Re: [Emu] Short review of draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp-01

2021-07-28 Thread Alan DeKok
On Jul 28, 2021, at 12:26 PM, Dan Harkins wrote: > Assuming everything can be assigned a username and a password is what is > wrong. Yes. That was intended to be just an example, though. > If you're concerned about *standard* EAP methods being used in *standard* ways > then think about wha

Re: [Emu] Short review of draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp-01

2021-07-28 Thread Alan DeKok
On Jul 28, 2021, at 12:16 PM, Dan Harkins wrote: > I think you're reading a bit too much into "provisioning mode" here. There > was never an intention in TEAP to allow for the PKCS10/PKCS7 exchange to be > done after an anonymous Phase 1. The anonymous Phase 1 was used to get a > tunnel up in or

Re: [Emu] Short review of draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp-01

2021-07-28 Thread Dan Harkins
On 7/28/21 5:06 AM, Alan DeKok wrote: On Jul 27, 2021, at 1:50 PM, Alan DeKok wrote: We are trying to avoid wheel reinvention. The novel bit here is the mutual authentication in the TLS stack based on the already defined Wi-Fi Alliance DPP bootstrap key. The novel bit in the EAP-DPP dra

Re: [Emu] Short review of draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp-01

2021-07-28 Thread Dan Harkins
  Hi Alan, On 7/27/21 10:50 AM, Alan DeKok wrote: On Jul 27, 2021, at 1:23 PM, Owen Friel (ofriel) wrote: [ofriel] the goal here is to push the provisioning info (e.g. CA roots, peer identity certs) inside TEAP using existing TEAP mechanisms e.g. Trusted Server Root, PKCS#7 TLVs. That p

Re: [Emu] Short review of draft-friel-tls-eap-dpp-01

2021-07-28 Thread Alan DeKok
On Jul 27, 2021, at 1:50 PM, Alan DeKok wrote: >> We are trying to avoid wheel reinvention. The novel bit here is the mutual >> authentication in the TLS stack based on the already defined Wi-Fi Alliance >> DPP bootstrap key. The novel bit in the EAP-DPP draft, yes. My leaning is more and