Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-08 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List



On 3/8/2019 2:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Why is the probability not 1.0.  Why is there any effect at all in any 
continuation?  Why is experience dependent on physics, if it is just a matter 
of timeless arithmetical relations.

Because to get physics you need to be able to make prediction.


But why do you need to "get physics".  You seem to be arguing backwards 
from the conclusion you want.  You know you need to get physics to make 
a prediction, otherwise your theory is useless.  So then you argue that 
therefore substituting for brain parts is necessary because that makes 
"getting physics" necessary.


Brent

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Re: What is the largest integer you can write in 5 seconds?

2019-03-08 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 5:05 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

 > *BB(8000) is stil an infinitesimal (so to speak) compared to
> f_epsilon_0(BB(8000)).*


I don't know what "f_epsilon_0" is but if its computable then BB[BB(8000)]
would be a larger number than that because BB grows faster than any
computable function.

John K Clark

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Re: What is the largest integer you can write in 5 seconds?

2019-03-08 Thread John Clark
On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 5:05 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> Assuming you're just using 2 symbols (like 0 and 1) there are
>> (16001)^8000  different 8000 state Turing Machines. And that is a very
>> large number but a finite one. And one of those machines makes the largest
>> number of FINITE operations before halting. And that number of operations
>> is BB(8000).  Even theoretically, much less practically,  you can never
>> compute that number but I have given a unique description of it, no other
>> 8000 state Turing Machine has that propertie.
>
>

*> Yes, sure BB(8000) is a precise well defined finite number. But it is no
> what logician and philosopher call a “name”, where the number should be
> computable in principle. My point is just a vocabulary point,*
>

I agree it's just a question of vocabulary but to avoid confusion if
logician and philosophers want to use commonly used words then their
technical meaning should have some relationship to their common meaning.
Parents can give a precise definition to their child (he's the only kid in
the crib) so they can "name" him even though they can't calculate him.


> > *and a way to remind a nice problem which I have used to illustrate
> some less known application of Cantor’s diagonal.*
>

It always seemed to me that if Cantor had taken just one more small step he
could have proven the existence of non computable numbers more than 40
years before Turing did.

 John K Clark

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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-08 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, March 8, 2019 at 4:42:28 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Mar 2019, at 23:00, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, March 7, 2019 at 11:47:41 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 Mar 2019, at 22:10, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 12:20:13 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> We cannot predict in advance if a machine will stop. The extensional 
>>> equality of machines, or combinators, is unsolvable. 
>>>
>>>
>>
>> There is some conceptual and practical division between mathematics and 
>> applied mathematics
>>
>>
>> Yes. But note that the division we can made there are dependent of the 
>> metaphysics.
>>
>> Then Gödel has shown that we can apply mathematics to metamathematics, 
>> and that a large part of metamathematics is in mathematics, so mathematics 
>> have application in mathematics. But that is obvious through the 
>> representation theorems, and my factors. We can say that the theory of 
>> complex analysis has found extraordinary application in the pure number 
>> theory, like Riemann discovered. 
>>
>> Category theory is born from the discovery of abstract pattern relying 
>> many application of some branch of math to another branch of math. It helps 
>> mathematician to not reinvent the wheel all the time.
>>
>>
>>
>> (and there are institutionally separate Mathematics (PM, P for "Pure") 
>> and Applied Mathematics (AM) Departments or Divisions at *some* 
>> universities.
>>
>>
>> Yes. That has been the root of my problem with some local academician. I 
>> naively stated that I decide to study mathematics because I saw application 
>> of mathematical logic (the second recursion theorem) to biology (like I 
>> have shown in my paper “Amoeba, Planaria and Dreaming machine”. But I was 
>> told that mathematical logic was taught in the section of Pure Mathematics, 
>> where it was very badly seen to apply mathematics to anything but 
>> mathematics. This illustrates it makes no sense to decide that some part of 
>> math are pure or not.
>>
>> And this is even more true with mechanism.  There is no more an 
>> ontological physical reality, or any gods of that sort (which have never 
>> been tested, actually, except with my work, of course, where the test was 
>> negative for “Matter”). So the fundamental reality becomes mathematical. 
>> And we are pure mathematical object living in a mathematical reality. That 
>> is not entirely correct, because the internal phenomenology, for technical 
>> reason, escapes even the whole of mathematics. So, eventually, the reality 
>> is theological, to be correct. But the theology of the machines is a 
>> theory, which today, is classified in pure mathematics (the logic of 
>> provability). 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> There is a PM and an AM way of approaching what "computing" is.
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes, even in arithmetic. The universal machine discover that there is a 
>> big difference between being implemented by a nameable “in principle” 
>> universal number, and being implemented by something emerging from an 
>> infinity of computations from the first person points of view. The first 
>> leads to the theory G* (the “scientific theology of the ideally sound 
>> machine”), and the others leads to quantum logic and physics, and the right 
>> one, if mechanism is correct.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> In an AM way of thinking, no computer can run forever, assuming what 
>> scientists theorize about the future of the universe (big freeze, crunch, 
>> etc.).
>>
>>
>> And assuming some physical reality. If you do serious metaphysics, it is 
>> better to invoke an ontological commitment only in last ressort. Invoking 
>> an ontological or primary physical universe is like saying “and god made 
>> it”. That does not work. It is wishful thinking, provably if Mechanism is 
>> assumed.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> AM would see computing as being nothing more than what can be done on 
>> material computers, natural or manmade. 
>>
>>
>> Computation have been discovered in arithmetic, before physics.
>>
>> Of course, the fact that we have cells and brains suggest, once we 
>> understand that a computation is an arithmetical notion,  that the physical 
>> reality too is Turing complete. But with mechanism, to solve the mind-body 
>> problem, you have to derive the physical reality (and its Turing 
>> completeness) from arithmetic. It is nota question of choice.
>>
>> Of course you can say that in your religion, machine cannot have souls, 
>> that you are not a machine, and so you can believe in the fantasy you want. 
>> That is what we do since we have put theology out of science (just to make 
>> it possible for some tyran to exploit people).
>>
>> Or you can try to build a precise non computationalist theory of mind, 
>> and how to test it, in which case the computationalist theory will gives 
>> many hint. Indeed, if some logics the universal machine gives for matter is 
>> contradicted by nature, we do have a 

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-08 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 7 Mar 2019, at 23:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, March 7, 2019 at 11:47:41 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 Mar 2019, at 22:10, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 12:20:13 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> We cannot predict in advance if a machine will stop. The extensional 
>> equality of machines, or combinators, is unsolvable. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> There is some conceptual and practical division between mathematics and 
>> applied mathematics
> 
> Yes. But note that the division we can made there are dependent of the 
> metaphysics.
> 
> Then Gödel has shown that we can apply mathematics to metamathematics, and 
> that a large part of metamathematics is in mathematics, so mathematics have 
> application in mathematics. But that is obvious through the representation 
> theorems, and my factors. We can say that the theory of complex analysis has 
> found extraordinary application in the pure number theory, like Riemann 
> discovered. 
> 
> Category theory is born from the discovery of abstract pattern relying many 
> application of some branch of math to another branch of math. It helps 
> mathematician to not reinvent the wheel all the time.
> 
> 
> 
>> (and there are institutionally separate Mathematics (PM, P for "Pure") and 
>> Applied Mathematics (AM) Departments or Divisions at some universities.
> 
> Yes. That has been the root of my problem with some local academician. I 
> naively stated that I decide to study mathematics because I saw application 
> of mathematical logic (the second recursion theorem) to biology (like I have 
> shown in my paper “Amoeba, Planaria and Dreaming machine”. But I was told 
> that mathematical logic was taught in the section of Pure Mathematics, where 
> it was very badly seen to apply mathematics to anything but mathematics. This 
> illustrates it makes no sense to decide that some part of math are pure or 
> not.
> 
> And this is even more true with mechanism.  There is no more an ontological 
> physical reality, or any gods of that sort (which have never been tested, 
> actually, except with my work, of course, where the test was negative for 
> “Matter”). So the fundamental reality becomes mathematical. And we are pure 
> mathematical object living in a mathematical reality. That is not entirely 
> correct, because the internal phenomenology, for technical reason, escapes 
> even the whole of mathematics. So, eventually, the reality is theological, to 
> be correct. But the theology of the machines is a theory, which today, is 
> classified in pure mathematics (the logic of provability). 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> There is a PM and an AM way of approaching what "computing" is.
> 
> 
> Yes, even in arithmetic. The universal machine discover that there is a big 
> difference between being implemented by a nameable “in principle” universal 
> number, and being implemented by something emerging from an infinity of 
> computations from the first person points of view. The first leads to the 
> theory G* (the “scientific theology of the ideally sound machine”), and the 
> others leads to quantum logic and physics, and the right one, if mechanism is 
> correct.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> In an AM way of thinking, no computer can run forever, assuming what 
>> scientists theorize about the future of the universe (big freeze, crunch, 
>> etc.).
> 
> And assuming some physical reality. If you do serious metaphysics, it is 
> better to invoke an ontological commitment only in last ressort. Invoking an 
> ontological or primary physical universe is like saying “and god made it”. 
> That does not work. It is wishful thinking, provably if Mechanism is assumed.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> AM would see computing as being nothing more than what can be done on 
>> material computers, natural or manmade. 
> 
> Computation have been discovered in arithmetic, before physics.
> 
> Of course, the fact that we have cells and brains suggest, once we understand 
> that a computation is an arithmetical notion,  that the physical reality too 
> is Turing complete. But with mechanism, to solve the mind-body problem, you 
> have to derive the physical reality (and its Turing completeness) from 
> arithmetic. It is nota question of choice.
> 
> Of course you can say that in your religion, machine cannot have souls, that 
> you are not a machine, and so you can believe in the fantasy you want. That 
> is what we do since we have put theology out of science (just to make it 
> possible for some tyran to exploit people).
> 
> Or you can try to build a precise non computationalist theory of mind, and 
> how to test it, in which case the computationalist theory will gives many 
> hint. Indeed, if some logics the universal machine gives for matter is 
> contradicted by nature, we do have a precise hint how to transform the 
> machine theory to get a correct non mechanist theory.
> Today, such theory does not exist, Nature follows perfectly well 

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 7 Mar 2019, at 22:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/7/2019 9:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 7 Mar 2019, at 05:48, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 3/6/2019 10:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 I use mechanism in the sense that if little daemon substitute each piece 
 of my brain, at some resolution level,  by functional digital equivalent, 
 then my consciousness would not notice the difference.
>>> According to your theory, your consciousness is instantiated by the 
>>> computational threads of the universal dovetailer, which exists within 
>>> arithmetic.  So whether a piece of your brain is present, replaced, or 
>>> removed should make no difference to you consciousness.
>> 
>> Proof?
>> 
>> Yes, at first sight, naively, the universal dovetailing predicts white 
>> rabbits, or even white noise. But this is like forgetting the definition of 
>> the subject given (the Gödel-Löbian machines), and the fact that the thread 
>> in the Universal dovetailing is entirely structured by the nuance of 
>> provability imposed by incompleteness.
>> 
>> Then the math shows that we get a quantum logic for the 3p physics, another 
>> quantum logics for the 1p physics, and even (I was wrong in my original 
>> thesis) a quantum logic for the 1p-soul. Plotinus was right on this, the 
>> soul has already a foot in matter, even if that quantum logic is an 
>> intuitionist quantum logic.
>> 
>> If I belong to a normal history, for those arithmetical quantum logic,  
>> where some people decide to remove a piece of my brain, the probability will 
>> be high that I will survive that lobotomic experience in the “continuum” of 
>> continuations which are executed in the sigma_1 arithmetic (equivalent to a 
>> universal dovetailing).
> 
> Why is the probability not 1.0.  Why is there any effect at all in any 
> continuation?  Why is experience dependent on physics, if it is just a matter 
> of timeless arithmetical relations.

Because to get physics you need to be able to make prediction. To get a logic 
of probability, incompleteness forbid to use “[]p” (true in all accessible 
continuations) because there are path to cul-de-sac at each world, so we need 
to explicitly define observation by []p & <>t. That does gives a logic of 
probability in general, and with “[]” = Gödel’s beweisbar, that gives a quantum 
probability calculus, etc.

In general relativity, people also explain the perception of time from a static 
reality. With mechanism, though, we don’t have a block-universe, but a 
block-mindscape, where the mind can be defined by the set of accessible 
computational continuation relatively to a universal machine.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> And mechanism is not my theory. Nor is the G* theology, which is just the 
>> truth theory of all classical Löbian machine, as demonstrate by the work of 
>> Gödel, Löb and Solovay. I have not invented the intensional variants. ([]p & 
>> p) has been discovered by Goldblatt and Boolos, well studied by Artemov. And 
>> yes, I point on the existence of infinitely many others, some crucial to 
>> derive “Matter” from arithmetic in the manner prescribed by Mechanism (or, 
>> actually Neoplatonism).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-03-08 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 7 Mar 2019, at 22:13, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/7/2019 8:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Mar 2019, at 20:57, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 3/6/2019 5:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Every time I mention this you strike back at the straw man of primitive 
> matter...which I never refer to.
 But then, why do you criticise the theorem? Maybe you don’t? Bt then why 
 are you saying that elementary arithmetic is not a TOE? It explain the 
 coupling consciousness/matter using only elementary arithmetic.
>>> 
>>> My criticism of the theory is different from my criticism of your repeated 
>>> claim that you have eliminated and matter and attributing anything to it is 
>>> "Aristotles error".   My criticism of the theory that arithmetic is a TOE 
>>> is that arithmetic proves too much.  
>> 
>> 
>> That looks like Deutsch criticism on Schmidhuber type of computationalist 
>> explanation.
>> 
>> But, this omit completely the first person indeterminacy, which not only 
>> explains (in a testable way) the origin of the physical laws, but above all 
>> makes the physics unique, and invariant for all machines.
>> 
>> The postulation of a primary universe, on the contrary, explains only the 
>> current first person prediction by using an identity thesis which is 
>> inconsistent with mechanism.
> 
> You're back to criticizing a strawman "primary" universe which I didn't 
> mention.

But then what is your point in critiszing the idea that with mechanism, we 
*must* derive physics from arithmetic, not for getting a new physics which 
would better than current theories in physics, but to solve the mind-body 
problem.




> 
>> Physics fails both for the prediction of “seeing an eclipse”, and miss the 
>> mind-body problem.
> 
> Let's see arithmetic predict an eclipse.  ISTM that you the ONLY thing your 
> theory predicts is the ineffability of consciousness.


No. It predicts/explain the existence of an apparent stable physical universe, 
which physics just assumed, and it predicts its quantum nature, which 
physicists cannot explain at all, nor even try. Then physics fails to predict 
anything without using an identity thesis which is inconsistent with Mechanism. 
It changes noting for all FAPP use of physics, and that will remain for long, 
like nobody would use quantum physics to do a pizza (although a microwave is 
based on quantum physics, but that’s not the point).

We might be at cross purpose. Keep in mind that I am working on the mind body 
problem, not on the problem to predict anything, but to more to justify why we 
can do prediction at all, and how our consciousness is related to them.



> 
>> Compared to the explanation in arithmetic, there is just no explanation 
>> given for the physical experiment and experience. It works very well 
>> locally, but only by using an inconsistent metaphysics. In fact, it does not 
>> tackle the fundamental question, and gives recipe to make prediction, 
>> without attempting to explains why we can be conscious of the prediction.
> 
> But your "mechanism" doesn't explain it either.  It simply identifies it with 
> logical inferences.

I don’t see that. Mechanism shows that the physical prediction can make sense, 
but the physics, to make sense with Mechanism (which is not proposed as a 
solution but used to reformulate an old problem mathematically), must be 
derived from arithmetic. And the derivation has given the theories S4Grz1, Z1* 
and X1*, which explains already why there is an apparent physical universe for 
all universal machine’s first person view, why it is symmetrical, but looks 
assymettrical, why its logics of observable cannot be boolean and is quantum 
like, etc. 

To pursue this, we need to solve mathematical problems. If nature refutes this, 
it will be time to search another metaphysics. But the Aristotelian has been 
shown to make no sense, or to eliminate consciousness and persons, and that is 
a position which I take as irrational deny of evidences. It is not serious with 
respect to cognitive science, which indeed is not the main interest in physics, 
even if it appears in the foundational studies.

Mechanism leads to a simple conceptual theory (indeed two small axioms), and 
explain consciousness and physical appearance, correctly up to now. Physics has 
not yet find a unifying theory, does not tackle consciousness, and use, with 
respect to mechanist cognitive science, an inconsistent metaphysics. 

Bruno 





> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> With mechanism we get the whole fundamental science, already axiomatised 
>> completely (thanks to Solovay- at the propositional level. I don’t see it 
>> explains too much. You might confuse Mechanism and digital physics. Digital 
>> physics just assume that there is some u such that phi_u is the physical 
>> universe. That reduce physics to arithmetic, but that explains 

Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-08 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, March 8, 2019 at 3:18:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Mar 2019, at 12:26, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, March 7, 2019 at 5:11:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 Mar 2019, at 14:43, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 8:30 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>> *> You confirm my theory that strong (non agnostic) atheism is radical 
>>> religious fundamentalism*
>>
>>
>> I've never heard you or anybody else criticize me that brilliantly 
>> before, you sure put me in my place. I am devastated!
>>
>>
>>
>> Lol. 
>>
>> The fact remains. Anyone mocking the science theology, helps the 
>> radicals, who have separated theology from science to mix it with (fake) 
>> politics (and real tyranny). You are under the influence of the post 529 
>> pseudo-christian propaganda. You defend, not intentionally I suppose, those 
>> who want us remaining non educated. 
>> The greek theology (not the greek mythology!) is at the origin of 
>> mathematics, physics, and even mathematical logic more recently.
>>
>> Note that the USSR, which have banned both religion and theology, did the 
>> same thing with biology. By mixing it with the state, it becomes 
>> obscurantist and non sensical (which led to a big famine).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > By theology, you know that  [...]  *Plato define God by* [...]
>>
>>
>> I'm sorry did you say something? I think I fell asleep 
>>
>>
>> Since long …
>> Since 529, somehow, I guess. 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> Epicurus (via Lucretius) had a philosophy based on physical and psychical 
> atoms.
>
>
>
> Intersting! (And just now you don’t provide links? I would be interested. 
> It would show that early materialist where not eliminativist). Plotinus 
> already complained on “eliminative materialism”, in its own term. I find 
> this both inexact and inhuman.
>
> But that leads to a non necessary dualism, which is also incompatible with 
> Descartes Mechanism and Turing’s one.
>
>
>
>
> Perhaps the writings of Epicurus and Democritus and their students should 
> have been preserved and the writings of Plato and Aristotle should have 
> been destroyed.
>
> :)
>
>
> Lol
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

Epicurus: 

Psychical [soul] atoms combine with physical [body] atoms to make conscious 
beings.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epicurus/#PsycEthi

*Having established the physical basis of the world, Epicurus proceeds to 
explain the nature of the soul (this, at least, is the order in which 
Lucretius sets things out). This too, of course, consists of atoms: first, 
there is nothing that is not made up of atoms and void (secondary qualities 
are simply accidents of the arrangement of atoms), and second, an 
incorporeal entity could neither act on nor be moved by bodies, as the soul 
is seen to do (e.g., it is conscious of what happens to the body, and it 
initiates physical movement). Epicurus maintains that soul atoms are 
particularly fine and are distributed throughout the body (LH 64), and it 
is by means of them that we have sensations (aisthêseis) and the experience 
of pain and pleasure, which Epicurus calls pathê (a term used by Aristotle 
and others to signify emotions instead). Body without soul atoms is 
unconscious and inert, and when the atoms of the body are disarranged so 
that it can no longer support conscious life, the soul atoms are scattered 
and no longer retain the capacity for sensation (LH 65). There is also a 
part of the human soul that is concentrated in the chest, and is the seat 
of the higher intellectual functions. The distinction is important, because 
it is in the rational part that error of judgment enters in. Sensation, 
like pain and pleasure, is incorrigible just because it is a function of 
the non-rational part, which does not modify a perception — that is, the 
reception of lamina emitted from macroscopic bodies — by the addition of 
opinion or belief.*


is an ancient precursor to

Realistic Monism (Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism)
Galen Strawson
http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s0/Realistic-Monism---Why-Physicalism-Entails-Panpsychism-Galen-Strawson.pdf

Physicalist panpsychism (Blackwell Companion to Consciousness) 
Galen Strawson
https://www.academia.edu/25420435/Physicalist_panpsychism_2017_draft


Note: Strawson uses "physicalism" to mean "materialism" since he thinks 
physics - what counts as its subject matter (pun intended) - will change in 
the future.

- pt

 

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Re: What is the largest integer you can write in 5 seconds?

2019-03-08 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 7 Mar 2019, at 15:04, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 8:18 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > Usually, when asked to name a big number, we mean to provide a number that 
> > e can compute in a finite time (no matter how long). BB(8000) will be 
> > rejected, because it is not a definite description, or name, because BB is 
> > not computable.
> 
> Assuming you're just using 2 symbols (like 0 and 1) there are (16001)^8000  
> different 8000 state Turing Machines. And that is a very large number but a 
> finite one. And one of those machines makes the largest number of FINITE 
> operations before halting. And that number of operations is BB(8000).  Even 
> theoretically, much less practically,  you can never compute that number but 
> I have given a unique description of it, no other 8000 state Turing Machine 
> has that propertie.


Yes, sure BB(8000) is a precise well defined finite number. But it is no what 
logician and philosopher call a “name”, where the number should be computable 
in principle. My point is just a vocabulary point, and a way to remind a nice 
problem which I have used to illustrate some less known application of Cantor’s 
diagonal. A constructive one, in this case. Then even using BB, you should 
still use the diagonalization, as BB(8000) is stil an infinitesimal (so to 
speak) compared to f_epsilon_0(BB(8000)).

Bruno





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>  John K Clark
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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-08 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 7 Mar 2019, at 12:26, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, March 7, 2019 at 5:11:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 Mar 2019, at 14:43, John Clark > wrote:
>> 
>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 8:30 AM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> 
>> > You confirm my theory that strong (non agnostic) atheism is radical 
>> > religious fundamentalism
>> 
>> I've never heard you or anybody else criticize me that brilliantly before, 
>> you sure put me in my place. I am devastated!
> 
> 
> Lol. 
> 
> The fact remains. Anyone mocking the science theology, helps the radicals, 
> who have separated theology from science to mix it with (fake) politics (and 
> real tyranny). You are under the influence of the post 529 pseudo-christian 
> propaganda. You defend, not intentionally I suppose, those who want us 
> remaining non educated. 
> The greek theology (not the greek mythology!) is at the origin of 
> mathematics, physics, and even mathematical logic more recently.
> 
> Note that the USSR, which have banned both religion and theology, did the 
> same thing with biology. By mixing it with the state, it becomes obscurantist 
> and non sensical (which led to a big famine).
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> > By theology, you know that  [...]  Plato define God by [...]
>> 
>> I'm sorry did you say something? I think I fell asleep 
> 
> Since long …
> Since 529, somehow, I guess. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> Epicurus (via Lucretius) had a philosophy based on physical and psychical 
> atoms.


Intersting! (And just now you don’t provide links? I would be interested. It 
would show that early materialist where not eliminativist). Plotinus already 
complained on “eliminative materialism”, in its own term. I find this both 
inexact and inhuman.

But that leads to a non necessary dualism, which is also incompatible with 
Descartes Mechanism and Turing’s one.



> 
> Perhaps the writings of Epicurus and Democritus and their students should 
> have been preserved and the writings of Plato and Aristotle should have been 
> destroyed.
> 
> :)

Lol

Bruno




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