Re: Chaos makes axioms unnecessary

2018-12-05 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 9:54:05 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/5/2018 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> "How many axioms would be needed [to model nature]?...if we look at the 
> universe in totality and not bracket any subset of phenomena, t*he 
> mathematics we would need would have no axioms at all* It is only the 
> way we look at the universe that gives us the illusion of structure."
>
> Chaos Makes the Multiverse Unnecessary
> by Noson S. Yanofsky
> November 29, 2018
> [ 
> http://nautil.us/issue/66/clockwork/chaos-makes-the-multiverse-unnecessary-rp 
> ]
> *Science predicts only the predictable, ignoring most of our chaotic 
> universe.*
>
>
> A point we discussed with Vic.  POVI doesn't apply to everything.  Only 
> some things are POVI and those are the things science is interested in.  
>
> Brent
>
>
> Noson S. Yanofsky is a professor of computer science at Brooklyn College 
> of The City University of New York.
> [ http://www.sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu/~noson/ ]
>
> - pt
>
>

I wasn't sure what to make of Yanofsky's "chaos universe" yet  - its 
relation to complexity theory, etc. Or maybe related to the *binary lambda 
calculu*s (BLC - all programs are binary number strings):

refs.
https://esolangs.org/wiki/Binary_lambda_calculus
https://esolangs.org/wiki/Dependently_Typed_Binary_Lambda_Calculus
https://tromp.github.io/cl/Binary_lambda_calculus.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZAb1QK1gMUs

All programming can be done in BLC .

So all "physics" can be written in BLC.

- pt

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Re: Extended Wigner’s Friend

2018-12-05 Thread Mason Green
To go into further detail, creatures who perceived time that way would not be 
able to maintain a sense of personal continuity or selfhood for very long, 
since they have many future “selves” and past “selves”. So instead, they prefer 
to think of their future and past “selves” as other people more like cousins or 
family. A consequence of this is that they are always changing their names as 
time passes; they are literally becoming different people as time passes 
because each observer-moment is a different person blending into other people. 
“Schizophrenia with a vengeance”, indeed! Definitely a good sci-fi idea.

Thanks for the story idea, guys! I’d never have come up with it without this 
discussion.

-Mason

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Re: Extended Wigner’s Friend

2018-12-05 Thread Mason Green
Ah, yes, multiple histories. Given only what we know now about the universe 
(and not what we “remember from before”, since our memories are actually just 
patterns encoded in our brain at the present moment), what’s to stop us from 
thinking that entropy was higher in the past and things just spontaneously 
arranged themselves into the present low-entropy state? In other words, the 
second law of thermodynamics might not be true and the arrow of time could be 
more of a parabola with our present selves at the bottom. That ripe banana in 
your hand might have been rotten 6 days ago.

If multiple histories is true, then MOST (by probability amplitude) of the 
universe’s histories are paradoxical in this way, since there are more possible 
pasts with high entropy than there are with low entropy. Furthermore these 
counterintuitive histories might be weird in other ways (for instance, some of 
them might not feature a Big Bang or expanding universe at all, but rather the 
light distribution just fluctuated in such a way as to mimic one). Everything 
we think we know about “the past” might come into doubt if MWI and multiple 
histories are true. I once tried asking this question on Physics Forums but it 
got deleted for being too weird. Apparently they don’t like anything that 
upsets their common sense too much.

Actually I find the idea that the past is not as it seems to be oddly 
fascinating. I’m thinking I might write a story about beings who perceive time 
as parabolic, with their present selves at an entropy minimum: their language 
is structured so that they can only talk about possible pasts and not “the” 
past, and also they have words for all the Second Law-violating reverse 
processes that had to have occurred in the high-entropy majority of their 
possible pasts.

-Mason

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Re: Chaos makes axioms unnecessary

2018-12-05 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/5/2018 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



"How many axioms would be needed [to model nature]?...if we look at 
the universe in totality and not bracket any subset of phenomena, t*he 
mathematics we would need would have no axioms at all* It is only 
the way we look at the universe that gives us the illusion of structure."


Chaos Makes the Multiverse Unnecessary
by Noson S. Yanofsky
November 29, 2018
[ 
http://nautil.us/issue/66/clockwork/chaos-makes-the-multiverse-unnecessary-rp 
]
/Science predicts only the predictable, ignoring most of our chaotic 
universe./


A point we discussed with Vic.  POVI doesn't apply to everything. Only 
some things are POVI and those are the things science is interested in.


Brent



Noson S. Yanofsky is a professor of computer science at Brooklyn 
College of The City University of New York.

[ http://www.sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu/~noson/ ]

- pt

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Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2018-12-05 Thread agrayson2000


On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 9:42:51 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:52 PM > wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 11:42:06 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:

 On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM  wrote:

>
> *Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of 
> interference and coherence, without introducing your theory of 
> consciousness. Mainstream thinking today is that decoherence does occur, 
> but this seems to imply preexisting coherence, and therefore interference 
> among the component states of a superposition. If the superposition is 
> expressed using eigenfunctions, which are mutually orthogonal -- implying 
> no mutual interference -- how is decoherence possible, insofar as 
> coherence, IIUC, doesn't exist using this basis? AG*
>

 I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it is used 
 off an expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal eigenvectors. 
 The 
 expansion in some eigenvector basis is written as

|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)

 where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the dimension of 
 the Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are the complex numbers a_i. 
 Since these are complex coefficients, they contain inherent phases. It is 
 the preservation of these phases of the expansion coefficients that is 
 meant by "maintaining coherence". So it is the coherence of the particular 
 expansion that is implied, and this has noting to do with the mutual 
 orthogonality or otherwise of the basis vectors themselves. In 
 decoherence, 
 the phase relationships between the terms in the original expansion are 
 lost.

 Bruce 

>>>
>>> I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my error -- 
>>> confusing orthogonality with interference and coherence. Let me have your 
>>> indulgence on a related issue. AG
>>>
>>
>> Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its superposition 
>> expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with variable p. Does the 
>> phase of the original wf carry over into the eigenfunctions as identical 
>> for each, or can each component in the superposition have different phases? 
>> I ask this because the probability determined by any complex amplitude is 
>> independent of its phase. TIA, AG 
>>
>
> The phases of the coefficients are independent of each other.
>

When I formally studied QM, no mention was made of calculating the phases 
since, presumably, they don't effect probability calculations. Do you have 
a link which explains how they're calculated? TIA, AG 

>
> Bruce
>
>  
>

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Re: Measuring a system in a superposition of states vs in a mixed state

2018-12-05 Thread agrayson2000


On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 9:46:08 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 11:01 PM > wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:39:43 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 3:53 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
 On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 10:28:39 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 3:45:32 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 6:58 AM Philip Thrift  
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 1:53:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:


 On 12/4/2018 12:25 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:


 1. Histories originate at an emitter e and end at screen locations 
 s on a screen S.
 2. At each s there is a history bundle histories(s). A weight w(s) 
 is computed from the bundle by summing the unit complex numbers of the 
 histories and taking the modulus. 
 3. The weight w(s) is sent back in time over a single history h*(s) 
 selected at random (uniformly) from histories(s).
 4. At e, the weights w(s) on backchannel of h*(s) are received (in 
 the "present" time)
 5. A single history h*(s*) is then selected from the distribution 
 in 4.


 How is it selected?  Above you said "at random".  But that implies 
 there is already a probability measure defined on the histories.  How 
 is 
 this probability measure determined?  Or put another way how do you 
 determine what histories to consider to form the bundles in step 2?

 Brent

>>>
>>> Selection happens via quantum Darwinism. 
>>>
>>
>>
>> Do you have even the faintest understanding of Quantum Darwinism?
>>
>> Bruce 
>>
>
> How is *sum over histories with Darwinian selection*  (as defined) 
> not quantum Darwinism?
>
> Operationally, what is different?
>
> - pt
>

 *Sum over histories with Darwinian selection* is consistent with *Quantum 
 Darwinism as a Darwinian process*  [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1001.0745 ].

>>>
>>> No, you clearly don't understand Quantum Darwinism! Zurek's Darwinism is 
>>> selection of pointer states, not one history from a bundle.
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>
>> Wiki isn't clear in its definition of pointer states. WRT the double slit 
>> experiment, would it be correct to say the impacts with very high 
>> probability are "pointer states" and those with a low or zero probability 
>> are respectively less, or not at all pointer states? TIA, AG 
>>
>
> No. Pointer states are those corresponding to the basis that is stable 
> against environmental decoherence. In the double slit experiment, the 
> pointer states are positions on the screen -- some are occupied and some 
> not, but that is not a distinction that is relevant to the formation of the 
> pointer states.
>
> Bruce
>

An illustrative example might suffice to explain the concept; what are the 
pointer states for the double slit experiment? AG 

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Re: Measuring a system in a superposition of states vs in a mixed state

2018-12-05 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 11:01 PM  wrote:

> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:39:43 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 3:53 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 10:28:39 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:

 On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 3:45:32 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 6:58 AM Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 1:53:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/4/2018 12:25 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> 1. Histories originate at an emitter e and end at screen locations s
>>> on a screen S.
>>> 2. At each s there is a history bundle histories(s). A weight w(s)
>>> is computed from the bundle by summing the unit complex numbers of the
>>> histories and taking the modulus.
>>> 3. The weight w(s) is sent back in time over a single history h*(s)
>>> selected at random (uniformly) from histories(s).
>>> 4. At e, the weights w(s) on backchannel of h*(s) are received (in
>>> the "present" time)
>>> 5. A single history h*(s*) is then selected from the distribution in
>>> 4.
>>>
>>>
>>> How is it selected?  Above you said "at random".  But that implies
>>> there is already a probability measure defined on the histories.  How is
>>> this probability measure determined?  Or put another way how do you
>>> determine what histories to consider to form the bundles in step 2?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> Selection happens via quantum Darwinism.
>>
>
>
> Do you have even the faintest understanding of Quantum Darwinism?
>
> Bruce
>

 How is *sum over histories with Darwinian selection*  (as defined) not
 quantum Darwinism?

 Operationally, what is different?

 - pt

>>>
>>> *Sum over histories with Darwinian selection* is consistent with *Quantum
>>> Darwinism as a Darwinian process*  [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1001.0745 ].
>>>
>>
>> No, you clearly don't understand Quantum Darwinism! Zurek's Darwinism is
>> selection of pointer states, not one history from a bundle.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> Wiki isn't clear in its definition of pointer states. WRT the double slit
> experiment, would it be correct to say the impacts with very high
> probability are "pointer states" and those with a low or zero probability
> are respectively less, or not at all pointer states? TIA, AG
>

No. Pointer states are those corresponding to the basis that is stable
against environmental decoherence. In the double slit experiment, the
pointer states are positions on the screen -- some are occupied and some
not, but that is not a distinction that is relevant to the formation of the
pointer states.

Bruce

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Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2018-12-05 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:52 PM  wrote:

> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 11:42:06 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM  wrote:
>>>

 *Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of
 interference and coherence, without introducing your theory of
 consciousness. Mainstream thinking today is that decoherence does occur,
 but this seems to imply preexisting coherence, and therefore interference
 among the component states of a superposition. If the superposition is
 expressed using eigenfunctions, which are mutually orthogonal -- implying
 no mutual interference -- how is decoherence possible, insofar as
 coherence, IIUC, doesn't exist using this basis? AG*

>>>
>>> I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it is used off
>>> an expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal eigenvectors. The
>>> expansion in some eigenvector basis is written as
>>>
>>>|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)
>>>
>>> where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the dimension of the
>>> Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are the complex numbers a_i.
>>> Since these are complex coefficients, they contain inherent phases. It is
>>> the preservation of these phases of the expansion coefficients that is
>>> meant by "maintaining coherence". So it is the coherence of the particular
>>> expansion that is implied, and this has noting to do with the mutual
>>> orthogonality or otherwise of the basis vectors themselves. In decoherence,
>>> the phase relationships between the terms in the original expansion are
>>> lost.
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>
>> I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my error --
>> confusing orthogonality with interference and coherence. Let me have your
>> indulgence on a related issue. AG
>>
>
> Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its superposition
> expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with variable p. Does the
> phase of the original wf carry over into the eigenfunctions as identical
> for each, or can each component in the superposition have different phases?
> I ask this because the probability determined by any complex amplitude is
> independent of its phase. TIA, AG
>

The phases of the coefficients are independent of each other.

Bruce

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Chaos makes axioms unnecessary

2018-12-05 Thread Philip Thrift


"How many axioms would be needed [to model nature]?...if we look at the 
universe in totality and not bracket any subset of phenomena, t*he 
mathematics we would need would have no axioms at all* It is only the 
way we look at the universe that gives us the illusion of structure."

Chaos Makes the Multiverse Unnecessary
by Noson S. Yanofsky
November 29, 2018
[ 
http://nautil.us/issue/66/clockwork/chaos-makes-the-multiverse-unnecessary-rp 
]
*Science predicts only the predictable, ignoring most of our chaotic 
universe.*

Noson S. Yanofsky is a professor of computer science at Brooklyn College of 
The City University of New York.
[ http://www.sci.brooklyn.cuny.edu/~noson/ ]

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-05 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>> *computationalism 
>> is indeed false*, and it should be replaced by what I call *real 
>> computationalism* (where I am adopting the "real" label from Galen 
>> Strawson):
>>
>>
>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ ]
>>
>>  -pt
>>
>>
>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>  
>
> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
> ] — where 
> *there 
> are no such things as mathematical objects* — if computation is 
> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
> fiction.)
>
>
>
> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
> math-fictionanlist.
>
> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
> arithmetic.
>
> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
> x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
> can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
> waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
> solutions.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
(like us).

"Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist. Example: The 
Turing 
machine as defined in the standard textbook manner 
[ 
https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html 
].

(Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
"boring".)

So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 

- pt

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-05 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 10:05:44 AM UTC-6, Mark Buda wrote:
>
> Philip Thrift > writes: 
>
> > On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 4:50:22 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
> > 
> >  On 12/4/2018 11:50 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
> > 
> >  On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 1:46:44 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
> > 
> >  On 12/4/2018 12:06 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
> > 
> >  Can you give an example of "truth in the programming" and how it 
> differs from the mathematical idea of true and the correspondence theory of 
> truth? 
> > 
> >  Brent 
> > 
> >  Truth in programming follows the Brouwerian concept of truth: 
> >  [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/brouwer/ ] 
> > 
> >  There is no determinant of mathematical truth outside the activity of 
> thinking; a proposition only becomes true when the subject has experienced 
> its truth (by having carried out an appropriate 
> >  mental construction); similarly, a proposition only becomes false when 
> the subject has experienced its falsehood (by realizing that an appropriate 
> mental construction is not possible). 
> > 
> >  There is no determinant of mathematical truth outside the activity of 
> computing; a proposition only becomes true when the program has produced 
> its truth (by having carried out an 
> >  appropriate computational construction); similarly, a proposition only 
> becomes false when the program has produced its falsehood (by computing 
> that an appropriate computational construction is 
> >  not possible). 
> > 
> >  I didn't ask for examples of circular definitions. 
> > 
> >  Brent 
> > 
> >  In what sense is type theory circular logic? 
> > 
> >  First, I didn't ask for a logic, I asked for examples to the different 
> ideas of truth. Instead you provided some assertions about "where truth is 
> determined" and about becoming true...which were circular. 
> > 
> >  "a proposition only becomes true when the subject has experienced its 
> truth" 
> > 
> >  " a proposition only becomes true when the program has produced its 
> truth" 
> > 
> >  Third, neither your post nor the article on Brouwer said anything about 
> type theory. 
> >  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/type-theory-intuitionistic/ 
> > 
> >  Brent 
> > 
> > The simple way to put it: 
> > 
> > Write a Lisp program p. 
> > 
> > If p returns nil, pi is false. 
> > 
> > If p returns anything else, p is true. 
> > 
> > That's all you need to know about truth. 
>
> You have it all wrong. 
>
> "Beauty is truth, truth beauty," -- that is all 
> Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. 
> -- 
> Mark Buda > 
> I get my monkeys for nothing and my chimps for free 
>


One of the best-selling popular science books of 2018 is "Lost in Math" by 
Sabine Hossenfelder. In Germany, the title is “Das Hässliche Universum” 
(The Ugly Universe).

http://backreaction.blogspot.com/ @skdh 

The claim: The belief that "Beauty is truth, truth beauty" has caused 
theoretical physics to stagnate.

- pt


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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-05 Thread agrayson2000


On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 4:19:12 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 3:37:13 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Perspectivism is a form of modalism.
>>>
>>>
>>> Nietzsche is vindicated.
>>>
>>>
>>> Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, 
>>> perhaps!
>>> All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology 
>>> (capable only of saying what God is not).
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>> From  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/
>>> 6.2 Perspectivism
>>>
>>> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his 
>>> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of perspective. 
>>> He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the influence of 
>>> their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore failed to control 
>>> those perspectival effects (*BGE* 6; see *BGE* I more generally). 
>>> Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by what has come to be 
>>> called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a major concern in a 
>>> number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, e.g., Danto 1965; 
>>> Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 1985; Clark 1990; 
>>> Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has been as much 
>>> contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of commitments belong 
>>> under that heading as about their philosophical merits, but a few points 
>>> are relatively uncontroversial and can provide a useful way into this 
>>> strand of Nietzsche’s thinking.
>>>
>>> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in 
>>> his usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a 
>>> critical side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers for 
>>> ignoring the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we saw, 
>>> he simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a positive 
>>> contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he takes to be) 
>>> the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past philosophers, he 
>>> writes,
>>>
>>> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute 
>>> reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the spirit 
>>> has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently in this way for 
>>> once, *to want* to see differently, is no small discipline and 
>>> preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter 
>>> understood not as “disinterested contemplation” (which is a non-concept and 
>>> absurdity), but rather as the capacity to have one’s Pro and Contra *in 
>>> one’s power*, and to shift them in and out, so that one knows how to 
>>> make precisely the *difference* in perspectives and affective 
>>> interpretations useful for knowledge. (*GM* III, 12)
>>>
>>> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy at 
>>> least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of 
>>> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal the 
>>> way things really are, independently of any point of view whatsoever. 
>>> Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a revised 
>>> conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between one 
>>> perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of others, 
>>> without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so much as 
>>> possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the traditional 
>>> picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is equally a positive 
>>> set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge as a finite, limited 
>>> cognitive agent.
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly not 
>>> with neoplatonism, which explains everything from the many perspective of 
>>> the One, or at least can be interpreted that way.
>>>
>>> Pure perspectivism is an extreme position which leads to pure 
>>> relativism, which does not make sense, as we can only doubt starting from 
>>> indubitable things (cf Descartes). But Nietzsche might have been OK, as the 
>>> text above suggested a “revised conception” of objective. 
>>>
>>> With mechanism, you have an ablate truth (the sigma_1 arithmetical 
>>> truth), and the rest is explained by the perspective enforced by 
>>> incompleteness.
>>>
>>>
>>> My reading of Nietzsche is he thought that there are many different 
>>> perspectives and one can only approach the truth by looking from different 
>>> perspectives but never taking one of them as definitive.  This goes along 
>>> with his denial 

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-05 Thread agrayson2000


On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 3:37:13 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:25, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> Perspectivism is a form of modalism.
>>
>>
>> Nietzsche is vindicated.
>>
>>
>> Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, 
>> perhaps!
>> All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology 
>> (capable only of saying what God is not).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>> From  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/
>> 6.2 Perspectivism
>>
>> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his 
>> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of perspective. 
>> He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the influence of 
>> their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore failed to control 
>> those perspectival effects (*BGE* 6; see *BGE* I more generally). 
>> Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by what has come to be 
>> called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a major concern in a 
>> number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, e.g., Danto 1965; 
>> Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 1985; Clark 1990; 
>> Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has been as much 
>> contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of commitments belong 
>> under that heading as about their philosophical merits, but a few points 
>> are relatively uncontroversial and can provide a useful way into this 
>> strand of Nietzsche’s thinking.
>>
>> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in his 
>> usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a critical 
>> side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers for ignoring 
>> the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we saw, he 
>> simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a positive 
>> contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he takes to be) 
>> the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past philosophers, he 
>> writes,
>>
>> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute 
>> reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the spirit 
>> has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently in this way for 
>> once, *to want* to see differently, is no small discipline and 
>> preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter 
>> understood not as “disinterested contemplation” (which is a non-concept and 
>> absurdity), but rather as the capacity to have one’s Pro and Contra *in 
>> one’s power*, and to shift them in and out, so that one knows how to 
>> make precisely the *difference* in perspectives and affective 
>> interpretations useful for knowledge. (*GM* III, 12)
>>
>> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy at 
>> least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of 
>> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal the 
>> way things really are, independently of any point of view whatsoever. 
>> Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a revised 
>> conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between one 
>> perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of others, 
>> without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so much as 
>> possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the traditional 
>> picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is equally a positive 
>> set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge as a finite, limited 
>> cognitive agent.
>>
>>
>> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly not 
>> with neoplatonism, which explains everything from the many perspective of 
>> the One, or at least can be interpreted that way.
>>
>> Pure perspectivism is an extreme position which leads to pure relativism, 
>> which does not make sense, as we can only doubt starting from indubitable 
>> things (cf Descartes). But Nietzsche might have been OK, as the text above 
>> suggested a “revised conception” of objective. 
>>
>> With mechanism, you have an ablate truth (the sigma_1 arithmetical 
>> truth), and the rest is explained by the perspective enforced by 
>> incompleteness.
>>
>>
>> My reading of Nietzsche is he thought that there are many different 
>> perspectives and one can only approach the truth by looking from different 
>> perspectives but never taking one of them as definitive.  This goes along 
>> with his denial and rejection of being a system builder.  I think he 
>> equated system builders with those who took their perspective to be the 
>> only one.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> Nietzsche  is famous 

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-05 Thread Mark Buda
Philip Thrift  writes:

> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 4:50:22 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>  On 12/4/2018 11:50 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>  On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 1:46:44 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>
>  On 12/4/2018 12:06 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>  Can you give an example of "truth in the programming" and how it differs 
> from the mathematical idea of true and the correspondence theory of truth?
>
>  Brent
>
>  Truth in programming follows the Brouwerian concept of truth:
>  [ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/brouwer/ ]
>
>  There is no determinant of mathematical truth outside the activity of 
> thinking; a proposition only becomes true when the subject has experienced 
> its truth (by having carried out an appropriate
>  mental construction); similarly, a proposition only becomes false when the 
> subject has experienced its falsehood (by realizing that an appropriate 
> mental construction is not possible).
>
>  There is no determinant of mathematical truth outside the activity of 
> computing; a proposition only becomes true when the program has produced its 
> truth (by having carried out an
>  appropriate computational construction); similarly, a proposition only 
> becomes false when the program has produced its falsehood (by computing that 
> an appropriate computational construction is
>  not possible). 
>
>  I didn't ask for examples of circular definitions.
>
>  Brent
>
>  In what sense is type theory circular logic? 
>
>  First, I didn't ask for a logic, I asked for examples to the different ideas 
> of truth. Instead you provided some assertions about "where truth is 
> determined" and about becoming true...which were circular.
>
>  "a proposition only becomes true when the subject has experienced its truth"
>
>  " a proposition only becomes true when the program has produced its truth" 
>
>  Third, neither your post nor the article on Brouwer said anything about type 
> theory.
>  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/type-theory-intuitionistic/
>
>  Brent
>
> The simple way to put it:
>
> Write a Lisp program p.
>
> If p returns nil, pi is false.
>
> If p returns anything else, p is true.
>
> That's all you need to know about truth.

You have it all wrong.

"Beauty is truth, truth beauty," -- that is all
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know.
-- 
Mark Buda 
I get my monkeys for nothing and my chimps for free

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Re: Measuring a system in a superposition of states vs in a mixed state

2018-12-05 Thread agrayson2000


On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:39:43 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 3:53 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 10:28:39 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 3:45:32 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

 On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 6:58 AM Philip Thrift  
 wrote:

>
> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 1:53:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12/4/2018 12:25 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> 1. Histories originate at an emitter e and end at screen locations s 
>> on a screen S.
>> 2. At each s there is a history bundle histories(s). A weight w(s) is 
>> computed from the bundle by summing the unit complex numbers of the 
>> histories and taking the modulus. 
>> 3. The weight w(s) is sent back in time over a single history h*(s) 
>> selected at random (uniformly) from histories(s).
>> 4. At e, the weights w(s) on backchannel of h*(s) are received (in 
>> the "present" time)
>> 5. A single history h*(s*) is then selected from the distribution in 
>> 4.
>>
>>
>> How is it selected?  Above you said "at random".  But that implies 
>> there is already a probability measure defined on the histories.  How is 
>> this probability measure determined?  Or put another way how do you 
>> determine what histories to consider to form the bundles in step 2?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Selection happens via quantum Darwinism. 
>


 Do you have even the faintest understanding of Quantum Darwinism?

 Bruce 

>>>
>>> How is *sum over histories with Darwinian selection*  (as defined) not 
>>> quantum Darwinism?
>>>
>>> Operationally, what is different?
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>
>> *Sum over histories with Darwinian selection* is consistent with *Quantum 
>> Darwinism as a Darwinian process*  [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1001.0745 ].
>>
>
> No, you clearly don't understand Quantum Darwinism! Zurek's Darwinism is 
> selection of pointer states, not one history from a bundle.
>
> Bruce
>

Wiki isn't clear in its definition of pointer states. WRT the double slit 
experiment, would it be correct to say the impacts with very high 
probability are "pointer states" and those with a low or zero probability 
are respectively less, or not at all pointer states? TIA, AG 

>  
>

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Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2018-12-05 Thread agrayson2000


On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 11:42:06 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> *Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of 
>>> interference and coherence, without introducing your theory of 
>>> consciousness. Mainstream thinking today is that decoherence does occur, 
>>> but this seems to imply preexisting coherence, and therefore interference 
>>> among the component states of a superposition. If the superposition is 
>>> expressed using eigenfunctions, which are mutually orthogonal -- implying 
>>> no mutual interference -- how is decoherence possible, insofar as 
>>> coherence, IIUC, doesn't exist using this basis? AG*
>>>
>>
>> I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it is used off 
>> an expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal eigenvectors. The 
>> expansion in some eigenvector basis is written as
>>
>>|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)
>>
>> where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the dimension of the 
>> Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are the complex numbers a_i. 
>> Since these are complex coefficients, they contain inherent phases. It is 
>> the preservation of these phases of the expansion coefficients that is 
>> meant by "maintaining coherence". So it is the coherence of the particular 
>> expansion that is implied, and this has noting to do with the mutual 
>> orthogonality or otherwise of the basis vectors themselves. In decoherence, 
>> the phase relationships between the terms in the original expansion are 
>> lost.
>>
>> Bruce 
>>
>
> I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my error -- 
> confusing orthogonality with interference and coherence. Let me have your 
> indulgence on a related issue. AG
>

Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its superposition 
expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with variable p. Does the 
phase of the original wf carry over into the eigenfunctions as identical 
for each, or can each component in the superposition have different phases? 
I ask this because the probability determined by any complex amplitude is 
independent of its phase. TIA, AG 

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Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2018-12-05 Thread agrayson2000


On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM > wrote:
>
>>
>> *Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of 
>> interference and coherence, without introducing your theory of 
>> consciousness. Mainstream thinking today is that decoherence does occur, 
>> but this seems to imply preexisting coherence, and therefore interference 
>> among the component states of a superposition. If the superposition is 
>> expressed using eigenfunctions, which are mutually orthogonal -- implying 
>> no mutual interference -- how is decoherence possible, insofar as 
>> coherence, IIUC, doesn't exist using this basis? AG*
>>
>
> I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it is used off 
> an expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal eigenvectors. The 
> expansion in some eigenvector basis is written as
>
>|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)
>
> where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the dimension of the 
> Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are the complex numbers a_i. 
> Since these are complex coefficients, they contain inherent phases. It is 
> the preservation of these phases of the expansion coefficients that is 
> meant by "maintaining coherence". So it is the coherence of the particular 
> expansion that is implied, and this has noting to do with the mutual 
> orthogonality or otherwise of the basis vectors themselves. In decoherence, 
> the phase relationships between the terms in the original expansion are 
> lost.
>
> Bruce 
>

I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my error -- 
confusing orthogonality with interference and coherence. Let me have your 
indulgence on a related issue. 

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 6:37:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 11:39, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 4:25:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 3 Dec 2018, at 23:01, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 1:24:30 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 2 Dec 2018, at 13:24, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 5:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 29 Nov 2018, at 20:00, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, November 29, 2018 at 10:27:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 27 Nov 2018, at 18:50, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, November 27, 2018 at 4:32:53 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 24 Nov 2018, at 17:27, John Clark > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Turing explained how matter can behave intelligently,
>> 
>> No. He showed how a person can be attached to a computation, and also 
>> that physics is Turing complete, so that we can use matter to implement 
>> computations, like nature plausibly does. But it is not matter which 
>> behave intelligently: it is the person associated to the computation, 
>> and it behaves as well relatively to numbers than to matter. You use of 
>> matter is “magical”.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> If humans are matter (meaning of course that human brains are matter), 
>> then humans behave intelligently means that (at least some) matter 
>> behaves intelligently.  
> 
> Like with a computer: some arrangement of some matter can emulate a 
> (universal) computation. That means that the physical laws are Turing 
> complete. 
> 
> It does not mean that primary matter exists (see my reminding of what 
> this means in my answer to Brent, soon enough!).
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> It is not clear that Turing in his last ("morphogenesis") years thought 
>> that the Turing machine was a complete definition of computing in nature.
> 
> 
> If mechanism is true, in principle, nature has more powerful processing 
> ability than any computer. Now, it could mean only that nature use a 
> random oracle, which would come only from our ignorance about which 
> computations run us, if I may say.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Going by something Barry Cooper wrote
> 
> The intuition is that computational unconventionality certainly entails 
> higher-type computation, with a correspondingly enhanced respect for 
> embodied information. There is some understanding of the algorithmic 
> content of descriptions. But so far we have merely scratched the surface.
> 
> "natural computing" may involve something that is non-Turing in a sense 
> that doesn't involve actual oracles in the hyperarithmetical processing 
> sense (but could involve topology: We can say that topology is precisely 
> about the relation between finiteness and infiniteness that is relevant 
> to computation. [ 
> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/introduction-to-higher-order-computation-NLS-2017.pdf
>  
> 
>  ]).
> 
> 
> I posit that experience processing is a "natural computing" that is 
> non-Turing.
> 
> This new article may be of interest:
> 
> 
> "there are now many signs that consciousness-like phenomena might exist 
> not just among humans or even great apes – but that insects might have 
> them, too"
> ] 
> https://aeon.co/essays/inside-the-mind-of-a-bee-is-a-hive-of-sensory-activity
>  
> 
>  ]
 
 I am OK with this. I am open that plants do think, somehow. What is 
 provably inconsistent with digital mechanism is that consciousness is 
 “natural” or a product of matter. That equates two different kind of 
 mysteries, without adding light on Matter nor Consciousness. That might be 
 true, but I don’t see any evidence for such a move. 
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 That consciousness is an "intrinsic" property of patter will be the 
 subject of
 
 Galileo's Error
 Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
 
 by Philip Goff
 (coming from Penguin Random House)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Please make an argument. Cite people only if you use an idea from them, but 
>>> present the idea and use it.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 
 What higher-order computing matter does is an open question. But there is 
 no evidence that there is any mathematical entity existing outside of 
 matter (the subject of science).
>>> 

Re: Measuring a system in a superposition of states vs in a mixed state

2018-12-05 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 1:55:22 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 6:08 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>> As has been pointed out, path integrals are a calculational tool, not an 
>>> interpretation.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Oh,* that* again. It's like Groundhog Day (the movie).
>>
>
> Given your repetitive harping on half-baked path integral ideas, I thought 
> repetition was the way forward. 
>
> Bruce
>
>

Just harping on the misguided Platonism of belief in the wave function. 

- pt

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