Re: Planck Length

2019-02-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, February 2, 2019 at 12:58:14 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 1:54:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/1/2019 5:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>> In any case, one of the "micropsychists"  has a new paper just out:
>>
>>
>> "According to the *fusion* view ... when micro- or protoconscious 
>> entities come together in the right way, they fuse or 'blend' together to 
>> form a single unified consciousness. ..."
>>
>> *Is Consciousness Intrinsic? A Problem for the Integrated Information 
>> Theory*
>> Hedda Hassel Mørch
>> Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):133-162(30) (2019)
>>
>> https://philpapers.org/rec/MRCICI
>> https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCICI.pdf
>>
>> *Abstract*
>> The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) claims that 
>> consciousness is identical to maximal integrated information, or maximal Φ. 
>> One objection to IIT is based on what may be called the intrinsicality 
>> problem: consciousness is an intrinsic property, but maximal Φ is an 
>> extrinsic property; therefore, they cannot be identical. 
>>
>>
>> A more cogent objection is that it attributes lots of consciousness to a 
>> Vandermonde matrix:
>>
>> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>
> Scott Aaronson wrote this about 5 years ago. I haven't looked if he has 
> has anything new.
>
> Regarding informationism vs. panpsychism, he only addresses the former.
>
> *I’ve just conjured into my imagination beings whose Φ-values are a 
> thousand, nay a trillion times larger than humans’, yet who are also 
> philosophical zombies: entities that there’s nothing that it’s like to be.*
>   
>
> That of course panpsychists agree with.
>
> He procedes:
>
> *Let S=F_p, where p is some prime sufficiently larger than n, and let V be 
> an n×n Vandermonde matrix over F_p—that is, a matrix whose (i,j) entry 
> equals i^(j-1) (mod p).  Then let f:S^n→S^n be the update function defined 
> by f(x)=Vx. *
>
> Concludes: *the fact that Integrated Information Theory is 
> wrong—demonstrably wrong, for reasons that go to its core—puts it in 
> something like the top 2% of all mathematical theories of consciousness 
> ever proposed.*
>
>
> Now here is where panpsychists diverge from this way of thinking: 
> Everything Scott wrote above involves ultimately computing with numerical 
> entities as the "atoms" (so to speak) of what the "computer" is computing 
> with. What the panpsychists are saying is that it is not numerical entities 
> (numericals: Ns) at all that are at the base of the computing, but 
> experiential entities (experientials: Es). *Es are as basic 
> (ontologically) as Ns*.
>
> *Defining what Es are* is the fundamental problem for panpsychists (vs. 
> numerists, or informationists).
>
>
> - pt
>
>  
>


The commenters to Scott's post seem to try to get into this with 
ψ-properties vs. Φ-properties.

- pt

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Re: Planck Length

2019-02-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 1:54:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/1/2019 5:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
> In any case, one of the "micropsychists"  has a new paper just out:
>
>
> "According to the *fusion* view ... when micro- or protoconscious 
> entities come together in the right way, they fuse or 'blend' together to 
> form a single unified consciousness. ..."
>
> *Is Consciousness Intrinsic? A Problem for the Integrated Information 
> Theory*
> Hedda Hassel Mørch
> Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):133-162(30) (2019)
>
> https://philpapers.org/rec/MRCICI
> https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCICI.pdf
>
> *Abstract*
> The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) claims that 
> consciousness is identical to maximal integrated information, or maximal Φ. 
> One objection to IIT is based on what may be called the intrinsicality 
> problem: consciousness is an intrinsic property, but maximal Φ is an 
> extrinsic property; therefore, they cannot be identical. 
>
>
> A more cogent objection is that it attributes lots of consciousness to a 
> Vandermonde matrix:
>
> https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799
>
> Brent
>
>
>

Scott Aaronson wrote this about 5 years ago. I haven't looked if he has has 
anything new.

Regarding informationism vs. panpsychism, he only addresses the former.

*I’ve just conjured into my imagination beings whose Φ-values are a 
thousand, nay a trillion times larger than humans’, yet who are also 
philosophical zombies: entities that there’s nothing that it’s like to be.*
  

That of course panpsychists agree with.

He procedes:

*Let S=F_p, where p is some prime sufficiently larger than n, and let V be 
an n×n Vandermonde matrix over F_p—that is, a matrix whose (i,j) entry 
equals i^(j-1) (mod p).  Then let f:S^n→S^n be the update function defined 
by f(x)=Vx. *

Concludes: *the fact that Integrated Information Theory is 
wrong—demonstrably wrong, for reasons that go to its core—puts it in 
something like the top 2% of all mathematical theories of consciousness 
ever proposed.*


Now here is where panpsychists diverge from this way of thinking: 
Everything Scott wrote above involves ultimately computing with numerical 
entities as the "atoms" (so to speak) of what the "computer" is computing 
with. What the panpsychists are saying is that it is not numerical entities 
(numericals: Ns) at all that are at the base of the computing, but 
experiential entities (experientials: Es). *Es are as basic (ontologically) 
as Ns*.

*Defining what Es are* is the fundamental problem for panpsychists (vs. 
numerists, or informationists).


- pt

 

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Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2019-02-01 Thread agrayson2000


On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 1:29:49 PM UTC-7, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 5:55:30 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 31 Jan 2019, at 21:10, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:47:12 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 31 Jan 2019, at 01:28, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 2:38:58 PM UTC-7, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:16:05 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 30 Jan 2019, at 02:59, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, January 29, 2019 at 4:37:34 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 28 Jan 2019, at 22:50, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 7:33:05 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Jan 2019, at 09:29, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 11:54:43 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 9:56:17 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Jan 2019, at 18:50, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 18, 2019 at 12:09:58 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 14:48, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 12:36:07 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:33, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 3:58:48 AM UTC, Brent wrote:



 On 1/16/2019 7:25 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Monday, January 14, 2019 at 6:12:43 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 1/13/2019 9:51 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> This means, to me, that the arbitrary phase angles have 
> absolutely no effect on the resultant interference pattern which 
> is 
> observed. But isn't this what the phase angles are supposed to 
> effect? AG
>
>
> The screen pattern is determined by *relative phase angles 
> for the different paths that reach the same point on the screen*. 
>  
> The relative angles only depend on different path lengths, so the 
> overall 
> phase angle is irrelevant.
>
> Brent
>


 *Sure, except there areTWO forms of phase interference in Wave 
 Mechanics; the one you refer to above, and another discussed in 
 the 
 Stackexchange links I previously posted. In the latter case, the 
 wf is 
 expressed as a superposition, say of two states, where we consider 
 two 
 cases; a multiplicative complex phase shift is included prior to 
 the sum, 
 and different complex phase shifts multiplying each component, all 
 of the 
 form e^i (theta). Easy to show that interference exists in the 
 latter case, 
 but not the former. Now suppose we take the inner product of the 
 wf with 
 the ith eigenstate of the superposition, in order to calculate the 
 probability of measuring the eigenvalue of the ith eigenstate, 
 applying one 
 of the postulates of QM, keeping in mind that each eigenstate is 
 multiplied 
 by a DIFFERENT complex phase shift.  If we further assume the 
 eigenstates 
 are mutually orthogonal, the probability of measuring each 
 eigenvalue does 
 NOT depend on the different phase shifts. What happened to the 
 interference 
 demonstrated by the Stackexchange links? TIA, AG *

 Your measurement projected it out. It's like measuring which 
 slit the photon goes through...it eliminates the interference.

 Brent

>>>
>>> *That's what I suspected; that going to an orthogonal basis, I 
>>> departed from the examples in Stackexchange where an arbitrary 
>>> superposition is used in the analysis of interference. 
>>> Nevertheless, isn't 
>>> it possible to transform from an arbitrary superposition to one 
>>> using an 
>>> orthogonal basis? And aren't all bases equivalent from a linear 
>>> algebra 
>>> pov? If all bases are equivalent, why 

Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2019-02-01 Thread agrayson2000


On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 5:07:55 PM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 2:10:06 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>
> ... the phase angles are responsible for interference. I doubt that 
> result. Am I mistaken? AG
>
>
>
> Whatever approach you take, it's still like each possibility has a little 
> spin wheel marking its phase:
>
>   https://www.online-stopwatch.com/images/wheel-dice.png 
>
> When combined, phases in the same general direction reinforce. Phases that 
> don't, interfere.
>
> - pt
>


*I think you're right. Although the cross terms are zeroed out when using 
orthonormal eigenstates in the superposition, there is interference due to 
the interactions of the waves remaining. AG *

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Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2019-02-01 Thread agrayson2000


On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 5:55:30 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 31 Jan 2019, at 21:10, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:47:12 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 31 Jan 2019, at 01:28, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 2:38:58 PM UTC-7, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:16:05 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 30 Jan 2019, at 02:59, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Tuesday, January 29, 2019 at 4:37:34 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Jan 2019, at 22:50, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 7:33:05 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Jan 2019, at 09:29, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 11:54:43 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 9:56:17 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 18 Jan 2019, at 18:50, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Friday, January 18, 2019 at 12:09:58 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 17 Jan 2019, at 14:48, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 12:36:07 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:33, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 3:58:48 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1/16/2019 7:25 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, January 14, 2019 at 6:12:43 AM UTC, Brent wrote:



 On 1/13/2019 9:51 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

 This means, to me, that the arbitrary phase angles have 
 absolutely no effect on the resultant interference pattern which 
 is 
 observed. But isn't this what the phase angles are supposed to 
 effect? AG


 The screen pattern is determined by *relative phase angles for 
 the different paths that reach the same point on the screen*.  
 The relative angles only depend on different path lengths, so the 
 overall 
 phase angle is irrelevant.

 Brent

>>>
>>>
>>> *Sure, except there areTWO forms of phase interference in Wave 
>>> Mechanics; the one you refer to above, and another discussed in the 
>>> Stackexchange links I previously posted. In the latter case, the wf 
>>> is 
>>> expressed as a superposition, say of two states, where we consider 
>>> two 
>>> cases; a multiplicative complex phase shift is included prior to 
>>> the sum, 
>>> and different complex phase shifts multiplying each component, all 
>>> of the 
>>> form e^i (theta). Easy to show that interference exists in the 
>>> latter case, 
>>> but not the former. Now suppose we take the inner product of the wf 
>>> with 
>>> the ith eigenstate of the superposition, in order to calculate the 
>>> probability of measuring the eigenvalue of the ith eigenstate, 
>>> applying one 
>>> of the postulates of QM, keeping in mind that each eigenstate is 
>>> multiplied 
>>> by a DIFFERENT complex phase shift.  If we further assume the 
>>> eigenstates 
>>> are mutually orthogonal, the probability of measuring each 
>>> eigenvalue does 
>>> NOT depend on the different phase shifts. What happened to the 
>>> interference 
>>> demonstrated by the Stackexchange links? TIA, AG *
>>>
>>> Your measurement projected it out. It's like measuring which 
>>> slit the photon goes through...it eliminates the interference.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> *That's what I suspected; that going to an orthogonal basis, I 
>> departed from the examples in Stackexchange where an arbitrary 
>> superposition is used in the analysis of interference. Nevertheless, 
>> isn't 
>> it possible to transform from an arbitrary superposition to one 
>> using an 
>> orthogonal basis? And aren't all bases equivalent from a linear 
>> algebra 
>> pov? If all bases are equivalent, why would transforming to an 
>> orthogonal 
>> basis lose interference, whereas a general superposition does not? 
>> TIA, AG*
>>
>>
>> I don’t understand this. All the bases we have used all the time 
>> are 

Re: Planck Length

2019-02-01 Thread Brent Meeker



On 2/1/2019 5:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:

In any case, one of the "micropsychists"  has a new paper just out:


"According to the *fusion* view ... when micro- or protoconscious 
entities come together in the right way, they fuse or 'blend' together 
to form a single unified consciousness. ..."


*Is Consciousness Intrinsic? A Problem for the Integrated Information 
Theory*

Hedda Hassel Mørch
Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (1-2):133-162(30) (2019)

https://philpapers.org/rec/MRCICI
https://philpapers.org/archive/MRCICI.pdf

/Abstract/
The Integrated Information Theory of consciousness (IIT) claims that 
consciousness is identical to maximal integrated information, or 
maximal Φ. One objection to IIT is based on what may be called the 
intrinsicality problem: consciousness is an intrinsic property, but 
maximal Φ is an extrinsic property; therefore, they cannot be identical.


A more cogent objection is that it attributes lots of consciousness to a 
Vandermonde matrix:


https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799

Brent


In this paper, I show that this problem is not unique to IIT, but 
rather derives from a trilemma that confronts almost any theory of 
consciousness. Given most theories of consciousness, the following 
three claims are inconsistent. INTRINSICALITY: Consciousness is 
intrinsic. NON-OVERLAP: Conscious systems do not overlap with other 
conscious systems (a la Unger’s problem of the many). REDUCTIONISM: 
Consciousness is constituted by more fundamental properties (as per 
standard versions of physicalism and Russellian monism). In view of 
this, I will consider whether rejecting INTRINSICALITY is necessarily 
less plausible than rejecting NON-OVERLAP or REDUCTIONISM. I will also 
consider whether IIT is necessarily committed to rejecting 
INTRINSICALITY or whether it could also accept solutions that reject 
NON-OVERLAP or REDUCTIONISM instead. I will suggest that the best 
option for IIT may be a solution that rejects REDUCTIONISM rather than 
INTRINSICALITY or NON-OVERLAP.



- pt


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Re: Planck Length

2019-02-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 9:41:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 1 Feb 2019, at 14:52, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 7:19:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 31 Jan 2019, at 15:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:28:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


> As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I 
> cannot use any ontological commitment other than the term of some 
> arbitrary 
> but fixed universal system. 
>
> You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without 
> evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not 
> work with Mechanism.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
 There is no mind|body problem.
 Only a language|body problem.



 With mechanism, we can identify body, words, numbers, and it is a pure 
 third person notion, but mind has a first person part (indeed called the 
 soul or the personal consciousness) which is pure 1p. The mind body 
 problem 
 consists in linking, without magic or ontological commitment those two 
 things. The solution suggested by Theaetetus in Plato, has been refuted by 
 Socrates (in Plato) but incompleteness refutes Socrates argument, and 
 rehabilitates Theatetus’idea (the soul or the first person knower is the 
 true-believer).
 You can compare this with the semantic problem for language/body. To 
 associate a semantic to a program or machine is related to the problem of 
 associating a mind or a meaning to a body or to a code. The problem is 
 virtually the same: once a theory/body is “rich enough”, its semantics 
 escapes it and get multiple. Rich theories have many non isomorphic 
 models/semantics, a bit like any computational state is supported by 
 infinitely many computational situation, and some indeterminacy has to be 
 taken into account.

 Bruno

>>>
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/

 - pt


>>>
>>> Epicurus was born about the time Plato died. His "atomism" had atoms for 
>>> consciousness (mind) that were mixed with the bodily atoms. Modern science 
>>> rejected that concept, until the recent revival of (material) panpsychism 
>>> has a updated version of it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Unfortunately this does not explain neither what the atoms and where 
>>> they comes from, nor what is consciousness and where it comes from. 
>>> Mechanism explains this entirely, up to the testability of all its 
>>> consequences, which, like every where in fundamental science, needs a 
>>> perpetual doubt and constant verification and re-verification. 
>>>
>>> If the theory S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* violate nature, then we will have some 
>>> evidence for no-mechanism, and thus for primitive matter. But assuming 
>>> primitive matter a priori seems like wanting to not understand the problem, 
>>> or hiding it under ontological commitment, like materialists do since 1500 
>>> years, if not right since Aristotle.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> On "where do atoms come from" I guess *any physicist*  you meet today 
>> has as good (or bad) an answer as any, in their way of thinking, anyway.
>>
>>
>> They usually assume a primary physical reality. They make the physical 
>> universe into a (non personal god). But that explains nothing, even if very 
>> interesting in physics. Physicists are just NOT meta physicists, except 
>> very bad one the week-end or after retirement.
>>
>> An explanation of X must not assume X, or, if it does, the recursion 
>> employed must be entirely justified too.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On consciousness: 
>>
>> In a micropsychist* approach, the lowest-level psychical properties could 
>> appear in the form of their own material subatomic entities, like quarks —  
>> quirks? :) —  in current physical theories. Thus human-level consciousness 
>> is "constituted" from lower-level material entities possessing lower-level 
>> psychical features.
>>
>>
>> I don’t see an atom of explanation of consciousness here. That seems just 
>> like a more sophisticated way to hide the problem under the rug of 
>> microphysics, without addressing any of the question raised by the 
>> philosopher of mind or the cognitive scientist. If you dig in that 
>> direction, both matter and consciousness becomes only more obscure. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *According to constitutive micropsychism, the smallest parts of my brain 
>> have very basic forms of consciousness, and the consciousness of my brain 
>> as a whole is in some sense made up from the consciousness of its parts. 
>> This is the form of panpsychism that suffers most acutely from the 
>> combination problem, which we will explore below. 

Re: Planck Length

2019-02-01 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 1 Feb 2019, at 14:52, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 7:19:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 31 Jan 2019, at 15:40, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:28:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I cannot 
 use any ontological commitment other than the term of some arbitrary but 
 fixed universal system. 
 
 You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without 
 evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not 
 work with Mechanism.
 
 Bruno
 
 
 
 
 There is no mind|body problem.
 Only a language|body problem.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> With mechanism, we can identify body, words, numbers, and it is a pure 
>>> third person notion, but mind has a first person part (indeed called the 
>>> soul or the personal consciousness) which is pure 1p. The mind body problem 
>>> consists in linking, without magic or ontological commitment those two 
>>> things. The solution suggested by Theaetetus in Plato, has been refuted by 
>>> Socrates (in Plato) but incompleteness refutes Socrates argument, and 
>>> rehabilitates Theatetus’idea (the soul or the first person knower is the 
>>> true-believer).
>>> You can compare this with the semantic problem for language/body. To 
>>> associate a semantic to a program or machine is related to the problem of 
>>> associating a mind or a meaning to a body or to a code. The problem is 
>>> virtually the same: once a theory/body is “rich enough”, its semantics 
>>> escapes it and get multiple. Rich theories have many non isomorphic 
>>> models/semantics, a bit like any computational state is supported by 
>>> infinitely many computational situation, and some indeterminacy has to be 
>>> taken into account.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
 https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/ 
 
 
 - pt
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Epicurus was born about the time Plato died. His "atomism" had atoms for 
>>> consciousness (mind) that were mixed with the bodily atoms. Modern science 
>>> rejected that concept, until the recent revival of (material) panpsychism 
>>> has a updated version of it.
>> 
>> 
>> Unfortunately this does not explain neither what the atoms and where they 
>> comes from, nor what is consciousness and where it comes from. Mechanism 
>> explains this entirely, up to the testability of all its consequences, 
>> which, like every where in fundamental science, needs a perpetual doubt and 
>> constant verification and re-verification. 
>> 
>> If the theory S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* violate nature, then we will have some 
>> evidence for no-mechanism, and thus for primitive matter. But assuming 
>> primitive matter a priori seems like wanting to not understand the problem, 
>> or hiding it under ontological commitment, like materialists do since 1500 
>> years, if not right since Aristotle.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On "where do atoms come from" I guess any physicist  you meet today has as 
>> good (or bad) an answer as any, in their way of thinking, anyway.
> 
> They usually assume a primary physical reality. They make the physical 
> universe into a (non personal god). But that explains nothing, even if very 
> interesting in physics. Physicists are just NOT meta physicists, except very 
> bad one the week-end or after retirement.
> 
> An explanation of X must not assume X, or, if it does, the recursion employed 
> must be entirely justified too.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> On consciousness: 
>> 
>> In a micropsychist* approach, the lowest-level psychical properties could 
>> appear in the form of their own material subatomic entities, like quarks —  
>> quirks? :) —  in current physical theories. Thus human-level consciousness 
>> is "constituted" from lower-level material entities possessing lower-level 
>> psychical features.
> 
> I don’t see an atom of explanation of consciousness here. That seems just 
> like a more sophisticated way to hide the problem under the rug of 
> microphysics, without addressing any of the question raised by the 
> philosopher of mind or the cognitive scientist. If you dig in that direction, 
> both matter and consciousness becomes only more obscure. 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> According to constitutive micropsychism, the smallest parts of my brain have 
>> very basic forms of consciousness, and the consciousness of my brain as a 
>> whole is in some sense made up from the consciousness of its parts. This is 
>> the form of panpsychism that suffers most acutely from the combination 
>> problem, which we will explore below. However, if it can be made sense of, 
>> constitutive micropsychism promises an 

Re: Planck Length

2019-02-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 7:19:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 31 Jan 2019, at 15:40, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:28:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
 As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I 
 cannot use any ontological commitment other than the term of some 
 arbitrary 
 but fixed universal system. 

 You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without 
 evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not 
 work with Mechanism.

 Bruno




>>> There is no mind|body problem.
>>> Only a language|body problem.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> With mechanism, we can identify body, words, numbers, and it is a pure 
>>> third person notion, but mind has a first person part (indeed called the 
>>> soul or the personal consciousness) which is pure 1p. The mind body problem 
>>> consists in linking, without magic or ontological commitment those two 
>>> things. The solution suggested by Theaetetus in Plato, has been refuted by 
>>> Socrates (in Plato) but incompleteness refutes Socrates argument, and 
>>> rehabilitates Theatetus’idea (the soul or the first person knower is the 
>>> true-believer).
>>> You can compare this with the semantic problem for language/body. To 
>>> associate a semantic to a program or machine is related to the problem of 
>>> associating a mind or a meaning to a body or to a code. The problem is 
>>> virtually the same: once a theory/body is “rich enough”, its semantics 
>>> escapes it and get multiple. Rich theories have many non isomorphic 
>>> models/semantics, a bit like any computational state is supported by 
>>> infinitely many computational situation, and some indeterminacy has to be 
>>> taken into account.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>>
>>
>> Epicurus was born about the time Plato died. His "atomism" had atoms for 
>> consciousness (mind) that were mixed with the bodily atoms. Modern science 
>> rejected that concept, until the recent revival of (material) panpsychism 
>> has a updated version of it.
>>
>>
>>
>> Unfortunately this does not explain neither what the atoms and where they 
>> comes from, nor what is consciousness and where it comes from. Mechanism 
>> explains this entirely, up to the testability of all its consequences, 
>> which, like every where in fundamental science, needs a perpetual doubt and 
>> constant verification and re-verification. 
>>
>> If the theory S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* violate nature, then we will have some 
>> evidence for no-mechanism, and thus for primitive matter. But assuming 
>> primitive matter a priori seems like wanting to not understand the problem, 
>> or hiding it under ontological commitment, like materialists do since 1500 
>> years, if not right since Aristotle.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> On "where do atoms come from" I guess *any physicist*  you meet today has 
> as good (or bad) an answer as any, in their way of thinking, anyway.
>
>
> They usually assume a primary physical reality. They make the physical 
> universe into a (non personal god). But that explains nothing, even if very 
> interesting in physics. Physicists are just NOT meta physicists, except 
> very bad one the week-end or after retirement.
>
> An explanation of X must not assume X, or, if it does, the recursion 
> employed must be entirely justified too.
>
>
>
>
>
> On consciousness: 
>
> In a micropsychist* approach, the lowest-level psychical properties could 
> appear in the form of their own material subatomic entities, like quarks —  
> quirks? :) —  in current physical theories. Thus human-level consciousness 
> is "constituted" from lower-level material entities possessing lower-level 
> psychical features.
>
>
> I don’t see an atom of explanation of consciousness here. That seems just 
> like a more sophisticated way to hide the problem under the rug of 
> microphysics, without addressing any of the question raised by the 
> philosopher of mind or the cognitive scientist. If you dig in that 
> direction, both matter and consciousness becomes only more obscure. 
>
>
>
>
>
> *According to constitutive micropsychism, the smallest parts of my brain 
> have very basic forms of consciousness, and the consciousness of my brain 
> as a whole is in some sense made up from the consciousness of its parts. 
> This is the form of panpsychism that suffers most acutely from the 
> combination problem, which we will explore below. However, if it can be 
> made sense of, constitutive micropsychism promises an elegant and 
> parsimonious view of nature, with all the richness of nature accounted for 
> in terms of facts at the micro-level.*
>
>
> I am skeptical this can work, and of course, it is 

Re: Planck Length

2019-02-01 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 31 Jan 2019, at 15:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:28:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I cannot 
>>> use any ontological commitment other than the term of some arbitrary but 
>>> fixed universal system. 
>>> 
>>> You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without 
>>> evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not 
>>> work with Mechanism.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> There is no mind|body problem.
>>> Only a language|body problem.
>> 
>> 
>> With mechanism, we can identify body, words, numbers, and it is a pure third 
>> person notion, but mind has a first person part (indeed called the soul or 
>> the personal consciousness) which is pure 1p. The mind body problem consists 
>> in linking, without magic or ontological commitment those two things. The 
>> solution suggested by Theaetetus in Plato, has been refuted by Socrates (in 
>> Plato) but incompleteness refutes Socrates argument, and rehabilitates 
>> Theatetus’idea (the soul or the first person knower is the true-believer).
>> You can compare this with the semantic problem for language/body. To 
>> associate a semantic to a program or machine is related to the problem of 
>> associating a mind or a meaning to a body or to a code. The problem is 
>> virtually the same: once a theory/body is “rich enough”, its semantics 
>> escapes it and get multiple. Rich theories have many non isomorphic 
>> models/semantics, a bit like any computational state is supported by 
>> infinitely many computational situation, and some indeterminacy has to be 
>> taken into account.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/ 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> - pt
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Epicurus was born about the time Plato died. His "atomism" had atoms for 
>> consciousness (mind) that were mixed with the bodily atoms. Modern science 
>> rejected that concept, until the recent revival of (material) panpsychism 
>> has a updated version of it.
> 
> 
> Unfortunately this does not explain neither what the atoms and where they 
> comes from, nor what is consciousness and where it comes from. Mechanism 
> explains this entirely, up to the testability of all its consequences, which, 
> like every where in fundamental science, needs a perpetual doubt and constant 
> verification and re-verification. 
> 
> If the theory S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* violate nature, then we will have some 
> evidence for no-mechanism, and thus for primitive matter. But assuming 
> primitive matter a priori seems like wanting to not understand the problem, 
> or hiding it under ontological commitment, like materialists do since 1500 
> years, if not right since Aristotle.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On "where do atoms come from" I guess any physicist  you meet today has as 
> good (or bad) an answer as any, in their way of thinking, anyway.

They usually assume a primary physical reality. They make the physical universe 
into a (non personal god). But that explains nothing, even if very interesting 
in physics. Physicists are just NOT meta physicists, except very bad one the 
week-end or after retirement.

An explanation of X must not assume X, or, if it does, the recursion employed 
must be entirely justified too.




> 
> On consciousness: 
> 
> In a micropsychist* approach, the lowest-level psychical properties could 
> appear in the form of their own material subatomic entities, like quarks —  
> quirks? :) —  in current physical theories. Thus human-level consciousness is 
> "constituted" from lower-level material entities possessing lower-level 
> psychical features.

I don’t see an atom of explanation of consciousness here. That seems just like 
a more sophisticated way to hide the problem under the rug of microphysics, 
without addressing any of the question raised by the philosopher of mind or the 
cognitive scientist. If you dig in that direction, both matter and 
consciousness becomes only more obscure. 



> 
> 
> According to constitutive micropsychism, the smallest parts of my brain have 
> very basic forms of consciousness, and the consciousness of my brain as a 
> whole is in some sense made up from the consciousness of its parts. This is 
> the form of panpsychism that suffers most acutely from the combination 
> problem, which we will explore below. However, if it can be made sense of, 
> constitutive micropsychism promises an elegant and parsimonious view of 
> nature, with all the richness of nature accounted for in terms of facts at 
> the micro-level.

I am skeptical this can work, and of course, it is incompatible with Digital 
mechanism. This one explains consciousness in the most standard 

Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2019-02-01 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 31 Jan 2019, at 21:10, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:47:12 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 31 Jan 2019, at 01:28, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 2:38:58 PM UTC-7, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:16:05 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 30 Jan 2019, at 02:59, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tuesday, January 29, 2019 at 4:37:34 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 28 Jan 2019, at 22:50, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 
 
 On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 7:33:05 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 24 Jan 2019, at 09:29, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 11:54:43 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 9:56:17 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 18 Jan 2019, at 18:50, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, January 18, 2019 at 12:09:58 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 14:48, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 12:36:07 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:33, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 
 
 On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 3:58:48 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
 
 
 On 1/16/2019 7:25 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Monday, January 14, 2019 at 6:12:43 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 1/13/2019 9:51 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>> This means, to me, that the arbitrary phase angles have absolutely 
>> no effect on the resultant interference pattern which is observed. 
>> But isn't this what the phase angles are supposed to effect? AG
> 
> The screen pattern is determined by relative phase angles for the 
> different paths that reach the same point on the screen.  The 
> relative angles only depend on different path lengths, so the overall 
> phase angle is irrelevant.
> 
> Brent
> 
> Sure, except there areTWO forms of phase interference in Wave 
> Mechanics; the one you refer to above, and another discussed in the 
> Stackexchange links I previously posted. In the latter case, the wf 
> is expressed as a superposition, say of two states, where we consider 
> two cases; a multiplicative complex phase shift is included prior to 
> the sum, and different complex phase shifts multiplying each 
> component, all of the form e^i (theta). Easy to show that 
> interference exists in the latter case, but not the former. Now 
> suppose we take the inner product of the wf with the ith eigenstate 
> of the superposition, in order to calculate the probability of 
> measuring the eigenvalue of the ith eigenstate, applying one of the 
> postulates of QM, keeping in mind that each eigenstate is multiplied 
> by a DIFFERENT complex phase shift.  If we further assume the 
> eigenstates are mutually orthogonal, the probability of measuring 
> each eigenvalue does NOT depend on the different phase shifts. What 
> happened to the interference demonstrated by the Stackexchange links? 
> TIA, AG 
> 
 Your measurement projected it out. It's like measuring which slit the 
 photon goes through...it eliminates the interference.
 
 Brent
 
 That's what I suspected; that going to an orthogonal basis, I departed 
 from the examples in Stackexchange where an arbitrary superposition is 
 used in the analysis of interference. Nevertheless, isn't it possible 
 to transform from an arbitrary superposition to one using an 
 orthogonal basis? And aren't all bases equivalent from a linear 
 algebra pov? If all bases are equivalent, why would transforming to an 
 orthogonal basis lose interference, whereas a general superposition 
 does not? TIA, AG
>>> 
>>> I don’t understand this. All the bases we have used all the time are 
>>> supposed to be orthonormal bases. We suppose that the scalar product 
>>> (e_i e_j) = delta_i_j, when presenting the Born rule, and the quantum 
>>> formalism.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> Generally, bases in a vector space are NOT orthonormal. 
>> 
>> Right. But we can always build an orthonormal base with a decent scalar 
>> product, like in Hilbert space, 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> For example, in the vector space of vectors in the plane, any pair of 
>>> non-parallel vectors form a basis. Same for any general