Re: Planck Length

2019-02-04 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, February 4, 2019 at 10:06:45 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 1 Feb 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 9:41:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 1 Feb 2019, at 14:52, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 7:19:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 31 Jan 2019, at 15:40, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:28:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift  wrote:



 On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>> As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I 
>> cannot use any ontological commitment other than the term of some 
>> arbitrary 
>> but fixed universal system. 
>>
>> You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without 
>> evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not 
>> work with Mechanism.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> There is no mind|body problem.
> Only a language|body problem.
>
>
>
> With mechanism, we can identify body, words, numbers, and it is a pure 
> third person notion, but mind has a first person part (indeed called the 
> soul or the personal consciousness) which is pure 1p. The mind body 
> problem 
> consists in linking, without magic or ontological commitment those two 
> things. The solution suggested by Theaetetus in Plato, has been refuted 
> by 
> Socrates (in Plato) but incompleteness refutes Socrates argument, and 
> rehabilitates Theatetus’idea (the soul or the first person knower is the 
> true-believer).
> You can compare this with the semantic problem for language/body. To 
> associate a semantic to a program or machine is related to the problem of 
> associating a mind or a meaning to a body or to a code. The problem is 
> virtually the same: once a theory/body is “rich enough”, its semantics 
> escapes it and get multiple. Rich theories have many non isomorphic 
> models/semantics, a bit like any computational state is supported by 
> infinitely many computational situation, and some indeterminacy has to be 
> taken into account.
>
> Bruno
>

 https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/
>
> - pt
>
>

 Epicurus was born about the time Plato died. His "atomism" had atoms 
 for consciousness (mind) that were mixed with the bodily atoms. Modern 
 science rejected that concept, until the recent revival of (material) 
 panpsychism has a updated version of it.



 Unfortunately this does not explain neither what the atoms and where 
 they comes from, nor what is consciousness and where it comes from. 
 Mechanism explains this entirely, up to the testability of all its 
 consequences, which, like every where in fundamental science, needs a 
 perpetual doubt and constant verification and re-verification. 

 If the theory S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* violate nature, then we will have some 
 evidence for no-mechanism, and thus for primitive matter. But assuming 
 primitive matter a priori seems like wanting to not understand the 
 problem, 
 or hiding it under ontological commitment, like materialists do since 1500 
 years, if not right since Aristotle.

 Bruno




>>> On "where do atoms come from" I guess *any physicist*  you meet today 
>>> has as good (or bad) an answer as any, in their way of thinking, anyway.
>>>
>>>
>>> They usually assume a primary physical reality. They make the physical 
>>> universe into a (non personal god). But that explains nothing, even if very 
>>> interesting in physics. Physicists are just NOT meta physicists, except 
>>> very bad one the week-end or after retirement.
>>>
>>> An explanation of X must not assume X, or, if it does, the recursion 
>>> employed must be entirely justified too.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On consciousness: 
>>>
>>> In a micropsychist* approach, the lowest-level psychical properties 
>>> could appear in the form of their own material subatomic entities, like 
>>> quarks —  quirks? :) —  in current physical theories. Thus human-level 
>>> consciousness is "constituted" from lower-level material entities 
>>> possessing lower-level psychical features.
>>>
>>>
>>> I don’t see an atom of explanation of consciousness here. That seems 
>>> just like a more sophisticated way to hide the problem under the rug of 
>>> microphysics, without addressing any of the question raised by the 
>>> philosopher of mind or the cognitive scientist. If you dig in that 
>>> direction, both matter and consciousness becomes only more obscure. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> *According to constitutive micropsychism, the smallest parts of my brain 
>>> have 

Re: Planck Length

2019-02-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 1 Feb 2019, at 19:16, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 9:41:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 1 Feb 2019, at 14:52, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 7:19:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 31 Jan 2019, at 15:40, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:28:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 30 Jan 2019, at 23:14, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 
 On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:45:34 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> As I try to solve the mind-body problem in the Mechanist frame, I cannot 
> use any ontological commitment other than the term of some arbitrary but 
> fixed universal system. 
> 
> You assume some God, but that makes everything more complex, without 
> evidences why to do so, except naive physical realism, but that does not 
> work with Mechanism.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> There is no mind|body problem.
> Only a language|body problem.
 
 
 With mechanism, we can identify body, words, numbers, and it is a pure 
 third person notion, but mind has a first person part (indeed called the 
 soul or the personal consciousness) which is pure 1p. The mind body 
 problem consists in linking, without magic or ontological commitment those 
 two things. The solution suggested by Theaetetus in Plato, has been 
 refuted by Socrates (in Plato) but incompleteness refutes Socrates 
 argument, and rehabilitates Theatetus’idea (the soul or the first person 
 knower is the true-believer).
 You can compare this with the semantic problem for language/body. To 
 associate a semantic to a program or machine is related to the problem of 
 associating a mind or a meaning to a body or to a code. The problem is 
 virtually the same: once a theory/body is “rich enough”, its semantics 
 escapes it and get multiple. Rich theories have many non isomorphic 
 models/semantics, a bit like any computational state is supported by 
 infinitely many computational situation, and some indeterminacy has to be 
 taken into account.
 
 Bruno
 
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/01/22/matter-gets-psyched/ 
> 
> 
> - pt
 
 
 
 Epicurus was born about the time Plato died. His "atomism" had atoms for 
 consciousness (mind) that were mixed with the bodily atoms. Modern science 
 rejected that concept, until the recent revival of (material) panpsychism 
 has a updated version of it.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Unfortunately this does not explain neither what the atoms and where they 
>>> comes from, nor what is consciousness and where it comes from. Mechanism 
>>> explains this entirely, up to the testability of all its consequences, 
>>> which, like every where in fundamental science, needs a perpetual doubt and 
>>> constant verification and re-verification. 
>>> 
>>> If the theory S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* violate nature, then we will have some 
>>> evidence for no-mechanism, and thus for primitive matter. But assuming 
>>> primitive matter a priori seems like wanting to not understand the problem, 
>>> or hiding it under ontological commitment, like materialists do since 1500 
>>> years, if not right since Aristotle.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On "where do atoms come from" I guess any physicist  you meet today has as 
>>> good (or bad) an answer as any, in their way of thinking, anyway.
>> 
>> They usually assume a primary physical reality. They make the physical 
>> universe into a (non personal god). But that explains nothing, even if very 
>> interesting in physics. Physicists are just NOT meta physicists, except very 
>> bad one the week-end or after retirement.
>> 
>> An explanation of X must not assume X, or, if it does, the recursion 
>> employed must be entirely justified too.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> On consciousness: 
>>> 
>>> In a micropsychist* approach, the lowest-level psychical properties could 
>>> appear in the form of their own material subatomic entities, like quarks —  
>>> quirks? :) —  in current physical theories. Thus human-level consciousness 
>>> is "constituted" from lower-level material entities possessing lower-level 
>>> psychical features.
>> 
>> I don’t see an atom of explanation of consciousness here. That seems just 
>> like a more sophisticated way to hide the problem under the rug of 
>> microphysics, without addressing any of the question raised by the 
>> philosopher of mind or the cognitive scientist. If you dig in that 
>> direction, both matter and consciousness becomes only more obscure. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> According to constitutive micropsychism, the smallest parts of my brain 
>>> have very basic forms of consciousness, and the consciousness of my brain 
>>> as a whole is in some 

Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2019-02-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 3 Feb 2019, at 00:03, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 2, 2019 at 2:59:30 PM UTC-7, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, February 2, 2019 at 1:40:29 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 1 Feb 2019, at 21:29, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, February 1, 2019 at 5:55:30 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 31 Jan 2019, at 21:10, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, January 31, 2019 at 6:47:12 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 31 Jan 2019, at 01:28, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 
 
 On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 2:38:58 PM UTC-7, agrays...@gmail.com 
  wrote:
 
 
 On Wednesday, January 30, 2019 at 5:16:05 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 30 Jan 2019, at 02:59, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, January 29, 2019 at 4:37:34 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 28 Jan 2019, at 22:50, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, January 25, 2019 at 7:33:05 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 24 Jan 2019, at 09:29, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 11:54:43 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, January 20, 2019 at 9:56:17 AM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 18 Jan 2019, at 18:50, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 
 
 On Friday, January 18, 2019 at 12:09:58 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 17 Jan 2019, at 14:48, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 12:36:07 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 17 Jan 2019, at 09:33, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, January 17, 2019 at 3:58:48 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 1/16/2019 7:25 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Monday, January 14, 2019 at 6:12:43 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 1/13/2019 9:51 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 This means, to me, that the arbitrary phase angles have absolutely 
 no effect on the resultant interference pattern which is observed. 
 But isn't this what the phase angles are supposed to effect? AG
>>> 
>>> The screen pattern is determined by relative phase angles for the 
>>> different paths that reach the same point on the screen.  The 
>>> relative angles only depend on different path lengths, so the 
>>> overall phase angle is irrelevant.
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> Sure, except there areTWO forms of phase interference in Wave 
>>> Mechanics; the one you refer to above, and another discussed in the 
>>> Stackexchange links I previously posted. In the latter case, the wf 
>>> is expressed as a superposition, say of two states, where we 
>>> consider two cases; a multiplicative complex phase shift is 
>>> included prior to the sum, and different complex phase shifts 
>>> multiplying each component, all of the form e^i (theta). Easy to 
>>> show that interference exists in the latter case, but not the 
>>> former. Now suppose we take the inner product of the wf with the 
>>> ith eigenstate of the superposition, in order to calculate the 
>>> probability of measuring the eigenvalue of the ith eigenstate, 
>>> applying one of the postulates of QM, keeping in mind that each 
>>> eigenstate is multiplied by a DIFFERENT complex phase shift.  If we 
>>> further assume the eigenstates are mutually orthogonal, the 
>>> probability of measuring each eigenvalue does NOT depend on the 
>>> different phase shifts. What happened to the interference 
>>> demonstrated by the Stackexchange links? TIA, AG 
>>> 
>> Your measurement projected it out. It's like measuring which slit 
>> the photon goes through...it eliminates the interference.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> That's what I suspected; that going to an orthogonal basis, I 
>> departed from the examples in Stackexchange where an arbitrary 
>> superposition is used in the analysis of interference. Nevertheless, 
>> isn't it possible to transform from an arbitrary superposition to 
>> one using an orthogonal basis? And aren't all bases equivalent from 
>> a linear algebra pov? If all bases are equivalent, why would 
>> transforming to an orthogonal basis lose interference, whereas a 
>> general superposition does not? TIA, AG
> 
> I don’t understand this. All the bases we