) -- there is only key confirmation taking place. The NAS can therefore report different identities to the EAP client and to the AAA server.

Re: [Emu] Comments from Hannes on draft-clancy-emu-aaapay-01.txt

Hi Joe, The idea of defining one payload format for carrying information in EAP methods sounds useful. Then, someone only has to define something once and it is available (at least from a specification point of view) in all EAP methods. In practice, this obviously requires code changes and

Re: [Emu] Liaison Statement on ITU-T Recommendation X.1034

Here are a few random review comments. Section 3.2: Terminology The definition of PFS does not correspond to the crypto literature. Here is the definition from the Handbook of applied cryptography: 12.16 Definition A protocol is said to have perfect forward secrecy if compromise of long-term

AW: AW: [Emu] Re: Next Steps on Passwd-based EAP Methods

- Von: ext Sam Hartman [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Gesendet: Dienstag, 3. April 2007 17:40 An: Tschofenig, Hannes Cc: Hannes Tschofenig; [EMAIL PROTECTED]; emu@ietf.org Betreff: Re: AW: [Emu] Re: Next Steps on Passwd-based EAP Methods Tschofenig, == Tschofenig, Hannes [EMAIL PROTECTED

AW: [Emu] EAP-GPSK: Ciphersuites

Hi Lakshminath, I am not sure that the group wants to use CCM. (If you are referring to this part of your mail.) Ciao Hannes -Ursprüngliche Nachricht- Von: Lakshminath Dondeti [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Gesendet: Dienstag, 22. August 2006 11:44 An: Hannes Tschofenig Cc: