Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:20:22 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 8:04:11 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:53:50 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, 
>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> * As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing 
>>> there is nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard 
>>> that 
>>> position articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. AG 
>>> *
>>>


>>
>> Victor Stenger
>> *Materialism Deconstructed?*
>>
>> https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
>>  
>>
>
> *I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in the 
> reality of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks back. But 
> he 
> didn't deny the possibility that there could be something more 
> fundamental 
> underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is the materialist 
> position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know this, of course, 
> being a member of that group. Right? AG*
>
>>
>> - pt
>>
>  

 I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him fairly 
 personally .

 Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental 
 substance in nature") is in his books. *Timeless Reality* in 
 particular.

 One can be open-minded, or *ironist *in Rorty's definition [ 
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism ], and he was that.

 But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was 
 always a hardcore materialist.

 - pt

>>>
>>> Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal and 
>>> unknown underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's model of 
>>> materialism among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply to Vic. AG 
>>>
>>
>>
>> When Vic refutes that materialism ("all there is is matter") has been 
>> refuted (as Vic did in his essay), he is asserting all there is is matter. 
>> There is no matter + some ghosts behind matter. He wanted to banish the 
>> ghosts (the immaterial).
>>
>
> Apparently, you don't understand what the issue with materialism is. I 
> already explained it. AG 
>
>>
>> - pt
>>
>

I guess I don't know what the issue with *materialism* ("the notion that 
only matter exists"*) is that you are referring to.



This I do know: To have an issue with (be opposed to) materialism is to 
have a belief such as:


   - Immaterialism , a 
   philosophy branching from George Berkeley of which his idealism is a type
   - Dualism (philosophy of mind) 
   , a 
   philosophy which includes the claim that mental phenomena are, in some 
   respects, non-physical
   - Gnosticism , a general class 
   of religious movements which hold that human beings have divine souls 
   trapped in a material world
   - Idealism , which holds that 
   the ultimate nature of reality is based on mind or ideas
   - Maya (illusion) , a 
   concept in various Indian religions regarding the dualism of the Universe
   - Platonic realism , 
   which holds that certain universals have a *real* existence, in the 
   sense of philosophical realism
   - Supernaturalism 
   - Transcendentalism , a 
   group of ideas involving an ideal spiritual state that 'transcends' the 
   physical and empirical realms


* [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Antimaterialism ]

- pt


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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-11 Thread agrayson2000


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 8:04:11 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:53:50 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, 
> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> * As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing 
>> there is nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that 
>> position articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. AG *
>>
>>>
>>>
>
> Victor Stenger
> *Materialism Deconstructed?*
>
> https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
>  
>

 *I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in the 
 reality of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks back. But he 
 didn't deny the possibility that there could be something more fundamental 
 underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is the materialist 
 position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know this, of course, 
 being a member of that group. Right? AG*

>
> - pt
>
  
>>>
>>> I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him fairly 
>>> personally .
>>>
>>> Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental 
>>> substance in nature") is in his books. *Timeless Reality* in particular.
>>>
>>> One can be open-minded, or *ironist *in Rorty's definition [ 
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism ], and he was that.
>>>
>>> But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was always 
>>> a hardcore materialist.
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>
>> Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal and 
>> unknown underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's model of 
>> materialism among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply to Vic. AG 
>>
>
>
> When Vic refutes that materialism ("all there is is matter") has been 
> refuted (as Vic did in his essay), he is asserting all there is is matter. 
> There is no matter + some ghosts behind matter. He wanted to banish the 
> ghosts (the immaterial).
>

Apparently, you don't understand what the issue with materialism is. I 
already explained it. AG 

>
> - pt
>

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 8:44 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 1:20 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>> And they produce no results since they run both ways.  They are not even
>> computations in the CT sense.
>>
>
> I am not sure about that. There is the concept of reversible Turing
> machines:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reversible_computing#Logical_reversibility
>

Why don't they build a perpetual motion machine while they are at it?

Bruce

Jason
>

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 3:44:26 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 1:20 PM Brent Meeker  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/11/2018 11:06 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 12:53 PM Philip Thrift > > wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: 



 On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker  
 wrote:

>
>
> On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter 
>> is primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from something more 
>> fundamental.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>  
>
> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. *The 
> universal numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal B [ 
> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as providing a purely 
> informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then 
> why would *actual matter* need to come into existence at all? Actual 
> matter itself would seem to be superfluous. 
>
> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), 
> and actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of 
> simulation of pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual 
> matter 
> to come into existence.
>
>
> If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the 
> equations of matter how is it not "actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is that 
> consciousness of matter and it's effects are all we can know about 
> matter.  
> So if the "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those 
> conscious thoughts about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets.  
> Remember Bruno is a theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of 
>  
> God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.
>

 It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus Muller's 
 paper:

 In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this 
> “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict her future 
> observations. Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her, 
> since its state is strongly correlated with her experiences. If the 
> measure 
> µ that is computed within her computational universe assigns probability 
> close to one to the experience of hitting her head against a brick, then 
> the corresponding experience of pain will probably render all abstract 
> insights into the non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant.  


 Jason 

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What is the computer that running "her computational universe"?
>>>
>>>
>> The very same that powers the equations that bring life to our universe 
>> as you see it evolve.
>>  
>>
>>> What is its power supply?
>>>
>>>
>> Power is only required to erase information, and that is only a concept 
>> of the physical laws of this universe.  Even the laws of our universe 
>> permit the creation of computers which require no power to run.
>>
>> See the bit about reversible computing: 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle  (computations that 
>> are reversible require no energy).
>>
>>
>> And they produce no results since they run both ways.  They are not even 
>> computations in the CT sense.
>>
>
> I am not sure about that. There is the concept of reversible Turing 
> machines:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reversible_computing#Logical_reversibility
>
> Jason 
>




"Reversible computing is a form of unconventional computing 
."


:)

- pt 

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 2:12 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 1:56 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> >>Without matter and the laws of physics there could be no objective
>>> statements or statements of any sort because there would be nobody around
>>> to make them.
>>>
>>
>> > *But we're talking about ultimate foundations of reality, *
>>
>
> Without physics reality  would not need a foundation  because there would
> be no reality, there would be nothing. And nothing could be explained not
> only because there would nobody to explain it to but more importantly
> because there would be nothing around that needs explaining.
>

You are assuming the answer at the start.  None of the above is an argument
that physics is fundamental, rather than derivative.


>
>
>> *> you could always count the number of ways you could uniquely arrange
>> those items, leading to a bigger number, ad infinitum.  For example. You
>> start with 3 objects.  You could arrange them in 3! = 6 ways. If you then
>> arranged those arrangements, you would have 6! ways of doing that, etc. *
>>
>
> But suppose there were no 3 objects, suppose there were no objects at all
> in existence as would be the case without matter and physics. How many ways
> can you arrange nothing?  As for "ad infinitum", it's easy to say arrange 3
> objects in a infinite number of ways but to actually DO it you'd need a
> infinite amount of energy and space and time, and physics will not allow
> that.
>

So do you think mathematical properties require things to count?  How many
things to count are necessary?


>
>
>> > You are packing a lot of assumptions into your word "DO".
>>
>
> For something to DO anything a change must be made in space and time, and
> numbers never change in space and time, the language of mathematics will
> always and everywhere insist that the English language word "cow" has 3
> letters.
>
>
>> *> You mean the numbers cannot affect the movement of particles in this
>> universe. *
>>
>
> There is certainly a relationship between matter and numbers but does
> matter describe numbers or do numbers describe matter?  I think matter
> describes numbers and I can give you lots of examples of that, the most
> obvious is the physical brain of a mathematician. Bruno thinks numbers
> describe matter but is unable to provide a single example of this.
>

Give me your reasons for why you think computations that exist in the
universe of numbers are ineffectual and cannot produce consciousness, but
computations that exist in the universe of numbers that describe the
coordinates of mathematical objects called elections and photons can.


>
>
>> > *You have not shown that the arithmetical programs cannot simulate
>> conscious beings which would perceive themselves to exist within those
>> simulations.*
>>
>
> Forget consciousness, a computer program can't simulate anyone or do
> anything else either unless it is run on a Turing Machine made of matter
> that obeys the laws of physics.
>

You have provided no proof to back up this statement.


>
>
>> >>> *Do we live in a Diophantine equation*

>>> >> No.
>>>
>>
>> *> What is your argument?*
>>
>
> A Diophantine equation can not change in time or space therefore a Diophantine
> equation can not DO anything and a mind needs to change its thoughts or
> it won't be thinking.
>
>
Spacetime does not change in time or space either. The universe is a static
four dimensional block.  The "deletion/erasure/forced non-existence"
(whatever you call it) of previous moments in time is completely void of
explanatory power. The argument is simple:

If you think other (past or future) moments of time need to stop existing
for you to experience change, then you can experience change without the
past moment existing.
But if you can experience change with only the present existing, then the
existence of the present moment is entirely sufficient to explain your
current experience.
Which means that whether other moments in time exist or not, has no bearing
on your present experience and belief in change.

Therefore, past moments in time do not have to be deleted from existence,
and by Occam (not to mention relativity), the better theory is that all
points in time exist, and your belief in change is an unrelated illusion,
and is not at all substantiated by your belief in change.

Jason

Jason

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 1:20 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/11/2018 11:06 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 12:53 PM Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>


 On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter
> is primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from something more
> fundamental.
>
> Jason
>


 I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. *The universal
 numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal B [
 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as providing a purely
 informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then
 why would *actual matter* need to come into existence at all? Actual
 matter itself would seem to be superfluous.

 If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and
 actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of
 pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into
 existence.


 If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the
 equations of matter how is it not "actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is that
 consciousness of matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter.
 So if the "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those
 conscious thoughts about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets.
 Remember Bruno is a theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of
 God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.

>>>
>>> It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus Muller's
>>> paper:
>>>
>>> In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this
 “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict her future
 observations. Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her,
 since its state is strongly correlated with her experiences. If the measure
 µ that is computed within her computational universe assigns probability
 close to one to the experience of hitting her head against a brick, then
 the corresponding experience of pain will probably render all abstract
 insights into the non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant.
>>>
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> What is the computer that running "her computational universe"?
>>
>>
> The very same that powers the equations that bring life to our universe as
> you see it evolve.
>
>
>> What is its power supply?
>>
>>
> Power is only required to erase information, and that is only a concept of
> the physical laws of this universe.  Even the laws of our universe permit
> the creation of computers which require no power to run.
>
> See the bit about reversible computing:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle  (computations that
> are reversible require no energy).
>
>
> And they produce no results since they run both ways.  They are not even
> computations in the CT sense.
>

I am not sure about that. There is the concept of reversible Turing
machines:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reversible_computing#Logical_reversibility

Jason

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread John Clark
On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 1:56 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

>>Without matter and the laws of physics there could be no objective
>> statements or statements of any sort because there would be nobody around
>> to make them.
>>
>
> > *But we're talking about ultimate foundations of reality, *
>

Without physics reality  would not need a foundation  because there would
be no reality, there would be nothing. And nothing could be explained not
only because there would nobody to explain it to but more importantly
because there would be nothing around that needs explaining.


> *> you could always count the number of ways you could uniquely arrange
> those items, leading to a bigger number, ad infinitum.  For example. You
> start with 3 objects.  You could arrange them in 3! = 6 ways. If you then
> arranged those arrangements, you would have 6! ways of doing that, etc. *
>

But suppose there were no 3 objects, suppose there were no objects at all
in existence as would be the case without matter and physics. How many ways
can you arrange nothing?  As for "ad infinitum", it's easy to say arrange 3
objects in a infinite number of ways but to actually DO it you'd need a
infinite amount of energy and space and time, and physics will not allow
that.


> > You are packing a lot of assumptions into your word "DO".
>

For something to DO anything a change must be made in space and time, and
numbers never change in space and time, the language of mathematics will
always and everywhere insist that the English language word "cow" has 3
letters.


> *> You mean the numbers cannot affect the movement of particles in this
> universe. *
>

There is certainly a relationship between matter and numbers but does
matter describe numbers or do numbers describe matter?  I think matter
describes numbers and I can give you lots of examples of that, the most
obvious is the physical brain of a mathematician. Bruno thinks numbers
describe matter but is unable to provide a single example of this.


> > *You have not shown that the arithmetical programs cannot simulate
> conscious beings which would perceive themselves to exist within those
> simulations.*
>

Forget consciousness, a computer program can't simulate anyone or do
anything else either unless it is run on a Turing Machine made of matter
that obeys the laws of physics.


> >>> *Do we live in a Diophantine equation*
>>>
>> >> No.
>>
>
> *> What is your argument?*
>

A Diophantine equation can not change in time or space therefore a Diophantine
equation can not DO anything and a mind needs to change its thoughts or it
won't be thinking.

 John K Clark

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:53:50 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:



 On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
>
> * As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing there 
> is nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that 
> position 
> articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. AG *
>
>>
>>

 Victor Stenger
 *Materialism Deconstructed?*

 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
  

>>>
>>> *I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in the 
>>> reality of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks back. But he 
>>> didn't deny the possibility that there could be something more fundamental 
>>> underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is the materialist 
>>> position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know this, of course, 
>>> being a member of that group. Right? AG*
>>>

 - pt

>>>  
>>
>> I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him fairly 
>> personally .
>>
>> Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental 
>> substance in nature") is in his books. *Timeless Reality* in particular.
>>
>> One can be open-minded, or *ironist *in Rorty's definition [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism ], and he was that.
>>
>> But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was always 
>> a hardcore materialist.
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
> Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal and 
> unknown underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's model of 
> materialism among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply to Vic. AG 
>


When Vic refutes that materialism ("all there is is matter") has been 
refuted (as Vic did in his essay), he is asserting all there is is matter. 
There is no matter + some ghosts behind matter. He wanted to banish the 
ghosts (the immaterial).

- pt

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-11 Thread agrayson2000


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:

 * As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing there 
 is nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that 
 position 
 articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. AG *

>
>
>>>
>>> Victor Stenger
>>> *Materialism Deconstructed?*
>>>
>>> https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
>>>  
>>>
>>
>> *I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in the 
>> reality of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks back. But he 
>> didn't deny the possibility that there could be something more fundamental 
>> underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is the materialist 
>> position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know this, of course, 
>> being a member of that group. Right? AG*
>>
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>  
>
> I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him fairly 
> personally .
>
> Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental substance 
> in nature") is in his books. *Timeless Reality* in particular.
>
> One can be open-minded, or *ironist *in Rorty's definition [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism ], and he was that.
>
> But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was always a 
> hardcore materialist.
>
> - pt
>

Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal and 
unknown underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's model of 
materialism among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply to Vic. AG 

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:04:41 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/11/2018 9:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 11:29:13 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter is 
>>> primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from something more 
>>> fundamental.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>  
>>
>> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. *The universal 
>> numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal B [ 
>> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as providing a purely 
>> informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then 
>> why would *actual matter* need to come into existence at all? Actual 
>> matter itself would seem to be superfluous. 
>>
>> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and 
>> actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of 
>> pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into 
>> existence.
>>
>>
>> If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the equations 
>> of matter how is it not "actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is that 
>> consciousness of matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter.  
>> So if the "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those 
>> conscious thoughts about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets.  
>> Remember Bruno is a theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of  
>> God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> I suppose that one can argue that *simulata* can replace *materia* until 
> the cows come home 
> .
>
> (Simulata people think they are materia. Materia people think they are 
> simulata. ...)
>
> But pragmatically, I'm not sure where this leads. Engineers still think 
> they are pushing matter around to make things. Not simulations of the 
> things they think are material.
>
>
> The point is that there is no difference.  There is no distinction except 
> in the metaphysics used to talk about it.   Engineers don't do metaphysics.
>
> Bret
>
>
> (For Kant, it was *noumena*.)
>
> - pt
>
>

I think by merely being (non-zombie) humans, engineers do metaphysics.  
Victor Stenger wrote an article about how physicists do metaphysics even 
when they clam they don't. 

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/physicists-are-philosophers-too/

- pt

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> * As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing there 
>>> is nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that position 
>>> articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. AG *
>>>


>>
>> Victor Stenger
>> *Materialism Deconstructed?*
>>
>> https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
>>  
>>
>
> *I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in the 
> reality of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks back. But he 
> didn't deny the possibility that there could be something more fundamental 
> underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is the materialist 
> position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know this, of course, 
> being a member of that group. Right? AG*
>
>>
>> - pt
>>
>  

I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him fairly 
personally .

Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the fundamental substance 
in nature") is in his books. *Timeless Reality* in particular.

One can be open-minded, or *ironist *in Rorty's definition 
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism ], and he was that.

But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he was always a 
hardcore materialist.

- pt

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/11/2018 11:06 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 12:53 PM Philip Thrift > wrote:




On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker
 wrote:



On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason
wrote:



No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the
idea that matter is primary.  That is, that matter is
not derivative from something more fundamental.

Jason


I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g.
*The universal numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal
B [ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as
providing a purely informational basis for (thinking of)
matter and consciousness, but then why would *actual
matter* need to come into existence at all? Actual matter
itself would seem to be superfluous.

If actual matter is not needed for experientiality
(consciousness), and actual matter does no exist at all,
then we live in a type of simulation of pure
numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter
to come into existence.


If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys
the equations of matter how is it not "actual" matter? 
Bruno's idea is that consciousness of matter and it's
effects are all we can know about matter.  So if the
"simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those
conscious thoughts about matter then that's a "actual" as
anything gets.  Remember Bruno is a theologian so all this
"simulation" is in the mind of God=arithmetic; and
arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.


It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus
Muller's paper:

In particular, her observations do not fundamentally
supervene on this “physical universe”; it is merely a
useful tool to predict her future observations.
Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to
her, since its state is strongly correlated with her
experiences. If the measure µ that is computed within her
computational universe assigns probability close to one to
the experience of hitting her head against a brick, then
the corresponding experience of pain will probably render
all abstract insights into the non-fundamental nature of
that brick irrelevant. 



Jason






What is the computer that running "her computational universe"?


The very same that powers the equations that bring life to our 
universe as you see it evolve.


What is its power supply?


Power is only required to erase information, and that is only a 
concept of the physical laws of this universe. Even the laws of our 
universe permit the creation of computers which require no power to run.


See the bit about reversible computing: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle (computations 
that are reversible require no energy).


And they produce no results since they run both ways.  They are not even 
computations in the CT sense.


Brent

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 12:53 PM Philip Thrift 
wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



 No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter
 is primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from something more
 fundamental.

 Jason

>>>
>>>
>>> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. *The universal
>>> numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal B [
>>> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as providing a purely
>>> informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then
>>> why would *actual matter* need to come into existence at all? Actual
>>> matter itself would seem to be superfluous.
>>>
>>> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and
>>> actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of
>>> pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into
>>> existence.
>>>
>>>
>>> If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the equations
>>> of matter how is it not "actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is that
>>> consciousness of matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter.
>>> So if the "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those
>>> conscious thoughts about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets.
>>> Remember Bruno is a theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of
>>> God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.
>>>
>>
>> It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus Muller's
>> paper:
>>
>> In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this
>>> “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict her future
>>> observations. Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her,
>>> since its state is strongly correlated with her experiences. If the measure
>>> µ that is computed within her computational universe assigns probability
>>> close to one to the experience of hitting her head against a brick, then
>>> the corresponding experience of pain will probably render all abstract
>>> insights into the non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant.
>>
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
>
>
>
>
> What is the computer that running "her computational universe"?
>
>
The very same that powers the equations that bring life to our universe as
you see it evolve.


> What is its power supply?
>
>
Power is only required to erase information, and that is only a concept of
the physical laws of this universe.  Even the laws of our universe permit
the creation of computers which require no power to run.

See the bit about reversible computing:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle  (computations that
are reversible require no energy).

Jason

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/11/2018 9:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 11:29:13 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea
that matter is primary.  That is, that matter is not
derivative from something more fundamental.

Jason


I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. *The
universal numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal B [
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993
 ]) as providing a
purely informational basis for (thinking of) matter and
consciousness, but then why would *actual matter* need to come
into existence at all? Actual matter itself would seem to be
superfluous.

If actual matter is not needed for experientiality
(consciousness), and actual matter does no exist at all, then we
live in a type of simulation of pure numericality. There would be
no reason for actual matter to come into existence.


If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the
equations of matter how is it not "actual" matter? Bruno's idea is
that consciousness of matter and it's effects are all we can know
about matter.  So if the "simulation" that is simulating us, also
simulates those conscious thoughts about matter then that's a
"actual" as anything gets.  Remember Bruno is a theologian so all
this "simulation" is in the mind of  God=arithmetic; and
arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.

Brent



I suppose that one can argue that *simulata* can replace *materia* 
until the cows come home 
.


(Simulata people think they are materia. Materia people think they are 
simulata. ...)


But pragmatically, I'm not sure where this leads. Engineers still 
think they are pushing matter around to make things. Not simulations 
of the things they think are material.


The point is that there is no difference.  There is no distinction 
except in the metaphysics used to talk about it.   Engineers don't do 
metaphysics.


Bret



(For Kant, it was *noumena*.)

- pt
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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-11 Thread agrayson2000


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>> * As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing there is 
>> nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that position 
>> articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. AG *
>>
>>>
>>>
>
> Victor Stenger
> *Materialism Deconstructed?*
>
> https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
>  
>

*I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic believed in the reality 
of matter, in the sense that if you kick it, it kicks back. But he didn't 
deny the possibility that there could be something more fundamental 
underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is the materialist 
position, but it surely wasn't Vic's position. You know this, of course, 
being a member of that group. Right? AG*

>
> - pt
>

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:46 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Sat, Dec 8, 2018 at 2:02 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> *> Numbers come from relationships upon which objective statements can be
>> made*
>>
>
> Without matter and the laws of physics there could be no objective
> statements or statements of any sort because there would be nobody around
> to make them.
>

But we're talking about ultimate foundations of reality, not what people
might be able to say about this or that.  Objective reality precedes the
statements which might be made about it (assuming there is anyone around to
make such statements).


>
>
>> > *For example, I can make and prove a statement about a number with a
>> million digits. *
>>
>
> You could also say the English language word "cow" has 3 letters, but
> that is only because it is the cultural convention of a minority of bipedal
> mammals on a small planet, and the same is true of representing numbers
> with digits in the language of mathematics.
>

Are you disagreeing? I thought in the past you had made a similar argument
that numbers are greater than the number of things that can be counted,
because you could always count the number of ways you could uniquely
arrange those items, leading to a bigger number, ad infinitum.  For
example. You start with 3 objects.  You could arrange them in 3! = 6 ways.
If you then arranged those arrangements, you would have 6! ways of doing
that, etc.  In any case, I don't see how arithmetical truth and relations
can be based on counting when we use mathematical relations concerning
numbers far greater than things we can count all the time.  e.g. The trust
of the web server through which I am composing this e-mail is makes use of
certain properties of a particular 2048-bit (~616 digit) number.  There are
"only" 10^80 (an 80 digit number) or so particles in the observable
universe.


>
>
>> > *You can build computers and programs out of equations concerning the
>> arithmetical relationships that exist between numbers. *
>>
>
> But such a "computer" is unable to DO anything because it is unable to
> change in space or time, for that you need physics,
>
>

You are packing a lot of assumptions into your word "DO".  You mean the
numbers cannot affect the movement of particles in this universe.  This
argument sounds a bit like Searle's argument who expected simulations of
rain storms to result in water leaking out of the computer running the
simulation. You see the flaw in his reasoning, don't you?

You have not shown that the arithmetical programs cannot simulate conscious
beings which would perceive themselves to exist within those simulations.


> > *Do we live in a Diophantine equation*
>>
>
> No.
>
>
What is your argument?

Jason

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:45:13 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter is 
>>> primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from something more 
>>> fundamental.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>  
>>
>> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. *The universal 
>> numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal B [ 
>> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as providing a purely 
>> informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then 
>> why would *actual matter* need to come into existence at all? Actual 
>> matter itself would seem to be superfluous. 
>>
>> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and 
>> actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of 
>> pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into 
>> existence.
>>
>>
>> If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the equations 
>> of matter how is it not "actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is that 
>> consciousness of matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter.  
>> So if the "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those 
>> conscious thoughts about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets.  
>> Remember Bruno is a theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of  
>> God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.
>>
>
> It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus Muller's 
> paper:
>
> In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this 
>> “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict her future 
>> observations. Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her, 
>> since its state is strongly correlated with her experiences. If the measure 
>> µ that is computed within her computational universe assigns probability 
>> close to one to the experience of hitting her head against a brick, then 
>> the corresponding experience of pain will probably render all abstract 
>> insights into the non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant.  
>
>
> Jason 
>





What is the computer that running "her computational universe"?

What is its power supply?

- pt

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:29 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter is
>> primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from something more
>> fundamental.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
>
> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. *The universal
> numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal B [
> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as providing a purely
> informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then
> why would *actual matter* need to come into existence at all? Actual
> matter itself would seem to be superfluous.
>
> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and
> actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of
> pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into
> existence.
>
>
> If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the equations
> of matter how is it not "actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is that
> consciousness of matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter.
> So if the "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those
> conscious thoughts about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets.
> Remember Bruno is a theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of
> God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.
>

It's not just Bruno who reached this conclusion. from Markus Muller's paper:

In particular, her observations do not fundamentally supervene on this
> “physical universe”; it is merely a useful tool to predict her future
> observations. Nonetheless, this universe will seem perfectly real to her,
> since its state is strongly correlated with her experiences. If the measure
> µ that is computed within her computational universe assigns probability
> close to one to the experience of hitting her head against a brick, then
> the corresponding experience of pain will probably render all abstract
> insights into the non-fundamental nature of that brick irrelevant.


Jason

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
> * As for physicists being materialists in the sense of believing there is 
> nothing underlying matter as its cause, I have never heard that position 
> articulated by any physicist, in person or on the Internet. AG *
>
>>
>>

Victor Stenger
*Materialism Deconstructed?*
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html
 

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-11 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/11/2018 3:58 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > wrote:


Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise".

(Derrida, Rorty, …)


That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation
does not make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we
postulate some reality.

Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some
“religions” do, although only when they are used for that purpose.
 Some philosophies vindicate  their lack of rigour into a
principle. That leads to relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks
nice as anyone can defend any idea, but eventually it hurts in
front of the truth.

Bruno



Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?


I've been following him like forever.

* e.g.

  * *Mathematics is /so/ useful because physical scientists and
engineers have the good sense to largely ignore the "religious"
fanaticism of professional mathematicians, and their insistence on
so-called rigor, that in many cases is misplaced and hypocritical,
since it is based on "axioms" that are completely fictional, i.e.
those that involve the so-called infinity.*



Physics is to mathematics as sex is to masturbation.
   --- Richard Feynman

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:13:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/9/2018 11:38 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 8:43:59 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:02 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 9:36:39 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote: 



 On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:53 AM Philip Thrift  
 wrote:

>
>
> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:27:45 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: 
>>
>>
>> I think truth is primitive.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
>
> As a matter of linguistics (and philosophy),  *truth* and *matter* 
> are linked:
>
> "As a matter of fact, ..."
> "The truth of the matter is ..."
> "It matters that ..."
> ...
> [ https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter ]
>

 I agree they are linked.  Though matter may be a few steps removed from 
 truth.  Perhaps one way to interpret the link more directly is thusly:

 There is an equation whose every solution (where the equation happens 
 to be *true*, e.g. is satisfied when it has certain values assigned to 
 its variables) maps its variables to states of the time evolution of the 
 wave function of our universe.  You might say that we (literally not 
 figuratively) live within such an equation.  That its truth reifies what 
 we 
 call matter.

 But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll than this.  e.g. 
 because the following statement is *true* "two has a successor" then 
 there exists a successor to 2 distinct from any previous number.  
 Similarly, the *truth* of "9 is not prime" implies the existence of a 
 factor of 9 besides 1 and 9.

 Jason


  

>
> Schopenhauer 's view: "A judgment has *material truth* if its 
> concepts are based on intuitive perceptions that are generated from 
> sensations. If a judgment has its reason (ground) in another judgment, 
> its 
> truth is called logical or formal. If a judgment, of, for example, pure 
> mathematics or pure science, is based on the forms (space, time, 
> causality) 
> of intuitive, empirical knowledge, then the judgment has transcendental 
> truth."
> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth ]
>
>
 I guess I am referring to transcend truth here. Truth concerning the 
 integers is sufficient to yield the universe, matter, and all that we see 
 around us.

 Jason

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In my view there is basically just *material* (from matter) truth and 
>>> *linguistic* (from language) truth.
>>>
>>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/18/to-tell-the-truth/ ] 
>>>
>>> Relations and functions are linguistic: relational type theory (RTT) , 
>>> functional type theory (FTT) languages.
>>>
>>> Numbers are also linguistic beings, the (fictional) semantic objects of 
>>> Peano arithmetic (PA).
>>>
>>> Numbers can be "materialized" via *nominalization *(cf. Hartry Field, 
>>> refs. in [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartry_Field ]).
>>>
>>>
>> Assuming the primacy of matter assumes more and explains less, than 
>> assuming the primacy of arithmetical truth.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>
>
>
> In today's era of mathematics, Joel David Hamkins (@JDHamkins 
> ) has shown there is a "multiverse" of 
> truths:
>
> *The set-theoretic multiverse*
> [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223 ]
>
>
> *The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this 
> article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, each 
> instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The universe view, 
> in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute background set concept, with 
> a corresponding absolute set-theoretic universe in which every 
> set-theoretic question has a definite answer. The multiverse position, I 
> argue, explains our experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic 
> possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In 
> particular, I argue that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the 
> multiverse view by our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the 
> multiverse, and as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner 
> formerly hoped for. *
>
>
> What this means is that for mathematics (a language category), truth 
> depends on the language.
>
>
> I think Hamkins could say the same thing in French.  His example of the 
> continuum hypothesis just says that by adding as axioms different 
> undecidable propositions we get different sets of theorems.  He doesn't use 
> the word "truth" and I think with good reason.  Theorems in mathematics 
> aren't "true" in any normal sense of the word.  What is true is that the 
> axioms imply the theorem...given the rules of inference.
>
> Brent
>



"truth=proof" is what (intuitionistic) type theory is about. Curry-Howard 
correspondence makes 

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-11 Thread agrayson2000


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 10:12:54 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Dec 2018, at 18:01, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 10:27:37 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 14:20, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 11:21:38 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 17:19, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 3:37:13 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Perspectivism is a form of modalism.
>
>
> Nietzsche is vindicated.
>
>
> Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, 
> perhaps!
> All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology 
> (capable only of saying what God is not).
>
> Bruno
>
>
> From  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/
> 6.2 Perspectivism
>
> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his 
> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of 
> perspective. 
> He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the influence of 
> their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore failed to control 
> those perspectival effects (*BGE* 6; see *BGE* I more generally). 
> Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by what has come to 
> be 
> called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a major concern in a 
> number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, e.g., Danto 1965; 
> Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 1985; Clark 1990; 
> Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has been as much 
> contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of commitments belong 
> under that heading as about their philosophical merits, but a few points 
> are relatively uncontroversial and can provide a useful way into this 
> strand of Nietzsche’s thinking.
>
> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in 
> his usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a 
> critical side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers 
> for 
> ignoring the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we saw, 
> he simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a 
> positive 
> contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he takes to 
> be) 
> the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past philosophers, he 
> writes,
>
> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute 
> reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the 
> spirit 
> has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently in this way 
> for 
> once, *to want* to see differently, is no small discipline and 
> preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter 
> understood not as “disinterested contemplation” (which is a non-concept 
> and 
> absurdity), but rather as the capacity to have one’s Pro and Contra *in 
> one’s power*, and to shift them in and out, so that one knows how to 
> make precisely the *difference* in perspectives and affective 
> interpretations useful for knowledge. (*GM* III, 12)
>
> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy 
> at least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of 
> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal 
> the 
> way things really are, independently of any point of view whatsoever. 
> Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a revised 
> conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between one 
> perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of 
> others, 
> without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so much as 
> possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the traditional 
> picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is equally a 
> positive 
> set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge as a finite, limited 
> cognitive agent.
>
>
> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly 
> not with neoplatonism, which explains everything from the many 
> perspective 
> of the One, or at least can be interpreted that way.
>
> Pure perspectivism is an extreme position which leads to pure 
> relativism, which does not make 

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Brent Meeker




On 12/11/2018 3:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But only by abstracting from and generalizing some rules based 
counting and then postulating that they apply to arbitrarily large 
numbers of things.  For example, arithmetic assumes that you can add 
1 to 10^1000 and get a different number.  But that is purely an 
assumption.


I prefer to say that it is a theorem, from the usual assumption like 
Kxy = x, Sxyz = xz(yz) +some definitions, or from x+0 = x, etc.







Counting could never confirm it.


You are right, but a physical confirmation is not a proof, it is just 
an absence of refutation, inviting us to keep the theory if it is 
simple, by Occam.


Right. It is a convenience.  Which is not a good reason to take it as 
reality.


Brent

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-11 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/11/2018 2:12 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
When we say that God cannot be omniscient (for pure logical reason), 
the atheists replies by saying that we cannot change the definition. 
They would have said that Earth does not exist when it was discovered 
that it is round! Of course, in science we change the definition *all 
the time*.


But the Earth is defined ostensively.  Nobody changed the definition.  
The definition of God is never ostensive and so it is subject to wildly 
varying changes to serve the needs and prejudices of whomever wants 
divine support for their theories.








*but for you their beliefs are the same? How ridiculous this is! AG*


Same belief in Matter (which is the God incompatible with Mechanism).
Same belief that God = the Christian God only (total oversight of a 
millenium of scientific theology!).


They don’t have the same belief in God, but they share the same 
definition (curiously enough).


What is curious about that.  If you have a different belief in fascism 
than Siegfried Verbeke don't you have to share the same definition of 
fascism; otherwise you would be having a different belief about a 
different thing and you could no more disagree with him than my 
believing eggs are a good breakfast would be disagreeing with you that 
coffee is good at breakfast.  You have to agree on what you are talking 
about in order to disagree on what you believe about it.


Brent

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/9/2018 11:38 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 8:43:59 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:02 PM Philip Thrift > wrote:



On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 9:36:39 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:53 AM Philip Thrift
 wrote:



On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:27:45 PM UTC-6,
Jason wrote:


I think truth is primitive.

Jason



As a matter of linguistics (and philosophy), *truth*
and *matter* are linked:

"As a matter of fact, ..."
"The truth of the matter is ..."
"It matters that ..."
...
[ https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter
 ]


I agree they are linked.  Though matter may be a few steps
removed from truth.  Perhaps one way to interpret the link
more directly is thusly:

There is an equation whose every solution (where the
equation happens to be */true/*, e.g. is satisfied when it
has certain values assigned to its variables) maps its
variables to states of the time evolution of the wave
function of our universe.  You might say that we
(literally not figuratively) live within such an
equation.  That its truth reifies what we call matter.

But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll than
this.  e.g. because the following statement is */true/*
"two has a successor" then there exists a successor to 2
distinct from any previous number.  Similarly, the
*/truth/* of "9 is not prime" implies the existence of a
factor of 9 besides 1 and 9.

Jason



Schopenhauer 's view: "A judgment has /material truth/
if its concepts are based on intuitive perceptions
that are generated from sensations. If a judgment has
its reason (ground) in another judgment, its truth is
called logical or formal. If a judgment, of, for
example, pure mathematics or pure science, is based on
the forms (space, time, causality) of intuitive,
empirical knowledge, then the judgment has
transcendental truth."
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth
 ]


I guess I am referring to transcend truth here. Truth
concerning the integers is sufficient to yield the
universe, matter, and all that we see around us.

Jason




In my view there is basically just *material* (from matter)
truth and *linguistic* (from language) truth.

[
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/18/to-tell-the-truth/

]

Relations and functions are linguistic: relational type theory
(RTT) , functional type theory (FTT) languages.

Numbers are also linguistic beings, the (fictional) semantic
objects of Peano arithmetic (PA).

Numbers can be "materialized" via /nominalization /(cf. Hartry
Field, refs. in [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartry_Field
 ]).


Assuming the primacy of matter assumes more and explains less,
than assuming the primacy of arithmetical truth.

Jason




In today's era of mathematics, Joel David Hamkins (@JDHamkins 
) has shown there is a "multiverse" of 
truths:


*The set-theoretic multiverse*
[ https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223 ]

/The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in this 
article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of set, 
each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. The 
universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute 
background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic 
universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite answer. 
The multiverse position, I argue, explains our experience with the 
enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibilities, a phenomenon that 
challenges the universe view. In particular, I argue that the 
continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by our 
extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and as a 
result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped for.

/
/
/
/
/
What this means is that for mathematics (a language category), truth 
depends on the language.


I think Hamkins could say the same thing in French.  His example of the 
continuum hypothesis just says that by adding as axioms different 
undecidable propositions we get 

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 11:29:13 AM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter is 
>> primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from something more 
>> fundamental.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>  
>
> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. *The universal 
> numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal B [ 
> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as providing a purely 
> informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then 
> why would *actual matter* need to come into existence at all? Actual 
> matter itself would seem to be superfluous. 
>
> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and 
> actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of 
> pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into 
> existence.
>
>
> If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the equations 
> of matter how is it not "actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is that 
> consciousness of matter and it's effects are all we can know about matter.  
> So if the "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates those 
> conscious thoughts about matter then that's a "actual" as anything gets.  
> Remember Bruno is a theologian so all this "simulation" is in the mind of  
> God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.
>
> Brent
>


I suppose that one can argue that *simulata* can replace *materia* until 
the cows come home 
.

(Simulata people think they are materia. Materia people think they are 
simulata. ...)

But pragmatically, I'm not sure where this leads. Engineers still think 
they are pushing matter around to make things. Not simulations of the 
things they think are material.

(For Kant, it was *noumena*.)

- pt

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread John Clark
On Sat, Dec 8, 2018 at 2:02 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

*> Numbers come from relationships upon which objective statements can be
> made*
>

Without matter and the laws of physics there could be no objective
statements or statements of any sort because there would be nobody around
to make them.


> > *For example, I can make and prove a statement about a number with a
> million digits. *
>

You could also say the English language word "cow" has 3 letters, but that
is only because it is the cultural convention of a minority of bipedal
mammals on a small planet, and the same is true of representing numbers
with digits in the language of mathematics.


> > *You can build computers and programs out of equations concerning the
> arithmetical relationships that exist between numbers. *
>

But such a "computer" is unable to DO anything because it is unable to
change in space or time, for that you need physics,


> > *Do we live in a Diophantine equation*
>

No.

 John K Clark

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/11/2018 12:31 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that
matter is primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from
something more fundamental.

Jason


I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. *The universal 
numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal B 
[ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as providing a 
purely informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, 
but then why would *actual matter* need to come into existence at all? 
Actual matter itself would seem to be superfluous.


If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), 
and actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of 
simulation of pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual 
matter to come into existence.


If it feels like matter and it looks like matter and obeys the equations 
of matter how is it not "actual" matter?  Bruno's idea is that 
consciousness of matter and it's effects are all we can know about 
matter.  So if the "simulation" that is simulating us, also simulates 
those conscious thoughts about matter then that's a "actual" as anything 
gets.  Remember Bruno is a theologian so all this "simulation" is in the 
mind of  God=arithmetic; and arithmetic/God is the ur-stuff.


Brent

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Dec 2018, at 09:31, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter is 
> primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from something more 
> fundamental.
> 
> Jason
>  
> 
> I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. The universal 
> numbers. From Biology to Physics. Marchal B [ 
> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as providing a purely 
> informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then why 
> would actual matter need to come into existence at all? Actual matter itself 
> would seem to be superfluous. 

The only things which are felt as actual are the relative computational state. 
“Actual” is the possible seen from the possible. 



> 
> If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and 
> actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of 
> pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into 
> existence.

That is exactly the point. 
So by Occam, no need to assume it.

Bruno

> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Dec 2018, at 07:50, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 4:51:57 AM UTC, Jason wrote:

> 
> 


> Jason
> 
> Supposing every thing you write above is true, how does this produce the 
> illusion of matter? TIA, AG 
>  
> 
> This is explained in Bruno's work: 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm 
> 
> 
> Also in a recent paper by Markus Muller: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01826.pdf 
> 
> 
> So you are unable to explain it succinctly. AG 
> 
> 
> Succinctly your experience is included in the set of all the experiences 
> generated by all computations.
> 
> If you want to know why this should leads to stable experiences within a 
> larger environment that ruled by simple laws with a simpler time in the past, 
> you will need to do some reading.  Not every question can be expected to have 
> a succinct answer.
> 
> Jason
> 
> Concerning QM, GR, and SR, one can give succinct summaries that are 
> informative even if incomplete, but you can't do it about your theory on the 
> origin of matter. So I can't take it seriously. AG
>  
> 
> That explains a lot, doesn't it?
> 
> In fact it does, albeit imperfectly. I can make many meaningful, informative 
> statements about those theories, but I don't see anything resembling that in 
> the theory that everything is derivable from arithmetic. Concerning the claim 
> that matter is primary and not derivable from anything else, I don't think 
> that's the prevailing pov among physicists. They're really not Aristotelian 
> if that means believing there's nothing underlying matter as its cause. I 
> don't see any pervasive denial of the possibility that matter being observed 
> and measured, stands by itself without any deeper cause. I therefore reject 
> Bruno's position of some Aristotelian bias among physicists. AG
> 
>  
> 


Actually, during the 30 years of work for the derivation, my work was 
criticised as being not original, and I realised indeed that I was proposing 
what a millenium of theology did already proposed (from Pythagorus (-500)  to 
Damascius (+500)).

And indeed, I have never had any problem with physicists and logicians, or any 
scientists. I got only (big) problems with materialist philosophers, who equate 
physics and metaphysics, and are dogmatic in metaphysics. Serious physicists 
are cautious when talking metaphysics, as they are aware that many problems are 
not solved in that field, and they do have evidence that a notion of primary 
matter is problematical, if only due to Bell, Kochen and Specker, and the hard 
problems physics is confronted with. Usually, most physicists I met (especially 
those I have worked with, like François Englert), were quite open to the 
conclusion, if only because it solves easily the problem of why mathematics is 
so useful in physics).

Now you ask for a succinct explanation, but this works only if you are enough 
open. If the goal is to dismiss an idea, any succinct presentation will be 
useful for that. But don’t worry, the Universal Dovetailer Argument gives 
already a succinct presentation of the main result. Have you read SANE04 up to 
step 3? Have you still some problem with the Mechanist hypothesis? Just ask 
question. Usually people understand mechanism easily. It is exploited (with 
diverse degree of rigour) in the sc. fit. literature: my favorite one is Daniel 
F. Galouye: Simulacron III.
https://www.amazon.com/Simulacron-3-Daniel-F-Galouye/dp/1612420206

Bruno






>  
> 
> Jason
> 
>  
> The main conclusions are confirmed by experience, namely:
> “What I observe seems to be fundamentally nondeterministic; it seems that 
> that there is irreducible randomness that governs my experience.”
> “But it seems that this randomness is itself subject to simple laws, which I 
> can write down in concise equations. I can feed these equations into a 
> computer and use them to predict future observations quite successfully, even 
> if only probabilistically.”
> It also predicts a "Big Bang":
> 
> In particular, we will see that our theory predicts (under the assumption 
> just mentioned) that observers should indeed expect to see two facts which 
> are features of our physics as we know it: first, the fact that the observer 
> seems to be part of an external world that evolves in time (a “universe”), 
> and second, that this external world seems to have had an absolute beginning 
> in the past (the “Big Bang”).
>  
>  Jason
> 
> -- 
> You received 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 5:41:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> Nothing is "confirmed" and "made precise". 
>
> (Derrida, Rorty, …)
>
>
> That would make Derrida and Rorty into obscurantism. Confirmation does not 
> make an idea true, but it is better than nothing, once we postulate some 
> reality.
>
> Some “philosophies” prevents the scientific attitude, like some 
> “religions” do, although only when they are used for that purpose.  Some 
> philosophies vindicate  their lack of rigour into a principle. That leads 
> to relativisme, and obscurantism. It looks nice as anyone can defend any 
> idea, but eventually it hurts in front of the truth.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
Have you read some of the Opinions* or watched some of the (youtube) 
lectures of Rutgers math professor Doron Zeilberger?

I've been following him like forever.

* e.g.

   - *Mathematics is so useful because physical scientists and engineers 
   have the good sense to largely ignore the "religious" fanaticism of 
   professional mathematicians, and their insistence on so-called rigor, that 
   in many cases is misplaced and hypocritical, since it is based on "axioms" 
   that are completely fictional, i.e. those that involve the so-called 
   infinity.*
   - 
   

- pt

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 10 Dec 2018, at 20:30, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 11:00:17 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Dec 2018, at 21:02, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 9:36:39 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:53 AM Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:27:45 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>> 
>> I think truth is primitive.
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> 
>> As a matter of linguistics (and philosophy),  truth and matter are linked:
>> 
>> "As a matter of fact, ..."
>> "The truth of the matter is ..."
>> "It matters that ..."
>> ...
>> [ https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter 
>>  ]
>> 
>> I agree they are linked.  Though matter may be a few steps removed from 
>> truth.  Perhaps one way to interpret the link more directly is thusly:
>> 
>> There is an equation whose every solution (where the equation happens to be 
>> true, e.g. is satisfied when it has certain values assigned to its 
>> variables) maps its variables to states of the time evolution of the wave 
>> function of our universe.  You might say that we (literally not 
>> figuratively) live within such an equation.  That its truth reifies what we 
>> call matter.
>> 
>> But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll than this.  e.g. 
>> because the following statement is true "two has a successor" then there 
>> exists a successor to 2 distinct from any previous number.  Similarly, the 
>> truth of "9 is not prime" implies the existence of a factor of 9 besides 1 
>> and 9.
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Schopenhauer 's view: "A judgment has material truth if its concepts are 
>> based on intuitive perceptions that are generated from sensations. If a 
>> judgment has its reason (ground) in another judgment, its truth is called 
>> logical or formal. If a judgment, of, for example, pure mathematics or pure 
>> science, is based on the forms (space, time, causality) of intuitive, 
>> empirical knowledge, then the judgment has transcendental truth."
>> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth  ]
>> 
>> 
>> I guess I am referring to transcend truth here. Truth concerning the 
>> integers is sufficient to yield the universe, matter, and all that we see 
>> around us.
>> 
>> Jason
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> In my view there is basically just material (from matter) truth and 
>> linguistic (from language) truth.
> 
> Linguistic is concerned with grammar. To have a notion of truth, you need a 
> notion of reality, or semantic, or model (in the logician’s sense). 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/18/to-tell-the-truth/ 
>>  ] 
>> 
>> Relations and functions are linguistic: relational type theory (RTT) , 
>> functional type theory (FTT) languages.
>> 
>> Numbers are also linguistic beings, the (fictional) semantic objects of 
>> Peano arithmetic (PA).
> 
> “Fictional” is a bad adjective as it enforces the choice of the ontology. I 
> understand that you believe in matter as a base. I can only wait for your 
> solution of the mind-body problem, but usually non-mechanist theories have a 
> tradition of being unclear (to say the least).
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Numbers can be "materialized" via nominalization (cf. Hartry Field, refs. in 
>> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartry_Field 
>>  ]).
> 
> 
> Please do it. That could be a good subject of Phd thesis in philosophy, but I 
> am not sure you have understand the main things about universal machine, 
> which is that we don’t understand them at all, we are just discovering them. 
> It put some mess in the arithmetical Platonia.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Language theory (both natural and programming) includes syntax, semantics, 
> pragmatics. 
> 
> The nominalization of scientific theories expressed in mathematical language 
> began with Field.
> 
> "Science Without Numbers" 
> https://books.google.com/books/about/Science_Without_Numbers.html?id=Exc1DQAAQBAJ
> 
> "Progress in Field’s Nominalistic Program"
> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13083/1/Chen_Intrinsic_Nom_QM.pdf
> 
> In this paper, I introduce an intrinsic account of the quantum state.


So we are already put of the computationalist hypothesis.

Bruno



> This account contains three desirable features that the standard platonistic 
> account lacks: (1) it does not refer to any abstract mathematical objects 
> such as complex numbers, (2) it is independent of the usual arbitrary 
> conventions in the wave function representation, and (3) it explains why the 
> quantum state has its amplitude and phase degrees of freedom.
> 
> 
> Consequently, this account extends Hartry Field’s program outlined in Science 
> Without Numbers (1980), responds to David Malament’s long-standing 
> impossibility conjecture (1982), and establishes an important first 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Dec 2018, at 12:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 4:21:07 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Dec 2018, at 21:45, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 6:03:27 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 21:17, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
 computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I 
 call real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from 
 Galen Strawson):
>>> 
>>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
 
 [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
  ]
 
  -pt
 
 
>>> 
>>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>>  
>>> 
>>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>>> ] — where 
>>> there are no such things as mathematical objects — if computation is 
>>> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
>>> fiction.)
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
>> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
>> math-fictionanlist.
>> 
>> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
>> arithmetic.
>> 
>> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
>> x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. 
>> I can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
>> waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not 
>> have solutions.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
>> ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
>> (like us).
>> 
>> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist.
> 
> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
> than in the moon.
> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
> the computationalist theory of mind.
> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical 
> objects are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not 
> aware of the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Example: The Turing 
>> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
>> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>>  
>> 
>>  ].
> 
> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, 
> and their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid 
> get a 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since 
>> a computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
>> "boring”.)
> 
> 
> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
> machine) in Turing sense.
> 
> 
>> 
>> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
> 
> 
> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in 
> some non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
> 
> http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/ 

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 8 Dec 2018, at 23:13, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/8/2018 11:02 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sat, Dec 8, 2018 at 4:04 AM Philip Thrift > > wrote:
>> 
>> What is more primary than numbers?
>> 
>> 1. Numbers come from counting.
>> 
>> Numbers come from relationships upon which objective statements can be made 
>> (with or without objects to count).
>> For example, I can make and prove a statement about a number with a million 
>> digits.  Despite that there are not that many things (in my vicinity) to 
>> count.
> 
> But only by abstracting from and generalizing some rules based counting and 
> then postulating that they apply to arbitrarily large numbers of things.  For 
> example, arithmetic assumes that you can add 1 to 10^1000 and get a different 
> number.  But that is purely an assumption. 

I prefer to say that it is a theorem, from the usual assumption like Kxy = x, 
Sxyz = xz(yz) +some definitions, or from x+0 = x, etc.





> Counting could never confirm it.

You are right, but a physical confirmation is not a proof, it is just an 
absence of refutation, inviting us to keep the theory if it is simple, by Occam.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>>  
>> But one counts things (things that are not numbers themselves, in the 
>> primitive case). So the things one counts + the one that counts must be more 
>> primary than numbers. 
>> 
>> 2. Numbers come from lambda calculus (LC). But LC - a programming language - 
>> needs a machine LCM to interpret LC programs. So LC + LCM is more primary 
>> than numbers.
>> 
>> 
>> You can build computers and programs out of equations concerning the 
>> arithmetical relationships that exist between numbers.  See my post "Do we 
>> live in a Diophantine equation": 
>> https://groups.google.com/forum/#!msg/everything-list/KTopDTsOW10/TqYgylAiBgAJ
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> Jason 
> 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 4:21:07 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Dec 2018, at 21:45, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 6:03:27 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 21:17, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically 
>>> that *computationalism is indeed false*, and it should be replaced 
>>> by what I call *real computationalism* (where I am adopting the 
>>> "real" label from Galen Strawson):
>>>
>>>
>>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>>> opinion private, if I have one.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
>>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>>> ]
>>>
>>>  -pt
>>>
>>>
>>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>  
>>
>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>> ] — 
>> where *there are no such things as mathematical objects* — if 
>> computation is considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then 
>> computationalism is fiction.)
>>
>>
>>
>> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
>> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
>> math-fictionanlist.
>>
>> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
>> arithmetic.
>>
>> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z 
>> such x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon 
>> exists”. I can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t 
>> conceive waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have 
>> and 
>> not have solutions.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist 
> are ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of 
> nature (like us).
>
> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist. 
>
>
> That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
> than in the moon.
> Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot 
> use the computationalist theory of mind.
> I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical 
> objects are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not 
> aware of the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
>
>
>
>
> Example: The Turing 
> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>  
> ].
>
>
> Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
> immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
> But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, 
> and 
> their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
> 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
>
>
>
>
> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" 
> since a computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that 
> idea "boring”.)
>
>
>
> I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
> machine) in Turing sense.
>
>
>
> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
>
>
>
> Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in 
> some non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
 I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in

 http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/  - International Center of Unconventional 
 Computing
 http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/ - Unconventional Computation and 
 Natural Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 2019
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unconventional_computing
 etc.


 Does 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 9 Dec 2018, at 21:45, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 6:03:27 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 21:17, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 9:39:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 7 Dec 2018, at 12:38, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 4:14:20 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 6 Dec 2018, at 12:33, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:05:55 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 5 Dec 2018, at 19:20, Philip Thrift > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:29:44 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 4 Dec 2018, at 17:48, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On the truth of computationalism, I mean to express emphatically that 
>>> computationalism is indeed false, and it should be replaced by what I 
>>> call real computationalism (where I am adopting the "real" label from 
>>> Galen Strawson):
>> 
>> I take a look, but don’t see clearly what you mean by “real 
>> computationalism”.  If it assumes some primary matter, it cannot be 
>> computationalist indeed. But I prefer to stay agnostic, and to keep my 
>> opinion private, if I have one.
>> 
>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> [ https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/ 
>>>  ]
>>> 
>>>  -pt
>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> The background idea of real computationalism is:
>>  
>> 
>> (From the perspective of mathematical fictionalism [MathFict 
>> ] — where 
>> there are no such things as mathematical objects — if computation is 
>> considered to be a branch of pure mathematics, then computationalism is 
>> fiction.)
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> You should better call it “real physicalism”. With computationalism, 
> physics is fiction, simply. (In the sense of fiction used by 
> math-fictionanlist.
> 
> But math-fictionalise does not make much sense to me with resect to 
> arithmetic.
> 
> I believe more in the proposition “either it exist numbers x, y, z such 
> x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, or not” is less fictional than “the moon exists”. I 
> can conceive waking up in a world without a moon, but I can’t conceive 
> waking up in a world where  x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33, would have and not have 
> solutions.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Basically it is a materialist thesis: The only computers that exist are 
> ones that naturally arise in nature, or can be built by beings of nature 
> (like us).
> 
> "Pure mathematical" computers are fictions. They do not exist.
 
 That makes few sense. I believe more in numbers (and universal number) 
 than in the moon.
 Of course that makes sense for a materialist, but then he/she cannot use 
 the computationalist theory of mind.
 I cannot conceive of anything more concrete than numbers. Physical objects 
 are much more abstract, and *seems* concrete because we are not aware of 
 the pre-theorisation made by the brain long history.
 
 
 
 
> Example: The Turing 
> machine as defined in the standard textbook manner [ 
> https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/projects/raspberrypi/tutorials/turing-machine/one.html
>  
> 
>  ].
 
 Nice to hear that you understand that the Turing machine notion is 
 immaterial/mathematical, and does not rely on any assumption in physics. 
 But the paper should not call them hypothetical. Immaterial is enough, and 
 their existence are provable from elementary arithmetic. When a kid get a 
 0/10, it will not help him/her to say that 0 is hypothetical ...
 
 
 
> 
> (Some quibble that there is no such thing as a "natural computer" since a 
> computer by definition has to be a human-built thing. I call that idea 
> "boring”.)
 
 
 I agree. Bacteria *are* physical implementation of computer (universal 
 machine) in Turing sense.
 
 
> 
> So one could call it "material computationalism" I guess. 
 
 
 Unfortunately, that is contradictory, unless you use “computation” in some 
 non standard sense, out of the Church-Turing thesis.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 I use it "unconventional"-ly, as in
 
 http://uncomp.uwe.ac.uk/   - International 
 Center of Unconventional Computing
 http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/  - 
 Unconventional Computation and Natural Computation 2019 TOKYO, June 3-7, 
 2019
 

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-11 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 9 Dec 2018, at 18:01, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, December 7, 2018 at 10:27:37 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 Dec 2018, at 14:20, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 11:21:38 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 5 Dec 2018, at 17:19, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Monday, December 3, 2018 at 3:37:13 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 2 Dec 2018, at 21:25, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Sunday, December 2, 2018 at 2:02:43 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
 
 
 On 12/2/2018 4:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 30 Nov 2018, at 19:22, Brent Meeker > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 11/30/2018 1:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Perspectivism is a form of modalism.
 
 Nietzsche is vindicated.
>>> 
>>> Interesting. If you elaborate, you might change my mind on Nietzche, 
>>> perhaps!
>>> All what I say is very close the Neoplatonism and Negative Theology 
>>> (capable only of saying what God is not).
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>> 
>> From  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nietzsche/ 
>> 
>> 6.2 Perspectivism
>> 
>> Much of Nietzsche’s reaction to the theoretical philosophy of his 
>> predecessors is mediated through his interest in the notion of 
>> perspective. He thought that past philosophers had largely ignored the 
>> influence of their own perspectives on their work, and had therefore 
>> failed to control those perspectival effects (BGE 6; see BGE I more 
>> generally). Commentators have been both fascinated and perplexed by what 
>> has come to be called Nietzsche’s “perspectivism”, and it has been a 
>> major concern in a number of large-scale Nietzsche commentaries (see, 
>> e.g., Danto 1965; Kaulbach 1980, 1990; Schacht 1983; Abel 1984; Nehamas 
>> 1985; Clark 1990; Poellner 1995; Richardson 1996; Benne 2005). There has 
>> been as much contestation over exactly what doctrine or group of 
>> commitments belong under that heading as about their philosophical 
>> merits, but a few points are relatively uncontroversial and can provide 
>> a useful way into this strand of Nietzsche’s thinking.
>> 
>> Nietzsche’s appeals to the notion of perspective (or, equivalently in 
>> his usage, to an “optics” of knowledge) have a positive, as well as a 
>> critical side. Nietzsche frequently criticizes “dogmatic” philosophers 
>> for ignoring the perspectival limitations on their theorizing, but as we 
>> saw, he simultaneously holds that the operation of perspective makes a 
>> positive contribution to our cognitive endeavors: speaking of (what he 
>> takes to be) the perversely counterintuitive doctrines of some past 
>> philosophers, he writes,
>> 
>> Particularly as knowers, let us not be ungrateful toward such resolute 
>> reversals of the familiar perspectives and valuations with which the 
>> spirit has raged against itself all too long… : to see differently in 
>> this way for once, to want to see differently, is no small discipline 
>> and preparation of the intellect for its future “objectivity”—the latter 
>> understood not as “disinterested contemplation” (which is a non-concept 
>> and absurdity), but rather as the capacity to have one’s Pro and Contra 
>> in one’s power, and to shift them in and out, so that one knows how to 
>> make precisely the difference in perspectives and affective 
>> interpretations useful for knowledge. (GM III, 12)
>> 
>> This famous passage bluntly rejects the idea, dominant in philosophy at 
>> least since Plato, that knowledge essentially involves a form of 
>> objectivity that penetrates behind all subjective appearances to reveal 
>> the way things really are, independently of any point of view 
>> whatsoever. Instead, the proposal is to approach “objectivity” (in a 
>> revised conception) asymptotically, by exploiting the difference between 
>> one perspective and another, using each to overcome the limitations of 
>> others, without assuming that anything like a “view from nowhere” is so 
>> much as possible. There is of course an implicit criticism of the 
>> traditional picture of a-perspectival objectivity here, but there is 
>> equally a positive set of recommendations about how to pursue knowledge 
>> as a finite, limited cognitive agent.
>> 
>> 
> 
> Thanks. But I do not oppose perspectivism with Plato, and certainly not 
> with neoplatonism, which explains everything from the many perspective of 
> the One, or at least can be interpreted that way.
> 
> Pure perspectivism is an extreme position which leads to pure relativism, 
> which does not make sense, as we can only doubt starting 

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, December 10, 2018 at 7:05:17 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> No one is refuting the existence of matter, only the idea that matter is 
> primary.  That is, that matter is not derivative from something more 
> fundamental.
>
> Jason
>
 

I can understand an (immaterial) computationalism (e.g. *The universal 
numbers. From Biology to Physics.* Marchal B 
[ https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/26140993 ]) as providing a purely 
informational basis for (thinking of) matter and consciousness, but then 
why would *actual matter* need to come into existence at all? Actual matter 
itself would seem to be superfluous. 

If actual matter is not needed for experientiality (consciousness), and 
actual matter does no exist at all, then we live in a type of simulation of 
pure numericality. There would be no reason for actual matter to come into 
existence.

- pt


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