Re: [Emu] RFC 7170 (TEAP) errata

2019-07-22 Thread Alan DeKok
On Jul 22, 2019, at 1:50 PM, Joseph Salowey  wrote:
> [Joe] I'd like to hear if anyone has an implementation, and how they 
> implemented on a cipher suite that is not SHA-1.

  TBH, I haven't seen an implementation.

  I suspect that the lack of implementations is why these questions are only 
coming up now.

>  My feeling is that it would be better to make the TLV length variable with 
> the hash length.  However, I do not see why truncating would work as well. 

  My $0.02 is to allow a variable TLV length.

  I think it's OK to leave these as errata now.  I'm not sure that any existing 
EMU document would be appropriate for these changes.

  Alan DeKok.

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Re: [Emu] RFC 7170 (TEAP) errata

2019-07-22 Thread Joseph Salowey
On Mon, Jul 1, 2019 at 4:11 PM Jouni Malinen  wrote:

> 
>
> (2) S-IMCK[j] derivation when inner EAP methods in the sequence derive
> both MSK and EMSK (or even more complicated, if there are multiple inner
> EAP authentication methods that have difference in whether they derive MSK
> or EMSK):
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5770
>
>
[Joe]  I'd like to hear from implementers on this one.

I think the intent is that section 5.4 should say the S-IMCK is generated
as specified  as described in section 5.2.

Section 5.2 does provide a mechanism to derive the S-IMCK at the end of the
section.  Each IMCK can be derived in one of 3 ways:
- MSK
- EMSK
- 0s if the method is not key generating

There is ambiguity on how to derive each IMSK in the case that both sides
do not have the same capability to export the EMSK.   I think the steps
involving the compound MAC are meant to disambiguate this situation.

Is the problem that the section does not explicitly say how to use the
compound MAC sent to determine which IMCK derivation to use?



> I'd hope to avoid having to guess or make my own specification of how this
> is supposed to work before being able to implement this (and then have to
> re-implement everything if others disagree with that interpretation/guess
> on the design), so any feedback on these items would be very welcome so
> that there would be a general agreement on how the protocol is supposed to
> work to provide better chances for getting interoperable implementations.
>
> - Jouni
>
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Re: [Emu] RFC 7170 (TEAP) errata

2019-07-22 Thread Joseph Salowey
On Mon, Jul 1, 2019 at 4:11 PM Jouni Malinen  wrote:

> 
>
> (1) Crypto-Binding TLV format for the cases where the negotiated TLS
> cipher suite uses SHA256 (or SHA384, for that matter) instead of SHA-1 (and
> I'd hope all deployments of TEAP would be recent enough to avoid use of
> SHA-1..):
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5768
>
>
> [Joe] I'd like to hear if anyone has an implementation, and how they
implemented on a cipher suite that is not SHA-1.  My feeling is that it
would be better to make the TLV length variable with the hash length.
However, I do not see why truncating would work as well.


>
> - Jouni
>
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