Re: [Emu] Idea: New X509 Extension for securing EAP-TLS

2019-11-20 Thread Alan DeKok
On Nov 20, 2019, at 9:58 AM, Dan Harkins wrote: >> The use-case of the document is that an individual is issued a client >> certificate. That certificate contains an OID about the expected use-case >> (EAPoL), and also a list of SSIDs used to perform EAP. When a client system >> is

Re: [Emu] Idea: New X509 Extension for securing EAP-TLS

2019-11-20 Thread Dan Harkins
On 11/20/19 4:11 AM, Alan DeKok wrote: On Nov 20, 2019, at 5:23 AM, Dan Harkins wrote: I am asking for ambiguous data to be certified and placed in my certificate for my own use? If this attribute is in a certificate I receive then what does it mean to "select the correct certificate for

Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

2019-11-20 Thread Alan DeKok
On Nov 19, 2019, at 10:40 PM, Owen Friel (ofriel) wrote: > > Assuming that NAIRealm is a registered domain as per RFC 7542, and thus > public CAs can verify ownership, the goal / where we want to get to is: > > - CA may be a public CA and thus public CAs can be enabled by default in >

Re: [Emu] Idea: New X509 Extension for securing EAP-TLS

2019-11-20 Thread Alan DeKok
On Nov 20, 2019, at 5:23 AM, Dan Harkins wrote: >> See RFC 4334 and its discussion of SSIDs. > > Is this _my_ certificate that has this attribute in it or is it in a > certificate I receive? The Introduction of RFC 4334 says: Automated selection of client certificates for use with PPP

Re: [Emu] Idea: New X509 Extension for securing EAP-TLS

2019-11-20 Thread Dan Harkins
On 11/19/19 4:17 AM, Alan DeKok wrote: On Nov 18, 2019, at 7:39 PM, Dan Harkins wrote: [snip] Then what you can infer from a domain name in a certificate issued by such a CA is that the holder of the corresponding private key controls that domain. Nothing more, nothing less. But you