Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

2019-11-20 Thread Alan DeKok
On Nov 19, 2019, at 10:40 PM, Owen Friel (ofriel) wrote: > > Assuming that NAIRealm is a registered domain as per RFC 7542, and thus > public CAs can verify ownership, the goal / where we want to get to is: > > - CA may be a public CA and thus public CAs can be enabled by default in >

Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

2019-11-19 Thread Owen Friel (ofriel)
practices for supplicants and authenticators After the meeting earlier today, I made some notes on best practices for supplicants and authenticators. I think it would be useful to have an official WG document which gives guidance. Background: a) the current practice in TLS-based EAP methods

Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

2019-11-18 Thread Alan DeKok
On Nov 18, 2019, at 11:01 AM, Cappalli, Tim (Aruba) wrote: > > So you’re saying an NAIRealm must be a publicly registered domain name? I > agree, but just want to be crystal clear. Yes. See RFC 7542. It defines the NAI in some detail. Alan DeKok.

Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

2019-11-18 Thread Cappalli, Tim (Aruba)
So you’re saying an NAIRealm must be a publicly registered domain name? I agree, but just want to be crystal clear. tim From: Alan DeKok Date: Monday, November 18, 2019 at 10:57 AM To: Cappalli, Tim (Aruba) Cc: EMU WG Subject: Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

2019-11-18 Thread Cappalli, Tim (Aruba)
configuration, that doesn’t change the requirement to manually configure the supplicant. So what are we actually trying to improve here? From: Alan DeKok Date: Monday, November 18, 2019 at 10:43 AM To: Cappalli, Tim (Aruba) Cc: EMU WG Subject: Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants

Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

2019-11-18 Thread Alan DeKok
On Nov 18, 2019, at 10:37 AM, Cappalli, Tim (Aruba) wrote: > > If the goal is not to improve identity assurance of an EAP server then what > is this best practice change actually for? I have been *explicit* in my statements that my goal *is* to improve validation of the EAP server identity.

Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

2019-11-18 Thread Cappalli, Tim (Aruba)
If the goal is not to improve identity assurance of an EAP server then what is this best practice change actually for? From: Alan DeKok Date: Monday, November 18, 2019 at 10:34 AM To: Cappalli, Tim (Aruba) Cc: EMU WG Subject: Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

2019-11-18 Thread Alan DeKok
> On Nov 18, 2019, at 10:22 AM, Cappalli, Tim (Aruba) wrote: > > So again, if NAIRealm is not bound to an organization’s public domain name, I never suggested that or implied it. I'm not sure why it's relevant. > how does a public CA prove ownership of an NAIRealm? How is this different

Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

2019-11-18 Thread Jan-Frederik Rieckers
On 18.11.19 16:22, Cappalli, Tim (Aruba) wrote: > So again, if NAIRealm is not bound to an organization’s public domain > name, how does a public CA prove ownership of an NAIRealm? How is this > different than ESSID? It must not be a public domain name, but it can be. Speaking of eduroam this is

Re: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

2019-11-18 Thread Cappalli, Tim (Aruba)
Subject: [Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators After the meeting earlier today, I made some notes on best practices for supplicants and authenticators. I think it would be useful to have an official WG document which gives guidance. Background: a) the current practice

[Emu] Best practices for supplicants and authenticators

2019-11-18 Thread Alan DeKok
After the meeting earlier today, I made some notes on best practices for supplicants and authenticators. I think it would be useful to have an official WG document which gives guidance. Background: a) the current practice in TLS-based EAP methods is to use certificates with