Updates on the actions thus far:

On 3/29/21 12:20 AM, Joseph Salowey wrote:
The authors have been working on the draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13 in the GitHub 
Repo (https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13).  Below is a brief 
summary of the Issues and PRs that have recently been merged or ready to be 
merged.  If you are aware of issues that are not currently tracked in the repo 
please add them or let the chairs know.  We are looking to publish a new draft 
in the next few weeks so indicate on the list if there are problems with these 
resolutions.

Thanks,

Joe

PR #44<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/pull/44> - Merged - 
Editorial - Clarifies that Message Flows are Examples
PR #50<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/pull/50> - Merged - 
Editorial - Moving from Master to Main terminology as in RFC8446bis
PR #51<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/pull/51> - Merged - 
Editorial - added text to suggest that one session ticket be sent - Issue 
48<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/issues/48>
PR #53<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/pull/53> - Merged - 
Normative - Uses type code in the context of the key derivation - Issue 
32<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/issues/32> - Issue 
56<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/issues/56>
PR #40<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/pull/40> - Ready to 
Merge - Editorial - alignment with EAP State Machine Terminology - Issue 
33<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/issues/33> Issue 
36<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/issues/36>
Merged.
PR #41<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/pull/41> - Ready to 
Merge - Editorial - Discussion of packet modification attacks - Issue 
36<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/issues/36>
Merged.
PR #42<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/pull/42> - Ready to 
Merge - Editorial - Reference EAP-Types draft
Merged.
PR #45<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/pull/45/files> - 
Ready to Merge - Editorial - Describes why session resumption is needed - Issue 
34<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/issues/34>
Merged.
PR #46<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/pull/46> - Ready to 
Merge - Normative - Makes it mandatory to send Error Alerts to single EAP 
Failure - Issue 
37<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/issues/37> - Issue 
38<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/issues/38>
Merged.
PR #54<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/pull/54> - Ready to 
Merge - Normative - uses protected success indicators as single 0x00 byte of 
application data - Issue 
55<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/issues/55>
Merged.

Open Issues without proposed Resolution

Issue #52<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/issues/52> - Needs 
Discussion and Proposal - Update security considerations with discussion of 
implications no peer authentication

Commit 
(https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/commit/c1e648ab9e9f6b44f833689205528f8b53cc7db0)
 with the following text pushed:

   EAP servers will usually require the EAP peer to provide a valid
   certificate and will fail the connection if one is not provided.
   Some deployments may permit no peer authentication for some or all
   connections.  When peer authentication is not used, implementations
   MUST take care to limit network access appropriately for
   unauthenticated peers and implementations MUST use resumption with
   caution to ensure that a resumed session is not granted more
   privilege than was intended for the original session.


Issue #47<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/issues/47> - Needs 
DIscussion and proposal - how does the peer validate the identity of the server?

Commit 
(https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/commit/d0c3d6f04c97a62ef80002d2f32622b5e8b5fbd6)
 with the following text merged:

  The EAP server identity in the TLS server certificate is typically a
   fully qualified domain name (FQDN).  EAP peer implementations SHOULD
   allow users to configuring a unique trust root (CA certificate) and a
   server name to authenticate the server certificate and match the
   subjectAlternativeName (SAN) extension in the server certificate with
   the configured server name.  In the absence of a user-configured root
   CA certificate, implementations MAY rely on system-wide root CA
   certificate bundles for authenticating the server certificate.  If
   server name matching is not used, then peers may end up trusting
   servers for EAP authentication that are not intended to be EAP
   servers.  If name matching is not used with a public CA bundle, then
   effectively any server can obtain a certificate which will be trusted
   for EAP authentication by the Peer.

   The process of configuring a root CA certificate and a server name is
   non-trivial and therefore automated methods of provisioning are
   RECOMMENDED.  For example, the eduroam federation [RFC7593] provides
   a Configuration Assistant Tool (CAT) to automate the configuration  process. 
 In the absence of a trusted root CA certificate (user
   configured or system-wide), EAP peers MAY implement a trust on first
   use (TOFU) mechanism where the peer trusts and stores the server
   certificate during the first connection attempt.  The EAP peer
   ensures that the server presents the same stored certificate on
   subsequent interactions.  Use of TOFU mechanism does not allow for
   the server certificate to change without out-of-band validation of
   the certificate and is therefore not suitable for many deployments.


Issue #29<https://github.com/emu-wg/draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13/issues/29> -  
Needs DIscussion and proposal - mutual authentication section is broader than 
mutual authentication

Section 2.1.1 renamed to "Authentication".

We plan to push a few more updates during the coming week. We plan to submit 
version -15 shortly afterwards. Publishing version -15 does not mean that it is 
ready for publication as RFC. Instead, it will be an opportunity for others who 
don't follow the draft on github to review and provide feedback.

--Mohit





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