Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-14 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/14/2018 7:31 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker > wrote:


Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are
provable.  But you ignore that what is false is also provable. 
Provable is only relative to axioms.


1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not?

2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to prove 
whether or not any given Turing machine will halt or not?


3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth, 
proofs, and axioms?


What do you think it tells us.  Does it tell us that a false axiom will 
not allow proof of a false proposition?


Brent

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-14 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/14/2018 11:32 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 9:36 AM John Clark > wrote:


On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 8:21 PM Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:

>>The block universe changes along the time dimension and
special relativity deals with time, but the number 3 never
changes with time and has nothing to do with it.


/>Then you agree that there can be an objectively static object,/


Static with respect to what dimension? The block universe is a
mathematical 4D object  constructed in 1 dimension of time and 3
dimensions of space that follows Non-Euclidean geometry, and it
changes in time and it changes in space, if it didn't there would
be no details in the universe and everything would be a even
unchanging fog.


Special Relativity implies all points in time are equally real, and 
moreover, cannot be sliced into any objective view of a "present", 
each inertial reference frame can have its own view of what the 
present is.


Which only shows that the idea of a reference frame defining a "present" 
is inconsistent with relativity.  It is light cones that are 
invariant...not specious "nows".


Brent

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-14 Thread Brent Meeker




On 12/14/2018 10:41 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
One type of objection might be that matter is a mystery, but math 
isn't. But I think complexity theorists (like Chaitin) have shown that 
math is a mystery too.


Actually the argument has been made the other way.  Math is not a 
mystery, it is completely known as are fictional stories like "Moby 
Dick". What is written down in all there is.  If you ask what was the 
beam of the Pequod there is no corresponding fact.  But if you ask what 
was the beam of the Pinta, there was such a value, even if you can't 
find what it was.  So real things are more complex and are not 
completely definable.


Brent

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-14 Thread Jason Resch
On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 8:43 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> Yes, you create a whole theology around not all truths are provable.  But
> you ignore that what is false is also provable.  Provable is only relative
> to axioms.
>
>
1. Do you agree a Turing machine will either halt or not?

2. Do you agree that no finite set of axioms has the power to prove whether
or not any given Turing machine will halt or not?

3. What does this tell us about the relationship between truth, proofs, and
axioms?

Jason

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-14 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/12/2018 3:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 10 Dec 2018, at 20:26, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 12/9/2018 11:38 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 8:43:59 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:02 PM Philip Thrift > wrote:



On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 9:36:39 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:53 AM Philip Thrift
 wrote:



On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:27:45 PM UTC-6,
Jason wrote:


I think truth is primitive.

Jason



As a matter of linguistics (and philosophy), *truth*
and *matter* are linked:

"As a matter of fact, ..."
"The truth of the matter is ..."
"It matters that ..."
...
[ https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter
 ]


I agree they are linked.  Though matter may be a few
steps removed from truth.  Perhaps one way to interpret
the link more directly is thusly:

There is an equation whose every solution (where the
equation happens to be */true/*, e.g. is satisfied when
it has certain values assigned to its variables) maps
its variables to states of the time evolution of the
wave function of our universe.  You might say that we
(literally not figuratively) live within such an
equation.  That its truth reifies what we call matter.

But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll
than this.  e.g. because the following statement is
*/true/* "two has a successor" then there exists a
successor to 2 distinct from any previous number. 
Similarly, the */truth/* of "9 is not prime" implies the
existence of a factor of 9 besides 1 and 9.

Jason



Schopenhauer 's view: "A judgment has /material
truth/ if its concepts are based on intuitive
perceptions that are generated from sensations. If a
judgment has its reason (ground) in another
judgment, its truth is called logical or formal. If
a judgment, of, for example, pure mathematics or
pure science, is based on the forms (space, time,
causality) of intuitive, empirical knowledge, then
the judgment has transcendental truth."
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth
 ]


I guess I am referring to transcend truth here. Truth
concerning the integers is sufficient to yield the
universe, matter, and all that we see around us.

Jason




In my view there is basically just *material* (from matter)
truth and *linguistic* (from language) truth.

[
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/18/to-tell-the-truth/

]

Relations and functions are linguistic: relational type
theory (RTT) , functional type theory (FTT) languages.

Numbers are also linguistic beings, the (fictional) semantic
objects of Peano arithmetic (PA).

Numbers can be "materialized" via /nominalization /(cf.
Hartry Field, refs. in [
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartry_Field
 ]).


Assuming the primacy of matter assumes more and explains less,
than assuming the primacy of arithmetical truth.

Jason




In today's era of mathematics, Joel David Hamkins (@JDHamkins 
) has shown there is a "multiverse" 
of truths:


*The set-theoretic multiverse*
[ https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223 ]

/The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in 
this article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts of 
set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic universe. 
The universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is an absolute 
background set concept, with a corresponding absolute set-theoretic 
universe in which every set-theoretic question has a definite 
answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains our experience 
with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic possibilities, a 
phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In particular, I argue 
that the continuum hypothesis is settled on the multiverse view by 
our extensive knowledge about how it behaves in the multiverse, and 
as a result it can no longer be settled in the manner formerly hoped 
for.

/
/
/
/
/
What this means is that for mathematics (a language category), truth 
depends on the language.


I think Hamkins could say the same thing 

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-14 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/11/2018 10:34 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:13:14 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 12/9/2018 11:38 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 8:43:59 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:02 PM Philip Thrift
 wrote:



On Sunday, December 9, 2018 at 9:36:39 AM UTC-6, Jason
wrote:



On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 2:53 AM Philip Thrift
 wrote:



On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:27:45 PM
UTC-6, Jason wrote:


I think truth is primitive.

Jason



As a matter of linguistics (and philosophy),
*truth* and *matter* are linked:

"As a matter of fact, ..."
"The truth of the matter is ..."
"It matters that ..."
...
[ https://www.etymonline.com/word/matter
 ]


I agree they are linked.  Though matter may be a few
steps removed from truth.  Perhaps one way to
interpret the link more directly is thusly:

There is an equation whose every solution (where the
equation happens to be */true/*, e.g. is satisfied
when it has certain values assigned to its variables)
maps its variables to states of the time evolution of
the wave function of our universe.  You might say
that we (literally not figuratively) live within such
an equation.  That its truth reifies what we call matter.

But I think truth plays an even more fundamental roll
than this.  e.g. because the following statement is
*/true/* "two has a successor" then there exists a
successor to 2 distinct from any previous number. 
Similarly, the */truth/* of "9 is not prime" implies
the existence of a factor of 9 besides 1 and 9.

Jason



Schopenhauer 's view: "A judgment has /material
truth/ if its concepts are based on intuitive
perceptions that are generated from sensations.
If a judgment has its reason (ground) in another
judgment, its truth is called logical or formal.
If a judgment, of, for example, pure mathematics
or pure science, is based on the forms (space,
time, causality) of intuitive, empirical
knowledge, then the judgment has transcendental
truth."
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Truth
 ]


I guess I am referring to transcend truth here. Truth
concerning the integers is sufficient to yield the
universe, matter, and all that we see around us.

Jason




In my view there is basically just *material* (from
matter) truth and *linguistic* (from language) truth.

[
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/06/18/to-tell-the-truth/

]

Relations and functions are linguistic: relational type
theory (RTT) , functional type theory (FTT) languages.

Numbers are also linguistic beings, the (fictional)
semantic objects of Peano arithmetic (PA).

Numbers can be "materialized" via /nominalization /(cf.
Hartry Field, refs. in [
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartry_Field
 ]).


Assuming the primacy of matter assumes more and explains
less, than assuming the primacy of arithmetical truth.

Jason




In today's era of mathematics, Joel David Hamkins (@JDHamkins
) has shown there is a
"multiverse" of truths:

*The set-theoretic multiverse*
[ https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.4223  ]

/The multiverse view in set theory, introduced and argued for in
this article, is the view that there are many distinct concepts
of set, each instantiated in a corresponding set-theoretic
universe. The universe view, in contrast, asserts that there is
an absolute background set concept, with a corresponding absolute
set-theoretic universe in which every set-theoretic question has
a definite answer. The multiverse position, I argue, explains our
experience with the enormous diversity of set-theoretic
possibilities, a phenomenon that challenges the universe view. In

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-14 Thread Brent Meeker



On 12/11/2018 12:04 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:53:50 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:




On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 7:30:32 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 1:02:52 PM UTC-6,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 6:44:34 PM UTC, Philip
Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, December 11, 2018 at 12:32:51 PM UTC-6,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

* As for physicists being materialists in the
sense of believing there is nothing underlying
matter as its cause, I have never heard that
position articulated by any physicist, in person
or on the Internet. AG *




Victor Stenger
*Materialism Deconstructed?*

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/victor-stenger/materialism-deconstructed_b_2228362.html





*I was once a member of Vic's discussion group. Vic
believed in the reality of matter, in the sense that if
you kick it, it kicks back. But he didn't deny the
possibility that there could be something more fundamental
underlying matter.  This denial is what Bruno claims is
the materialist position, but it surely wasn't Vic's
position. You know this, of course, being a member of that
group. Right? AG*


- pt


I hosted Vic in Dallas in 2014 for a talk. I got to know him
fairly personally .

Homages to philosophical materialism ("matter is the
fundamental substance in nature") is in his books. /Timeless
Reality/ in particular.

One can be open-minded, or /ironist /in Rorty's definition [
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ironism
 ], and he was that.

But despite all the "models" talk, I would confidently say he
was always a hardcore materialist.

- pt


Show me one instance, just one, where Vic denied something causal
and unknown underlying the existence of matter? This is Bruno's
model of materialism among physicists but it clearly doesn't apply
to Vic. AG



When Vic refutes that materialism ("all there is is matter") has been 
refuted (as Vic did in his essay), he is asserting all there is is 
matter. There is no matter + some ghosts behind matter. He wanted to 
banish the ghosts (the immaterial).


Ghosts are agents.  The proposal that there is nothing more to matter 
than mathematical relations, an idea advocated by Max Tegmark, Bruno 
Marchal, Wheeler and others, is quite different from "ghosts".


Brent

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, December 14, 2018 at 5:00:33 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> >> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  > wrote: 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>  But that is the same as saying proof=>truth. 
> >>> I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is 
> proved. 
> >> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true) 
>  So in this case proof entails truth?? 
> > But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> 
> p) -> p” is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s 
> beweisbar. 
> > 
> > The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> 
> >>> For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to 
> G* \ G. 
> >>> 
> >>> Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. 
> In fact <>t -> ~[]<>t. 
> >>> Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency. 
> >> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them 
> for every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
> undefinable)? 
> > No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious 
> truth you want, like “1 = 1”. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for 
> which []<>t -> <>t is false? 
> > You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), 
> and indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this 
> provability and consistency referred to. 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> >>> 
>  Nothing which is proven can be false, 
> >>> Assuming consistency, which is not provable. 
> >> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for 
> arithmetic.  But finding that an axiom is false is common in argument. 
> > Explain this to your tax inspector! 
>
> I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
> mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater. 
>
> > 
> > If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are 
> false. 
>
> Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises. 
>
> > 
> > Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as 
> no one has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, 
> which confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it 
> cannot prove its consistency. 
>
> But it can be proven in bigger systems. 
>
> > Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, 
> quite the contrary. 
> > 
> > Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove 
> (easily) its consistency. 
>
> Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction.  
> And even then there might be a question of the rules of inference. 
>
> Brent 
>




I have read in various texts that at some point matter (all there is in the 
universe) may reach a point of inconsistency: All matter itself would just 
disintegrate.  That's all, folks!

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-14 Thread Brent Meeker




On 12/14/2018 2:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But that is the same as saying proof=>truth.

I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is proved.

So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  So in 
this case proof entails truth??

But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> p) -> p” 
is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s beweisbar.

The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p.






For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to G* \ G.

Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. In fact <>t -> 
~[]<>t.
Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency.

I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them for every 
substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is undefinable)?

No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious truth you 
want, like “1 = 1”.





Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for which []<>t -> 
<>t is false?

You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), and 
indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this provability 
and consistency referred to.







Nothing which is proven can be false,

Assuming consistency, which is not provable.

So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for arithmetic.  But 
finding that an axiom is false is common in argument.

Explain this to your tax inspector!


I have.  Just because I spent $125,000 on my apartment building doesn't 
mean it's appraised value must be $125,000 greater.




If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are false.


Not inconsistent, derived from false or inapplicable premises.



Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as no one 
has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, which 
confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it cannot 
prove its consistency.


But it can be proven in bigger systems.


Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about arithmetic’s consistency, quite 
the contrary.

Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove (easily) 
its consistency.


Only if you first found the inconsistency, i.e. proved a contradiction.  
And even then there might be a question of the rules of inference.


Brent

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-14 Thread agrayson2000


On Friday, December 14, 2018 at 11:27:05 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:27, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 6:49:34 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 18:05, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 11:34:48 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:


 SNIP

>
>
> *No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG*.
>
>
> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification 
> modes were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where 
> unfortunately 
> the made “stealing” was made in 1248.
>
> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test 
> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. 
> Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science.
>
>
>
>
>
> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible 
>> with Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its 
>> appearance comes from something else, non physical.
>>
>
> *Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and 
> Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG *
>
>
>
> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the 
> physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised 
> sense). 
> To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness 
> (or you can assume it outright). 
>
> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot 
> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that 
> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a 
> computation 
> run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). 
> This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a 
> statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we 
> do 
> the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal 
> machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a 
> symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. 
> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains 
> on the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any 
> evidences.
>
> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer 
> in place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of 
> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. 
>

 *Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, 
 to some existing "universal machine" doing anything?*

 You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the 
 existence of a universal machine.

>>>  
>>> *You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism 
>>> implies we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need 
>>> mechanism to be true for your theory to be viable. *
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain 
>>> Digital transplantation. Yes.
>>>
>>> I don’t claim it is true.
>>>
>>> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it 
>>> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without 
>>> collapse).
>>>
>>
>>
>> *I don't believe it's testable. Has that been done to any degree? And if 
>> it were, I don't see how it would predict quantum theory. AG *
>>
>>
>>
>> That is a quite sane attitude, and rather normal remark, before studying 
>> the argument/proof.
>>
>> Now, if instead of not believing, you positively disbelief that Digital 
>> Mechanism is testable, you need to prove or argue for that statement, or 
>> better, to say at which step of my argument you depart from.
>>
>> Or you invoke your personal opinion, which is then like abandoning the 
>> scientific attitude in the domain, to sell a “pseudo-religion”. I don’t 
>> think so (I hope).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without 
>>> going further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation 
>>> of materialism. AG*
>>>
>>>
>>> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. 
>>>
>>
>> *Which form of materialism are you referring to? *
>>
>>
>> Weak Materialsim: the idea that we have to *assume* physical things, like 
>> anything whose existence is inferred from observation and is judged to be 
>> not having a simpler explanation which does not invoke a ontological 
>> commitment in (Aristotelian) substance.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *Not the form 

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-14 Thread Jason Resch
On Fri, Dec 14, 2018 at 9:36 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 8:21 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> >>The block universe changes along the time dimension and special
>>> relativity deals with time, but the number 3 never changes with time and
>>> has nothing to do with it.
>>>
>>
>> *>Then you agree that there can be an objectively static object,*
>>
>
>  Static with respect to what dimension? The block universe is a
> mathematical 4D object  constructed in 1 dimension of time and 3 dimensions
> of space that follows Non-Euclidean geometry, and it changes in time and it
> changes in space, if it didn't there would be no details in the universe
> and everything would be a even unchanging fog.
>

Special Relativity implies all points in time are equally real, and
moreover, cannot be sliced into any objective view of a "present", each
inertial reference frame can have its own view of what the present is.  If
all points in time exist then the universe doesn't change.  The universe is
then an unchanging "platonic object", perhaps not unlike the integers,
platonic execution traces, the Mandelbrot set, etc.


>
> > *and that if we proceed through it in some dimension some view of it
>> changes.*
>>
>
> It may be implicit but the word "change" only has meaning if it's relative
> to some dimension, and if we're talking about consciousness there is no
> dimension more important than time. And unlike us numbers can't see time so
> if we are to have any hope of understanding consciousness we must look
> elsewhere.
>
>
I never said numbers see time.  But programs can.


> > *How is this different from a platonic computation, along which you can
>> view the state of the machine at individual steps?*
>>
>
> The difference is with a platonic computer you can NOT view the state of
> the machine at individual steps or view anything else about it either, and
> the scientific method can not provide a single scrap of evidence that the
> machine even exists.
>

It can.  You are using an overly constrained method of science which
depends on your vision.  We can't see beyond the Hubble volume, nor prove
that anything exists beyond it, but the conclusions of testable theories
are that there is stuff beyond the horizon, so we ought to believe in it.
Likewise, the small amount of evidence we have points toward arithmetical
realism as the basis of physics (it has passed several tests without being
refuted). Thus it is a theory in all respects as any other testable
scientific theory is.  I don't know why you object so strongly to it when
you have presented zero counter evidence.


>
>
> >>What are computations but the descriptions of particle's motion?
>>> Particles can do computations but computations can't do particles.
>>>
>>
>> > *How are the motions of "really real" particles different from the
>> motions of particles in a simulation of particles? *
>>
>
> The simulated particle relies on a computer made of matter for its
> existence and, unless we're living in a simulation, real particles don't.
> And if we are in a simulation then the computer that is simulating us must
> be made of real matter because even there numbers can't change, only
> matter/energy can.
>

What about hypothetical analogous forms of "matter and energy" that exist
in other string theory universes with different laws of physics? Could one
build a computer using their equivalents of "matter and energy"?  What are
the bare necessities, as you envisage, for building a computer?


>
>
>> *> You believe a simulation of a conscious mind still results in
>> consciousness, don't you?*
>>
>
> Of course.
>
> > *I think you are being inconsistent here.*
>>
>
> It would be inconsistent if personal identity were a noun but it's not,
> its an adjective. I am the way matter behaves when it is organized in a
> johnkclarkian way, if the pattern of electrical charges inside a computer
> are organized in a johnkclarkian way then that is John K Clark.
>
> > *If change is an illusion,*
>>
>
> When talking about the nature of consciousness that word should never be
> used because it is a total cop out and explains nothing.
>

But we shouldn't depend our naive common experience when making conclusions
about reality. Otherwise we are liable to conclude the sun moves around the
Earth, or that there is an objectively moving present and that past and
future points in time don't exist.  Or that only one branch of the wave
function is real, or that only matter from the universe I am in can do
anything.


>
>
>> > *that illusion can exist within the conscious minds implemented in
>> platonic computations as well.*
>>
>
> It's not just consciousness, NOTHING can exist inside the mind of a
> platonic computer unless something changes, and it only has numbers to work
> with or it wouldn't be platonic so nothing can change.
>

But didn't you accept the block universe view?  How do you resolve these
two seemingly incompatible ideas?


>
>
>> >>> Think of consecutively computed 

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, December 14, 2018 at 9:16:58 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Mathematics is immaterial, but it makes no sense to say it is fiction, 
> unless deciding that Aristotle is true and Plato is wrong, but I would need 
> some evidences for this, which are literally never given.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
"Mathematics is immaterial" is a conclusion or an assumption. If it is an 
assumption, then one can proceed within that context.

If it is a conclusion, then what is the basis of that conclusion?

Fiction can be considered to be material. If all the traces of Sherlock 
Holmes stories were taken out by the sun exploding (the books, movies, TV 
show recordings, the brains with SH memories), there would be no more 
Sherlock Holmes (unless a SH story were sent on one of those human-made 
objects leaving the solar system 
[ 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_artificial_objects_leaving_the_Solar_System
 
]).

But suppose that "mathematics is material". That (I claim) is a better 
claim to support than "mathematics is immaterial".

I don't get the "1+1=2" proof that math is immaterial. The immaterialist 
already presumes that math is immaterial, so "1+1=2" is the case in some 
immaterial (Platonic) realm (they claim), so therefor math is immaterial. 
Sounds like circular reasoning. The materialist sees "1+1=2" as something 
that applies when he (when he was a caveman) put a rock next to another 
rock. And so on. 

One type of objection might be that matter is a mystery, but math isn't. 
But I think complexity theorists (like Chaitin) have shown that math is a 
mystery too.

So *mathematics* and *matter* are both mysteries (but that *matter is 
primary* is the best way to go, given everything).

I agree with Galen Strawson at this point: The one thing that isn't a 
mystery is *consciousness*.


- pt



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What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-14 Thread John Clark
On Thu, Dec 13, 2018 at 8:21 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

>>The block universe changes along the time dimension and special
>> relativity deals with time, but the number 3 never changes with time and
>> has nothing to do with it.
>>
>
> *>Then you agree that there can be an objectively static object,*
>

 Static with respect to what dimension? The block universe is a
mathematical 4D object  constructed in 1 dimension of time and 3 dimensions
of space that follows Non-Euclidean geometry, and it changes in time and it
changes in space, if it didn't there would be no details in the universe
and everything would be a even unchanging fog.

> *and that if we proceed through it in some dimension some view of it
> changes.*
>

It may be implicit but the word "change" only has meaning if it's relative
to some dimension, and if we're talking about consciousness there is no
dimension more important than time. And unlike us numbers can't see time so
if we are to have any hope of understanding consciousness we must look
elsewhere.

> *How is this different from a platonic computation, along which you can
> view the state of the machine at individual steps?*
>

The difference is with a platonic computer you can NOT view the state of
the machine at individual steps or view anything else about it either, and
the scientific method can not provide a single scrap of evidence that the
machine even exists.

>>What are computations but the descriptions of particle's motion?
>> Particles can do computations but computations can't do particles.
>>
>
> > *How are the motions of "really real" particles different from the
> motions of particles in a simulation of particles? *
>

The simulated particle relies on a computer made of matter for its
existence and, unless we're living in a simulation, real particles don't.
And if we are in a simulation then the computer that is simulating us must
be made of real matter because even there numbers can't change, only
matter/energy can.


> *> You believe a simulation of a conscious mind still results in
> consciousness, don't you?*
>

Of course.

> *I think you are being inconsistent here.*
>

It would be inconsistent if personal identity were a noun but it's not, its
an adjective. I am the way matter behaves when it is organized in a
johnkclarkian way, if the pattern of electrical charges inside a computer
are organized in a johnkclarkian way then that is John K Clark.

> *If change is an illusion,*
>

When talking about the nature of consciousness that word should never be
used because it is a total cop out and explains nothing.


> > *that illusion can exist within the conscious minds implemented in
> platonic computations as well.*
>

It's not just consciousness, NOTHING can exist inside the mind of a
platonic computer unless something changes, and it only has numbers to work
with or it wouldn't be platonic so nothing can change.


> >>> Think of consecutively computed states in the Game of Life, for
>>> example.
>>>
>>
>> >>Bad example. There is no memory in the Game of Life,
>>
>
> > *I picked the example on purpose. Game Of Life is Turing Complete.*
>

I know, I've mentioned that fact on this list many many times; it means if
you organize matter according to the rules determined by the game of life
then that matter can compute anything that can be computed.

> You can build Turing Machines in the Game of Life, so you can build
> systems with memories
>

NO! You can't store any memories in the game, if I show you a particular
Life pattern you could figure out its next state but there is no way in
general you or anybody else could figure out what it's previous pattern was
because there just isn't any information about that stored inside the
pattern. When the game is run memories of a previous state in the game are
stored *outside* of the game in silicon memory chips that are part of the
computer running the Life program.

> *Likewise with out universe, as the quantum erasure experiment shows, or
> even just the single photon interferometer experiment.*


A photon is a particle and it contains energy not numbers.

>>And the Game of Life needs either a biological brain or a electronic
>> computer for the game to change, that is to say for it to DO anything, and
>> both brains and computers are made of matter and obey physics.
>
>
> *> False, see above. *


See what above?

*> You can have a non-biological, non-electronic computer built within the
> "physics" of the Game of Life.*


Then do so and become the richest and most powerful man the world has ever
known before this month is over.

  > *This computer could simulate a mind with consciousness.  No electrons
> or photons are needed. Just a lot of gliders and glider guns, and other
> such structures.  All built from very simple rules.*


The first program I ever wrote was a Game of Life program, but before those
gliders and glider guns could DO anything they needed 2 things, my brain to
write the program and a computer to run it on, and 

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-14 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:41, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/13/2018 4:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> See the bit about reversible computing: 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landauer%27s_principle 
>>   (computations 
>> that are reversible require no energy).
> 
> And they produce no results since they run both ways.  They are not even 
> computations in the CT sense.
 
 They are computations in the CT sense.
>>> 
>>> CT computations halt.  A program that can just wander back an forth at 
>>> random doesn't halt.
>> 
>> 
>> ?
>> 
>> There is no CT for the programs who always halt. Universal machine would not 
>> exist. The price of being a universal machine is that not only it does not 
>> always halt, but there is no mechanical procedure deciding when it halts or 
>> not.
> 
> No, my point was that unless a program halts it has not computed anything. 



That reminds me Malcom who disbelieve in consciousness-during-a-dream. That has 
been refuted experimentally by LaBerge and Dement. Now a dream does not compute 
anything, and we are conscious all along the working of the dream.

Somehow, you make the “error” described by the paper of Goldin and Wegner 
(mentioned by Philip Thrift). You consider only the extensional CT, not the 
intensional CT which flows from the intensional CT. The extensional CT is 
concerned with computable functions. The intensional CT is concerned with 
emulable process. They are probably equivalent, except that for a process, the 
computation involved can not stop.





> I objected to the above "computations that are reversible require no energy". 
>   This is either a statement about the abstract mathematical computation, in 
> which case it is trivial, or it is a statement about physically realized 
> computations in which case it is false because physically reversible 
> computations have no direction.


This lead to Non-Mechanism, and to te fact that if a (quantum, perhaps) 
computer emulate a dream, there is no consciousness associated with it. Malcom 
argues that a dream memory is created at the awakening moment. With such a 
theory, the entire universe cannot “run consciousness”, and ur consciousness is 
created at the last moment when the universe output something, which is already 
very weird.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-14 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 13 Dec 2018, at 19:59, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 10:44:04 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 15:31, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 6:01:59 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 21:33, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 1:39:12 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 4:56 PM Jason Resch > wrote:
>>> 
>>> >> Without physics reality  would not need a foundation  because there 
>>> >> would be no reality, there would be nothing. And nothing could be 
>>> >> explained not only because there would nobody to explain it to but more 
>>> >> importantly because there would be nothing around that needs explaining.
>>> 
>>> > You are assuming the answer at the start. 
>>> 
>>> I am assuming that if you ask me to explain nothing I could do so because I 
>>> am very good at nothing.
>>> 
>>> > None of the above is an argument that physics is fundamental, rather than 
>>> > derivative.
>>> 
>>> Nobody will ever prove that something is absolutely fundamental, but you 
>>> can show that some things are more fundamental than others. 
>>> 
>>> > So do you think mathematical properties require things to count? 
>>> 
>>> Yes I think so. And I think things are required to think.
>>> 
>>> > How many things to count are necessary?
>>> 
>>> More than none.
>>> 
>>> > Give me your reasons for why you think computations that exist in the 
>>> > universe of numbers
>>> 
>>> Computations "exist" in the universe of numbers in the same way that the 
>>> Incredible Hulk "exists" in the universe of Marvel comics. 
>>>  
>>> > are ineffectual and cannot produce consciousness
>>> 
>>> One of the few things we know for certain about consciousness is it 
>>> involves change, but numbers never change in space or time; matter/energy 
>>> is the only known thing that can change.
>>>  
>>> >>Forget consciousness, a computer program can't simulate anyone or do 
>>> >>anything else either unless it is run on a Turing Machine made of matter 
>>> >>that obeys the laws of physics.   
>>> 
>>> > You have provided no proof to back up this statement.
>>> 
>>> I don't have proof but I have lots of examples of matter doing arithmetic 
>>> but nobody has an example of arithmetic doing matter. Matter/energy may or 
>>> may not be fundamental, but it's certainly more fundamental than 
>>> arithmetic. 
>>> 
>>> > Spacetime does not change in time or space either.
>>> 
>>> Of course it does, if the universe contains anything in it then the block 
>>> universe can't be exactly the same all the time everywhere! If we ignore 
>>> Quantum Mechanics as Minkowski and Einstein did when they came up with the 
>>> block universe idea then time and space are the 2 fundamental coordinates 
>>> of existence, and as we move along the time axis we see a change in the 3D 
>>> shape of the Block Universe and if we see a different 3D shape we know it 
>>> must be a different time.  
>>>  
>>> > The universe is a static four dimensional block. 
>>> 
>>> That could only be true if the universe contained no details. That could 
>>> only be true if the universe was infinite unbounded and homogeneous in both 
>>> space and time, and that is the best definition of "nothing" that I know of.
>>> 
>>> > If you think other (past or future) moments of time need to stop existing 
>>> > for you to experience change,
>>> 
>>> I think it is a reasonable assumption but please note you are already 
>>> assuming the existence of time, otherwise the past and future you speak of 
>>> would have no meaning and it's not even clear what you mean by "stop". 
>>> 
>>> > then you can experience change without the past moment existing.
>>> 
>>> If it's not a change in experience with respect to time what is it with 
>>> respect to? The only alternative is a change in experience with respect to 
>>> space, but such a move would take time. 
>>> 
>>> John K Clark
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Computations "exist" in the universe of numbers in the same way that the 
>>> Incredible Hulk "exists" in the universe of Marvel comics.  
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> Great quotable!
>> 
>> 
>> Then you, or Clark, should explain why Hulk is not taught in all primary 
>> school on he planet, like elementary arithmetic is. May be we should ask all 
>> physicists, economist and bankers as well, to use Hulk instead of the 
>> numbers, when they share their results.
>> 
>> Do you agree that x^3 + y^3 + z^3 = 33 does admit or not a solution? Do the 
>> term “open problem” makes sense? Ca you give me an open problem about Hulk?
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> I think there are "open questions" in the comic universes:
>> 
>> There are many open questions surrounding Avengers: Infinity War. A film 
>> that brings together all facets of the Marvel Cinematic Universe has a lot 
>> to live up to. Even after the credits roll there are still many open 
>> questions that 

Re: Class calculus and conscious AIs

2018-12-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 14 Dec 2018, at 04:18, Mason Green  wrote:
> 
> Hi, I’m wondering if any of you have read this paper and if so, what do you 
> think about it. The author says he’s discovered a new kind of mathematics 
> that could give rise to machine consciousness. A few other publications 
> picked it up but it got surprisingly little fanfare, for such a bold claim.
> 
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.03301.pdf


This not bad, especially the idea of learning from hierarchical description 
from data, but I doubt it is new. The class algebra is total, and the whole 
thing seems close to some typed lambda calculus. He made some weird statement, 
like claiming that the axiom of choice is responsible for paradox in set 
theory, or for the existence of non halting machine. The fact that his class 
algebra imposes halting is rather dubious, especially in the frame of 
intelligence, which needs universality (imo) and thus unpredictable non halting 
behaviour. Its use of fuzziness is also not quite convincing (most similar 
attempts have failed).

He mentions consciousness at the end of the paper, but seems really naive on 
this, and unaware of the conceptual problem: it is still the “easy” problem of 
consciousness (identifying []A with []A & A, actually, which makes sense in 
some applications, but is wrong in mechanist cognitive science).

Now, I am not sure that the notion of super-intelligence makes sense by itself. 
It should be called “universal competence”, but it can be proved that this will 
not be applicable in any domain, as the author intends.

I read it rather quickly, so perhaps I missed the big idea, but it does not 
seems so original, at least at first sight.

Bruno





> 
> -Mason
> 
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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-14 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 1:12:35 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 10:27:29 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 5:34:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 
 SNIP
 
 
> No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG.
 
 Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification modes 
 were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where unfortunately the 
 made “stealing” was made in 1248.
 
 Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test 
 mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. 
 Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science.
 
 
 
 
> 
> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible with 
> Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its 
> appearance comes from something else, non physical.
> 
> Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and 
> Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG 
 
 
 Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the 
 physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised 
 sense). To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies 
 digitalness (or you can assume it outright). 
 
 But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot 
 distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that 
 Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation 
 run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). 
 This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a 
 statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we 
 do the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal 
 machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a 
 symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. 
 Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains on 
 the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any 
 evidences.
 
 Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer in 
 place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of 
 substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. 
 
 Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, to 
 some existing "universal machine" doing anything?
>>> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the 
>>> existence of a universal machine.
>>>  
>>> You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism 
>>> implies we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need 
>>> mechanism to be true for your theory to be viable.
>> 
>> 
>> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain Digital 
>> transplantation. Yes.
>> 
>> I don’t claim it is true.
>> 
>> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it 
>> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without 
>> collapse).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without going 
>>> further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation of 
>>> materialism. AG
>> 
>> 
>> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. Mechanism and 
>> Materialism are in complete opposition. You need high infinities in the 
>> observable world to attach a piece of matter to a mind. 
>> We can come back on this when you study the UD-Argument (UD = Universal 
>> Dovetailer) step by step.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The "working hypothesis" of panpsychical materialism (Galen Strawson, Philip 
>> Goff, David Skrbina, ...) is that "mind" (consciousness) needs 
>> experientialities (not infinities).
> 
> Please, study the UD-Argument. Here I said that Matter needs infinities, if 
> we want keep Mechanism. 
> 
> Mind, I mean the conscious part of Mind,  needs experientialities, and that 
> is provided by using the definition of “knowledge” by Theaetetus, (true 
> opinion) refuted by Socrates, but the refutation by Socrates assumes 
> implicitly a form of completeness which is itself refuted by Gödel+Turing, 
> for machines.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Whether "Matter needs infinities" is something I think many physicists today 
> are right about: It isn't the case.
> 
> Max Tegmark says this emphatically. (Infinities are "ruining physics", he 
> 

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, December 14, 2018 at 5:05:28 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Dec 2018, at 20:12, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 10:27:29 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 5:34:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:


 SNIP

>
>
> *No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG*.
>
>
> Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification 
> modes were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where 
> unfortunately 
> the made “stealing” was made in 1248.
>
> Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test 
> mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. 
> Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science.
>
>
>
>
>
> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible 
>> with Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its 
>> appearance comes from something else, non physical.
>>
>
> *Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and 
> Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG *
>
>
>
> Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the 
> physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised 
> sense). 
> To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies digitalness 
> (or you can assume it outright). 
>
> But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot 
> distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that 
> Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a 
> computation 
> run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). 
> This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a 
> statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we 
> do 
> the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal 
> machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a 
> symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. 
> Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains 
> on the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any 
> evidences.
>
> Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer 
> in place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of 
> substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. 
>

 *Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, 
 to some existing "universal machine" doing anything?*

 You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the 
 existence of a universal machine.

>>>  
>>> *You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism 
>>> implies we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need 
>>> mechanism to be true for your theory to be viable. *
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain 
>>> Digital transplantation. Yes.
>>>
>>> I don’t claim it is true.
>>>
>>> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it 
>>> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without 
>>> collapse).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without 
>>> going further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation 
>>> of materialism. AG*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. Mechanism and 
>>> Materialism are in complete opposition. You need high infinities in the 
>>> observable world to attach a piece of matter to a mind. 
>>> We can come back on this when you study the UD-Argument (UD = Universal 
>>> Dovetailer) step by step.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>
>> The "working hypothesis" of panpsychical materialism (Galen Strawson, 
>> Philip Goff, David Skrbina, ...) is that "mind" (consciousness) needs 
>> *experientialities* (not *infinities)*.
>>
>>
>> Please, study the UD-Argument. Here I said that Matter needs infinities, 
>> if we want keep Mechanism. 
>>
>> Mind, I mean the conscious part of Mind,  needs experientialities, and 
>> that is provided by using the definition of “knowledge” by Theaetetus, 
>> (true opinion) refuted by Socrates, but the refutation by Socrates assumes 
>> implicitly a form of completeness which is itself refuted by Gödel+Turing, 
>> for machines.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> Whether "Matter needs infinities" is something I think many physicists 

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-14 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:27, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 6:49:34 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 18:05, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 11:34:48 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 
 SNIP
 
 
> No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG.
 
 Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification modes 
 were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where unfortunately the 
 made “stealing” was made in 1248.
 
 Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test 
 mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. 
 Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science.
 
 
 
 
> 
> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible with 
> Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its 
> appearance comes from something else, non physical.
> 
> Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and 
> Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG 
 
 
 Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the 
 physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised 
 sense). To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies 
 digitalness (or you can assume it outright). 
 
 But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot 
 distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that 
 Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation 
 run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). 
 This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a 
 statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we 
 do the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal 
 machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a 
 symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. 
 Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains on 
 the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any 
 evidences.
 
 Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer in 
 place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of 
 substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. 
 
 Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, to 
 some existing "universal machine" doing anything?
>>> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the 
>>> existence of a universal machine.
>>>  
>>> You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism 
>>> implies we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need 
>>> mechanism to be true for your theory to be viable.
>> 
>> 
>> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain Digital 
>> transplantation. Yes.
>> 
>> I don’t claim it is true.
>> 
>> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it 
>> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without 
>> collapse).
>> 
>> I don't believe it's testable. Has that been done to any degree? And if it 
>> were, I don't see how it would predict quantum theory. AG 
> 
> 
> That is a quite sane attitude, and rather normal remark, before studying the 
> argument/proof.
> 
> Now, if instead of not believing, you positively disbelief that Digital 
> Mechanism is testable, you need to prove or argue for that statement, or 
> better, to say at which step of my argument you depart from.
> 
> Or you invoke your personal opinion, which is then like abandoning the 
> scientific attitude in the domain, to sell a “pseudo-religion”. I don’t think 
> so (I hope).
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>> But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without going 
>>> further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation of 
>>> materialism. AG
>> 
>> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism.
>> 
>> Which form of materialism are you referring to?
> 
> Weak Materialsim: the idea that we have to *assume* physical things, like 
> anything whose existence is inferred from observation and is judged to be not 
> having a simpler explanation which does not invoke a ontological commitment 
> in (Aristotelian) substance.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Not the form or definition used by Stenger.
> 
> He is just unclear about that, but he seems to clearly assume analysis and 
> some physical reality.
> 
> Its book will be very helpful to get the whole physics, when enough of the 
> 

Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-12-14 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 13 Dec 2018, at 20:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 10:27:29 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 13 Dec 2018, at 15:12, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 5:34:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 12 Dec 2018, at 19:38, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, December 12, 2018 at 3:51:04 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 11 Dec 2018, at 19:32, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 
 SNIP
 
 
> No testable hypotheses; conclusios not based on empirical data. AG.
 
 Only since 529. Those proposing theories and empirical verification modes 
 were persecuted. They escaped in the Middle-East, where unfortunately the 
 made “stealing” was made in 1248.
 
 Of course, I provide a counter-example, by showing that we can test 
 mechanism/materialism, and the test favour mechanism on materialism. 
 Physics seems to NOT be the fundamental science.
 
 
 
 
> 
> In that domain, you can understand that Mechanism is not compatible with 
> Materialism, and that the cosmos is not the ultimate reality. Its 
> appearance comes from something else, non physical.
> 
> Play it again Sam. Succinctly, how do you define Mechanism and 
> Materialism, and why are they incompatible? AG 
 
 
 Mechanism is the idea that our consciousness results only from the 
 physical functioning of the brain, or the body (in some generalised 
 sense). To be “functioning” (and biologically reproductible) implies 
 digitalness (or you can assume it outright). 
 
 But then it is easy to understand that a universal machine cannot 
 distinguish a computation supporting him/her and executed by this or that 
 Turing complete system. In particular, it cannot distinguish a computation 
 run by a God, or by Matter, or by arithmetic (which is Turing complete). 
 This means that to predict anything empirically, it has to emerge from a 
 statistics on all (relative) computations (seen by the machine). When we 
 do the math, we do recover already that the observable of the universal 
 machine (an arithmetical notion, see Turing) obey a quantum logic, with a 
 symmetrical hamiltonian, etc. 
 Up to now, Mechanism won the empirical test, where materialism remains on 
 the side of the philosophical ontological commitment, without any 
 evidences.
 
 Mechanism is just the idea that we can survive with a digital computer in 
 place of the body or the brain. It assumes the existence of a level of 
 substitution where we survive a functional digital substitution. 
 
 Let's assume such a substitution is possible. How do you go from that, to 
 some existing "universal machine" doing anything?
>>> You don’t need to assume that we survive such substitution to get the 
>>> existence of a universal machine.
>>>  
>>> You wrote above that we could assume it "outright" -- that mechanism 
>>> implies we can survive a digital substitution? So I think you need 
>>> mechanism to be true for your theory to be viable.
>> 
>> 
>> I define Mechanism by the hypothesis that we can survive such brain Digital 
>> transplantation. Yes.
>> 
>> I don’t claim it is true.
>> 
>> I claim it is testable, and indeed, somehow already confirmed because it 
>> imposed a physics quite similar (up to now) to quantum theory (without 
>> collapse).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> But then you've already solved the problem of consciousness without going 
>>> further, and it seems the conventional, albeit unproved expectation of 
>>> materialism. AG
>> 
>> 
>> No, Materialism is refuted when you assume Mechanism. Mechanism and 
>> Materialism are in complete opposition. You need high infinities in the 
>> observable world to attach a piece of matter to a mind. 
>> We can come back on this when you study the UD-Argument (UD = Universal 
>> Dovetailer) step by step.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The "working hypothesis" of panpsychical materialism (Galen Strawson, Philip 
>> Goff, David Skrbina, ...) is that "mind" (consciousness) needs 
>> experientialities (not infinities).
> 
> Please, study the UD-Argument. Here I said that Matter needs infinities, if 
> we want keep Mechanism. 
> 
> Mind, I mean the conscious part of Mind,  needs experientialities, and that 
> is provided by using the definition of “knowledge” by Theaetetus, (true 
> opinion) refuted by Socrates, but the refutation by Socrates assumes 
> implicitly a form of completeness which is itself refuted by Gödel+Turing, 
> for machines.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Whether "Matter needs infinities" is something I think many physicists today 
> are right about: It isn't the case.

But then materialism implies mechanism. But mechanism implies non-materialism.


Thus materialism (without infinities) implies non-materialism, and is 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, December 14, 2018 at 4:49:33 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:05, Brent Meeker > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/13/2018 3:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> *Automating Gödel'’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence ¨ with 
> Higher-order Automated Theorem Provers*
> http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf
>
>
> Gödel took the modal logic S5 for its proof, which is the only logic NOT 
> available for the machines.
>
>
> What about S5 makes it not available for machines?
>
>
>
> There are no intensional variant of G leading to S5.
>
> The axiom “5” is the guilty one (as []p & p obeys S4, and S5 can be 
> defined by S4 + “5”)
>
> “5” is <>p -> []<>p (the opposite of incompleteness: <>p -> ~[]<>p, but 
> also incompatible in the logic X, Z, etc.).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

How does this relate to the "higher-order theorem provers" that deals with 
modal systems like S5?


https://www.ijcai.org/Proceedings/16/Papers/137.pdf 

- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-14 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:24, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/13/2018 3:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> But that is the same as saying proof=>truth.
>> 
>> I don’t think so. It says that []p -> p is not provable, unless p is proved.
> 
> So  []([]p -> p) -> p  or in other words Proof([]p -> p) => (p is true)  So 
> in this case proof entails truth??

But “[]([]p -> p) -> p” is not a theorem of G, meaning that "[]([]p -> p) -> p” 
is not true in general for any arithmetic p, with [] = Gödel’s beweisbar.

The Löb’s formula is []([]p -> p) -> []p, not []([]p -> p) -> p.



> 
> 
>> For example []f -> f (consistency) is not provable. It will belong to G* \ G.
>> 
>> Another example is that []<>t -> <>t is false, despite <>t being true. In 
>> fact <>t -> ~[]<>t.
>> Or <>t -> <>[]f. Consistency implies the consistency of inconsistency.
> 
> I'm not sure how to interpret these formulae.  Are you asserting them for 
> every substitution of t by a true proposition (even though "true" is 
> undefinable)? 

No, only by either the constant propositional “true”, or any obvious truth you 
want, like “1 = 1”.




> Or are you asserting that there is at least one true proposition for which 
> []<>t -> <>t is false?

You can read it beweisbar (consistent(“1 = 1”)) -> (consistent (“1=1”), and 
indeed that is true, but not provable by the machine too which this provability 
and consistency referred to.




> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Nothing which is proven can be false,
>> 
>> Assuming consistency, which is not provable.
> 
> So consistency is hard to determine.  You just assume it for arithmetic.  But 
> finding that an axiom is false is common in argument.

Explain this to your tax inspector!

If elementary arithmetic is inconsistent, all scientific theories are false.

Gödel’s theorem illustrate indirectly the consistency of arithmetic, as no one 
has ever been able to prove arithmetic’s consistency in arithmetic, which 
confirms its consistency, given that if arithmetic is consistent, it cannot 
prove its consistency. Gödel’s result does not throw any doubt about 
arithmetic’s consistency, quite the contrary.

Of course, if arithmetic was inconsistent, it would be able to prove (easily) 
its consistency.



> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> which in tern implies that no axiom can ever be false.
>> 
>> Which is of course easily refuted.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Which makes my point that the mathematical idea of "true" is very different 
>>> from the common one.
>> 
>> “BBB” is true just in case it is the case that BBB.
> 
> But you can't know whether it is the case that 10^1 + 1 is the successor 
> of 10^1000 independent of the axioms, i.e. you assume it.

That is the best we can do in science.

Bruno






> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> I am not sure, but the point is that no machine can prove []p -> p in 
>> general. And the machine can know that, making her “modest” (Löbian).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-12-14 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 13 Dec 2018, at 21:05, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 12/13/2018 3:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Automating Gödel'’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence ¨ with 
>>> Higher-order Automated Theorem Provers
>>> http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf 
>>> 
>> 
>> Gödel took the modal logic S5 for its proof, which is the only logic NOT 
>> available for the machines.
> 
> What about S5 makes it not available for machines?


There are no intensional variant of G leading to S5.

The axiom “5” is the guilty one (as []p & p obeys S4, and S5 can be defined by 
S4 + “5”)

“5” is <>p -> []<>p (the opposite of incompleteness: <>p -> ~[]<>p, but also 
incompatible in the logic X, Z, etc.).

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Class calculus and conscious AIs

2018-12-14 Thread Telmo Menezes
Hi Mason,

On Fri, 14 Dec 2018 at 04:18, Mason Green  wrote:
>
> Hi, I’m wondering if any of you have read this paper and if so, what do you 
> think about it. The author says he’s discovered a new kind of mathematics 
> that could give rise to machine consciousness. A few other publications 
> picked it up but it got surprisingly little fanfare, for such a bold claim.

The author appears to be claiming that the algebra he is proposing
could enable artificial general intelligence. It looks interesting, I
will take a deeper look, but it makes no claims about consciousness.

Telmo.

> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.03301.pdf
>
> -Mason
>
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Re: Class calculus and conscious AIs

2018-12-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, December 13, 2018 at 9:18:47 PM UTC-6, Mason Green wrote:
>
> Hi, I’m wondering if any of you have read this paper and if so, what do 
> you think about it. The author says he’s discovered a new kind of 
> mathematics that could give rise to machine consciousness. A few other 
> publications picked it up but it got surprisingly little fanfare, for such 
> a bold claim. 
>
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1804.03301.pdf 
>
> -Mason


 

Class calculus and class algebra are from object-oriented programming 
language and database theory.

( [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virtual_class ], [ 
https://arxiv.org/abs/1302.0334 - same author as above)

Beyond that?

- pt

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