Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 8:27:20 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 12:18 PM Brent Meeker  > wrote:
>
>> On 1/10/2019 4:21 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> *So even Feynman knew that there was no theoretical value for the FSC, 
>>> alpha.*
>>>
>>
>> No,  he knew very well there was a theory that could come up with a 
>> value because his own Feynman Diagrams could do it. But what he didn't know 
>> and what nobody knows is why his theory came up with that particular pure 
>> number when he never specifically stuck that number into the rules on how 
>> the diagrams should operate. 
>>
>>
>> The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are 
>> measured independent of any Feynman diagrams of quantum field theory.  The 
>> calculation using Feynman diagrams is of the anamolous magnetic moment.   A 
>> correction to the value of g that depend on relativistic effects (hence the 
>> occurence of c in the denominator).  The anamolous magnetic moment can be 
>> measure experimentally and using Feynman's diagrams and the measured values 
>> of e, hbar, and c a value can be calculated that includes the relativistic 
>> effects of quantum field theory. That's why the agreement with measurement 
>> is significant.
>>
>
> Right. The relation between fundamental physical constants, alpha = 
> e^2/hbar*c, is the closest one gets to a "theoretical" value for the FSC. 
> But that defines it in terms of other measured quantities. (Except that 
> these days, c is a defined number, not a measured physical parameter.) The 
> CODATA group use these theoretical relationships between constants, 
> together with the best available measurements, to make simultaneous fits to 
> all the constants and the data.That is where independent, "best values" for 
> these parameters come from. It is using these in the Feynman diagram 
> calculation of corrections to g-2 that gives the remarkable agreement 
> between theory and experiment. The point, though, is that the value of the 
> FSC used in calculating g-2 must be obtained independently of the g-2 
> measurement or else it is not a test of QED.. Conversely, of course, the 
> g-2 measurement can be use to estimate the FSC independently of other 
> measurements.
>
> Bruce
>
>
>> Brent
>>
>





As the Robert Geroch, James Hartle paper points out

*the issue of whether the existence of an algorithm to implement a 
theory should be adopted*
*as a criterion for acceptable physical theories.* 

if you want measurable constants to be computable, adopt a theory that does 
so.

- pt



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Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 10 Jan 2019, at 22:08, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 11:07:51 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 07:58, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 11:37:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 2:52:27 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 10:45:01 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:42 AM > wrote:
>> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:46:41 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>> wrote:
>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:46:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>> wrote:
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 10:13:57 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>> wrote:
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 9:42:51 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:52 PM > wrote:
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 11:42:06 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>> wrote:
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM > wrote:
>> 
>> Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of interference 
>> and coherence, without introducing your theory of consciousness. Mainstream 
>> thinking today is that decoherence does occur, but this seems to imply 
>> preexisting coherence, and therefore interference among the component states 
>> of a superposition. If the superposition is expressed using eigenfunctions, 
>> which are mutually orthogonal -- implying no mutual interference -- how is 
>> decoherence possible, insofar as coherence, IIUC, doesn't exist using this 
>> basis? AG
>> 
>> I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it is used off an 
>> expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal eigenvectors. The 
>> expansion in some eigenvector basis is written as
>> 
>>|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)
>> 
>> where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the dimension of the 
>> Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are the complex numbers a_i. Since 
>> these are complex coefficients, they contain inherent phases. It is the 
>> preservation of these phases of the expansion coefficients that is meant by 
>> "maintaining coherence". So it is the coherence of the particular expansion 
>> that is implied, and this has noting to do with the mutual orthogonality or 
>> otherwise of the basis vectors themselves. In decoherence, the phase 
>> relationships between the terms in the original expansion are lost.
>> 
>> Bruce 
>> 
>> I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my error -- 
>> confusing orthogonality with interference and coherence. Let me have your 
>> indulgence on a related issue. AG
>> 
>> Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its superposition 
>> expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with variable p. Does the 
>> phase of the original wf carry over into the eigenfunctions as identical for 
>> each, or can each component in the superposition have different phases? I 
>> ask this because the probability determined by any complex amplitude is 
>> independent of its phase. TIA, AG 
>> 
>> The phases of the coefficients are independent of each other.
>> 
>> When I formally studied QM, no mention was made of calculating the phases 
>> since, presumably, they don't effect probability calculations. Do you have a 
>> link which explains how they're calculated? TIA, AG 
>> 
>> I found some links on physics.stackexchange.com 
>>  which show that relative phases can 
>> effect probabilities, but none so far about how to calculate any phase 
>> angle. AG 
>> 
>> Here's the answer if anyone's interested. But what's the question? How are 
>> wf phase angles calculated? Clearly, if you solve for the eigenfunctions of 
>> some QM operator such as the p operator, any phase angle is possible; its 
>> value is completely arbitrary and doesn't effect a probability calculation. 
>> In fact, IIUC, there is not sufficient information to solve for a unique 
>> phase. So, I conclude,that the additional information required to uniquely 
>> determine a phase angle for a wf, lies in boundary conditions. If the 
>> problem of specifying a wf is defined as a boundary value problem, then, I 
>> believe, a unique phase angle can be calculated. CMIIAW. AG 
>> 
>> Bruce
>> 
>> I could use a handshake on this one. Roughly speaking, if one wants to 
>> express the state of a system as a superposition of eigenstates, how does 
>> one calculate the phase angles of the amplitudes for each eigenstate? AG
>> 
>> One doesn't. The phases are arbitrary unless one interferes the system with 
>> some other system.
>> 
>> Bruce 
>> 
>> If the phases are arbitrary and the system interacts with some other system, 
>> the new phases presumably are also arbitrary. So there doesn't seem to be 
>> any physical significance, yet this is the heart of decoherence theory as I 
>> understand it. What am I 

Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 10 Jan 2019, at 21:33, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 11:07:51 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 07:58, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 11:37:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 2:52:27 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 10:45:01 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:42 AM > wrote:
>> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:46:41 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>> wrote:
>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:46:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>> wrote:
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 10:13:57 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>> wrote:
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 9:42:51 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:52 PM > wrote:
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 11:42:06 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>> wrote:
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM > wrote:
>> 
>> Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of interference 
>> and coherence, without introducing your theory of consciousness. Mainstream 
>> thinking today is that decoherence does occur, but this seems to imply 
>> preexisting coherence, and therefore interference among the component states 
>> of a superposition. If the superposition is expressed using eigenfunctions, 
>> which are mutually orthogonal -- implying no mutual interference -- how is 
>> decoherence possible, insofar as coherence, IIUC, doesn't exist using this 
>> basis? AG
>> 
>> I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it is used off an 
>> expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal eigenvectors. The 
>> expansion in some eigenvector basis is written as
>> 
>>|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)
>> 
>> where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the dimension of the 
>> Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are the complex numbers a_i. Since 
>> these are complex coefficients, they contain inherent phases. It is the 
>> preservation of these phases of the expansion coefficients that is meant by 
>> "maintaining coherence". So it is the coherence of the particular expansion 
>> that is implied, and this has noting to do with the mutual orthogonality or 
>> otherwise of the basis vectors themselves. In decoherence, the phase 
>> relationships between the terms in the original expansion are lost.
>> 
>> Bruce 
>> 
>> I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my error -- 
>> confusing orthogonality with interference and coherence. Let me have your 
>> indulgence on a related issue. AG
>> 
>> Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its superposition 
>> expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with variable p. Does the 
>> phase of the original wf carry over into the eigenfunctions as identical for 
>> each, or can each component in the superposition have different phases? I 
>> ask this because the probability determined by any complex amplitude is 
>> independent of its phase. TIA, AG 
>> 
>> The phases of the coefficients are independent of each other.
>> 
>> When I formally studied QM, no mention was made of calculating the phases 
>> since, presumably, they don't effect probability calculations. Do you have a 
>> link which explains how they're calculated? TIA, AG 
>> 
>> I found some links on physics.stackexchange.com 
>>  which show that relative phases can 
>> effect probabilities, but none so far about how to calculate any phase 
>> angle. AG 
>> 
>> Here's the answer if anyone's interested. But what's the question? How are 
>> wf phase angles calculated? Clearly, if you solve for the eigenfunctions of 
>> some QM operator such as the p operator, any phase angle is possible; its 
>> value is completely arbitrary and doesn't effect a probability calculation. 
>> In fact, IIUC, there is not sufficient information to solve for a unique 
>> phase. So, I conclude,that the additional information required to uniquely 
>> determine a phase angle for a wf, lies in boundary conditions. If the 
>> problem of specifying a wf is defined as a boundary value problem, then, I 
>> believe, a unique phase angle can be calculated. CMIIAW. AG 
>> 
>> Bruce
>> 
>> I could use a handshake on this one. Roughly speaking, if one wants to 
>> express the state of a system as a superposition of eigenstates, how does 
>> one calculate the phase angles of the amplitudes for each eigenstate? AG
>> 
>> One doesn't. The phases are arbitrary unless one interferes the system with 
>> some other system.
>> 
>> Bruce 
>> 
>> If the phases are arbitrary and the system interacts with some other system, 
>> the new phases presumably are also arbitrary. So there doesn't seem to be 
>> any physical significance, yet this is the heart of decoherence theory as I 
>> understand it. What am I 

Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
>>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer 
>>> simulations of stories of them …
>>>
>>>
>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of 
>>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of 
>>> observable, you can infer that either:
>>>
>>> Mechanism is false, or
>>> You are dreaming, or
>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>>
>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
>>> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. 
>>
>>
>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low 
>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable 
>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical 
>> to me.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as 
>> the fundamental elements of nature. 
>>
>>
>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an 
>> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without 
>> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if 
>> invisible horses pull the car?
>>
>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
>> inconsistent with mechanism.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing 
>> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>>
>>
>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary 
>> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail 
>> the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
>> stories about vampires and werewolves.
>>
>>
>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
>> hypothesis.
>>
>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
>> your use of many links illustrates).
>>
>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
>> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go 
>> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary 
>> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, 
>> Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves 
>> Mechanism.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>  
>
> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be 
> a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
>
>
>
> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do 
> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any 
> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they 
> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.
>
>
>
>
> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a 
> possible *denotational semantics* for experiential processing, which *takes 
> place in matter*.
>
>
> That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to rough 
> for this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory implies it 
> appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and machine’s physics, 
> it will make sense to suppose some matter, and mechanism false, but that 
> is, before having evidences, quite speculative, and conceptually unclear. 
> It is almost like invoking a god in an explanation, to avoid an 
> explanation. 
>
> You added: < true nature of matter is appreciated.>>*
>
> What is the true nature of matter? By making matter primitive, it looks we 
> 

Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 10 Jan 2019, at 21:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 11:20:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 11:20, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:44:40 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 15:20, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> In terms of processing, I distinguish experience processing from 
>>> information processing.
>> 
>> 
>> OK. That is important, but the machines do that too. Information processing 
>> is like computing and proving, and can be described in 3p terms. It is the 
>> “[]p” in the list of self-referential modes. But the (Löbian) machine is 
>> aware that she cannot know, nor even define precisely, her own correctness, 
>> and that she cannot prove, if true, the equivalence between []p and “[]p & 
>> p”, so she is bounded to find Theatetetus definition of the soul or of the 
>> knower, which is pure 1p, and does not admits any pure 3p description. I 
>> would say that this might corresponds to your “experience” processing.
>> 
>> Then, eventually the notion of “matter” can be explained in term of the 
>> number experience processing (sharable for the quanta, and non sharable for 
>> the qualia). There is no need to invoke some inert substance that nobody can 
>> define nor test.
>> 
>> All computers (physical universal machine) and the non material universal 
>> machine are equivalent with respect to computability and emulability. Please 
>> note that they are NOT equivalent with respect to provability, even if, when 
>> self-referentially correct, their provability predicate will all obey to the 
>> same theology (G*), but will differ in their interpretation, contents, etc. 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/ 
>>> 
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> - pt
>>> 
>> 
>> This is interesting for a programming semantics (e.g. denotational) 
>> perspective, for experiential processing.
>> 
>> This reminds me of Galen Strawson's argument (which has nothing to do with 
>> stochasticism or determinism) about "ree will. He has a definition of "self" 
>> such that your self is a real thing
> 
> OK.
> 
> 
> 
>> (that includes your consciousness, which is also a real thing),
> 
> OK.
> 
> 
>> and to say your self has free will can't really be right, since you can't 
>> say (seriously) "I am free to not be my self" (since it is your self that is 
>> doing that): Whatever you chose, it is your self that is choosing.
> 
> 
> Once a universal machine introspect itself relatively to some universal 
> number, it becomes aware that it can predict itself completely and free-will 
> is a vague term alluding to the management of decision in absence of complete 
> information. 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> "Experience Processing": Maybe not this year [ International Conference on 
>> Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019  
>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/  ] …
> 
> I recently (it is nt used in my papers) consider that it implies a lot to 
> admit that all universal machine are maximally conscious, and that the 
> provability predicate (seen as an ideal self-referentially correct 
> brain/body) only filters the consciousness of the universal machine. When 
> unrpogrammed, and without input, its consciousness is quite different from 
> the mundane consciousness, it is more like a highly dissociated state of 
> consciousness, out of time and space, which needs a lot of spatio-temproral 
> experiences to develop the aproprioperception of a body. In the humain brain, 
> that sense is basically innate.
> 
> The experience is not “processed” by a code, it is a truth filtered by a 
> body/code. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> It the brain is biocomputing, as the human is a biocomputer [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_biocomputer ], then it is indeed 
> processing experience. (Processing is what computers do.)

Does biocomputing violate Church’s thesis? If yes, give me a biocomputable 
function from N to N which is not Turing-computable. If no, then the 
biocomputation are realised in arithmetic, and biology, like physics emerge 
from a statistics on all those computations. That can be tested (and has been).

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
> -- 
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Gödel-Löb Modal Logic (for Agent Programming)

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


at MIRI Research

http://intelligence.org/files/lob-notes-IAFF.pdf

- pt

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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
>>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer 
>>> simulations of stories of them …
>> 
>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of “bettable”. 
>> If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of observable, you can 
>> infer that either:
>> 
>> Mechanism is false, or
>> You are dreaming, or
>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>> 
>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
>> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
> 
> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical universe 
> is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low that we 
> need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable one) to 
> get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical to me.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as the 
>> fundamental elements of nature.
> 
> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing 
> theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it. 
> What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses 
> pull the car?
> 
> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of nature 
> comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not the 
> metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
> inconsistent with mechanism.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP) 
>> machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
> 
> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant of 
> provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the existence 
> of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both consciousness and 
> matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
>> stories about vampires and werewolves.
> 
> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
> hypothesis.
> 
> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To avoid 
> repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a conclusion 
> because we have another theory is not that much interesting, especially when 
> the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as your use of many 
> links illustrates).
> 
> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in matter 
> and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go in the 
> opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary matter 
> that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, Mechanism 
> would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves Mechanism.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be a 
> surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)


When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do not 
defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any universal 
machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they are 
universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.



> 
> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a possible 
> denotational semantics for experiential processing, which takes place in 
> matter.

That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to rough for 
this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory implies it 
appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and machine’s physics, it 
will make sense to suppose some matter, and mechanism false, but that is, 
before having evidences, quite speculative, and conceptually unclear. It is 
almost like invoking a god in an explanation, to avoid an explanation. 

You added: <>

What is the true nature of matter? By making matter primitive, it looks we 
avoid the question of its “true nature”, which with mechanism is purely 
phenomenological.


Bruno




> 
> (But that still can be a contribution, but it is by no means the complete 
> picture.)
> 
> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> 

Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2019-01-11 Thread agrayson2000


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 9:07:50 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 10 Jan 2019, at 22:08, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 11:07:51 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 07:58, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 11:37:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 2:52:27 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 10:45:01 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:42 AM  wrote:
>
>> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:46:41 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:46:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:

 On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 10:13:57 PM UTC, 
 agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 9:42:51 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:52 PM  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 11:42:06 AM UTC, 
>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM  wrote:
>
>>
>> *Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of 
>> interference and coherence, without introducing your theory of 
>> consciousness. Mainstream thinking today is that decoherence 
>> does occur, 
>> but this seems to imply preexisting coherence, and therefore 
>> interference 
>> among the component states of a superposition. If the 
>> superposition is 
>> expressed using eigenfunctions, which are mutually orthogonal -- 
>> implying 
>> no mutual interference -- how is decoherence possible, insofar 
>> as 
>> coherence, IIUC, doesn't exist using this basis? AG*
>>
>
> I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it 
> is used off an expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal 
> eigenvectors. The expansion in some eigenvector basis is written 
> as
>
>|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)
>
> where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the 
> dimension of the Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are 
> the complex 
> numbers a_i. Since these are complex coefficients, they contain 
> inherent 
> phases. It is the preservation of these phases of the expansion 
> coefficients that is meant by "maintaining coherence". So it is 
> the 
> coherence of the particular expansion that is implied, and this 
> has noting 
> to do with the mutual orthogonality or otherwise of the basis 
> vectors 
> themselves. In decoherence, the phase relationships between the 
> terms in 
> the original expansion are lost.
>
> Bruce 
>

 I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my 
 error -- confusing orthogonality with interference and coherence. 
 Let me 
 have your indulgence on a related issue. AG

>>>
>>> Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its 
>>> superposition expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with 
>>> variable 
>>> p. Does the phase of the original wf carry over into the 
>>> eigenfunctions as 
>>> identical for each, or can each component in the superposition have 
>>> different phases? I ask this because the probability determined by 
>>> any 
>>> complex amplitude is independent of its phase. TIA, AG 
>>>
>>
>> The phases of the coefficients are independent of each other.
>>
>
> When I formally studied QM, no mention was made of calculating the 
> phases since, presumably, they don't effect probability calculations. 
> Do 
> you have a link which explains how they're calculated? TIA, AG 
>

 I found some links on physics.stackexchange.com which show that 
 relative phases can effect probabilities, but none so far about how to 
 calculate any phase angle. AG 

>>>
>>> Here's the answer if anyone's interested. But what's the question? 
>>> How are wf phase angles calculated? Clearly, if you solve for the 
>>> eigenfunctions of some QM operator such as the p operator, any phase 
>>> angle 
>>> is possible; its value is completely arbitrary and doesn't effect a 
>>> 

Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:54, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 9:07:50 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 22:08, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 11:07:51 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 07:58, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 11:37:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 2:52:27 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 10:45:01 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:42 AM > wrote:
>>> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:46:41 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>>> wrote:
>>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:46:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>>> wrote:
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 10:13:57 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>>> wrote:
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 9:42:51 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:52 PM > wrote:
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 11:42:06 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>>> wrote:
>>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM > wrote:
>>> 
>>> Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of interference 
>>> and coherence, without introducing your theory of consciousness. Mainstream 
>>> thinking today is that decoherence does occur, but this seems to imply 
>>> preexisting coherence, and therefore interference among the component 
>>> states of a superposition. If the superposition is expressed using 
>>> eigenfunctions, which are mutually orthogonal -- implying no mutual 
>>> interference -- how is decoherence possible, insofar as coherence, IIUC, 
>>> doesn't exist using this basis? AG
>>> 
>>> I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it is used off an 
>>> expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal eigenvectors. The 
>>> expansion in some eigenvector basis is written as
>>> 
>>>|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)
>>> 
>>> where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the dimension of the 
>>> Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are the complex numbers a_i. 
>>> Since these are complex coefficients, they contain inherent phases. It is 
>>> the preservation of these phases of the expansion coefficients that is 
>>> meant by "maintaining coherence". So it is the coherence of the particular 
>>> expansion that is implied, and this has noting to do with the mutual 
>>> orthogonality or otherwise of the basis vectors themselves. In decoherence, 
>>> the phase relationships between the terms in the original expansion are 
>>> lost.
>>> 
>>> Bruce 
>>> 
>>> I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my error -- 
>>> confusing orthogonality with interference and coherence. Let me have your 
>>> indulgence on a related issue. AG
>>> 
>>> Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its superposition 
>>> expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with variable p. Does the 
>>> phase of the original wf carry over into the eigenfunctions as identical 
>>> for each, or can each component in the superposition have different phases? 
>>> I ask this because the probability determined by any complex amplitude is 
>>> independent of its phase. TIA, AG 
>>> 
>>> The phases of the coefficients are independent of each other.
>>> 
>>> When I formally studied QM, no mention was made of calculating the phases 
>>> since, presumably, they don't effect probability calculations. Do you have 
>>> a link which explains how they're calculated? TIA, AG 
>>> 
>>> I found some links on physics.stackexchange.com 
>>>  which show that relative phases can 
>>> effect probabilities, but none so far about how to calculate any phase 
>>> angle. AG 
>>> 
>>> Here's the answer if anyone's interested. But what's the question? How are 
>>> wf phase angles calculated? Clearly, if you solve for the eigenfunctions of 
>>> some QM operator such as the p operator, any phase angle is possible; its 
>>> value is completely arbitrary and doesn't effect a probability calculation. 
>>> In fact, IIUC, there is not sufficient information to solve for a unique 
>>> phase. So, I conclude,that the additional information required to uniquely 
>>> determine a phase angle for a wf, lies in boundary conditions. If the 
>>> problem of specifying a wf is defined as a boundary value problem, then, I 
>>> believe, a unique phase angle can be calculated. CMIIAW. AG 
>>> 
>>> Bruce
>>> 
>>> I could use a handshake on this one. Roughly speaking, if one wants to 
>>> express the state of a system as a superposition of eigenstates, how does 
>>> one calculate the phase angles of the amplitudes for each eigenstate? AG
>>> 
>>> One doesn't. The phases are arbitrary unless one interferes the system with 
>>> some other system.
>>> 
>>> Bruce 
>>> 
>>> If the phases are 

Interference of probability waves

2019-01-11 Thread agrayson2000
If probability values are always positive and between 0 and 1, how does one 
get destructive interference, or constructive interfering probability 
values within the acceptable range? Brent once answered this question but I 
have completely forgotten the answer. AG

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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift  wrote:


 Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, 
 werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in 
 computer simulations of stories of them …


 Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of 
 “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of 
 observable, you can infer that either:

 Mechanism is false, or
 You are dreaming, or
 You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
 descendent who want to fail us on reality).

 Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we 
 see exactly what mechanism predicts.

 Bruno




>>>
>>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. 
>>>
>>>
>>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
>>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low 
>>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable 
>>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical 
>>> to me.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as 
>>> the fundamental elements of nature. 
>>>
>>>
>>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an 
>>> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without 
>>> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if 
>>> invisible horses pull the car?
>>>
>>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
>>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
>>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
>>> inconsistent with mechanism.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing 
>>> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
>>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>>>
>>>
>>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary 
>>> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail 
>>> the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
>>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make 
>>> up stories about vampires and werewolves.
>>>
>>>
>>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
>>> hypothesis.
>>>
>>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
>>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
>>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
>>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
>>> your use of many links illustrates).
>>>
>>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
>>> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go 
>>> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary 
>>> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, 
>>> Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves 
>>> Mechanism.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>  
>>
>> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be 
>> a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
>>
>>
>>
>> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
>> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do 
>> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any 
>> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they 
>> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a 
>> possible *denotational semantics* for experiential processing, which *takes 
>> place in matter*.
>>
>>
>> That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to rough 
>> for this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory implies it 
>> appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and machine’s physics, 
>> it will make sense to suppose some matter, and mechanism false, but that 
>> is, before having evidences, quite 

Re: The Case Against Quantum Computing

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:23, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> “This scheme, like all other schemes for quantum computation, relies on 
> speculative technology, does not in its current form take into account all 
> possible sources of noise, unreliability and manufacturing error, and 
> probably will not work.”
> 
> Maybe they are right - quantum chips will only ultimately only be useful in 
> generating random numbers - but the above does sound like "fuel-powered 
> machines will never fly" in the 1800s.

Yes, especially with the error-tolerant types of quantum computation. It is the 
author (Dyakonov) which relies on negative speculative ideas about technology 
limitation, and as you illustrate, that is never a good idea. No doubt that 
quantum computations are very hard to realise, but for an argument of 
impossibility, I would need more sustained argumentation. I tend to agree with 
the rebuttal that Brent has also linked to.

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 5:45:47 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> Interesting articles. 
> 
> Brent 
> 
> 
>  Forwarded Message  
> 
> Another rebuttal: 
> https://www.hpcwire.com/2019/01/09/the-case-against-the-case-against-quantum-computing/
>  
> 
>  
> 
> On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 1:57 PM : 
> > In the IEEE Spectrum last week, Mikhail Dyakonov presented his overview of 
> > the field: 
> > 
> > https://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/hardware/the-case-against-quantum-computing
> >  
> > 
> >  
> 
> 
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Re: Materialism and Mechanism

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:57:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 10 Jan 2019, at 21:01, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 11:20:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 11:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 9:44:40 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 15:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> In terms of processing, I distinguish *experience processing* from 
>>> *information 
>>> processing.*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> OK. That is important, but the machines do that too. Information 
>>> processing is like computing and proving, and can be described in 3p terms. 
>>> It is the “[]p” in the list of self-referential modes. But the (Löbian) 
>>> machine is aware that she cannot know, nor even define precisely, her own 
>>> correctness, and that she cannot prove, if true, the equivalence between 
>>> []p and “[]p & p”, so she is bounded to find Theatetetus definition of the 
>>> soul or of the knower, which is pure 1p, and does not admits any pure 3p 
>>> description. I would say that this might corresponds to your “experience” 
>>> processing.
>>>
>>> Then, eventually the notion of “matter” can be explained in term of the 
>>> number experience processing (sharable for the quanta, and non sharable for 
>>> the qualia). There is no need to invoke some inert substance that nobody 
>>> can define nor test.
>>>
>>> All computers (physical universal machine) and the non material 
>>> universal machine are equivalent with respect to computability and 
>>> emulability. Please note that they are NOT equivalent with respect to 
>>> provability, even if, when self-referentially correct, their provability 
>>> predicate will all obey to the same theology (G*), but will differ in their 
>>> interpretation, contents, etc. 
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>>>
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>> This is interesting for a programming semantics (e.g. denotational) 
>> perspective, for experiential processing.
>>
>> This reminds me of Galen Strawson's argument (which has nothing to do 
>> with stochasticism or determinism) about "ree will. He has a definition of 
>> "self" such that your self is a real thing
>>
>>
>> OK.
>>
>>
>>
>> (that includes your consciousness, which is also a real thing), 
>>
>>
>> OK.
>>
>>
>> and to say your self has free will can't really be right, since you can't 
>> say (seriously) "I am free to not be my self" (since it is your self that 
>> is doing that): Whatever you chose, it is your self that is choosing.
>>
>>
>>
>> Once a universal machine introspect itself relatively to some universal 
>> number, it becomes aware that it can predict itself completely and 
>> free-will is a vague term alluding to the management of decision in absence 
>> of complete information. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> "Experience Processing": Maybe not this year [ International Conference 
>> on Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019  
>> http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ ] …
>>
>>
>> I recently (it is nt used in my papers) consider that it implies a lot to 
>> admit that all universal machine are maximally conscious, and that the 
>> provability predicate (seen as an ideal self-referentially correct 
>> brain/body) only filters the consciousness of the universal machine. When 
>> unrpogrammed, and without input, its consciousness is quite different from 
>> the mundane consciousness, it is more like a highly dissociated state of 
>> consciousness, out of time and space, which needs a lot of spatio-temproral 
>> experiences to develop the aproprioperception of a body. In the humain 
>> brain, that sense is basically innate.
>>
>> The experience is not “processed” by a code, it is a truth filtered by a 
>> body/code. 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> It the brain is biocomputing, as the human is a biocomputer [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_biocomputer ], then it is indeed 
> processing experience. (Processing is what computers do.)
>
>
> Does biocomputing violate Church’s thesis? If yes, give me a biocomputable 
> function from N to N which is not Turing-computable. If no, then the 
> biocomputation are realised in arithmetic, and biology, like physics emerge 
> from a statistics on all those computations. That can be tested (and has 
> been).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
 

*Slime Mold Can Solve Exponentially Complicated Problems in Linear Time*

http://www.sci-news.com/biology/slime-mold-problems-linear-time-06759.html


- pt

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Re: The Case Against Quantum Computing

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift

“This scheme, like all other schemes for quantum computation, relies on 
speculative technology, does not in its current form take into account all 
possible sources of noise, unreliability and manufacturing error, and 
probably will not work.”

Maybe they are right - quantum chips will only ultimately only be useful in 
generating random numbers - but the above does sound like "fuel-powered 
machines will never fly" in the 1800s.

- pt


On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 5:45:47 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
> Interesting articles. 
>
> Brent 
>
>
>  Forwarded Message  
>
> Another rebuttal: 
>
> https://www.hpcwire.com/2019/01/09/the-case-against-the-case-against-quantum-computing/
>  
>
> On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 1:57 PM : 
> > In the IEEE Spectrum last week, Mikhail Dyakonov presented his overview 
> of the field: 
> > 
> > 
> https://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/hardware/the-case-against-quantum-computing
>  
>
>

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Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:03, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 8:27:20 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 12:18 PM Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> On 1/10/2019 4:21 PM, John Clark wrote:
>> So even Feynman knew that there was no theoretical value for the FSC, alpha.
>> 
>> No,  he knew very well there was a theory that could come up with a value 
>> because his own Feynman Diagrams could do it. But what he didn't know and 
>> what nobody knows is why his theory came up with that particular pure number 
>> when he never specifically stuck that number into the rules on how the 
>> diagrams should operate.
> 
> The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are measured 
> independent of any Feynman diagrams of quantum field theory.  The calculation 
> using Feynman diagrams is of the anamolous magnetic moment.   A correction to 
> the value of g that depend on relativistic effects (hence the occurence of c 
> in the denominator).  The anamolous magnetic moment can be measure 
> experimentally and using Feynman's diagrams and the measured values of e, 
> hbar, and c a value can be calculated that includes the relativistic effects 
> of quantum field theory. That's why the agreement with measurement is 
> significant.
> 
> Right. The relation between fundamental physical constants, alpha = 
> e^2/hbar*c, is the closest one gets to a "theoretical" value for the FSC. But 
> that defines it in terms of other measured quantities. (Except that these 
> days, c is a defined number, not a measured physical parameter.) The CODATA 
> group use these theoretical relationships between constants, together with 
> the best available measurements, to make simultaneous fits to all the 
> constants and the data.That is where independent, "best values" for these 
> parameters come from. It is using these in the Feynman diagram calculation of 
> corrections to g-2 that gives the remarkable agreement between theory and 
> experiment. The point, though, is that the value of the FSC used in 
> calculating g-2 must be obtained independently of the g-2 measurement or else 
> it is not a test of QED.. Conversely, of course, the g-2 measurement can be 
> use to estimate the FSC independently of other measurements.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> As the Robert Geroch, James Hartle paper points out
> 
> the issue of whether the existence of an algorithm to implement a theory 
> should be adopted
> as a criterion for acceptable physical theories. 
> 
> if you want measurable constants to be computable, adopt a theory that does 
> so.

Some constant might be intrinsically not computable. Normally, the physical 
laws should at some point take into account the probability of (self) halting, 
which would introduce a non computable constant in nature, although it would be 
computable from the halting oracle. Mechanism prevents the physical reality 
from being entirely computable. I suspect Planck constant to be not computable, 
because if we extract QM from arithmetic, the Planck constant might very well 
related to the mechanist substitution level.

We cannot choose a theory according to our metaphysical state, especially in 
metaphysics. It has to be corroborated by the facts.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:16:13 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:03, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 8:27:20 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 12:18 PM Brent Meeker  
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On 1/10/2019 4:21 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> *So even Feynman knew that there was no theoretical value for the FSC, 
 alpha.*

>>>
>>> No,  he knew very well there was a theory that could come up with a 
>>> value because his own Feynman Diagrams could do it. But what he didn't know 
>>> and what nobody knows is why his theory came up with that particular pure 
>>> number when he never specifically stuck that number into the rules on how 
>>> the diagrams should operate. 
>>>
>>>
>>> The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are 
>>> measured independent of any Feynman diagrams of quantum field theory.  The 
>>> calculation using Feynman diagrams is of the anamolous magnetic moment.   A 
>>> correction to the value of g that depend on relativistic effects (hence the 
>>> occurence of c in the denominator).  The anamolous magnetic moment can be 
>>> measure experimentally and using Feynman's diagrams and the measured values 
>>> of e, hbar, and c a value can be calculated that includes the relativistic 
>>> effects of quantum field theory. That's why the agreement with measurement 
>>> is significant.
>>>
>>
>> Right. The relation between fundamental physical constants, alpha = 
>> e^2/hbar*c, is the closest one gets to a "theoretical" value for the FSC. 
>> But that defines it in terms of other measured quantities. (Except that 
>> these days, c is a defined number, not a measured physical parameter.) The 
>> CODATA group use these theoretical relationships between constants, 
>> together with the best available measurements, to make simultaneous fits to 
>> all the constants and the data.That is where independent, "best values" for 
>> these parameters come from. It is using these in the Feynman diagram 
>> calculation of corrections to g-2 that gives the remarkable agreement 
>> between theory and experiment. The point, though, is that the value of the 
>> FSC used in calculating g-2 must be obtained independently of the g-2 
>> measurement or else it is not a test of QED.. Conversely, of course, the 
>> g-2 measurement can be use to estimate the FSC independently of other 
>> measurements.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>
>
>
>
>
> As the Robert Geroch, James Hartle paper points out
>
> *the issue of whether the existence of an algorithm to implement a 
> theory should be adopted*
> *as a criterion for acceptable physical theories.* 
>
> if you want measurable constants to be computable, adopt a theory that 
> does so.
>
>
> Some constant might be intrinsically not computable. Normally, the 
> physical laws should at some point take into account the probability of 
> (self) halting, which would introduce a non computable constant in nature, 
> although it would be computable from the halting oracle. Mechanism prevents 
> the physical reality from being entirely computable. I suspect Planck 
> constant to be not computable, because if we extract QM from arithmetic, 
> the Planck constant might very well related to the mechanist substitution 
> level.
>
> We cannot choose a theory according to our metaphysical state, especially 
> in metaphysics. It has to be corroborated by the facts.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
Just as an example of another theory

*The Cellular Automaton Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics*
Gerard ’t Hooft
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1405.1548.pdf

What is computable in that theory?

Not saying this theory is a good one, but a theory is a theory is a theory.

- pt

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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:24:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, 
> werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in 
> computer simulations of stories of them …
>
>
> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of 
> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of 
> observable, you can infer that either:
>
> Mechanism is false, or
> You are dreaming, or
> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>
> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we 
> see exactly what mechanism predicts.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

 Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. 


 That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
 universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so 
 low 
 that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the 
 observable 
 one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical 
 to me.




 But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta 
 as the fundamental elements of nature. 


 You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an 
 existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without 
 assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if 
 invisible horses pull the car?

 Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
 nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
 the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
 inconsistent with mechanism.




 Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing 
 (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
 experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.


 With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary 
 variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail 
 the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
 consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?




 The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make 
 up stories about vampires and werewolves.


 The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the 
 computationalist hypothesis.

 Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
 avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
 conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
 especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
 your use of many links illustrates).

 All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
 matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go 
 in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary 
 matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, 
 Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves 
 Mechanism.

 Bruno



>>>  
>>>
>>> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would 
>>> be a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
>>> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do 
>>> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any 
>>> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they 
>>> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a 
>>> possible *denotational semantics* for experiential processing, which *takes 
>>> place in matter*.
>>>
>>>
>>> That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to 

Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Jan 2019, at 12:18, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:16:13 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:03, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 8:27:20 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>> On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 12:18 PM Brent Meeker > wrote:
>> On 1/10/2019 4:21 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>> So even Feynman knew that there was no theoretical value for the FSC, alpha.
>>> 
>>> No,  he knew very well there was a theory that could come up with a value 
>>> because his own Feynman Diagrams could do it. But what he didn't know and 
>>> what nobody knows is why his theory came up with that particular pure 
>>> number when he never specifically stuck that number into the rules on how 
>>> the diagrams should operate.
>> 
>> The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are measured 
>> independent of any Feynman diagrams of quantum field theory.  The 
>> calculation using Feynman diagrams is of the anamolous magnetic moment.   A 
>> correction to the value of g that depend on relativistic effects (hence the 
>> occurence of c in the denominator).  The anamolous magnetic moment can be 
>> measure experimentally and using Feynman's diagrams and the measured values 
>> of e, hbar, and c a value can be calculated that includes the relativistic 
>> effects of quantum field theory. That's why the agreement with measurement 
>> is significant.
>> 
>> Right. The relation between fundamental physical constants, alpha = 
>> e^2/hbar*c, is the closest one gets to a "theoretical" value for the FSC. 
>> But that defines it in terms of other measured quantities. (Except that 
>> these days, c is a defined number, not a measured physical parameter.) The 
>> CODATA group use these theoretical relationships between constants, together 
>> with the best available measurements, to make simultaneous fits to all the 
>> constants and the data.That is where independent, "best values" for these 
>> parameters come from. It is using these in the Feynman diagram calculation 
>> of corrections to g-2 that gives the remarkable agreement between theory and 
>> experiment. The point, though, is that the value of the FSC used in 
>> calculating g-2 must be obtained independently of the g-2 measurement or 
>> else it is not a test of QED.. Conversely, of course, the g-2 measurement 
>> can be use to estimate the FSC independently of other measurements.
>> 
>> Bruce
>> 
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> As the Robert Geroch, James Hartle paper points out
>> 
>> the issue of whether the existence of an algorithm to implement a theory 
>> should be adopted
>> as a criterion for acceptable physical theories. 
>> 
>> if you want measurable constants to be computable, adopt a theory that does 
>> so.
> 
> Some constant might be intrinsically not computable. Normally, the physical 
> laws should at some point take into account the probability of (self) 
> halting, which would introduce a non computable constant in nature, although 
> it would be computable from the halting oracle. Mechanism prevents the 
> physical reality from being entirely computable. I suspect Planck constant to 
> be not computable, because if we extract QM from arithmetic, the Planck 
> constant might very well related to the mechanist substitution level.
> 
> We cannot choose a theory according to our metaphysical state, especially in 
> metaphysics. It has to be corroborated by the facts.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Just as an example of another theory
> 
> The Cellular Automaton Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
> Gerard ’t Hooft
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1405.1548.pdf
> 
> What is computable in that theory?

Everything apparently, which makes it incompatible with mechanism, ironically 
enough.

I am not convinced either that super-determinisms makes sense, but this 
requires more thought.

I will take some time to read that book, but a first glance shows that it does 
not distinguish 3p, 1p, 1p-plural, so if mechanism is correct, something is 
necessarily missing. 

If QM is true and Mechanism is true, logicians and physicists should meet at 
the middle of the mind-body bridge, but ’t Hooft might depart a bit from the 
part of Everett which confirms mechanism.

> 
> Not saying this theory is a good one, but a theory is a theory is a theory.

Yes, that follows from x = x. We agree on everything apparently (despite 
working in antipodal conception of reality).

Bruno 



> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-11 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 8:18 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

* > The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are
> measured independent of any Feynman diagrams*
>

Absolutely correct. So if you use Feynman diagrams to predict what some
physical system is going to do, such as a physical system of 2 electrons
being hit by a photon of light with a wavelength small enough to contain
enough energy to prevent the electrons repulsion, then you'd better get a
number very close to the Fine Structure Constant. If you don't then Feynman
Diagrams aren't any good.

They didn't use 12,672 Feynman Diagrams because they wanted to know what
the Fine Structure Constant was, they already knew what that number was to
many decimal places from exparament, they used 12,672 Feynman Diagrams
because they wanted to see if Feynman Diagrams worked. And it turned out
they worked spectacularly well in that situation, and that gives scientists
great confidence they can use Feynman Diagrams in other situations to
calculate what other physical systems will do that involve the
Electromagnetic Force.

I asked this question twice before but have still not received an answer, if
checking a theoretical prediction against a measured value is not the way
to tell the difference between a good physical theory and a bad one what on
earth is?

John K Clark

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Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2019-01-11 Thread agrayson2000


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 10:11:10 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:54, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 9:07:50 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 22:08, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 11:07:51 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 07:58, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 11:37:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Monday, January 7, 2019 at 2:52:27 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, January 6, 2019 at 10:45:01 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:42 AM  wrote:
>>
>>> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:46:41 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:

 On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:46:13 PM UTC, 
 agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 10:13:57 PM UTC, 
> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 9:42:51 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:52 PM  wrote:
>>>
 On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 11:42:06 AM UTC, 
 agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> *Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context 
>>> of interference and coherence, without introducing your theory 
>>> of 
>>> consciousness. Mainstream thinking today is that decoherence 
>>> does occur, 
>>> but this seems to imply preexisting coherence, and therefore 
>>> interference 
>>> among the component states of a superposition. If the 
>>> superposition is 
>>> expressed using eigenfunctions, which are mutually orthogonal 
>>> -- implying 
>>> no mutual interference -- how is decoherence possible, insofar 
>>> as 
>>> coherence, IIUC, doesn't exist using this basis? AG*
>>>
>>
>> I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it 
>> is used off an expansion in terms of a set of mutually 
>> orthogonal 
>> eigenvectors. The expansion in some eigenvector basis is written 
>> as
>>
>>|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)
>>
>> where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the 
>> dimension of the Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are 
>> the complex 
>> numbers a_i. Since these are complex coefficients, they contain 
>> inherent 
>> phases. It is the preservation of these phases of the expansion 
>> coefficients that is meant by "maintaining coherence". So it is 
>> the 
>> coherence of the particular expansion that is implied, and this 
>> has noting 
>> to do with the mutual orthogonality or otherwise of the basis 
>> vectors 
>> themselves. In decoherence, the phase relationships between the 
>> terms in 
>> the original expansion are lost.
>>
>> Bruce 
>>
>
> I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my 
> error -- confusing orthogonality with interference and coherence. 
> Let me 
> have your indulgence on a related issue. AG
>

 Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its 
 superposition expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with 
 variable 
 p. Does the phase of the original wf carry over into the 
 eigenfunctions as 
 identical for each, or can each component in the superposition 
 have 
 different phases? I ask this because the probability determined by 
 any 
 complex amplitude is independent of its phase. TIA, AG 

>>>
>>> The phases of the coefficients are independent of each other.
>>>
>>
>> When I formally studied QM, no mention was made of calculating 
>> the phases since, presumably, they don't effect probability 
>> calculations. 
>> Do you have a link which explains how they're calculated? TIA, AG 
>>
>
> I found some links on physics.stackexchange.com which show that 
> relative phases can effect probabilities, but none so far about how 
> to 
> calculate any phase angle. AG 
>

 

Re: Interference of probability waves

2019-01-11 Thread agrayson2000


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 11:08:42 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:02, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> If probability values are always positive and between 0 and 1, how does 
> one get destructive interference, or constructive interfering probability 
> values within the acceptable range? Brent once answered this question but I 
> have completely forgotten the answer. AG
>
>
>
> The “whole problem of QM” is there. The coefficients of the terms in the 
> superposition are the “amplitude of probability”, and they can be negative. 
> The probability is given by the square of the amplitude of probability. As 
> long as we don’t make any observation, the wave acts like a wave, and the 
> amplitudes can be added or subtracted. To get the probability for the 
> measurement result on phi, we take the square of the amplitude (in the base 
> corresponding to what we want to measure).
>

*OK, but for positive amplitudes which are added, what guarantees that 
using Born's rule the result remains less than or equal to 1? AG *

>
> With Everett (non collapse), measurement is only self-entanglement. 
> Normally the Born rule should be justified from this, and some 
> justification exists, either based on frequency-operator (like Graham, 
> Preskill, and others) or by using Gleason theorem, etc. 
>
> Note that I do not claim that Everett formulation of QM solves all 
> conceptual problems of QM. But mechanism might and should. The psi wave 
> correspond to a description of a first person plural reality in a context 
> of many computations, like mechanism justifies, except that the price is 
> the needed to get the waves from the logic of the measure one observable 
> (provable, true and consistent). That makes mechanism testable, and QM 
> confirms it, but there are many arithmetical-physics proposition which 
> needs to still be tested. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> -- 
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> "Everything List" group.
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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
 that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer 
 simulations of stories of them …
>>> 
>>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of “bettable”. 
>>> If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of observable, you can 
>>> infer that either:
>>> 
>>> Mechanism is false, or
>>> You are dreaming, or
>>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
>>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>> 
>>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
>>> exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
>> 
>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low 
>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable 
>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical to 
>> me.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as 
>>> the fundamental elements of nature.
>> 
>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing 
>> theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it. 
>> What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses 
>> pull the car?
>> 
>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
>> inconsistent with mechanism.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP) 
>>> machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
>>> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>> 
>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant 
>> of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the 
>> existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
>>> stories about vampires and werewolves.
>> 
>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
>> hypothesis.
>> 
>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
>> your use of many links illustrates).
>> 
>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in matter 
>> and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go in the 
>> opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary matter 
>> that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, Mechanism 
>> would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves Mechanism.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be a 
>> surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
> 
> 
> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do 
> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any 
> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they 
> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a 
>> possible denotational semantics for experiential processing, which takes 
>> place in matter.
> 
> That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to rough for 
> this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory implies it 
> appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and machine’s physics, 
> it will make sense to suppose some matter, and mechanism false, but that is, 
> before having evidences, quite speculative, and conceptually unclear. It is 
> almost like invoking a god in an explanation, to avoid an explanation. 
> 
> You added: < nature of matter is 

Re: Interference of probability waves

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:02, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> If probability values are always positive and between 0 and 1, how does one 
> get destructive interference, or constructive interfering probability values 
> within the acceptable range? Brent once answered this question but I have 
> completely forgotten the answer. AG


The “whole problem of QM” is there. The coefficients of the terms in the 
superposition are the “amplitude of probability”, and they can be negative. The 
probability is given by the square of the amplitude of probability. As long as 
we don’t make any observation, the wave acts like a wave, and the amplitudes 
can be added or subtracted. To get the probability for the measurement result 
on phi, we take the square of the amplitude (in the base corresponding to what 
we want to measure).

With Everett (non collapse), measurement is only self-entanglement. Normally 
the Born rule should be justified from this, and some justification exists, 
either based on frequency-operator (like Graham, Preskill, and others) or by 
using Gleason theorem, etc. 

Note that I do not claim that Everett formulation of QM solves all conceptual 
problems of QM. But mechanism might and should. The psi wave correspond to a 
description of a first person plural reality in a context of many computations, 
like mechanism justifies, except that the price is the needed to get the waves 
from the logic of the measure one observable (provable, true and consistent). 
That makes mechanism testable, and QM confirms it, but there are many 
arithmetical-physics proposition which needs to still be tested. 

Bruno




> 
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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer 
> simulations of stories of them …
 
 Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of “bettable”. 
 If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of observable, you can 
 infer that either:
 
 Mechanism is false, or
 You are dreaming, or
 You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
 descendent who want to fail us on reality).
 
 Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
 exactly what mechanism predicts.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 
 
 Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
>>> 
>>> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
>>> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so low 
>>> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the observable 
>>> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical 
>>> to me.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as 
 the fundamental elements of nature.
>>> 
>>> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing 
>>> theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it. 
>>> What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses 
>>> pull the car?
>>> 
>>> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
>>> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
>>> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
>>> inconsistent with mechanism.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing (QuIP) 
 machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
 experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>>> 
>>> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant 
>>> of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the 
>>> existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
>>> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
 stories about vampires and werewolves.
>>> 
>>> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
>>> hypothesis.
>>> 
>>> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
>>> avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
>>> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
>>> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
>>> your use of many links illustrates).
>>> 
>>> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
>>> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go 
>>> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary 
>>> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, 
>>> Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves 
>>> Mechanism.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be a 
>>> surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
>> 
>> 
>> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
>> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do 
>> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any 
>> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they 
>> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a 
>>> possible denotational semantics for experiential processing, which takes 
>>> place in matter.
>> 
>> That seems a bit weird. Denotatotional semantics is OK (although to rough 
>> for this complex subject), but why assume Matter, when a theory implies it 
>> appearances. If we get a discrepancy between physics and machine’s physics, 
>> it 

Re: The Case Against Quantum Computing

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


New developments in *quantum materials science* may be needed.

https://www.nextplatform.com/2019/01/09/intels-quantum-efforts-tied-to-next-gen-materials-applications/


- pt

On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:15:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:23, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> “This scheme, like all other schemes for quantum computation, relies on 
> speculative technology, does not in its current form take into account all 
> possible sources of noise, unreliability and manufacturing error, and 
> probably will not work.”
>
> Maybe they are right - quantum chips will only ultimately only be useful 
> in generating random numbers - but the above does sound like "fuel-powered 
> machines will never fly" in the 1800s.
>
>
> Yes, especially with the error-tolerant types of quantum computation. It 
> is the author (Dyakonov) which relies on negative speculative ideas about 
> technology limitation, and as you illustrate, that is never a good idea. No 
> doubt that quantum computations are very hard to realise, but for an 
> argument of impossibility, I would need more sustained argumentation. I 
> tend to agree with the rebuttal that Brent has also linked to.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Jan 2019, at 12:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:24:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, werewolves, 
>> that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in computer 
>> simulations of stories of them …
> 
> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of 
> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of 
> observable, you can infer that either:
> 
> Mechanism is false, or
> You are dreaming, or
> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
> 
> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we see 
> exactly what mechanism predicts.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer.
 
 That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
 universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so 
 low that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the 
 observable one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also 
 problematical to me.
 
 
 
 
> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta as 
> the fundamental elements of nature.
 
 You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an existing 
 theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without assuming it. 
 What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if invisible horses 
 pull the car?
 
 Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
 nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
 the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which is 
 inconsistent with mechanism.
 
 
 
 
> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing 
> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
 
 With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary variant 
 of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would entail the 
 existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
 consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
 
 
 
> 
> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make up 
> stories about vampires and werewolves.
 
 The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the computationalist 
 hypothesis.
 
 Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. To 
 avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
 conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
 especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
 your use of many links illustrates).
 
 All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
 matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts go 
 in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary 
 matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, 
 Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves 
 Mechanism.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
  
 
 I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would be 
 a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
>>> physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I do 
>>> not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any 
>>> universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that they 
>>> are universal. Then we can test that theory as it implies the physical laws.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 At best, your theory (universal numbers, machines, dovetailers) is a 
 possible denotational semantics for experiential processing, which takes 
 

Re: Interference of probability waves

2019-01-11 Thread Brent Meeker



On 1/11/2019 2:02 AM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
If probability values are always positive and between 0 and 1, how 
does one get destructive interference, or constructive interfering 
probability values within the acceptable range? Brent once answered 
this question but I have completely forgotten the answer. AG


The wave function is a complex valued field, so it's values are not in 
[0,1).  Its complex value is usually called 'the probability 
/*amplitude*/' to distinguish it from a probability value.  Scott 
Aaronson has a nice discussion on his blog of how much of QM can be 
developed just by generalizing probability theory to allow complex values.


Brent

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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Brent Meeker




On 1/11/2019 3:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Anyway, the question is if it is true or false. In mathematics, 
mechanism restricts realism only to finite mathematics, or arithmetic. 
This is basically the idea that 2+2=4, and that this is true 
independently of me.


But "true"and "exist" are different things. Mathematics uses "exist" to 
mean "satisfies some predicate".  But we don't think Waston existed 
because he satisfied "the companion of Homes".


Brent

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Re: The Case Against Quantum Computing

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


It doesn't mention breakthroughs likely needed in quantum materials, as I 
mentioned.

- pt

On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 1:52:32 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
> Didn't you read the rebuttal to Dyahonov?
>
> Brent
>
> On 1/11/2019 2:23 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> “This scheme, like all other schemes for quantum computation, relies on 
> speculative technology, does not in its current form take into account all 
> possible sources of noise, unreliability and manufacturing error, and 
> probably will not work.”
>
> Maybe they are right - quantum chips will only ultimately only be useful 
> in generating random numbers - but the above does sound like "fuel-powered 
> machines will never fly" in the 1800s.
>
> - pt
>
>
> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 5:45:47 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>> Interesting articles. 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>>
>>  Forwarded Message  
>>
>> Another rebuttal: 
>>
>> https://www.hpcwire.com/2019/01/09/the-case-against-the-case-against-quantum-computing/
>>  
>>
>> On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 1:57 PM : 
>> > In the IEEE Spectrum last week, Mikhail Dyakonov presented his overview 
>> of the field: 
>> > 
>> > 
>> https://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/hardware/the-case-against-quantum-computing
>>  
>>
>> -- 
>
>
>

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Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:52:46 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
> Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its superposition 
> expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with variable p. Does the 
> phase of the original wf carry over into the eigenfunctions as identical 
> for each, or can each component in the superposition have different phases? 
> I ask this because the probability determined by any complex amplitude is 
> independent of its phase. TIA, AG 
>



This may help (or not) on what phases have to do with anything:

  
 http://muonray.blogspot.com/2016/03/the-path-integral-interpretation-of.html

- pt 


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Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-11 Thread Brent Meeker




On 1/11/2019 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I suspect Planck constant to be not computable, because if we extract 
QM from arithmetic, the Planck constant might very well related to the 
mechanist substitution level.


Planck's constant is not dimensionless. So its value is 1...in proper units.

Brent

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Re: Interference of probability waves

2019-01-11 Thread Brent Meeker




On 1/11/2019 3:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The “whole problem of QM” is there. The coefficients of the terms in 
the superposition are the “amplitude of probability”, and they can be 
negative. The probability is given by the square of the amplitude of 
probability. As long as we don’t make any observation, the wave acts 
like a wave, and the amplitudes can be added or subtracted. To get the 
probability for the measurement result on phi, we take the square of 
the amplitude (in the base corresponding to what we want to measure).


With Everett (non collapse), measurement is only self-entanglement.


Not "only".  The measurement device (person?) must have a reduced 
density matrix that is diagonalized by tracing over the other variables 
(environment?).


Brent

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Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-11 Thread Brent Meeker



On 1/11/2019 6:01 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 8:18 PM Brent Meeker > wrote:


/> The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values
are measured independent of any Feynman diagrams/


Absolutely correct. So if you use Feynman diagrams to predict what 
some physical system is going to do, such as a physical system of 2 
electrons being hit by a photon of light with a wavelength small 
enough to contain enough energy to prevent the electrons repulsion, 
then you'd better get a number very close to the Fine Structure 
Constant. If you don't then Feynman Diagrams aren't any good.


They didn't use 12,672 Feynman Diagramsbecause they wanted to know 
what the Fine Structure Constantwas, they already knew what that 
number was to many decimal places from exparament, they used 12,672 
Feynman Diagramsbecause they wanted to see if Feynman Diagrams worked. 
And it turned out they worked spectacularly well in that situation, 
and that gives scientists great confidence they can use Feynman 
Diagrams in other situations to calculate what other physical systems 
will do that involve the Electromagnetic Force.


There's always an interplay between theory and experiment.  It's 
completely analogous to Maxwell's discovery that light is EM waves. 
There were already experimental values of the permittivity and 
permeability of the vacuum and there were values for the speed of 
light.  Maxwell showed that his theory of EM predicted waves and using 
the permittivity and permeability values the speed of the waves matched 
that of light.  Now the speed of light is a defined constant and so are 
the permittivity and permeability of the vacuum.  So the connecting of 
the three values by a theory allows their values to be defined.  In the 
case of the anomalous magnetic moment of the electron, hbar and c are 
already defined constants. So quantum field theory (for which Feynman 
diagrams are just a calculational tool) linked them and e to g.


Brent

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Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2019-01-11 Thread Brent Meeker



On 1/11/2019 1:54 AM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:


*How can you prepare a system in any superposition state if you don't 
know the phase angles beforehand? You fail to distinguish measuring or 
assuming the phase angles from calculating them. One doesn't need 
Born's rule to calculate them. Maybe what Bruce meant is that you can 
never calculate them, but you can prepare a system with any relative 
phase angles. AG *


In practice you prepare a "system" (e.g. a photon) in some particular 
but unknown phase angle. Then you split the photon, or entangle it with 
another photon, so that you have two with definite relative phase 
angles, and with the same frequency,  then those two branches of the 
photon wave function can interfere, i.e. the photon the interferes with 
itself as in the Young's slits experiment.  So you only calculate the 
relative phase shift of the two branches of the wf of the photon, which 
is enough to define the interference pattern.


Brent

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Re: The Case Against Quantum Computing

2019-01-11 Thread Brent Meeker

Didn't you read the rebuttal to Dyahonov?

Brent

On 1/11/2019 2:23 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:


“This scheme, like all other schemes for quantum computation, relies 
on speculative technology, does not in its current form take into 
account all possible sources of noise, unreliability and manufacturing 
error, and probably will not work.”


Maybe they are right - quantum chips will only ultimately only be 
useful in generating random numbers - but the above does sound like 
"fuel-powered machines will never fly" in the 1800s.


- pt


On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 5:45:47 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

Interesting articles.

Brent


 Forwarded Message 

Another rebuttal:

https://www.hpcwire.com/2019/01/09/the-case-against-the-case-against-quantum-computing/




On Wed, Nov 21, 2018 at 1:57 PM :
> In the IEEE Spectrum last week, Mikhail Dyakonov presented his
overview of the field:
>
>

https://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/hardware/the-case-against-quantum-computing




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Re: Interference of probability waves

2019-01-11 Thread agrayson2000


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 7:46:19 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/11/2019 2:02 AM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> If probability values are always positive and between 0 and 1, how does 
> one get destructive interference, or constructive interfering probability 
> values within the acceptable range? Brent once answered this question but I 
> have completely forgotten the answer. AG
>
>
> The wave function is a complex valued field, so it's values are not in 
> [0,1).  Its complex value is usually called 'the probability *amplitude*' 
> to distinguish it from a probability value. 
>

I was aware of the foregoing. I'll check out your reference. Now I want to 
see how the probability values are constrained to be in the appropriate 
range after Born's rule is applied. AG 

> Scott Aaronson has a nice discussion on his blog of how much of QM can be 
> developed just by generalizing probability theory to allow complex values.
>
> Brent
>

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Re: Interference of probability waves

2019-01-11 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sat, Jan 12, 2019 at 8:01 AM  wrote:

> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 7:46:19 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>
>> On 1/11/2019 2:02 AM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> If probability values are always positive and between 0 and 1, how does
>> one get destructive interference, or constructive interfering probability
>> values within the acceptable range? Brent once answered this question but I
>> have completely forgotten the answer. AG
>>
>>
>> The wave function is a complex valued field, so it's values are not in
>> [0,1).  Its complex value is usually called 'the probability *amplitude*'
>> to distinguish it from a probability value.
>>
>
> I was aware of the foregoing. I'll check out your reference. Now I want to
> see how the probability values are constrained to be in the appropriate
> range after Born's rule is applied. AG
>

It is known as "unitarity". Evolution in QM by the Schroedinger equation is
always unitary -- given by exp(-iH) -- so probabilities can never exceed
unity, because the mod-squared of the evolution operator can never exceed
unity..

Bruce

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Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-11 Thread Lawrence Crowell
On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:18:21 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/10/2019 4:21 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
> *So even Feynman knew that there was no theoretical value for the FSC, 
>> alpha.*
>>
>
> No,  he knew very well there was a theory that could come up with a value 
> because his own Feynman Diagrams could do it. But what he didn't know and 
> what nobody knows is why his theory came up with that particular pure 
> number when he never specifically stuck that number into the rules on how 
> the diagrams should operate. 
>
>
> The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are 
> measured independent of any Feynman diagrams of quantum field theory.  The 
> calculation using Feynman diagrams is of the anamolous magnetic moment.   A 
> correction to the value of g that depend on relativistic effects (hence the 
> occurence of c in the denominator).  The anamolous magnetic moment can be 
> measure experimentally and using Feynman's diagrams and the measured values 
> of e, hbar, and c a value can be calculated that includes the relativistic 
> effects of quantum field theory. That's why the agreement with measurement 
> is significant.
>
> Brent
>

Everyone seems to be overlooking charge renormalization.

LC 

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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 8:41:19 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Jan 2019, at 12:40, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 5:24:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 11:30, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:03:10 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 Jan 2019, at 10:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:54:09 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 10 Jan 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:36:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Jan 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, January 9, 2019 at 4:06:08 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 Jan 2019, at 22:27, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> Why - in  numerical reality (UD)  - can't there be vampires, 
>> werewolves, that sort of things? They can certainly be "created" in 
>> computer simulations of stories of them …
>>
>>
>> Exactly, that is why we need to recover physics by a notion of 
>> “bettable”. If you see a vampire, not explained by the notion of 
>> observable, you can infer that either:
>>
>> Mechanism is false, or
>> You are dreaming, or
>> You belong to a “malevolent” simulation (à-la Bostrom, made by angry 
>> descendent who want to fail us on reality).
>>
>> Fortunately, we don’t see vampires, and up to know, thanks to QM, we 
>> see exactly what mechanism predicts.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> Seth Lloyd of course says the universe is a quantum computer. 
>
>
> That would entail Mechanism, but Mechanism entails that the physical 
> universe is not a quantum computer, unless our substitution level is so 
> low 
> that we need to emulate the whole physical reality (not just the 
> observable 
> one) to get “my” consciousness. The term “universe” is also problematical 
> to me.
>
>
>
>
> But what if there are qualia in addition to (or combined with) quanta 
> as the fundamental elements of nature. 
>
>
> You can always speculate a non existing theory to “contradict” an 
> existing theory. Why assumes something when we can explain it without 
> assuming it. What if the thermodynamic of the car motion works only if 
> invisible horses pull the car?
>
> Nature is also a imprecise term. All my scepticism on the existence of 
> nature comes from the observation of nature. The physical science are not 
> the metaphysical science, unless we postulate (weak) materialism, which 
> is 
> inconsistent with mechanism.
>
>
>
>
> Then the quantum computer - a purely quantum information processing 
> (QuIP) machine - needs to be upgraded to a qualium(+quantum) 
> experience(+information) processing (QuEP) machine.
>
>
> With mechanism, the qualia are “easily” explained by the necessary 
> variant of provability logic in G*. To add “material” to this would 
> entail 
> the existence of infinitely many p.zombie in arithmetic, and makes both 
> consciousness and matter into irreductible mystery. What is the goal?
>
>
>
>
> The universe (now a QuEP machine) could have conscious beings who make 
> up stories about vampires and werewolves.
>
>
> The arithmetical universe? Yes. Necessarily so with the 
> computationalist hypothesis.
>
> Some of your remark shows that you have not studied my contribution. 
> To avoid repetition, it might be useful to study it. Just criticising a 
> conclusion because we have another theory is not that much interesting, 
> especially when the “other theory” is not presented in a specific way (as 
> your use of many links illustrates).
>
> All what I can say is that you are logically coherent: you believe in 
> matter and you believe that mechanism is false. But the empirical facts 
> go 
> in the opposite direction. The empirical test of the existence of primary 
> matter that I have given fails up to now.The world would be Newtonian, 
> Mechanism would be judged reasonably refuted. Gödel + EPR-Everett saves 
> Mechanism.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
  

 I don't think your theory refutes the existence of matter. (That would 
 be a surprise to materials scientists, fro example.)



 When I first made the theory public, the opposition did not come from 
 physicists, nor mathematicians, but from materialist philosophers. But I 
 do 
 not defend any personal idea: it is not my theory, but the theory of any 
 universal machine “rich enough” to know (in the Theaetetus sense) that 
 they 
 are universal. Then we can test that theory as it 

Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:46:35 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/11/2019 6:01 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 8:18 PM Brent Meeker  > wrote:
>
> * > The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are 
>> measured independent of any Feynman diagrams*
>>
>
> Absolutely correct. So if you use Feynman diagrams to predict what some 
> physical system is going to do, such as a physical system of 2 electrons 
> being hit by a photon of light with a wavelength small enough to contain 
> enough energy to prevent the electrons repulsion, then you'd better get a 
> number very close to the Fine Structure Constant. If you don't then Feynman 
> Diagrams aren't any good. 
>
> They didn't use 12,672 Feynman Diagrams because they wanted to know what 
> the Fine Structure Constant was, they already knew what that number was 
> to many decimal places from exparament, they used 12,672 Feynman Diagrams 
> because they wanted to see if Feynman Diagrams worked. And it turned out 
> they worked spectacularly well in that situation, and that gives scientists 
> great confidence they can use Feynman Diagrams in other situations to 
> calculate what other physical systems will do that involve the 
> Electromagnetic Force.
>
>
> There's always an interplay between theory and experiment.  It's 
> completely analogous to Maxwell's discovery that light is EM waves. There 
> were already experimental values of the permittivity and permeability of 
> the vacuum and there were values for the speed of light.  Maxwell showed 
> that his theory of EM predicted waves and using the permittivity and 
> permeability values the speed of the waves matched that of light.  Now the 
> speed of light is a defined constant and so are the permittivity and 
> permeability of the vacuum.  So the connecting of the three values by a 
> theory allows their values to be defined.  In the case of the anomalous 
> magnetic moment of the electron, hbar and c are already defined constants.  
> So quantum field theory (for which Feynman diagrams are just a 
> calculational tool) linked them and e to g.
>
> Brent
>
>


If Feynman Diagrams (tools) are sufficient (to match experimental data) 
then Quantum Field Theory can be thrown in the wastebasket.

- pt 

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Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-11 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sat, Jan 12, 2019 at 9:29 AM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:18:21 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>> On 1/10/2019 4:21 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> *So even Feynman knew that there was no theoretical value for the FSC,
>>> alpha.*
>>>
>>
>> No,  he knew very well there was a theory that could come up with a
>> value because his own Feynman Diagrams could do it. But what he didn't know
>> and what nobody knows is why his theory came up with that particular pure
>> number when he never specifically stuck that number into the rules on how
>> the diagrams should operate.
>>
>>
>> The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are
>> measured independent of any Feynman diagrams of quantum field theory.  The
>> calculation using Feynman diagrams is of the anamolous magnetic moment.   A
>> correction to the value of g that depend on relativistic effects (hence the
>> occurence of c in the denominator).  The anamolous magnetic moment can be
>> measure experimentally and using Feynman's diagrams and the measured values
>> of e, hbar, and c a value can be calculated that includes the relativistic
>> effects of quantum field theory. That's why the agreement with measurement
>> is significant.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Everyone seems to be overlooking charge renormalization.
>

Do you really think that that is relevant? How?

Bruce

LC
>

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Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-11 Thread Lawrence Crowell
On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:51:24 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Sat, Jan 12, 2019 at 9:29 AM Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:18:21 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>> On 1/10/2019 4:21 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> *So even Feynman knew that there was no theoretical value for the FSC, 
 alpha.*

>>>
>>> No,  he knew very well there was a theory that could come up with a 
>>> value because his own Feynman Diagrams could do it. But what he didn't know 
>>> and what nobody knows is why his theory came up with that particular pure 
>>> number when he never specifically stuck that number into the rules on how 
>>> the diagrams should operate. 
>>>
>>>
>>> The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are 
>>> measured independent of any Feynman diagrams of quantum field theory.  The 
>>> calculation using Feynman diagrams is of the anamolous magnetic moment.   A 
>>> correction to the value of g that depend on relativistic effects (hence the 
>>> occurence of c in the denominator).  The anamolous magnetic moment can be 
>>> measure experimentally and using Feynman's diagrams and the measured values 
>>> of e, hbar, and c a value can be calculated that includes the relativistic 
>>> effects of quantum field theory. That's why the agreement with measurement 
>>> is significant.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> Everyone seems to be overlooking charge renormalization.
>>
>
> Do you really think that that is relevant? How?
>
> Bruce 
>

The physical charge is a bare mass corrected by a correction term e = e' + 
δe. Charge adjusts with energy in a renormalization group flow of 
adjustable parameters. At EW unification energy the fine structure constant 
is around 1/128. As E → 0 the RG flow reaches an attractor point that is 
the α = e^2/4πεħc. This is computed for the renormalized physical charge e 
from all radiative corrections possible.

LC
 

>
> LC 
>>
>

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Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-11 Thread Brent Meeker



On 1/11/2019 1:57 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 2:46:35 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 1/11/2019 6:01 AM, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 8:18 PM Brent Meeker > wrote:

/> The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three
values are measured independent of any Feynman diagrams/


Absolutely correct. So if you use Feynman diagrams to predict
what some physical system is going to do, such as a physical
system of 2 electrons being hit by a photon of light with a
wavelength small enough to contain enough energy to prevent the
electrons repulsion, then you'd better get a number very close to
the Fine Structure Constant. If you don't then Feynman Diagrams
aren't any good.

They didn't use 12,672 Feynman Diagramsbecause they wanted to
know what the Fine Structure Constantwas, they already knew what
that number was to many decimal places from exparament, they used
12,672 Feynman Diagramsbecause they wanted to see if Feynman
Diagrams worked. And it turned out they worked spectacularly well
in that situation, and that gives scientists great confidence
they can use Feynman Diagrams in other situations to calculate
what other physical systems will do that involve the
Electromagnetic Force.


There's always an interplay between theory and experiment. It's
completely analogous to Maxwell's discovery that light is EM
waves. There were already experimental values of the permittivity
and permeability of the vacuum and there were values for the speed
of light.  Maxwell showed that his theory of EM predicted waves
and using the permittivity and permeability values the speed of
the waves matched that of light.  Now the speed of light is a
defined constant and so are the permittivity and permeability of
the vacuum.  So the connecting of the three values by a theory
allows their values to be defined.  In the case of the anomalous
magnetic moment of the electron, hbar and c are already defined
constants.  So quantum field theory (for which Feynman diagrams
are just a calculational tool) linked them and e to g.

Brent




If Feynman Diagrams (tools) are sufficient (to match experimental 
data) then Quantum Field Theory can be thrown in the wastebasket.


?? Feynman Diagrams are just a mathematical trick for summing up terms 
to approximate the propagator of QFT.


Brent

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Re: UDA and the origin of physics

2019-01-11 Thread Brent Meeker




On 1/11/2019 2:36 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
Of course there are math professors (Dr. Z at Rutgers) who teach on 
the evils of Platonism. And "Truth" is like God, as Rorty said.






That is a good summary of Plato. Hirsschberger sum up Plato by saying 
that the God of Plato is Truth. Not the one we make public, but the 
one we search.


Now, all my life I have got the feeling that Plato is dismissed, and 
badly seen, notably in opposition to Aristotle. But Aristotle did not 
understood Plato, except in a curious passage of the “metaphysics” 
where he seems to suddenly got the point, and seems to come back to 
Plato without saying (but that is an optimistic reading of Aristotle’s 
metaphysics, To be sure I found some scholars who saw that too, like 
Gerson.


That "truth is God" makes sense for a computationalist, because 
“truth” when encompassing the description of a machine at its correct 
substitution level, is no more definable by that machine. Yes, Truth, 
and semantics, is very much like the platonician notion of God. You 
force me to agree with Rorty on this!




At the same time Rorty said,"Truth is like God" he was a "strict 
atheist".  He was also a pragmatist, meaning he thought the measure of 
truth was solely whether it worked.  So I'd gather that Rorty didn't 
think that "truth" was very useful idea; which is confirmed by him being 
called an "ironist" by his friends.


Brent

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Solomonoff induction and mechanism

2019-01-11 Thread Mason Green
Solomonoff’s method of induction seems like a good fit for a mechanist view of 
things. For instance, it could be used to assign a relative probability to the 
universe being generated by a universal dovetailer: 2^(-K) * m, where K is the 
Kolmogorov complexity of the universal dovetailer and m is the measure the 
dovetailer assigns to universes like ours.

This formula implies that a (more complex) non-universal dovetailer might be 
preferable _if_ it assigned a much higher measure to universes like ours. Such 
a dovetailer might, for instance, output only (or mostly) habitable worlds, 
instead of outputting mostly uninhabitable worlds as the standard UD does, and 
the higher resulting measure would offset the increased Kolmogorov complexity.

If we live in a highly “atypical” universe, that might also affect how we 
should do Solomonoff induction. For instance if we knew that we lived in a 
universe with much less suffering than an “average” inhabited universe, that 
could imply we were generated by a dovetailer that doesn’t like suffering. If 
the opposite is true and we live in a “mean world”, that means we might be 
generated by a sadistic dovetailer, etc.

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