Re: [Enigmail] 2.0.5 fails "make check" due to missingMdcError (should be mdcError?)

2018-05-21 Thread Patrick Brunschwig
On 21.05.18 21:59, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote: > Hi all-- > > i've just filed this pull request to fix a problem with "make check" > during a build of enigmail 2.0.5: > > https://gitlab.com/enigmail/enigmail/merge_requests/1 > > I'm a little surprised to see a signed tag that doesn't pass "make

Re: [Enigmail] [ANN] Enigmail 2.0.5 available - full protection against Efail

2018-05-21 Thread Patrick Brunschwig
On 21.05.18 23:58, Phil Stracchino wrote: > On 05/21/18 16:36, David wrote: >> On 5/21/2018 3:35 PM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote: >>> On 21.05.18 21:19, David wrote: Is Thunderbird going to continue to follow Mozilla Firefox's lead and eventually drop support for "bootstrap" extensions? If s

Re: [Enigmail] A postmortem on Efail

2018-05-21 Thread Mark Rousell
On 21/05/2018 18:12, Ben McGinnes wrote: > Had their publications been limited to the articles on the 13th and > 14th, I could buy that. Unfortunately the updates to the SSD website > on the 15th really strain things, especially the FAQ. Not only is it > potentially panic-inducing, but they recom

Re: [Enigmail] A postmortem on Efail

2018-05-21 Thread Mark Rousell
On 21/05/2018 19:34, Onno Ekker wrote: > Isn't the simplest way to prevent such an attack to decouple the > downloading and reading of e-mail? If you go online, download e-mail, go > offline and then read e-mail, there's no way a html-message can phone > home or otherwise leak information? Or am I

Re: [Enigmail] [ANN] Enigmail 2.0.5 available - full protection against Efail

2018-05-21 Thread Phil Stracchino
On 05/21/18 16:36, David wrote: > On 5/21/2018 3:35 PM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote: >> On 21.05.18 21:19, David wrote: >>> Is Thunderbird going to continue to follow Mozilla Firefox's lead >>> and eventually drop support for "bootstrap" extensions? If so may >>> I ask what you have planed for the fut

Re: [Enigmail] [ANN] Enigmail 2.0.5 available - full protection against Efail

2018-05-21 Thread David
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 5/21/2018 3:35 PM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote: > On 21.05.18 21:19, David wrote: >> On 5/21/2018 12:38 PM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote: >>> I have released Enigmail v2.0.5 for Thunderbird version 52 and >>> SeaMonkey 2.46 and newer. >> >> >>> Change

[Enigmail] 2.0.5 fails "make check" due to missingMdcError (should be mdcError?)

2018-05-21 Thread Daniel Kahn Gillmor
Hi all-- i've just filed this pull request to fix a problem with "make check" during a build of enigmail 2.0.5: https://gitlab.com/enigmail/enigmail/merge_requests/1 I'm a little surprised to see a signed tag that doesn't pass "make check" -- is "make check" run before every release? -

Re: [Enigmail] [ANN] Enigmail 2.0.5 available - full protection against Efail

2018-05-21 Thread Patrick Brunschwig
On 21.05.18 21:19, David wrote: > On 5/21/2018 12:38 PM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote: >> I have released Enigmail v2.0.5 for Thunderbird version 52 and >> SeaMonkey 2.46 and newer. > > >> Changes === This version prevents against all forms of the >> "Efail" vulnerability (https://efail.de) and s

Re: [Enigmail] [ANN] Enigmail 2.0.5 available - full protection against Efail

2018-05-21 Thread David
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 5/21/2018 12:38 PM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote: > I have released Enigmail v2.0.5 for Thunderbird version 52 and > SeaMonkey 2.46 and newer. > > > Changes === This version prevents against all forms of the > "Efail" vulnerability (https://efai

Re: [Enigmail] A postmortem on Efail

2018-05-21 Thread Ben McGinnes
On Mon, May 21, 2018 at 08:51:17AM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: >> That being the *incredibly* unhelpful and likely actively harmful >> recommendation to remove encryption and decryption functionality from >> vulnerable MUAs. > > I blame the EFF for that more than I blame the Efail developers.

[Enigmail] [ANN] Enigmail 2.0.5 available - full protection against Efail

2018-05-21 Thread Patrick Brunschwig
I have released Enigmail v2.0.5 for Thunderbird version 52 and SeaMonkey 2.46 and newer. Changes === This version prevents against all forms of the "Efail" vulnerability (https://efail.de) and similar attacks. I strongly recommend to upgrade to Enigmail 2.0.5 as soon as possible. Details ==

Re: [Enigmail] A postmortem on Efail

2018-05-21 Thread flapflap
Hi, Phil Pennock: > 4. Get together actual MUA maintainers who are users of the GnuPG >code-base in a mailing-list and hammer out details of "what should be >done about old mail". Cryptographers have long said to decrypt >inbound mail and re-encrypt it to a storage key, which can >

Re: [Enigmail] A postmortem on Efail

2018-05-21 Thread Andrew Gallagher
On 21/05/18 15:01, Phil Stracchino wrote: > On 05/21/18 09:57, Andrew Gallagher wrote: >> On 21/05/18 14:35, Phil Stracchino wrote: >>> What MySQL (from mid-5.7 on) does for tablespace encryption might be of >>> note here. MySQL uses a fixed table key for each encrypted InnoDB >>> table, but encry

Re: [Enigmail] A postmortem on Efail

2018-05-21 Thread Phil Stracchino
On 05/21/18 09:57, Andrew Gallagher wrote: > On 21/05/18 14:35, Phil Stracchino wrote: >> What MySQL (from mid-5.7 on) does for tablespace encryption might be of >> note here. MySQL uses a fixed table key for each encrypted InnoDB >> table, but encrypts the table keys with a master key which is >>

Re: [Enigmail] A postmortem on Efail

2018-05-21 Thread Andrew Gallagher
On 21/05/18 14:35, Phil Stracchino wrote: > What MySQL (from mid-5.7 on) does for tablespace encryption might be of > note here. MySQL uses a fixed table key for each encrypted InnoDB > table, but encrypts the table keys with a master key which is > periodically rotated. This allows regular rotat

Re: [Enigmail] A postmortem on Efail

2018-05-21 Thread Phil Stracchino
On 05/21/18 08:34, Ben McGinnes wrote: > To say, “we have this edge case scenario that really needs an active > targeted attack on a case by case basis, so everyone should just stop > integrating encryption” is the kind of thing that can get people > killed. Indeed. "There is a possible attack a

Re: [Enigmail] A postmortem on Efail

2018-05-21 Thread Phil Stracchino
On 05/20/18 16:28, Phil Pennock wrote: > 4. Get together actual MUA maintainers who are users of the GnuPG >code-base in a mailing-list and hammer out details of "what should be >done about old mail". Cryptographers have long said to decrypt >inbound mail and re-encrypt it to a storage

Re: [Enigmail] A postmortem on Efail

2018-05-21 Thread Robert J. Hansen
> That being the *incredibly* unhelpful and likely actively harmful > recommendation to remove encryption and decryption functionality from > vulnerable MUAs. I blame the EFF for that more than I blame the Efail developers. I expect the people who develop new attacks to overstate their importance

Re: [Enigmail] A postmortem on Efail

2018-05-21 Thread Ben McGinnes
On Sun, May 20, 2018 at 02:26:47AM -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Writing just for myself -- not for GnuPG and not for Enigmail and > definitely not for my employer -- I put together a postmortem on Efail. > You may find it worth reading. You may also not. Your mileage will > probably vary. :)

Re: [Enigmail] A postmortem on Efail

2018-05-21 Thread Phil Pennock
On 2018-05-20 at 02:26 -0400, Rob J Hansen wrote: > https://medium.com/@cipherpunk/efail-a-postmortem-4bef2cea4c08 Excellent post. I favor breaking backwards compatibility and including in the shipped README a description of "The conditions under which we anticipate future backwards compatibility