Hi Patrick,
> I fixed this on April 19, it will be part of the next release.
Thanks for your consideration of this issue and for fixing it.
--
Sukhbir
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On 28.04.13 02:04, Sukhbir Singh wrote:
> Hi,
>
>> So fixing the identifiable MIME boundaries is a necessary but
>> not sufficient step toward achieving the goals the Tor devs are
>> aiming for. If there are no downsides to making the change, it
>>
Hi,
> So fixing the identifiable MIME boundaries is a necessary but not
> sufficient step toward achieving the goals the Tor devs are aiming for.
> If there are no downsides to making the change, it would be good to
> take the step even if it doesn't solve all the problems.
dkg, thanks for bring
On 04/19/2013 02:33 AM, Patrick Brunschwig wrote:
> I can certainly do that. However, what would it change? I could still
> identify a message created by Enigmail, and I could still tell you if
> some other product would have faked a message to look like Enigmail.
> Things like line wrapping of the
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On 19.04.13 04:09, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
> hi enigmail folks--
>
> package/mimeEncrypt.js contains two hardcoded references to "enig2"
> that are used to create the MIME boundaries when using PGP/MIME.
>
> In many circumstances it is not a pro
hi enigmail folks--
package/mimeEncrypt.js contains two hardcoded references to "enig2" that
are used to create the MIME boundaries when using PGP/MIME.
In many circumstances it is not a problem to leak the information that
the mail sender is using enigmail specifically, but there are some users
