Re: Extended Wigner’s Friend

2018-12-03 Thread Brent Meeker




On 12/3/2018 5:47 PM, Mason Green wrote:

Here’s a recent editorial I found in the magazine arguing against Many-Worlds 
on the grounds that it denies the reality of experience or the self. 
(https://www.quantamagazine.org/why-the-many-worlds-interpretation-of-quantum-mechanics-has-many-problems-20181018/)

Well, if we don’t want many-worlds or subjectivism, than the only other option 
looks like it’d be to modify QM itself. Some form of digital physics might 
work, otherwise we could have objective collapse (either random, or else 
there’s something/someone outside the universe choosing which path the universe 
follows).


Remember, QM is not compatible with general relativity.  It is often 
assumed that the problem is finding a quantum theory of spacetime. But 
the long sought theory may also require some modification of QM or 
otherwise throw light on the measurement problem.  For example, 
Penrose's gravitationally induced collapse might work out.


Brent

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Re: Extended Wigner’s Friend

2018-12-03 Thread Brent Meeker

You should read Scott Aaronson's take:

https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=3975

Brent

On 12/3/2018 5:15 PM, Mason Green wrote:

There’s a new article in Quanta Magazine 
(https://www.quantamagazine.org/frauchiger-renner-paradox-clarifies-where-our-views-of-reality-go-wrong-20181203/)
 about a thought experiment that poses trouble for certain interpretations of 
quantum mechanics.

Specifically it implies that either 1. there are many worlds, 2. quantum 
mechanics will need to be modified (as in objective collapse theories), or 3. 
reality is subjective (solipsism?). Exciting stuff!

-Mason



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Re: Measuring a system in a superposition of states vs in a mixed state

2018-12-03 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/3/2018 8:50 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 3 Dec 2018, at 10:35, Philip Thrift > wrote:




On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 8:17:54 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 12/2/2018 5:14 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 4:25:04 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 12/2/2018 11:42 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 8:13:48 AM UTC-6,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

*
*
*Obviously, from a one-world perspective, only one
history survives for a single trial. But to even
grossly approach anything describable as "Darwinian",
you have to identify characteristics of histories which
contribute positively or negatively wrt surviving but I
don't see an inkling of that. IMO, Quantum Darwinism is
at best a vacuous restatement of the measurement
problemt; that we don't know why we get what we get. AG*





In the *sum over histories* interpretation - of the
double-slit experiment, for example - each history carries
a unit complex number - like a gene - and this gene
reenforces (positively) or interferes (negatively) with
other history's genes in the sum.


But I thought you said the ontology was that only one
history "popped out of the Lottery machine"?  Here you seem
to contemplate an ensemble of histories, all those ending at
the given spot, as being real.

Brent





All are real until all but one dies.
RIP: All those losing histories.


The trouble with that is the Born probability doesn't apply to
histories, it applies to results.  So your theory says nothing
about the probability of the fundamental ontologies.

Brent






The probability distribution on the space of histories is provided by 
the path integral.


Except that isn't true. A probability (or probability density) is 
provided for a bundle of histories joining two events.  It doesn't not 
provide a probability of a single history.


Brent



I agree, and this statement can be made rather rigorously in the 
approach of Griffith and Omnes, except that Omnes eventually add an 
axiom of irrationality to extract a unique physical reality from the 
formalism. He said it, at least, explicitly: like saying “and now 
there is a miracle”. He says that at this stage, we need 
irrationalism. But that appears in the last ten sentences of a rather 
quite rational book.
Well, the point is that we can generalise the Born rule for making 
sense on some probabilities on "consistent histories”.
(But I am in trouble (now) on how to handle the GHZ state in term of 
(Griffith and Omnes)-histories (3-particle-GHZ = 1/sqrt(2)(up up up + 
down down down)).






*Backward causation, hidden variables and the meaning of completenes*s
[ https://www.ias.ac.in/article/fulltext/pram/056/02-03/0199-0209 ]

/Feynman’s path integral approach, calculation of the probability of 
the outcome in question depends on an integration over the possible 
individual paths between the given initial state and the given final 
state, each weighted by a complex number. The fact that the weights 
associated with individual paths are complex makes it impossible to 
interpret them as real valued probabilities, associated with a 
classical statistical distribution of possibilities./

/
/
/However, there is no such difficulty at the level of the entire 
‘bundle’ of paths which comprise the path integral. If we think of 
the hidden reality as the instantiation not of one path rather than 
another but of one entire bundle rather than another, then the 
quantum mechanical probabilities can be thought of as classical 
probability distributions over such elements of reality. (For 
example, suppose we specify the boundary conditions in terms of the 
electron source, the fact that two slits are open, and the fact that 
a detector screen is present at a certain distance on the opposite 
side of the central screen. We then partition the detector screen, so 
as to define possible outcomes for the experiment. For each element 
O_i of this partition, there is a bundle B_i of Feynman paths, 
constituting the path integral used in calculating the probability of 
outcome O_i . We have a classical probability distribution/

/over the set of such B_i ./

One could stop at /history bundles/ as the sample space, or the 
"hidden reality" could be that /one history/ is selected at random 
from the history bundle. That could occur with t*ime symmetry* 
(retrocausality): The one path is chosen at random from a history 
bundle at the source in the present from the distribution determined 
on the history bundles in the future.



With mechanism, the randomness and the unicity is a first person 
(plural) experience only, and seems to me no more astonishing than in 
the amoeba duplication, or than in the Helsinki—> 

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-03 Thread Brent Meeker




On 12/3/2018 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:06, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 12/2/2018 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Language have no relation with truth a priori. Theories might have. Semantics 
are truth “by definition”, by relativising it to the notion of model/reality.


Then what is this "true" and "false" which you attribute to the propositions of 
modal logic?

In  classical logic, truth is any object in a set of two objects, or it is the 
supremum in a Boolean algebra. In propositional logic a “world” is defined by 
any function from the set of atomic letters to {t, f}.


Right.  T and F are just formal markers in logic and the rules of 
inference are supposed to preserve T.




Then if the theory is “rich enough”, truth can be meta-defined by “satisfied by 
the structure (N, 0, s, +, *).
Of course, this presuppose the intuitive understanding of 2+2=4, etc.

In our case, as all modal formula are arithmetical formula, it is the usual 
informal mathematical notion just above (arithmetical truth, satisfaction by 
the usual standard model).


That's satisfaction relative to some particular axioms and rules of 
inference.




That one can be define by V(‘p’) means the same as p. It is Tarski’s idea that ‘p’ 
is true when p, or when it is the case that p. Like wise, to say 
Provable-and-true(p) we use []p & p.


That's the correspondence theory of truth, which is what ordinary 
discourse and physics assume.  So there are at least three kinds of 
"true". To which we might add the Trump theory of truth, "If it makes me 
look good it's true."




I recommend the book by Torkel Franzen “Inexhaustibility” for a more detailed 
explanation of the concept of truth.


I have the book but I haven't read it (so many books, so little time).

Brent




We can come back, but I suggest to come back on this only when we need it, as 
this is an very rich and complex subject by itself.

Bruno






Brent

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Re: Extended Wigner’s Friend

2018-12-03 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Tue, 4 Dec 2018 at 12:47, Mason Green  wrote:

> Here’s a recent editorial I found in the magazine arguing against
> Many-Worlds on the grounds that it denies the reality of experience or the
> self. (
> https://www.quantamagazine.org/why-the-many-worlds-interpretation-of-quantum-mechanics-has-many-problems-20181018/
> )
>
> Well, if we don’t want many-worlds or subjectivism, than the only other
> option looks like it’d be to modify QM itself. Some form of digital physics
> might work, otherwise we could have objective collapse (either random, or
> else there’s something/someone outside the universe choosing which path the
> universe follows).
>

That article just claims, without explanation, that it would be impossible
to have consciousness if you were continually being duplicated. I don't
think you should accept this without further thought.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


Virus-free.
www.avast.com

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Re: The most accurate clock ever

2018-12-03 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/3/2018 5:24 AM, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 11:54 PM Brent Meeker > wrote:


>>If you are on the Earth's surface and you raise a clock by one
centimeter you've increased its distance from the earth's
center by one part in 637,000,000, it is now 1.16
times further away. The intensity of the gravitational field
is proportional to the square of the distance so gravity was
1.31 times stronger before you raised raised the
clock. Cavendish did not have a scale good enough to measure
that, even today the very best (and very expensive) lab weight
scale might be able to measure a change of 1.001 but the
clock can do several hundred times better. 



> He was measuring the change in a much smaller gravitational field.


Cavendish was measuring the displacement of a torsion balance parallel 
to the Earth's surface caused by a weak but constant gravitational 
field, there was no change whatsoever in the gravitational field 
parallel to the Earth's surface at any time during the exparament. If 
he had 2 *PRECISELY* identical cannonballs on the ends of a rod, 
placed a pivot point *PRECISELY*at the center and place one 
cannonball one centimeter higher than the other he would have 
transformed his torsion balance into a weight balance and 
theoretically he could have observed that the balance moved and 
measured the small difference in strength in the large field at 2 
different places, but Cavendish couldn't come close to achieving the 
sort of precision required to do that 220 years ago, we can't even do 
that today.


/> He was measuring the difference between the force on the
torsion balance with the cannon balls present vs absent. /


Cavendishsetup the exparament but nothing moved because the torsion 
balance was held in place by a thread, he then sealed the room and did 
nothing for 2 days to let the air currents settle down. He then 
carefully burned through the thread freeing the torsion balanceand 
observed its movement from far away through a telescope so his own 
movements wouldn't disturb anything. At no time did he measure the 
very small change of strength of 2 very large gravitational fields 
because a torsion balancecan't do that, you'd need either a super good 
weight balance or a super good clock.


Neither does a cesium clock measure the change in strength of 2 large 
gravitational fields.  It measures the difference in gravitational 
potential.  So I compared the change in gravitational potential when 
moving the clock up 1cm to the change in potential when Cavendish's 
torsion balance moved the sensing weights the smallest change in 
distance he said he could measure 0.25mm with the weights 9" (0.23m) 
from the cannon balls. The ratio of these two potentials is the product 
of three terms: The ratio of masses (1.37e25 lbm/348 lbm)  The ratio 
distances squared (0.23m/6.4e6m)^2. The ratio of smallest measurable 
changes (0.01m/0.00025m).  Work it out yourself.


Brent

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Extended Wigner’s Friend

2018-12-03 Thread Mason Green
Here’s a recent editorial I found in the magazine arguing against Many-Worlds 
on the grounds that it denies the reality of experience or the self. 
(https://www.quantamagazine.org/why-the-many-worlds-interpretation-of-quantum-mechanics-has-many-problems-20181018/)

Well, if we don’t want many-worlds or subjectivism, than the only other option 
looks like it’d be to modify QM itself. Some form of digital physics might 
work, otherwise we could have objective collapse (either random, or else 
there’s something/someone outside the universe choosing which path the universe 
follows).

-Mason

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-03 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/3/2018 9:59 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:


But that is close to the solipsist move. The fact that we cannot
define truth does not entail that some notion of truth does not
make sense. In particular, Peano arithmetic can already define an
infinity of approximation of truth, namely sigma_i and pi_i truth
(the truth of the sentences will a finite and fixed number of
quantifier, as opposed to finite sentences with an arbitrary
finite number of quantifier).

We can invoke truth, but we can develop meta-discourse relating
truth to theories, like we cannot invoke our own consciousness
does not prevent us to try theories about it.
It is a bit like “I cannot study my own brain”, but I can still
infer some theories of my brain by looking at the brain of others
and then assuming that I am not different.



So are do these theories produce true or false propositions?



Bruno



A different perspective (!) of "truth" comes from - vs. PA (Peano 
arithmetic) - *PLT* (programming language theory - the legacy to a 
large extent of John C. Reynolds 
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_C._Reynolds - who was originally 
a theoretical physicist ], and sort of in parallel the whole 
type-theory gang). Rather than an external "god-like" notion of truth, 
truth is in the programming.


- pt


Can you give an example of "truth in the programming" and how it differs 
from the mathematical idea of true and the correspondence theory of truth?


Brent

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Extended Wigner’s Friend

2018-12-03 Thread Mason Green

There’s a new article in Quanta Magazine 
(https://www.quantamagazine.org/frauchiger-renner-paradox-clarifies-where-our-views-of-reality-go-wrong-20181203/)
 about a thought experiment that poses trouble for certain interpretations of 
quantum mechanics.

Specifically it implies that either 1. there are many worlds, 2. quantum 
mechanics will need to be modified (as in objective collapse theories), or 3. 
reality is subjective (solipsism?). Exciting stuff!

-Mason

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-03 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark  wrote:




 Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently, 


 No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
 that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
 computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which 
 behave 
 intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
 behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is 
 “magical”.



>>> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
>>> then *humans behave intelligently* means that (at least some) *matter 
>>> behaves intelligently*.  
>>>
>>>
>>> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
>>> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
>>> complete. 
>>>
>>> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what 
>>> this means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
>>> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
>>> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random 
>>> oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations 
>>> run us, if I may say.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
>>
>> *The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
>> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
>> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
>> content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.*
>>
>> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
>> that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
>> sense (but could involve topology: *We can say that topology is 
>> precisely about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is 
>> relevant to computation.* [ 
>> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>>  
>> ]).
>>
>>
>> I posit that *experience processing* is a "natural computing" that is 
>> non-Turing.
>>
>> This new article may be of interest:
>>
>>
>> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist 
>> not just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have 
>> them, too"
>> ] 
>> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
>>  
>> ]
>>
>>
>> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is 
>> provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is 
>> “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of 
>> mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be 
>> true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the 
> subject of
>
> Galileo's Error
> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
>
> by Philip Goff
> (coming from Penguin Random House)
>
>
>
>
> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, 
> but present the idea and use it.
>
>
>
>
>
> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is 
> no evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of 
> matter (the subject of science).
>
>
> There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, 
> and then infer relation between those measurable numbers. 
>
>
> Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you 
> assume matter, you need indeed a non computationalist theory of matter and 
> of mind, which will need actual infinities, making hard to refute it 
> experimentally, which is not a good sign. 
>
> All matter theories assumes elementary arithmetic, you cannot avoid 
> assuming it when doping physics, so there is no need of assuming it outside 
> some primary matter. (I am the skeptical here).
>
> When assuming mechanism, we can’t assume more than arithmetic, without 
> empirical evidence for more, or we just make things harder to avoid solving 
> problems (that can prevent science).
>
> I claim no truth, I just show that we can test 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 3 Dec 2018, at 12:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 5:05:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> You assume a primary physical reality. I do not, and on the contrary show 
> that this idea is contradictory with the Mechanist theory.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Since Matter (a material computer) can compute Mechanism, I don't see how 
> Mechanism contradicts Materialism.


A material computer can emulate a computation supporting a person relatively to 
us, but with mechanism, a person cannot distinguish (without observing details) 
any computations leading to its local state, and so physics, and the appearance 
of matter can only be given by a statistics of all computation leading to that 
state, and structured by the ability of a machine to refer to itself.

Read my papers, I explain all this, or tell me at which step of the 8th step 
you have problem with. 





> 
> One could of course "eliminate" Matter in an Idealist metaphysics, but one 
> can (more plausibly to many) eliminate Numbers.

If you can understand the arithmetical definition of computation (Gödel, 
Church, Kleene), and if you are open to the digital mechanist thesis, then you 
can understand it will be easier to explain the appearances of the physical 
from the numbers, than to explain consciousness in term of material relation, 
and what those could be?

But all what I have done is providing the way to test all this, and what we 
observe till now rather confirm mechanism, and not materialism.

Bruno





> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
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Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2018-12-03 Thread agrayson2000


On Sunday, November 18, 2018 at 1:05:26 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, November 17, 2018 at 7:39:14 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>> If you write a superposition as a sum of eigenstates, why is it 
>> important, or relevant, or even true that the component states are coherent 
>> since eigenstates with distinct eigenvalues are orthogonal. This means 
>> there is no interference between the components of the superposition. AG
>>
>
> Put another way; from what I've read, coherence among components of a 
> superposition is necessary to guarantee interference, but since an 
> eigenstate expansion of the superposition consists of orthogonal, non 
> interfering eigenstates, the requirement of coherence seems unnecessary. AG 
>

*For decoherence to occur, one needs, presumably, a coherent superposition. 
But when the wf is expressed as a sum of eigenstates with unique 
eigenvalues, those eigenstates are mutually orthogonal; hence, IIUC, there 
is no coherence. So, how can decoherence occur when the state function, 
expressed as a sum of eigenstates with unique eigenvalues, is not coherent? 
I must be missing something, but what it is I have no clue. AG *

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:26:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:24, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:44:05 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 20:21, Brent Meeker > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> What is this "primary matter" of which you speak? 
>> 
>> 
>> X is Primary means basically that we have to assume X (or something judged 
>> enough equivalent).
>> 
>> The idea of primary matter is the (physicalist) idea that we have to assume 
>> a bit of physics, to get the physical law. It is used by people who dislike 
>> the idea that matter might be explained without assuming anything physical. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> My understanding of "primary matter" is that it is what matter (hyle) is 
>> before it meets form, hence hylomorphism [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism 
>>  ]. 
>> 
>> Thomas Aquinas thought (from what I've read) that matter is that which gives 
>> forms individual instances, or "character", like individual trees, or 
>> people, etc.
>> 
> 
> That is the usual Aristotelian explanation. It is inconsistent with the 
> assumption of digital mechanism.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> molecules?
>> 
>> Assuming contemporary chemistry, molecules are explained by quarks and 
>> electrons, and quantum mechanics.
>> 
>> 
>> Why are there so many articles today that claim to refute this?
> 
> Read them, and if one convince you, you can explain it here. Note that the 
> background of those paper are Aristotelian, where Mechanism enforces the 
> platonic view (if only to define properly what is a computation or machine).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> The papers in scientific publications (in recent science news, etc.) mainly 
> involve positing downward causation: There are chemical laws that cannot be 
> reduced to physical laws, and these (higher-level chemical) laws are needed 
> to explain currently "unsolved" problems in chemistry and biochemistry.

Above the threshold of universality, all reductionist theory broke. You can 
predict perfectly well the transistors, and still have no clue if a program 
will stop or not.

All my interest in arithmetic/meta-arithmetic is that we can see and understand 
how very simple rule, once Turing universal, leads to transfinite hierarchies 
of non controllability. 

Arithmetic is full of downward causation, and circular or spiral causation, at 
different levels.

That should be easy to understand from their self-referential logics and their 
variants. 

Bruno





> 
> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
>>> 
>>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also that 
>>> physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
>>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which behave 
>>> intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, and it 
>>> behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of matter is 
>>> “magical”.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), then 
>>> humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter behaves 
>>> intelligently.  
>> 
>> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
>> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
>> complete. 
>> 
>> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what this 
>> means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
>>> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
>> 
>> 
>> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
>> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a random 
>> oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which computations 
>> run us, if I may say.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
>> 
>> The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
>> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
>> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic content 
>> of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.
>> 
>> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense that 
>> doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing sense 
>> (but could involve topology: We can say that topology is precisely about the 
>> relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant to 
>> computation. [ 
>> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>>  
>> 
>>  ]).
>> 
>> 
>> I posit that experience processing is a "natural computing" that is 
>> non-Turing.
>> 
>> This new article may be of interest:
>> 
>> 
>> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist not 
>> just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have them, too"
>> ] 
>> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
>>  
>> 
>>  ]
> 
> I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is provably 
> inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is “natural” or a 
> product of matter. That equates two different kind of mysteries, without 
> adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be true, but I don’t see 
> any evidence for such a move. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the subject of
> 
> Galileo's Error
> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
> 
> by Philip Goff
> (coming from Penguin Random House)



Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, but 
present the idea and use it.



> 
> 
> What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is no 
> evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of matter 
> (the subject of science).

There is no evidence that matter is primary, physicists measure numbers, and 
then infer relation between those measurable numbers. 


Why limiting science to matter? Matter is vey interesting, but if you assume 
matter, you need indeed a non computationalist theory of matter and of mind, 
which will need actual infinities, making hard to refute it experimentally, 
which is not a good sign. 

All matter theories assumes elementary arithmetic, you cannot avoid assuming it 
when doping physics, so there is no need of assuming it outside some primary 
matter. (I am the skeptical here).

When assuming mechanism, we can’t assume more than arithmetic, without 
empirical evidence for more, or we just make things harder to avoid solving 
problems (that can prevent science).

I claim no truth, I just show that we can 

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-03 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 11:59:21 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 9:12:54 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 14:45, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 6:52:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 17:44, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, November 30, 2018 at 6:39:19 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Friday, November 30, 2018 at 9:13:29 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> *This may be a simplistic pov, but since there was IMO no Original 
> Sin, there was no need for a Sacrifice for its forgiveness. Under this 
> view, Christianity is overwhelmingly an illusion. And since Theology 
> seems 
> to be primarily an extended argument about the historical history and 
> truths about Christianity, it too is essentially worthless; an extended 
> wrangling over nothing. AG *
>
>
> That comes from the 1500 years of brainwashing. I use theology in the 
> sense of Plato, not the Gospel. Only atheists believe in JC, 
>

 *Really? It seems you never met any Christians on a personal level. If 
 you did, you'd see how uninformed you are. AG*
  

> except for the TV evangelist, which are arguably con men.
> That was the goal of the Christian after 529. To make us forget that 
> the original question of the greeks was about the existence of a 
> (primary) 
> physical universe. God exist by definition: it is, by definition, the 
> truth 
> we intuit to be larger than ourselves.
>

 *I really doubt the question about the nature of matter has been 
 forgotten. AG *

>
>
>
>>>
>>> There is no truth outside of language, and matter's just another word 
>>> for nothing left to lose.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Language have no relation with truth a priori. Theories might have. 
>>> Semantics are truth “by definition”, by relativising it to the notion of 
>>> model/reality.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>  
>>
>> *Rorty* is right, I think: Better not to use the word "truth" at all.
>>
>>
>> In any argument, we cannot invoke “truth", nor “real”, nor “god” etc. All 
>> this for the same basic reason which is justified in the Mechanist theory 
>> by their provable non definability (à-la Tarski).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> It's just "justification". Or "judgment" (a type-theoretic term).
>>
>>
>> But that is close to the solipsist move. The fact that we cannot define 
>> truth does not entail that some notion of truth does not make sense. In 
>> particular, Peano arithmetic can already define an infinity of 
>> approximation of truth, namely sigma_i and pi_i truth (the truth of the 
>> sentences will a finite and fixed number of quantifier, as opposed to 
>> finite sentences with an arbitrary finite number of quantifier).
>>
>> We can invoke truth, but we can develop meta-discourse relating truth to 
>> theories, like we cannot invoke our own consciousness does not prevent us 
>> to try theories about it. 
>> It is a bit like “I cannot study my own brain”, but I can still infer 
>> some theories of my brain by looking at the brain of others and then 
>> assuming that I am not different.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>  
> A different perspective (!) of "truth" comes from - vs. PA (Peano 
> arithmetic) - *PLT* (programming language theory - the legacy to a large 
> extent of John C. Reynolds [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_C._Reynolds - who was originally a 
> theoretical physicist ], and sort of in parallel the whole type-theory 
> gang). Rather than an external "god-like" notion of truth, truth is in the 
> programming.
>
> - pt
>
>
>
I should also mention (in addition to John Reynolds) Peter Landin 
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Landin ] (who looked a lot like 
Richard Deacon [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Deacon_(actor)  - *The 
Dick Van Dyke Show*, *Leave It To Beaver* ].


- pt

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-03 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 9:12:54 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 2 Dec 2018, at 14:45, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 6:52:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 17:44, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, November 30, 2018 at 6:39:19 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, November 30, 2018 at 9:13:29 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:



 *This may be a simplistic pov, but since there was IMO no Original Sin, 
 there was no need for a Sacrifice for its forgiveness. Under this view, 
 Christianity is overwhelmingly an illusion. And since Theology seems to be 
 primarily an extended argument about the historical history and truths 
 about Christianity, it too is essentially worthless; an extended wrangling 
 over nothing. AG *


 That comes from the 1500 years of brainwashing. I use theology in the 
 sense of Plato, not the Gospel. Only atheists believe in JC, 

>>>
>>> *Really? It seems you never met any Christians on a personal level. If 
>>> you did, you'd see how uninformed you are. AG*
>>>  
>>>
 except for the TV evangelist, which are arguably con men.
 That was the goal of the Christian after 529. To make us forget that 
 the original question of the greeks was about the existence of a (primary) 
 physical universe. God exist by definition: it is, by definition, the 
 truth 
 we intuit to be larger than ourselves.

>>>
>>> *I really doubt the question about the nature of matter has been 
>>> forgotten. AG *
>>>



>>
>> There is no truth outside of language, and matter's just another word for 
>> nothing left to lose.
>>
>>
>>
>> Language have no relation with truth a priori. Theories might have. 
>> Semantics are truth “by definition”, by relativising it to the notion of 
>> model/reality.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>  
>
> *Rorty* is right, I think: Better not to use the word "truth" at all.
>
>
> In any argument, we cannot invoke “truth", nor “real”, nor “god” etc. All 
> this for the same basic reason which is justified in the Mechanist theory 
> by their provable non definability (à-la Tarski).
>
>
>
>
>
> It's just "justification". Or "judgment" (a type-theoretic term).
>
>
> But that is close to the solipsist move. The fact that we cannot define 
> truth does not entail that some notion of truth does not make sense. In 
> particular, Peano arithmetic can already define an infinity of 
> approximation of truth, namely sigma_i and pi_i truth (the truth of the 
> sentences will a finite and fixed number of quantifier, as opposed to 
> finite sentences with an arbitrary finite number of quantifier).
>
> We can invoke truth, but we can develop meta-discourse relating truth to 
> theories, like we cannot invoke our own consciousness does not prevent us 
> to try theories about it. 
> It is a bit like “I cannot study my own brain”, but I can still infer some 
> theories of my brain by looking at the brain of others and then assuming 
> that I am not different.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
 
A different perspective (!) of "truth" comes from - vs. PA (Peano 
arithmetic) - *PLT* (programming language theory - the legacy to a large 
extent of John C. Reynolds [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_C._Reynolds 
- who was originally a theoretical physicist ], and sort of in parallel the 
whole type-theory gang). Rather than an external "god-like" notion of 
truth, truth is in the programming.

- pt




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Re: Measuring a system in a superposition of states vs in a mixed state

2018-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 3 Dec 2018, at 10:35, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 8:17:54 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 12/2/2018 5:14 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 4:25:04 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 12/2/2018 11:42 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 8:13:48 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Obviously, from a one-world perspective, only one history survives for a 
>>> single trial. But to even grossly approach anything describable as 
>>> "Darwinian", you have to identify characteristics of histories which 
>>> contribute positively or negatively wrt surviving but I don't see an 
>>> inkling of that. IMO, Quantum Darwinism is at best a vacuous restatement of 
>>> the measurement problemt; that we don't know why we get what we get. AG
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> In the sum over histories interpretation - of the double-slit experiment, 
>>> for example - each history carries a unit complex number - like a gene - 
>>> and this gene reenforces (positively) or interferes (negatively) with other 
>>> history's genes in the sum.
>> 
>> But I thought you said the ontology was that only one history "popped out of 
>> the Lottery machine"?  Here you seem to contemplate an ensemble of 
>> histories, all those ending at the given spot, as being real.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> All are real until all but one dies.
>> RIP: All those losing histories.
> 
> The trouble with that is the Born probability doesn't apply to histories, it 
> applies to results.  So your theory says nothing about the probability of the 
> fundamental ontologies.
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The probability distribution on the space of histories is provided by the 
> path integral. 

I agree, and this statement can be made rather rigorously in the approach of 
Griffith and Omnes, except that Omnes eventually add an axiom of irrationality 
to extract a unique physical reality from the formalism. He said it, at least, 
explicitly: like saying “and now there is a miracle”. He says that at this 
stage, we need irrationalism. But that appears in the last ten sentences of a 
rather quite rational book. 
Well, the point is that we can generalise the Born rule for making sense on 
some probabilities on "consistent histories”.
(But I am in trouble (now) on how to handle the GHZ state in term of (Griffith 
and Omnes)-histories (3-particle-GHZ = 1/sqrt(2)(up up up + down down down)).



> 
> Backward causation, hidden variables and the meaning of completeness 
> [ https://www.ias.ac.in/article/fulltext/pram/056/02-03/0199-0209 ]
> 
> Feynman’s path integral approach, calculation of the probability of the 
> outcome in question depends on an integration over the possible individual 
> paths between the given initial state and the given final state, each 
> weighted by a complex number. The fact that the weights associated with 
> individual paths are complex makes it impossible to interpret them as real 
> valued probabilities, associated with a classical statistical distribution of 
> possibilities.
> 
> However, there is no such difficulty at the level of the entire ‘bundle’ of 
> paths which comprise the path integral. If we think of the hidden reality as 
> the instantiation not of one path rather than another but of one entire 
> bundle rather than another, then the quantum mechanical probabilities can be 
> thought of as classical probability distributions over such elements of 
> reality. (For example, suppose we specify the boundary conditions in terms of 
> the electron source, the fact that two slits are open, and the fact that a 
> detector screen is present at a certain distance on the opposite side of the 
> central screen. We then partition the detector screen, so as to define 
> possible outcomes for the experiment. For each element O_i of this partition, 
> there is a bundle B_i of Feynman paths, constituting the path integral used 
> in calculating the probability of outcome O_i . We have a classical 
> probability distribution
> over the set of such B_i .
> 
> One could stop at history bundles as the sample space, or the "hidden 
> reality" could be that one history is selected at random from the history 
> bundle. That could occur with time symmetry (retrocausality): The one path is 
> chosen at random from a history bundle at the source in the present from the 
> distribution determined on the history bundles in the future.


With mechanism, the randomness and the unicity is a first person (plural) 
experience only, and seems to me no more astonishing than in the amoeba 
duplication, or than in the Helsinki—> Washington/Moscow duplication, as seen 
from the first person ways.

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:41, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 8:25:47 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> Perspectivism is a form of modalism.
> 
> Nietzsche is vindicated.
 
 Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, 
 perhaps!
 All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology 
 (capable only of saying what God is not).
 
 Bruno
>>> 
>>> From  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/ 
>>> 
>>> 6.2 Perspectivism
>>> 
>>> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his 
>>> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of perspective. 
>>> He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the influence of 
>>> their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore 
>>> failed to control those perspectival effects (BGE 6; see BGE I more 
>>> generally). Commentators have been both fascinated and 
>>> perplexed by what has come to be called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it 
>>> has been a major concern in a number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries 
>>> (see, e.g., Danto 1965; Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; 
>>> Nehamas 1985; Clark 1990; Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). 
>>> There has been as much contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of 
>>> commitments belong under that heading as about their philosophical merits, 
>>> but a few points are relatively uncontroversial and can provide a useful 
>>> way into this strand of Nietzsche’s thinking.
>>> 
>>> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in his 
>>> usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a critical 
>>> side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers for ignoring 
>>> the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we saw, he 
>>> simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a positive 
>>> contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he takes to be) 
>>> the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past philosophers, he 
>>> writes,
>>> 
>>> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute 
>>> reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the spirit 
>>> has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently in this way for 
>>> once, to want to see differently, is no small discipline and preparation of 
>>> the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter understood not as 
>>> “disinterested contemplation” (which is a non-concept and absurdity), but 
>>> rather as the capacity to have one’s Pro and Contra in one’s power, and to 
>>> shift them in and out, so that one knows how to make precisely the 
>>> difference in perspectives and affective interpretations useful for 
>>> knowledge. (GM III, 12)
>>> 
>>> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy at 
>>> least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of 
>>> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal the 
>>> way things really are, independently of any point of view whatsoever. 
>>> Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a revised 
>>> conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between one 
>>> perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of others, 
>>> without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so much as 
>>> possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the traditional 
>>> picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is equally a positive 
>>> set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge as a finite, limited 
>>> cognitive agent.
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly not with 
>> neoplatonism, which explains everything from the many perspective of the 
>> One, or at least can be interpreted that way.
>> 
>> Pure perspectivism is an extreme position which leads to pure relativism, 
>> which does not make sense, as we can only doubt starting from indubitable 
>> things (cf Descartes). But Nietzsche might have been OK, as the text above 
>> suggested a “revised conception” of objective. 
>> 
>> With mechanism, you have an ablate truth (the sigma_1 arithmetical truth), 
>> and the rest is explained by the perspective enforced by incompleteness.
> 
> My reading of Nietzsche is he thought that there are many different 
> perspectives and one can only approach the truth by looking from different 
> perspectives but never taking one of them as definitive.  This goes along 
> with his denial and rejection of being a 

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker > 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> Perspectivism is a form of modalism.
> 
> Nietzsche is vindicated.
 
 Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, 
 perhaps!
 All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology 
 (capable only of saying what God is not).
 
 Bruno
>>> 
>>> From  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/ 
>>> 
>>> 6.2 Perspectivism
>>> 
>>> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his 
>>> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of perspective. 
>>> He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the influence of 
>>> their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore failed to control 
>>> those perspectival effects (BGE 6; see BGE I more generally). Commentators 
>>> have been both fascinated and perplexed by what has come to be called 
>>> Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a major concern in a number of 
>>> large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, e.g., Danto 1965; Kaulbach 1980, 
>>> 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 1985; Clark 1990; Poellner 1995; 
>>> Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has been as much contestation over 
>>> exactly what doctrine or group of commitments belong under that heading as 
>>> about their philosophical merits, but a few points are relatively 
>>> uncontroversial and can provide a useful way into this strand of 
>>> Nietzsche’s thinking.
>>> 
>>> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in his 
>>> usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a critical 
>>> side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers for ignoring 
>>> the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we saw, he 
>>> simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a positive 
>>> contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he takes to be) 
>>> the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past philosophers, he 
>>> writes,
>>> 
>>> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute 
>>> reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the spirit 
>>> has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently in this way for 
>>> once, to want to see differently, is no small discipline and preparation of 
>>> the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter understood not as 
>>> “disinterested contemplation” (which is a non-concept and absurdity), but 
>>> rather as the capacity to have one’s Pro and Contra in one’s power, and to 
>>> shift them in and out, so that one knows how to make precisely the 
>>> difference in perspectives and affective interpretations useful for 
>>> knowledge. (GM III, 12)
>>> 
>>> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy at 
>>> least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of 
>>> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal the 
>>> way things really are, independently of any point of view whatsoever. 
>>> Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a revised 
>>> conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between one 
>>> perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of others, 
>>> without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so much as 
>>> possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the traditional 
>>> picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is equally a positive 
>>> set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge as a finite, limited 
>>> cognitive agent.
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly not with 
>> neoplatonism, which explains everything from the many perspective of the 
>> One, or at least can be interpreted that way.
>> 
>> Pure perspectivism is an extreme position which leads to pure relativism, 
>> which does not make sense, as we can only doubt starting from indubitable 
>> things (cf Descartes). But Nietzsche might have been OK, as the text above 
>> suggested a “revised conception” of objective. 
>> 
>> With mechanism, you have an ablate truth (the sigma_1 arithmetical truth), 
>> and the rest is explained by the perspective enforced by incompleteness.
> 
> My reading of Nietzsche is he thought that there are many different 
> perspectives and one can only approach the truth by looking from different 
> perspectives but never taking one of them as definitive.  This goes along 
> with his denial and rejection of being a system builder.  I think he equated 
> system builders with those who took their perspective to be the only 

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:06, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/2/2018 4:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> Language have no relation with truth a priori. Theories might have. 
>> Semantics are truth “by definition”, by relativising it to the notion of 
>> model/reality.
>> 
> 
> Then what is this "true" and "false" which you attribute to the propositions 
> of modal logic?

In  classical logic, truth is any object in a set of two objects, or it is the 
supremum in a Boolean algebra. In propositional logic a “world” is defined by 
any function from the set of atomic letters to {t, f}. 

Then if the theory is “rich enough”, truth can be meta-defined by “satisfied by 
the structure (N, 0, s, +, *). 
Of course, this presuppose the intuitive understanding of 2+2=4, etc.

In our case, as all modal formula are arithmetical formula, it is the usual 
informal mathematical notion just above (arithmetical truth, satisfaction by 
the usual standard model).

That one can be define by V(‘p’) means the same as p. It is Tarski’s idea that 
‘p’ is true when p, or when it is the case that p. Like wise, to say 
Provable-and-true(p) we use []p & p.

I recommend the book by Torkel Franzen “Inexhaustibility” for a more detailed 
explanation of the concept of truth.

We can come back, but I suggest to come back on this only when we need it, as 
this is an very rich and complex subject by itself.

Bruno





> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:02, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> Perspectivism is a form of modalism.
> 
> Nietzsche is vindicated.
 
 Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, 
 perhaps!
 All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology 
 (capable only of saying what God is not).
 
 Bruno
>>> 
>>> From  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/ 
>>> 
>>> 6.2 Perspectivism
>>> 
>>> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his 
>>> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of perspective. 
>>> He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the influence of 
>>> their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore failed to control 
>>> those perspectival effects (BGE 6; see BGE I more generally). Commentators 
>>> have been both fascinated and perplexed by what has come to be called 
>>> Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a major concern in a number of 
>>> large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, e.g., Danto 1965; Kaulbach 1980, 
>>> 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 1985; Clark 1990; Poellner 1995; 
>>> Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has been as much contestation over 
>>> exactly what doctrine or group of commitments belong under that heading as 
>>> about their philosophical merits, but a few points are relatively 
>>> uncontroversial and can provide a useful way into this strand of 
>>> Nietzsche’s thinking.
>>> 
>>> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in his 
>>> usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a critical 
>>> side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers for ignoring 
>>> the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we saw, he 
>>> simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a positive 
>>> contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he takes to be) 
>>> the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past philosophers, he 
>>> writes,
>>> 
>>> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute 
>>> reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the spirit 
>>> has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently in this way for 
>>> once, to want to see differently, is no small discipline and preparation of 
>>> the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter understood not as 
>>> “disinterested contemplation” (which is a non-concept and absurdity), but 
>>> rather as the capacity to have one’s Pro and Contra in one’s power, and to 
>>> shift them in and out, so that one knows how to make precisely the 
>>> difference in perspectives and affective interpretations useful for 
>>> knowledge. (GM III, 12)
>>> 
>>> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy at 
>>> least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of 
>>> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal the 
>>> way things really are, independently of any point of view whatsoever. 
>>> Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a revised 
>>> conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between one 
>>> perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of others, 
>>> without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so much as 
>>> possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the traditional 
>>> picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is equally a positive 
>>> set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge as a finite, limited 
>>> cognitive agent.
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly not with 
>> neoplatonism, which explains everything from the many perspective of the 
>> One, or at least can be interpreted that way.
>> 
>> Pure perspectivism is an extreme position which leads to pure relativism, 
>> which does not make sense, as we can only doubt starting from indubitable 
>> things (cf Descartes). But Nietzsche might have been OK, as the text above 
>> suggested a “revised conception” of objective. 
>> 
>> With mechanism, you have an ablate truth (the sigma_1 arithmetical truth), 
>> and the rest is explained by the perspective enforced by incompleteness.
> 
> My reading of Nietzsche is he thought that there are many different 
> perspectives and one can only approach the truth by looking from different 
> perspectives but never taking one of them as definitive.  This goes along 
> with his denial and rejection of being a system builder.  I think he equated 
> system builders with those who took their perspective to be the only one.

Yes, when we built theories of 

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 2 Dec 2018, at 14:45, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 6:52:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 17:44, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, November 30, 2018 at 6:39:19 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, November 30, 2018 at 9:13:29 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> 
>>> This may be a simplistic pov, but since there was IMO no Original Sin, 
>>> there was no need for a Sacrifice for its forgiveness. Under this view, 
>>> Christianity is overwhelmingly an illusion. And since Theology seems to be 
>>> primarily an extended argument about the historical history and truths 
>>> about Christianity, it too is essentially worthless; an extended wrangling 
>>> over nothing. AG 
>> 
>> That comes from the 1500 years of brainwashing. I use theology in the sense 
>> of Plato, not the Gospel. Only atheists believe in JC,
>> 
>> Really? It seems you never met any Christians on a personal level. If you 
>> did, you'd see how uninformed you are. AG
>>  
>> except for the TV evangelist, which are arguably con men.
>> That was the goal of the Christian after 529. To make us forget that the 
>> original question of the greeks was about the existence of a (primary) 
>> physical universe. God exist by definition: it is, by definition, the truth 
>> we intuit to be larger than ourselves.
>> 
>> I really doubt the question about the nature of matter has been forgotten. 
>> AG 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> There is no truth outside of language, and matter's just another word for 
>> nothing left to lose.
> 
> 
> Language have no relation with truth a priori. Theories might have. Semantics 
> are truth “by definition”, by relativising it to the notion of model/reality.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
>  
> 
> Rorty is right, I think: Better not to use the word "truth" at all.

In any argument, we cannot invoke “truth", nor “real”, nor “god” etc. All this 
for the same basic reason which is justified in the Mechanist theory by their 
provable non definability (à-la Tarski).




> 
> It's just "justification". Or "judgment" (a type-theoretic term).

But that is close to the solipsist move. The fact that we cannot define truth 
does not entail that some notion of truth does not make sense. In particular, 
Peano arithmetic can already define an infinity of approximation of truth, 
namely sigma_i and pi_i truth (the truth of the sentences will a finite and 
fixed number of quantifier, as opposed to finite sentences with an arbitrary 
finite number of quantifier).

We can invoke truth, but we can develop meta-discourse relating truth to 
theories, like we cannot invoke our own consciousness does not prevent us to 
try theories about it. 
It is a bit like “I cannot study my own brain”, but I can still infer some 
theories of my brain by looking at the brain of others and then assuming that I 
am not different.

Bruno






> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: If Quantum Mechanics can be derived using arithmetic only, how would that derivation begin?

2018-12-03 Thread agrayson2000


On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 2:42:26 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 2 Dec 2018, at 15:00, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 12:11:50 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 12:13, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, November 30, 2018 at 12:34:13 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>> What can be inferred always depends on what you take as premises.  If 
>>> you start from the Hilbert space formulation of QM or an equivalent 
>>> formulation* and you premise that there is a probability interpretation 
>>> of  a state*, then Gleason's theorem tells you that the Born rule 
>>> provides the unique probability values.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>> *So to get Born's Rule, Bruno would have to assume a huge amount IN 
>> ADDITION TO ARITHMETIC. I don't buy it. AG *
>>
>>
>> On the contrary, mechanism assumes less than any other theory. And 
>> Mechanism is roughly the idea that the brain does not invoke magical things.
>>
>> The theory of everything, with mechanism assumed at the metalevel, assume 
>> only S K, S≠K, and the axioms
>>
>> 1) If x = y and x = z, then y = z
>> 2) If x = y then xz = yz
>> 3) If x = y then zx = zy
>> 4) Kxy = x
>> 5) Sxyz = xz(yz)
>>
>> I doubt that you will find an easier theory.
>> (Exercice: prove that x = x)
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
> *But you haven't replied to my objection. In addition to logic and the 
> axioms of arithmetic, you must ALSO assume such a thing as probability 
> exists to even approach QM. What you have above won't cut it, IMO. AG *
>
>
>
> I do not assume any probabilities in the ontology. I justify them through 
> the phenomenology. Here I was just making clear that I assume only the 5 
> rules and axioms above. There is three inference rules:
>
> 1) If x = y and x = z, then y = z
> 2) If x = y then xz = yz
> 3) If x = y then zx = zy
>
> And two axioms:
>
> 4) Kxy = x
> 5) Sxyz = xz(yz)
>

*Are the variables restricted to natural numbers, that is, the positive 
integers? What are these axioms, explicitly? And No, I don't believe 
there's enough here to infer de Broglie matter waves, or the quantum 
interference pattern for, say, the double slit. AG*


> Nothing else is assumed, except mechanism and as much as needed 
> mathematics at the meta level, like in all theories.
>
> I don’t expect you to believe this immediately. I just present the result, 
> hoping you will study the proof. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 11/29/2018 10:23 AM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> *Regardless of rules of arithmetic and mathematical logic, I simply 
>>> don't believe that something like Born's Rule can be inferred without 
>>> actually observing a quantum interference pattern. AG*
>>>
>>>
>>>
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Re: If Quantum Mechanics can be derived using arithmetic only, how would that derivation begin?

2018-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 2 Dec 2018, at 15:00, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 12:11:50 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 12:13, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, November 30, 2018 at 12:34:13 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>> What can be inferred always depends on what you take as premises.  If you 
>> start from the Hilbert space formulation of QM or an equivalent formulation 
>> and you premise that there is a probability interpretation of  a state, then 
>> Gleason's theorem tells you that the Born rule provides the unique 
>> probability values.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> So to get Born's Rule, Bruno would have to assume a huge amount IN ADDITION 
>> TO ARITHMETIC. I don't buy it. AG 
> 
> On the contrary, mechanism assumes less than any other theory. And Mechanism 
> is roughly the idea that the brain does not invoke magical things.
> 
> The theory of everything, with mechanism assumed at the metalevel, assume 
> only S K, S≠K, and the axioms
> 
> 1) If x = y and x = z, then y = z
> 2) If x = y then xz = yz
> 3) If x = y then zx = zy
> 4) Kxy = x
> 5) Sxyz = xz(yz)
> 
> I doubt that you will find an easier theory.
> (Exercice: prove that x = x)
> 
> Bruno
> 
> But you haven't replied to my objection. In addition to logic and the axioms 
> of arithmetic, you must ALSO assume such a thing as probability exists to 
> even approach QM. What you have above won't cut it, IMO. AG 


I do not assume any probabilities in the ontology. I justify them through the 
phenomenology. Here I was just making clear that I assume only the 5 rules and 
axioms above. There is three inference rules:

1) If x = y and x = z, then y = z
2) If x = y then xz = yz
3) If x = y then zx = zy

And two axioms:

4) Kxy = x
5) Sxyz = xz(yz)

Nothing else is assumed, except mechanism and as much as needed mathematics at 
the meta level, like in all theories.

I don’t expect you to believe this immediately. I just present the result, 
hoping you will study the proof. 

Bruno




> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> On 11/29/2018 10:23 AM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> Regardless of rules of arithmetic and mathematical logic, I simply don't 
>>> believe that something like Born's Rule can be inferred without actually 
>>> observing a quantum interference pattern. AG
>> 
>> 
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Re: The most accurate clock ever

2018-12-03 Thread John Clark
On Sun, Dec 2, 2018 at 11:54 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>>If you are on the Earth's surface and you raise a clock by one centimeter
>> you've increased its distance from the earth's center by one part in
>> 637,000,000, it is now 1.16 times further away. The intensity of
>> the gravitational field is proportional to the square of the distance so
>> gravity was 1.31 times stronger before you raised raised the clock.
>> Cavendish did not have a scale good enough to measure that, even today the
>> very best (and very expensive) lab weight scale might be able to measure a
>> change of 1.001 but the clock can do several hundred times better.
>
>
> > He was measuring the change in a much smaller gravitational field.
>

Cavendish was measuring the displacement of a torsion balance parallel to
the Earth's surface caused by a weak but constant gravitational field,
there was no change whatsoever in the gravitational field parallel to the
Earth's surface at any time during the exparament. If he had 2
*PRECISELY* identical
cannonballs on the ends of a rod, placed a pivot point *PRECISELY* at the
center and place one cannonball one centimeter higher than the other he
would have transformed his torsion balance into a weight balance and
theoretically he could have observed that the balance moved and measured
the small difference in strength in the large field at 2 different places,
but Cavendish couldn't come close to achieving the sort of precision
required to do that 220 years ago, we can't even do that today.


> * > He was measuring the difference between the force on the torsion
> balance with the cannon balls present vs absent.  *
>

 Cavendish setup the exparament but nothing moved because the torsion
balance was held in place by a thread, he then sealed the room and did
nothing for 2 days to let the air currents settle down. He then carefully
burned through the thread freeing the torsion balance and observed its
movement from far away through a telescope so his own movements wouldn't
disturb anything. At no time did he measure the very small change of
strength of 2 very large gravitational fields because a torsion balance can't
do that, you'd need either a super good weight balance or a super good
clock.

 John K Clark

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-03 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 5:05:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> You assume a primary physical reality. I do not, and on the contrary show 
> that this idea is contradictory with the Mechanist theory.
>
>
>

Since Matter (a material computer) can compute Mechanism, I don't see how 
Mechanism *contradicts *Materialism.

One could of course "eliminate" Matter in an Idealist metaphysics, but one 
can (more plausibly to many) eliminate Numbers.

- pt


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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 30 Nov 2018, at 20:52, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Nov 29, 2018 at 1:53 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >>All I ask you to do is follow the scientific method. 
> 
> > I do, which is not so frequent in theology
> 
> The scientific method in theology? You must be kidding.

It is very simple. Never claim to have the truth, and always present a theory 
having verifiable consequences.




> 
> > You are the one invoking your ontological commitment when defining real by 
> > “physically real”
> 
> I'm not defining anything in fact I'm asking you to stop defining stuff for 
> one second and instead show me a example, show me a WORKING Turing Machine 
> that doesn't make use of the laws of physics so that I can observe it making 
> a calculation.


Well, assuming mechanism, you, and your laptop, are good examples, as there is 
no physical reality which is primary at all in that case.

You assume a primary physical reality. I do not, and on the contrary show that 
this idea is contradictory with the Mechanist theory.





> You insist such a thing exists so put up or shut up.


The existence is provable in Peano arithmetic. Read Gödel 1931.





>  
> > and then asking me the impossible task to transform a computation realised 
> > in arithmetic into a computation realised in the physical reality.
> 
> If it's impossible for arithmetic to do that, and I agree with you it is, 
> then physical reality can do something arithmetic can’t.

Arithmetic makes you believe in a physical reality. The physical becomes 
phenomenological.

You are the one doing an ontological commitment. 






>  
> >> the multiverse as a collection of all real universes and a real universe 
> >> is one capable of producing a working Turing Machine.
> 
> All terms are used in too fuzzy way here.
> 
> So says the man that can't use personal pronouns without tying himself into 
> logical knots and contradictions.

Repeating a statement again and again does not make it valid. Just wait I 
explain this to some other.




>  
> > The arithmetical reality produces all working machines
> 
> I don't believe you. Prove me wrong by producing a working machine that 
> doesn't use matter or physics.

This is ambiguous. Either you ask me something contradictory at the start, like 
creating primary matter from the numbers, or you ask me an example of a working 
machine, relatively to a universal machine, in arithmetic. That is long to 
show. See the proof by Gödel in 25 steps (in his 1931 paper).





> And by "working" I mean one that changes in time or space or both.

OK. Then your laptop is an excellent example.





> You can claim all you want  you've proven there are a thousand angels dancing 
> on the head of a pin by redefining the words "angles" and "dancing" and "pin" 
> but I won't be interested until you show me many very small spiritual beings 
> moving to the rhythm of music on a dance floor of less than one square 
> millimeter in area.
>  
> > You can’t use work like "real” when doing metaphysics with the scientific 
> > method.
> 
> There is no such thing as metaphysics with the scientific method


People who says that theology or metaphysics cannot be done with the scientific 
method are those who want impose their personal conviction to others.
Religion has been separated from science for one reason only: to make it into 
an instrument of control of the others.





> 
>  >> there is no better way to prove that something exists than to produce it.
> 
> > I guess you mean to produce it physically,
> 
> You can produce it anyway you like provided its observable.

We have to agree by what mean by observable. I gave a precise definition for 
“observable with measure one”, and illustrated it in step 3 with the cup of 
coffee offered to both reconstituted person. Eventually observable is defined 
by being sigma_1, provable and consistent. That is enough to extract quantum 
logic, and to begin an explanation of why observation can be persistent and 
locally sharable between different universal machine. 
I have no clue what you mean by observable, as you invoke your god-primary 
matter, which makes no sense.




>   I want to observe a working Turing Machine that is not made of matter and 
> does not make use of the laws of physics.


 {(q1 B 1 q1)}





> You just said that pure arithmetic can do exactly that, so stop talking about 
> it and SHOW ME.  

See my paper for the proof. But what you ask me to so is enough ambiguous, so 
whatever I will show you, I know how you will criticized it, and it will be 
invalid as you will invoke your god.

It is hard to convince believer.






>   
> >  the criteria of meta^hysical reality due to Aristotle [...]
> 
> Don't you ever get tired of dead Greeks?


The big difference between two quite different conceptions of reality start 
there: Aristotle (matter exists ontologically) and Plato (matter is a symptom 
of a deeper non physical reality). Since 1500 years, we have 

Re: Measuring a system in a superposition of states vs in a mixed state

2018-12-03 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 8:17:54 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/2/2018 5:14 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 4:25:04 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/2/2018 11:42 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 8:13:48 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>> *Obviously, from a one-world perspective, only one history survives for 
>>> a single trial. But to even grossly approach anything describable as 
>>> "Darwinian", you have to identify characteristics of histories which 
>>> contribute positively or negatively wrt surviving but I don't see an 
>>> inkling of that. IMO, Quantum Darwinism is at best a vacuous restatement of 
>>> the measurement problemt; that we don't know why we get what we get. AG*
>>>



>>
>> In the *sum over histories* interpretation - of the double-slit 
>> experiment, for example - each history carries a unit complex number - like 
>> a gene - and this gene reenforces (positively) or interferes (negatively) 
>> with other history's genes in the sum.
>>
>>
>> But I thought you said the ontology was that only one history "popped out 
>> of the Lottery machine"?  Here you seem to contemplate an ensemble of 
>> histories, all those ending at the given spot, as being real.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
>
> All are real until all but one dies.
> RIP: All those losing histories.
>
>
> The trouble with that is the Born probability doesn't apply to histories, 
> it applies to results.  So your theory says nothing about the probability 
> of the fundamental ontologies.
>
> Brent
>





The probability distribution on the space of histories is provided by the 
path integral. 

*Backward causation, hidden variables and the meaning of completenes*s 
[ https://www.ias.ac.in/article/fulltext/pram/056/02-03/0199-0209 ]

*Feynman’s path integral approach, calculation of the probability of the 
outcome in question depends on an integration over the possible individual 
paths between the given initial state and the given final state, each 
weighted by a complex number. The fact that the weights associated with 
individual paths are complex makes it impossible to interpret them as real 
valued probabilities, associated with a classical statistical distribution 
of possibilities.*

*However, there is no such difficulty at the level of the entire ‘bundle’ 
of paths which comprise the path integral. If we think of the hidden 
reality as the instantiation not of one path rather than another but of one 
entire bundle rather than another, then the quantum mechanical 
probabilities can be thought of as classical probability distributions over 
such elements of reality. (For example, suppose we specify the boundary 
conditions in terms of the electron source, the fact that two slits are 
open, and the fact that a detector screen is present at a certain distance 
on the opposite side of the central screen. We then partition the detector 
screen, so as to define possible outcomes for the experiment. For each 
element O_i of this partition, there is a bundle B_i of Feynman paths, 
constituting the path integral used in calculating the probability of 
outcome O_i . We have a classical probability distribution*
*over the set of such B_i .*

One could stop at *history bundles* as the sample space, or the "hidden 
reality" could be that *one history* is selected at random from the history 
bundle. That could occur with t*ime symmetry* (retrocausality): The one 
path is chosen at random from a history bundle at the source in the present 
from the distribution determined on the history bundles in the future.

- pt



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