I and II are subjective

2012-10-19 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Craig Weinberg Thankls for your help. I will considerI and II asbjective. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/19/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Craig Weinberg Receiver: everything-list Time:

Re: Re: Re: Why self-organization programs cannot be alive

2012-10-19 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Russell Standish Bernard cells are mechanical, not caused by a self as agent but by laws of physics. They may be self-organizing, but there's no self to organize things. Photosynthesis is a life process, not mechanical because it does things no computer program can do, namely turn light

Re: Re: Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Russell Standish Not so. A zombie can't converse with you, a real person can. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/19/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Russell Standish Receiver: everything-list

Re: Re: Re: The objective world of autopoesis

2012-10-19 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Terren Suydam IMHO a quale is the stuff of an unperceived-as-of-yet input sensory signal. It is unprocessed Firstness, so not sure of its status. My less than certain opinion is that being unprocessed, it is not yet an experience. IMHO nobody knows much about how that Firstness is turned

Re: Re: Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in Doubt

2012-10-19 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Richard Ruquist Don't take this too seriously, but my dislike of the idea of multiple universes makes me suggest that the other universes could be just potential or probable universes. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/19/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody

Re: RE: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread Roger Clough
Hi William R. Buckley You can speak to a potential test subject, but it can only reply if it indeed has a mind. This is the Turing test, the results of which are not certain. But it is the only test I can think of unless you want to get into the Chinese room argument, etc. If it does not

Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread Alberto G. Corona
A few discoveries of evolutionary psichology may help. According with EP the mind is composed of many functional modules, each one for a different purpose. many of them are specific of each specie. Each of these modules is the result of the computation of certain areas of the brain. A functional

Could Dennett be a zombie ?

2012-10-19 Thread Roger Clough
Hi Stephen P. King Maybe I'm wrong, but Dennett could be a zombie, because he seems to deny 1p. He also denies qualia, so you could test his personhood by asking him what color your eyes are. Or if he is awake or asleep. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/19/2012 Forever is a long time,

RE: RE: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread William R. Buckley
Hi William R. Buckley You can speak to a potential test subject, but it can only reply if it indeed has a mind. This is an assumption you make. This is the Turing test, the results of which are not certain. But it is the only test I can think of unless you want to get into the Chinese

Re: Could Dennett be a zombie ?

2012-10-19 Thread Stephen P. King
On 10/19/2012 6:35 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Maybe I'm wrong, but Dennett could be a zombie, because he seems to deny 1p. He also denies qualia, so you could test his personhood by asking him what color your eyes are. Or if he is awake or asleep. Hi Roger, We have no

Re: Continuous Game of Life

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:19, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal IMHO all life must have some degree of consciousness or it cannot perceive its environment. Are you sure? Would you say that the plants are conscious? I do think so, but I am not sure they have self-consciousness.

Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as ifratherthanis

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 17 Oct 2012, at 20:01, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/17/2012 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Dear Stephen, On 16 Oct 2012, at 16:03, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/16/2012 9:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Even ideal machines driven by reason have to face their irrationality when looking

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complex computations ?

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 17 Oct 2012, at 20:16, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/17/2012 11:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Oct 2012, at 20:17, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 9:08:49 AM UTC-4, Stephen Paul King wrote: On 10/16/2012 8:54 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
But arithmetic + comp might support string theory, and has too, if matter is strings. Also, arithmetic is simpler as it can be taught in high school, and I think that you need arithmetic to understand string theory. String theory assume the quantum theory, but the UD Argument shows that

Re: Computational Autopoetics 1

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 17 Oct 2012, at 23:57, Russell Standish wrote: On Wed, Oct 17, 2012 at 07:19:09PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Oct 2012, at 08:07, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 03:39:18PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Oct 2012, at 23:27, Russell Standish wrote: So any

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 17 Oct 2012, at 15:15, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/17/2012 8:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:33, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/16/2012 9:20 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Thanks. My mistake was to say that P's position is that consciousness, arises at (or

Re: Continuous Game of Life

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 17 Oct 2012, at 17:04, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, October 17, 2012 10:16:52 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Oct 2012, at 18:56, Craig Weinberg wrote: Two men and two women live together. The woman has a child. 2+2=5 You mean two men + two women + a baby = five persons.

Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 17 Oct 2012, at 19:12, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Sorry, I lost the thread on the doctor, and don't know what Craig believes about the p-zombie. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie A philosophical zombie or p-zombie in the philosophy of mind and perception is

Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 17 Oct 2012, at 15:28, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/17/2012 8:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 16 Oct 2012, at 15:00, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/16/2012 8:23 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Tuesday, October 16, 2012 4:02:44 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: There is of course the idea that the

RE: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread William R. Buckley
Solipsism makes everyone zombie except you. But in some context some people might conceive that zombie exists, without making everyone zombie. Craig believes that computers, if they might behave like conscious individuals would be a zombie, but he is no solipsist. There is no test for

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 17 Oct 2012, at 21:57, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/17 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 17 Oct 2012, at 10:12, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Life may support mathematics. Arithmetic may support life. It is full of life and dreams. Life is a computation devoted to making

Re: Re: Re: The objective world of autopoesis

2012-10-19 Thread Terren Suydam
Hi Roger, I'm not sure your notion of quale is the one commonly held, for instance see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quale. Arguing and otherwise communicating about this stuff is hard enough even when everyone is using the same definition. It's impossible if words can mean what we want them to.

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 17 Oct 2012, at 22:02, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/17 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com 2012/10/17 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 17 Oct 2012, at 10:12, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Life may support mathematics. Arithmetic may support life. It is full of life and

Re: Is consciousness just an emergent property of overly complexcomputations ?

2012-10-19 Thread Stephen P. King
On 10/19/2012 1:37 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Oct 2012, at 22:02, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2012/10/17 Alberto G. Corona agocor...@gmail.com mailto:agocor...@gmail.com 2012/10/17 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be On 17 Oct 2012, at 10:12,

Re: Computational Autopoetics 1

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 17 Oct 2012, at 23:09, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/17/2012 1:29 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Oct 2012, at 08:52, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/17/2012 2:07 AM, Russell Standish wrote: The self is directly related to the Dx = xx trick, for me. The Dx=xx trick is about

Code length = probability distribution

2012-10-19 Thread Stephen P. King
Hi, I was looking up a definition and found the following: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_description_length Central to MDL theory is the one-to-one correspondence between code length functions and probability distributions. (This follows from the Kraft-McMillan inequality.) For any

Re: Solipsism = 1p

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 18 Oct 2012, at 20:05, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think you can tell is 1p isn't just a shell by trying to converse with it. If it can converse, it's got a mind of its own. I agree with. It has mind, and its has a soul (but he has no real bodies. I can argue this follows

Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 19 Oct 2012, at 11:41, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Russell Standish Not so. A zombie can't converse with you, a real person can. By definition a (philosophical) zombie can converse with you. A zombie is en entity assumed not having consciousness, nor any private subjective life, and

Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 19 Oct 2012, at 12:26, Alberto G. Corona wrote: A few discoveries of evolutionary psichology may help. According with EP the mind is composed of many functional modules, each one for a different purpose. many of them are specific of each specie. Each of these modules is the result of

Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis

2012-10-19 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I do know that it's got to be one or the other. But I have just proved to you that it cannot be either one. So you have just proven that X is not Y and X is not not Y. BULLSHIT! you don't have the wisdom to know when

Re: Code length = probability distribution

2012-10-19 Thread meekerdb
On 10/19/2012 10:54 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, I was looking up a definition and found the following: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_description_length Central to MDL theory is the one-to-one correspondence between code length functions and probability distributions. (This

Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis

2012-10-19 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Friday, October 19, 2012 5:03:05 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Oct 18, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: I do know that it's got to be one or the other. But I have just proved to you that it cannot be either one. So you have just proven that X is not

Re: A test for solipsism

2012-10-19 Thread Alberto G. Corona
2012/10/19 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be On 19 Oct 2012, at 12:26, Alberto G. Corona wrote: A few discoveries of evolutionary psichology may help. According with EP the mind is composed of many functional modules, each one for a different purpose. many of them are specific of each specie.

Re: Code length = probability distribution

2012-10-19 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Oct 19, 2012 at 02:03:27PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 10/19/2012 10:54 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi, I was looking up a definition and found the following: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_description_length Central to MDL theory is the one-to-one correspondence between

Re: Re: Re: Why self-organization programs cannot be alive

2012-10-19 Thread Russell Standish
On Fri, Oct 19, 2012 at 05:39:58AM -0400, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Russell Standish Bernard cells are mechanical, not caused by a self as agent but by laws of physics. They may be self-organizing, but there's no self to organize things. Photosynthesis is a life process, not mechanical

Re: I believe that comp's requirement is one of as if ratherthanis

2012-10-19 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Oct 19, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If you can do something for your own personal reasons then you have free will. If you demand that personal reasons still must always come from outside of the person themselves[...] But I don't demand that at all! You might

Re: Continuous Game of Life

2012-10-19 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Oct 16, 2012 at 12:56 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote: So lets see, a giant junkyard magnet is a devastating logical argument but a junkyard car crusher is not. Explain to me how that works. Because talking about how you want to kill me in an argument about computers

Re: Continuous Game of Life

2012-10-19 Thread John Clark
On Wed, Oct 17, 2012 at 10:13 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Darwin does not need to be wrong. Consciousness role can be deeper, in the evolution/selection of the laws of physics from the coherent dreams (computations from the 1p view) in arithmetic. I have no idea what that