Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/8/27 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Does functionalism mean nothing more than if the same inputs produce the same outputs then the experience will be the same? I think this is to simplistic. To reduce it to a really simple example, suppose your

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: and hence that it can't in and of itself tell us anything fundamental about ontology. I don't think it revelas it sown ontology. OTOH, it must somehow be taken accounto fi in any succesful ontology because

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Flammarion wrote: On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Flammarion wrote: Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic level, you still wouldn't have captured all the information? That's an interesting question and one that I think relates

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-28 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com: This is because if consciousness is a computational process then it is independant of the (physical or ... virtual)

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-28 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Aug 2009, at 19:21, Flammarion wrote: On 24 Aug, 16:23, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Aug 2009, at 21:10, Brent Meeker wrote: But you see Brent, here you confirm that materialist are religious in the way they try to explain, or explain away

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-28 Thread Brent Meeker
Flammarion wrote: On 28 Aug, 02:27, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Flammarion wrote: On 21 Aug, 21:01, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Flammarion wrote: Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic level, you still wouldn't have captured

Re: Bayes Destroyed?

2009-08-28 Thread Brent Meeker
marc.geddes wrote: On Aug 28, 6:58 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: So how are you going to get around Cox's theorem?http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cox%27s_theorem Cox's theorem is referring to laws of probability for making predictions. I agree Bayesian inference

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-28 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Is your experience the same? Do you experience frabjous? If you put melody for frabjous, you've got synsathesia. I'd say that functional equivalence is relative to the level. At *some* level equal-input-output

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-28 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/8/26 David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com: This is because if consciousness

Re: Bayes Destroyed?

2009-08-28 Thread Brent Meeker
marc.geddes wrote: On Aug 27, 7:35 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Zermelo Fraenkel theory has full transfinite induction power, but is still limited by Gödel's incompleteness. What Gentzen showed is that you can prove the consistency of ARITHMETIC by a transfinite

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-28 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/8/28 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/8/27 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: On 27 Aug, 08:54, Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/8/26 David Nyman

Re: Bayes Destroyed?

2009-08-29 Thread Brent Meeker
marc.geddes wrote: On Aug 29, 5:21 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Look at Winbugs or R. They compute with some pretty complex priors - that's what Markov chain Monte Carlo methods were invented for. Complex =/= uncomputable. Techniques such the Monte Carlo

Re: Bayes Destroyed?

2009-08-29 Thread Brent Meeker
marc.geddes wrote: On Aug 29, 5:30 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: marc.geddes wrote: See for example ‘Theory and Reality’ (Peter Godfrey Smith) and debates in philosophy about prediction versus integration. True explanation is more than just prediction

Re: Bayes Destroyed?

2009-08-29 Thread Brent Meeker
marc.geddes wrote: On Aug 29, 6:16 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Stathis once pointed on this list that crazy people can actually still perform axiomatic reasoning very well, and invent all sorts of elaborate justifications, the problem is their priors

Re: Bayes Destroyed?

2009-08-29 Thread Brent Meeker
marc.geddes wrote: On Aug 29, 6:41 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: marc.geddes wrote: On Aug 29, 5:30 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: marc.geddes wrote: *Before* you can even begin to assign probabilities to anything, you

Re: Bayes Destroyed?

2009-08-29 Thread Brent Meeker
marc.geddes wrote: On Aug 29, 6:50 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: marc.geddes wrote: Ok, probablistic/axiomatic, none of it works without the correct priors, which Bayes can't produce. Bayes explicitly doesn't pretend to produce priors - although

Re: Bayes Destroyed?

2009-08-30 Thread Brent Meeker
marc.geddes wrote: On Aug 31, 4:19 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Aug 2009, at 10:12, marc.geddes wrote: But look at this. I decide to do the following experience. I prepare an electron so that it is in state up+down. I measure it in the base {up,

Re: Against Physics

2009-08-31 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 1:58 PM, Flammarionpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On 9 Aug, 06:55, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, Aug 9, 2009 at 1:26 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: If you suffer epileptic seizures seeing a neurosurgeon may offer

Re: Against Physics

2009-08-31 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 2:30 PM, Flammarionpeterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: If you can't see into the future, you are going to have to make your mind up in the present Assuming physicalism, my brain will make my mind up for me, Asssuming physcialism, your brain is you and not

Re: Against Physics

2009-08-31 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 2:37 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Either way, there is only the epiphenomenal experience of making my mind up...not the actuality of doing so. I'd say there was the epiphenomenal experience of making up your mind AND the actuality

Re: Against Physics

2009-08-31 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 4:01 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Where are you trying to get? to an immortal soul? a ghost-in-the-machine? What's wrong with my mind is what my brain does? Where I'm trying to get is that there is no explanation for our

Re: Against Physics

2009-08-31 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 10:52 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 4:01 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Where are you trying to get? to an immortal soul? a ghost-in-the-machine? What's

Re: Against Physics

2009-08-31 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 12:12 AM, Rex Allenrexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Aug 31, 2009 at 10:52 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: If you make yourself small enough you can avoid responsibility for everything. --- Daniel Dennett, in

Re: Against Physics

2009-09-01 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 12:37 AM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: In this case, I am not responsible (common usage) for the fortune or misfortune that has befallen those who I have stumbled into as a result of the universe's constant

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Peter, you need to keep firmly in mind that the superfluity of PM follows on the *assumption* of CTM. The razor is then applied on the basis of that assumption. If you prefer a theory of mind based on real reality, fair

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/1 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I claim that that is a *possiblity* and as such is enough to show that CTM does not necessarily follow from the computability of physics. It may be easy to lose sight, in the flurry of debate, that the argument is

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: On 1 Sep, 09:49, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: There are two points you make that I'd like to comment specifically on: OK. Memory is relevant to consciousness. It is relevant specifically to access consciousness. it is also easily explained physically and

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: On 1 Sep, 17:09, Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: If you don't like this, you have the option of abandoning CTM and with it the notion of a virtual ontology. This is so clear cut that I would expect that you would welcome the opportunity either to accept it or

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/1 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: There's something going on, but I don't know why you would suppose it's not analyzable in terms of physics. Well, what I would say is that the temporal psychology of the specious present is very odd in the face

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com I'm afraid that still doesn't work. I realise it's counter intuitive, but this is the point - to recalibrate the intuitions. 'Standard' CTM postulates that the mind is a computation implemented by the brain, and hence

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-01 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/2 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: And yet it seems clear nonetheless that there is the experience of change *within* such capsules. And if we argue that this change isn't within the capsule, we would have to believe in some integration of successive

Re: Against Physics

2009-09-02 Thread Brent Meeker
Flammarion wrote: On 2 Sep, 03:10, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Sep 1, 2009 at 9:13 AM, David Nymandavid.ny...@gmail.com wrote: I think his exploration of the constraints on our actions in Freedom Evolves is pretty much on the money. So I can't comment

Re: Against Physics

2009-09-04 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Thu, Sep 3, 2009 at 1:43 PM, Rex Allenrexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Sep 2, 2009 at 6:21 AM, Stathis Papaioannoustath...@gmail.com wrote: Dennett didn't invent compatibilism. It has a long history and extensive literature.

Re: Against Physics

2009-09-04 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Sep 4, 2009 at 2:54 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Furthermore we have no idea how to fix the person in a mechanistic way - and if we did would it be ethical (c.f. Clockwork Orange). A further thought: the solution to crime in A Clockwork

Re: Against Physics

2009-09-05 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/9/5 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: http://www.edge.org/q2006/q06_9.html#dawkins It seems foolish to beat Basil's car because (1) we know the beating will not improve it's function and (2) we know that is must be possible to fix it (since we

Re: Brain-computer interface and quantum robots

2009-09-10 Thread Brent Meeker
ronaldheld wrote: arXiv.org/abs/0909.1508 I saw the title and thought of what Bruno would make of it. Any thoughts? The authors write, However, recent studies lead to the conclusion that the human mind is not a classical computer, and, in general, not completely reducible to any kind of

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-10 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/9 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: What you say above seems pretty much in sympathy with the reductio arguments based on arbitrariness of implementation. It is strictly an argument against the claim that computation causes consciousness , as opposed

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-10 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Yes, I agree. But if we're after a physical theory, we also want to be able to give in either case a clear physical account of their apprehensiveness, which would include a physical justification of why the fine-grained

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-13 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/11 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making. If as you say the realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause consciousness, that would entail that no physically-realised computation could be identical

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-13 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: You regard doing the same computation as a purely formal (= non-physical) critereon, but I think this is specious. It seems right because we talk about a computation at a very high level of abstraction. But when we ask

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-13 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Yes, of course I know it's *implicitly* physical, that's the problem. The point is that evaluating CTM as a physical theory of mind necessitates making the relation between experience and process *explicitly* physical

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-16 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/16 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: I find that I can't real say what the difference is supposed to be between numbers existing mathematically and numbers existing Platonically, other than that different labels are being used. What precisely is the latter

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-16 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/9/16 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com On 16 Sep, 12:54, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com mailto:david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/9/16 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com mailto:peterdjo...@yahoo.com:

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-16 Thread Brent Meeker
m.a. wrote: - Original Message - From: Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, September 16, 2009 11:25 AM Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology On 16 Sep, 15:51, m.a. marty...@bellsouth.net wrote:

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-17 Thread Brent Meeker
m.a. wrote: - Original Message - From: Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2009 6:30 PM Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology On 17 Sep, 14:12, m.a. marty...@bellsouth.net wrote:

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-19 Thread Brent Meeker
m.a. wrote: - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, September 17, 2009 9:47 PM Subject: Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology m.a. wrote: - Original Message - From

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-21 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Sep 2009, at 02:49, Brent Meeker wrote: So does being pure thought mean without a reference, i.e. a fiction? As in Sherlock Holmes is a pure thought? Consider the Many world theory of Everett, or the many histories of comp. Does it make sense to say

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-22 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Sep 2009, at 23:48, m.a. wrote: *And when pressed as to exactly how the Heisenberg compensators worked, the spokesman replied, Very well, thank you.* :) That's the problem. Star strek teleportation has been invented well before Bennett Al. discovered

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-22 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Sep 2009, at 15:51, Flammarion wrote: He goes on to conclude that I am being generated by an immaterial UD. That is not possible if there are no immaterial entities. You are in a third person way. If you are a program relatively to any real world, you are

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-22 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/22 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: So what did you mean the reader to conclude from your original argument? I wasn't trying to settle the whole issue in one go. You concluded that the realisation of a computation doesn't cause consciousness. But did you also

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-23 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: On Sep 23, 3:20 am, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: What would make a theory of consciousness a physical theory would be a normal causal account of a succession of physical states, the experience that accompanies them, and the precise relation between them

Re: Yablo, Quine and Carnap on ontology

2009-09-23 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/23 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: Some people can argue that MGA is not needed. They believe that it is obvious that consciousness is not something material at all, and that it is a waste of time of both trying to attach consciousness to matter, or to argue

Re: Dreaming On

2009-09-24 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/24 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: if it can't, we need another strategy to disambiguate its actual relation to the physical account. The latter conclusion is what motivates the reversal of matter and mathematics in comp. There is no ambiguity in the reduction

Re: The seven step series (november 2009)

2009-11-09 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi, Let us come back on the seven step thread. Let me recall the initial motivation. The movie graph argument (cf the MGA thread) shows that it is senseless to attach consciousness to the physical activity of a brain or a computer. If we keep the computational

Re: The seven step series (november 2009)

2009-11-10 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 09 Nov 2009, at 20:43, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi, Let us come back on the seven step thread. Let me recall the initial motivation. The movie graph argument (cf the MGA thread) shows that it is senseless to attach consciousness to the physical

Re: The seven step series (november 2009)

2009-11-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Nov 10, 2009 at 1:29 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: That's why I say I take it as an ansatz - Let's consider all possible computations and see if we can pick out physics and the brain and consciousness from them. I would think that it's

Re: The seven step series (november 2009)

2009-11-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Nov 2009, at 19:29, Brent Meeker wrote: But this seems like creating a problem where none existed. The factorial is a certain function, the brain performs a certain function. Now you say we will formalize the concept of function in order to study what

Re: Arguably The World's Greatest Woman

2009-11-13 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Kim, Thank you very luch for the link to Carolyn Porco's presentation. Very nice talk. I appreciate a lot. She is correct (even comp-correct) on the main thing: Science is agnostic. "I believe in God" (Bg) is a religious statement. (B = I

Re: Arguably The World's Greatest Woman

2009-11-13 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Nov 2009, at 21:01, Brent Meeker wrote: I used to tell people who asked that I was an agnostic. But the trouble with that was that they supposed I was uncertain about the existence of *their* god: a supernatural immortal agent would loved us but had

Re: Arguably The World's Greatest Woman

2009-11-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Nov 2009, at 01:33, Brent Meeker wrote: Why should we use the term God in the sense of those who clearly have confused science with temporal authoritative argument? Because that's what most people who use the term mean. And if we tell them we're agnostic about

Re: Arguably The World's Greatest Woman

2009-11-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Nov 2009, at 22:33, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Nov 2009, at 01:33, Brent Meeker wrote: Why should we use the term God in the sense of those who clearly have confused science with temporal authoritative argument

Re: The seven step series (november 2009)

2009-11-16 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Nov 2009, at 19:52, Brent Meeker wrote: But how is the first person point of view defined? Can this theory tell me how many persons exist at a given time? I come back on this. The question how many persons? is a question which remains very hard

Re: Why I am I?

2009-12-03 Thread Brent Meeker
soulcatcher wrote: On Thu, Dec 3, 2009 at 4:59 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Hi soulcatcher, Good question, it is something I thought about too, then I realized I am me because it was this brain in my skull asking that question. I created the attached image to help

Re: Why I am I?

2009-12-03 Thread Brent Meeker
soulcatcher wrote: Lets consider two "hard" questions - "why do we live in THIS universe?" (1) and "why am I me?" (2). (1) . Why do we live in THIS universe? Here we got: - string theory and anthropic reasoning present us with a landscape of 10^(10^N) universes that we can choose

Re: Why I am I?

2009-12-03 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/12/3 soulcatcher☠ soulcatche...@gmail.com: On Thu, Dec 3, 2009 at 3:55 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: If you were Elvis and Elvis were you, what difference would that make to anything? That would

Re: Why I am I?

2009-12-03 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Thu, Dec 3, 2009 at 1:53 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Science advances in small steps that often depend on technology. I think the next 'hard' question that has some chance of being answered is, what information processes are necessary and sufficient

Re: Why I am I?

2009-12-03 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Dec 2009, at 19:56, Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2009/12/3 soulcatcher☠ soulcatche...@gmail.com: On Thu, Dec 3, 2009 at 3:55 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote

Re: Why I am I?

2009-12-04 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 03 Dec 2009, at 23:12, Brent Meeker wrote: Exactly.  It is the magical "I" that is swapped. That "I" is magical. It is like swapping both the mind (

Re: Why I am I?

2009-12-04 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Dec 2009, at 19:15, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Those thought experiences are not needed to understand that the physical reality and physical sensations emerge from numbers addition and multiplication, for example, but may be useful

Re: Why I am I?

2009-12-04 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Dec 4, 2009 at 7:30 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Dec 2009, at 19:15, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Those thought experiences are not needed to understand that the physical reality

Re: Why I am I?

2009-12-05 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Dec 4, 2009 at 10:35 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: What is your alternative to the everything universal acid? That things just are the way they are (uniquely), and there's ultimately no explanation for that. Right

Re: Why I am I?

2009-12-06 Thread Brent Meeker
rexallen...@gmail.com mailto:rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Dec 4, 2009 at 10:35 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: What is your alternative to the everything universal acid? That things just

Re: Why I am I?

2009-12-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, Dec 5, 2009 at 5:22 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: On Fri, Dec 4, 2009 at 10:35 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: What is your alternative to the everything universal acid

Re: Why I am I?

2009-12-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Sun, Dec 6, 2009 at 8:09 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: You seem to be reading a lot into my post. Ha! Ya, once I got going I figured I'd just throw everything in there and see if any of it elicited any interesting feedback

Re: Why I am I?

2009-12-08 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Sun, Dec 6, 2009 at 11:34 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: So my point is that: in a reductionist theory which implies a physicalist reality with no downwards causation, What defines upwards and downwards. Why would

Re: Why I am I?

2009-12-09 Thread Brent Meeker
benjayk wrote: Rex Allen wrote: Where could the explanation begin? I'd say there is no explanation. It just is what it is. As Brent said...it's descriptions all the way down. I wouldn't neccesarily disagree, though only if you mean verbal or formal explanation. In a sense

Re: Robotic Scientist

2009-12-27 Thread Brent Meeker
russell standish wrote: This article made me think immediately about Colin, and his very own proof that this is not possible. Of course I'm sure he is talking about something completely different :). http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2009/12/download-robot-scientist/ Cheers Actually

Re: UDA query

2010-01-03 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/4 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk: Thank you Stathis This has helped move me on a bit. “The hardwareless computer” has been giving me some real problems.  Let me replay my understanding of what you said back just to check it is on the right

Re: UDA query

2010-01-03 Thread Brent Meeker
this myself and get this feeling that there is a dynamic element missing from the static or timeless representations which I am assuming to be existent in the platonic realm Nick On Jan 3, 6:57 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote:2

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le mercredi 06 janvier 2010 à 00:29 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : 2010/1/5 Quentin Anciaux allco...@gmail.com: Consider a set of three one minute intervals of experience, {S1, S2, S3}, which belong to a person S. S2 remembers S1 and remembers no gap or

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/4 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I think you give an excellent explication of the problem, Stathis. However, one thing about it that still worries me is the role of time. You say the mapping need not be consistent even moment to moment, and yet

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Brent Meeker
Nick Prince wrote: Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always there. I can understand this because all the spatio temporal

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Brent Meeker
Nick On Jan 5, 6:59 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Nick Prince wrote: Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order

Re: UDA query

2010-01-05 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno will give me a hint here. Enjoying the dialogue! Nick On Jan 5, 10:44 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Nick Prince wrote: OOps sorry I sent an empty post by accident. I agree with you here.  But I am new to this field so I am

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/6 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk: As I understand it the UD generates all possible programs and as it generates each one it runs one step of it before generating the next. Does that not mean that eventually it will generate the program which is

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/6 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I can understand that view, but in that case why consider them computations?  Why not just suppose all states of your consciousness (and even other parts of the world) exist.  If they can be glued together

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:57, Brent Meeker wrote: Yes but the UD will generate infinitely more often the in order S1/S2/S3 than out of order... with what you are saying I don't even understand what is a computation if not a rules ordered sequential state order. Quentin

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Jan 2010, at 19:59, Brent Meeker wrote: Nick Prince wrote: Is this because you think of your stream of consciousness as somehow like a reel of film? All the individual pictures could be cut from the reel and laid out any which way but the implicit order is always

Re: UDA query

2010-01-06 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Jan 2010, at 01:21, Nick Prince wrote: Hi Brent Perhaps Bruno could give some clarification here. Just prior to his conclusion on the sane paper I quoted from was this: So if we keep comp at this stage, we are forced to relate the inner experience only to the

Re: UDA query

2010-01-07 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: A program that generates S2 as it were out of nowhere, with false memories of an S1 that has not yet happened or may never happen, is a perfectly legitimate program and the UD will generate it along with all

Re: UDA query

2010-01-07 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com: A program that generates S2

Re: UDA query

2010-01-08 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/7 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com

Re: UDA query

2010-01-08 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com

Re: UDA query

2010-01-08 Thread Brent Meeker
Johnathan Corgan wrote: On Fri, Jan 8, 2010 at 10:03 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Isn't it? Bruno presents comp as equivalent to betting that replacing your brain with a digitial device at the appropriate level of substitution will leave your stream of consciousness

Re: UDA query

2010-01-09 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/8 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: You've made this point in the past but I still don't understand it. If S1 and S2 are periods of experience generated consecutively in your brain in the usual manner, do you agree that you would still be experience

Re: UDA query

2010-01-10 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: It seems that you're saying the observer would notice that something odd had happened if his program were paused and restarted in the way described, but how is that possible when S1 and S2 are identical whether

Re: UDA query

2010-01-10 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: S1 and S2 can be precisely delimited as machine states but only more loosely as mental states. This is because, as you say, there may be a thought that spans S1 and S2, and is therefore partly generated by M1

Re: UDA query

2010-01-10 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But aren't you assuming that consciousness is produced by the abstract Platonic computation - rather than by the actual physical process (which is not the same) - in other words assuming the thing being argued

Re: UDA query

2010-01-11 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/11 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: No, I'm at this point assuming only that consciousness is produced by the physical process. We can assume for simplicity that the two machines M1 and M2 have similar architecture and similar operating systems. Once

Re: UDA query

2010-01-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: I know. I'm trying to see what exactly is being assumed about the computation being the same. Is it the same Platonic algorithm? Is it one that has the same steps as described in FORTRAN, but not those in LISP

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