Re: UDA query

2010-01-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke

Re: UDA query

2010-01-12 Thread Brent Meeker
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2010/1/12 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-13 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: ... The ASSA/RSSA distinction on this list came, as I understand it, from debate on the validity of the idea of quantum immortality. This is the theory that in a multiverse you can never die, because at every juncture where you could die there is always a version of

Re: UDA query

2010-01-13 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/13 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: You're asserting that neuron I/O replication is the appropriate level to make brain behavior the same; and I tend to agree that would be sufficient (though perhaps not necessary). But that's preserving a particular

Re: UDA query

2010-01-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/14 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Yes, I can see that. By aggregating the brain into one computation do you mean replacing it with a synchronous digital computer whose program would not only reproduce the I/O of individual neurons, but also

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/14 Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com: I agree, there is no subjective difference. But I think there is a logical difference, if you are only your current OM why go to work when some other OM will enjoy the fruits of that labor? But by attaching every OM to

Re: UDA query

2010-01-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 14-janv.-10, à 09:01, Brent Meeker a écrit : I think there may be different kinds of consciousness, so a look-up-table (like Searle's Chinese Room) may be conscious but in a different way. In a way distinguishable by the person? From its own (first person

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/15 Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com: There's no clear answer. This is where the idea that we live only transiently is helpful: there is no fact-of-the-matter about who is me and who isn't since none of them are me, but we can talk about under what

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 10:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: There is no real distinction between the different possibilities you mention, but evolution has programmed me to think that I am a single individual travelling in the forward direction through

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-14 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/15 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: There is no real distinction between the different possibilities you [Jason Resch] mention, but evolution has programmed me to think that I am a single individual travelling in the forward direction through time

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-15 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/15 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Or why not suppose you are your body (including your genes). Then evolution would be able to have had the imputed effect on you that you suppose it does. The actual effect of any adaptive behaviour must

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-16 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 2:57 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: There is some reality independent of us but which we invent theories about which refer to some aspects of this reality. Is this reality deterministic or random? Random. What caused

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-16 Thread Brent Meeker
, Jan 16, 2010 at 2:06 AM, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com mailto:rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Jan 15, 2010 at 12:05 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: On Thu, Jan 14, 2010 at 10:16 PM, Stathis Papaioannou

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-16 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 1:59 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: What caused it to exist? Who said it needs a cause? Why this reality as opposed to nothing? Given the principle of sufficient reason, wouldn't nothingness

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-16 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 10:09 AM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Dear Brent, just a tiny (but fundamental?) question. You wrote (never mind 'on' what): One can look at them that way, but ARE they that way? the BIG question: are we in any position to identify 'real

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-17 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, Jan 16, 2010 at 6:26 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: It seems to me that you are starting with a strong bias towards matter as fundamental, instead of starting with a clean slate and working forward from first principles

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-17 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Sun, Jan 17, 2010 at 3:11 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: Okay, an underlying objective reality causes the order in what we experience - but then what causes the order in this underlying objective reality? You haven't answered any

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-17 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Sun, Jan 17, 2010 at 7:22 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: So ultimately, there is no reason you value the things you do...that's just the way things are. Suppose there was a reason - what would it be like? And why would

Re: on consciousness levels and ai

2010-01-17 Thread Brent Meeker
silky wrote: I'm not sure if this question is appropriate here, nevertheless, the most direct way to find out is to ask it :) Clearly, creating AI on a computer is a goal, and generally we'll try and implement to the same degree of computationalness as a human. But what would happen if we

Re: on consciousness levels and ai

2010-01-17 Thread Brent Meeker
silky wrote: On Mon, Jan 18, 2010 at 6:08 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: silky wrote: I'm not sure if this question is appropriate here, nevertheless, the most direct way to find out is to ask it :) Clearly, creating AI on a computer is a goal, and generally we'll try

Re: on consciousness levels and ai

2010-01-18 Thread Brent Meeker
silky wrote: On Mon, Jan 18, 2010 at 6:57 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: silky wrote: On Mon, Jan 18, 2010 at 6:08 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: silky wrote: I'm not sure if this question is appropriate here, nevertheless, the most

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-18 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 17 Jan 2010, at 09:11, Brent Meeker wrote: Brent The reason that there is Something rather than Nothing is that Nothing is unstable. -- Frank Wilczek, Nobel Laureate, phyiscs 2004 So, why is Nothing unstable? Because there are so many ways to be something

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-18 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 Jan 2010, at 00:37, Rex Allen wrote: The patterns I've observed don't explain my conscious experience. There's nothing in my concept of patterns which would explain how it might give rise to conscious experience. So I fully buy the idea that patterns (physical or

Re: on consciousness levels and ai

2010-01-18 Thread Brent Meeker
silky wrote: On Tue, Jan 19, 2010 at 1:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: 2010/1/18 silky michaelsli...@gmail.com: It would be my (naive) assumption, that this is arguably trivial to do. We can design a program that has a desire to 'live', as desire to find mates, and

Re: on consciousness levels and ai

2010-01-18 Thread Brent Meeker
silky wrote: On Tue, Jan 19, 2010 at 10:09 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: silky wrote: On Tue, Jan 19, 2010 at 1:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: 2010/1/18 silky michaelsli...@gmail.com: It would be my (naive) assumption

Re: on consciousness levels and ai

2010-01-18 Thread Brent Meeker
silky wrote: On Tue, Jan 19, 2010 at 10:30 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: 2010/1/19 silky michaelsli...@gmail.com: On Tue, Jan 19, 2010 at 1:24 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: 2010/1/18 silky michaelsli...@gmail.com: It would be my

Re: on consciousness levels and ai

2010-01-18 Thread Brent Meeker
silky wrote: On Tue, Jan 19, 2010 at 1:02 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: silky wrote: On Tue, Jan 19, 2010 at 10:09 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: silky

Re: on consciousness levels and ai

2010-01-18 Thread Brent Meeker
silky wrote: On Tue, Jan 19, 2010 at 2:19 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: silky wrote: On Tue, Jan 19, 2010 at 1:02 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke

Re: on consciousness levels and ai

2010-01-19 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/19 silky michaelsli...@gmail.com: Exactly my point! I'm trying to discover why I wouldn't be so rational there. Would you? Do you think that knowing all there is to know about a cat is unpractical to the point of being impossible *forever*, or do you

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-19 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/19 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk: Perhaps you misunderstood my reference to the use of copies. What I meant was why they are considered as an indication of measure at the beginning of thought experiments such as the one you discussed (tea/ coffe).

Re: on consciousness levels and ai

2010-01-19 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 19 Jan 2010, at 03:28, silky wrote: I don't disagree with you that it would be significantly complicated, I suppose my argument is only that, unlike with a real cat, I - the programmer - know all there is to know about this computer cat. I'm wondering to what degree

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-19 Thread Brent Meeker
Nick Prince wrote: On Jan 19, 6:43 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/19 Nick Prince m...@dtech.fsnet.co.uk: Perhaps you misunderstood my reference to the use of copies. What I meant was why they are considered as an indication

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-01-20 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/20 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: What do you think could happen if there were 100 copies of you running in parallel and 90 were terminated? If you think you would definitely continue living as one of the 10 remaining copies then to be consistent you

Re: on consciousness levels and ai

2010-01-22 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi John, On 21 Jan 2010, at 22:19, John Mikes wrote: Dear Bruno, you took extra pain to describe (in your vocabulary) what I stand for (using MY vocabulary). - On Thu, Jan 21, 2010 at 2:17 PM, Bruno Marchal

Re: on consciousness levels and ai

2010-01-24 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Jan 2010, at 20:52, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi John, On 21 Jan 2010, at 22:19, John Mikes wrote: Dear Bruno, you took extra pain to describe (in your vocabulary) what I stand for (using MY vocabulary

Re: UDA steps 5 and 6: huh?

2010-01-25 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Jan 2010, at 04:39, Mark Buda wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: I would suggest the SANE 2004 paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm Okay, first question: in step 5, assuming the measure is 1/2 in the preceding steps, suppose I agree

Re: UDA steps 5 and 6: huh?

2010-01-26 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Jan 2010, at 03:34, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Jan 2010, at 04:39, Mark Buda wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: I would suggest the SANE 2004 paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm Okay, first question: in step

Re: measure again '10

2010-01-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 2010/1/27 Jack Mallah jackmal...@yahoo.com: See above. That would be a measure-conserving process, so it would be OK. I would be upset at the prospect of someone killing me even if they filled the world with angelic beings by way of atonement, because it

Re: UDA steps 5 and 6: huh?

2010-01-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Mark Buda wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 27-janv.-10, à 01:39, Mark Buda a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Jan 2010, at 23:15, Mark Buda wrote: On 25 Jan 2010, at 04:39, Mark Buda wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: I would suggest the SANE

Re: the redness of the red

2010-01-30 Thread Brent Meeker
soulcatcher? wrote: I see a red rose. You see a red rose. Is your experience of redness the same as mine? 1. Yes, they are identical. 2. They are different as long as neural organization of our brains is slightly different, but you are potentially capable of experiencing my redness with some

Re: the redness of the red

2010-02-01 Thread Brent Meeker
soulcatcher? wrote: Do you see the meaning of physical laws being somehow different from the programmed laws that simulate an environment? Yes, I feel that simulated mind is not identical to the real one. Simulation is only the extension of the mind - just a tool, a mental crutch, a

Re: the redness of the red

2010-02-01 Thread Brent Meeker
Jason Resch wrote: On Sat, Jan 30, 2010 at 8:10 PM, soulcatcher☠ soulcatche...@gmail.com mailto:soulcatche...@gmail.com wrote: Let me explain with example. Suppose, that you: 1. simulate my brain in a computer program, so we can say that this program represents my brain in your

Re: measure again '10

2010-02-01 Thread Brent Meeker
Jack Mallah wrote: --- On Wed, 1/27/10, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Jack is talking about copies in the common sense of initially physically identical beings who however occupy different places in the same spacetime and hence have different viewpoints and experiences

Re: A parable.

2010-02-02 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Feb 2010, at 12:07, w.tay...@math.canterbury.ac.nz wrote (FOR list) : The problem with both groups is that both have a tendency to forget that both Science and Religion are constructs They are not. Religion is a construct, science is a method.

Re: A parable.

2010-02-02 Thread Brent Meeker
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Feb 2010, at 12:07, w.tay...@math.canterbury.ac.nz mailto:w.tay...@math.canterbury.ac.nz wrote (FOR list) : The problem with both groups is that both have a tendency to forget that both Science and Religion are constructs They are not. Religion is a construct,

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: This is old hat, but I've been thinking about it on awakening every morning for the last week. Is consciousness - i.e. the actual first- person experience itself - literally uncomputable from any third- person perspective? The only rationale for adducing the additional

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: Is there a problem with the idea that 3-p can be derived from some combinatorics of many interacting 1-p's? Is there a reason why we keep trying to derive 1-p from 3-p? I suspect there's a problem either way. AFAICS the issue is that, in 3-p and 1-p, there exist two

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: On 16 February 2010 22:21, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Consciousness could be computable in the sense that if you are the computation, you have the experience. Yes, but that's precisely not the sense I was referring to. Rather the sense I'm

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: On 17 February 2010 00:06, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: I don't see that my 1-p experience is at all causally closed. In fact, thoughts pop into my head all the time with no provenance and no hint of what caused them. The problem is that if one

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-16 Thread Brent Meeker
David Nyman wrote: On 17 February 2010 00:16, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: But suppose we had a really good theory and understanding of the brain so that we could watch yours in operation on some kind of scope (like an fMRI, except in great detail) and from our theory we

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-21 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: The only rationale for adducing the additional existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p world is the raw fact that we possess it (or seem to, according to some). We can't compute the existence of any

Re: problem of size '10

2010-02-22 Thread Brent Meeker
Jesse Mazer wrote: Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 10:48:28 -0800 From: jackmal...@yahoo.com Subject: Re: problem of size '10 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com --- On Fri, 2/12/10, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Jack Mallah wrote: --- On Thu, 2/11/10, Bruno Marchal

Re: problem of size '10

2010-02-22 Thread Brent Meeker
Jesse Mazer wrote: Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2010 08:42:17 -0800 From: meeke...@dslextreme.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: problem of size '10 Jesse Mazer wrote: Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 10:48:28 -0800 From: jackmal...@yahoo.com Subject: Re: problem of size '10

[Fwd: The Brain's Dark Energy Scien amer]

2010-02-22 Thread Brent Meeker
As long thought, consciousness is only a small part of what the brain does - maybe even only a small part of "thinking". Brent Original Message The Brain's Dark Energy ( Preview ) Brain regions active when our minds wander may hold a key to understanding neurological

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-22 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 8:50 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: On 21 February 2010 23:25, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: So we know 1-p directly, while we only infer the existence of 3-p. However, you seem to start from the assumption that 1-p is in

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-22 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Sun, Feb 21, 2010 at 9:52 PM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 1:07 PM, David Nyman david.ny...@gmail.com wrote: The only rationale for adducing the additional existence of any 1-p experience in a 3-p

Re: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds

2010-02-22 Thread Brent Meeker
Jesse Mazer wrote: Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2010 21:42:54 -0800 Subject: Re: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds From: charlesrobertgood...@gmail.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com On Feb 23, 6:08 pm, rmiller rmil...@legis.com wrote: If we accept what the laws of physics appear to say, that

Re: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds

2010-02-22 Thread Brent Meeker
Charles wrote: On Feb 23, 7:57 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Retro causation solves the EPR problem (i.e. provides a local explanation of the correlations without hidden variables). See Vic Stenger's book Timeless Quantum in which he uses this kind of explanation to good

Re: On the computability of consciousness

2010-02-24 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Tue, Feb 23, 2010 at 1:52 AM, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: The idea of a material world that exists fundamentally and uncaused while giving rise to conscious experience is no more coherent than the idea that conscious experience

Re: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds

2010-02-25 Thread Brent Meeker
Charles wrote: On Feb 25, 6:41 am, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: Yes, this is the mainstream point of view, not unique to Price. It's generally thought that reason we see an arrow of time at the macroscopic level--including the arrow of time inherent in the fact that we can look at

Re: Many-worlds vs. Many-Minds

2010-02-25 Thread Brent Meeker
Charles wrote: On Feb 26, 2:05 pm, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Isn't the AOT explained in terms of probability? E.g. There are far more combinations for a system to be disordered rather than ordered, as such the universe overall will tend to fall into these more likely

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-02-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 27 February 2010 14:59, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Feb 26, 2010 at 5:55 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 February 2010 16:41, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: Could our universe *actually* produce

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-02-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 5:27 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 February 2010 14:59, Rex Allen rexallen...@gmail.com wrote: People can only have beliefs that supervene onto one of the physical configurations that it is possible for a human brain to

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-02-28 Thread Brent Meeker
On 2/27/2010 10:33 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 4:27 PM, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: Rex Allen wrote: Note that I am not arguing that this particular belief is an impossible belief. What I'm arguing is that evolution doesn't help you one way or the other in

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-02-28 Thread Brent Meeker
On 2/27/2010 10:38 PM, Rex Allen wrote: On Sat, Feb 27, 2010 at 10:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 February 2010 05:33, Rex Allenrexallen...@gmail.com wrote: I'm not sure what you're saying here. Is it that peoples' beliefs could not be other than what

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-03-02 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/2/2010 10:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Mar 2010, at 20:29, Rex Allen wrote: I don't have a problem with anti-realism about causal laws, since as you say, my position boils down to consciousness is fundamental and uncaused. What does that explain? I cannot even derive from that if

Re: R/ASSA query

2010-03-03 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/3/2010 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 02 Mar 2010, at 20:27, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/2/2010 10:09 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Mar 2010, at 20:29, Rex Allen wrote: I don't have a problem with anti-realism about causal laws, since as you say, my position boils down

Re: problem of size '10

2010-03-05 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/5/2010 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: In this list I have already well explained the seven step of UDA, and one difficulty remains in the step 8, which is the difference between a computation and a description of computation. Due to the static character of Platonia, some believes it

Re: problem of size '10

2010-03-05 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/5/2010 1:29 PM, Charles wrote: --- On Wed, 3/3/10, Stathis Papaioannoustath...@gmail.com wrote: I'm not sure if you overlooked it but the key condition in my paper is that the inputs to the remaining brain are identical to what they would have been if the whole brain were present.

Re: problem of size '10

2010-03-06 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/6/2010 5:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Mar 2010, at 03:02, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/5/2010 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: In this list I have already well explained the seven step of UDA, and one difficulty remains in the step 8, which is the difference between a computation

Re: problem of size '10

2010-03-10 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/10/2010 6:57 PM, Jack Mallah wrote: --- On Mon, 3/8/10, Stathis Papaioannoustath...@gmail.com wrote: In the original fading qualia thought experiment the artificial neurons could be considered black boxes, the consciousness status of which is unknown. The conclusion is that if the

Re: problem of size '10

2010-03-11 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical or a computational role to inactive device in the actual supervenience of a an actual computation currently not using that device. I'm not sure I understand that question. It seems

Re: problem of size '10

2010-03-11 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/11/2010 4:51 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 11 March 2010 13:57, Jack Mallahjackmal...@yahoo.com wrote: --- On Mon, 3/8/10, Stathis Papaioannoustath...@gmail.com wrote: In the original fading qualia thought experiment the artificial neurons could be considered black boxes,

Re: problem of size '10

2010-03-11 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/11/2010 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Mar 2010, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical or a computational role to inactive device in the actual supervenience of a an actual

Re: Free will: Wrong entry.

2010-03-11 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/11/2010 1:26 PM, m.a. wrote: *Bruno and John,* * The confusion is my fault. I copied the URL from a Kurzweil page heading when I should have gone to the article itself, so the wrong feature appeared. This is the one I requested comments about:*

Re: Free will: Wrong entry.

2010-03-11 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/11/2010 1:56 PM, m.a. wrote: - Original Message - *From:* Brent Meeker mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Sent:* Thursday, March 11, 2010 4:38 PM *Subject:* Re: Free will: Wrong

Re: Free will: Wrong entry.

2010-03-11 Thread Brent Meeker
word, because the reference you gave said: * NOT FOUND* So what kind of a 'universe' is it? bootstrap, self reflecting autodidacta? Creator-made? John M ** ** On 3/11/10, *Brent Meeker* meeke...@dslextreme.com mailto:meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: On 3/11/2010 1:26 PM, m.a. wrote: *Bruno

Re: problem of size '10

2010-03-11 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/11/2010 2:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 12 March 2010 04:17, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: [Stathis] We can do a thought experiment. A brain is rigged to explode unless it goes down one particular pathway. Does it change the computation being implemented if it is

Re: problem of size '10

2010-03-11 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/11/2010 4:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 12 March 2010 10:46, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: [Stathis] When a brain is not being consciously used at all, because the person is in dreamless sleep, the counterfactuals are all still there; [Brent] Hmmm. Are they?

Re: Free will: Wrong entry.

2010-03-12 Thread Brent Meeker
coercion, otherwise I think Dennett has it right in Elbow Room. Brent You can avoid responsibility for everything if you make yourself small enough. --- Daniel Dennett Bruno On 12 Mar 2010, at 00:04, Brent Meeker wrote: My apologies. I forgot that Lawrence National Laboratories

Re: problem of size '10

2010-03-12 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/12/2010 6:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Mar 2010, at 20:38, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/11/2010 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Mar 2010, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide

Re: Free will: Wrong entry.

2010-03-12 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/12/2010 11:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Mar 2010, at 18:57, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/12/2010 4:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Brent, We have discussed this a long time ago. Ah, perhaps it was on the FOR list. Free-will can only diminish when indeterminacy is added

Re: Free will: Wrong entry.

2010-03-12 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/12/2010 12:49 PM, John Mikes wrote: Brent: why should I accept opinions of (even respected!) scientists? I asked YOUR opinion. You mean when you wrote, So what kind of a 'universe' is it? bootstrap, self reflecting autodidacta? Creator-made? I'm not sure I have anything strong enough

Re: Free will: Wrong entry.

2010-03-12 Thread Brent Meeker
That depends on what you think free will means. If it means a neural network can produce non-random outputs with no input - the answer is yes. If it means you can't know the totality of the causes of your thoughts and actions the answer is no. If it means you actions arise from your biology

Re: Free will: Wrong entry.

2010-03-13 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/13/2010 3:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Mar 2010, at 21:53, m.a. wrote: I agree with you that quantum indeterminacy doesn't affect (free) will: Quantum mechanics is local and deterministic, and explains why it seems indeterministic to the 99,...% of the observers. (3/12/2010

Re: problem of size '10

2010-03-13 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/13/2010 6:32 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 12 March 2010 11:59, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: The pathways are all intact and can spring into action if the person wakes up. There is a continuum from everything being there and ready to use immediately, to all there

Re: Free will: Wrong entry.

2010-03-13 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/13/2010 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi William, OK I found it on the net: http://www.socialbehavior.uzh.ch/teaching/semsocialneurosciencespring09/Haynes_NatNeurosci_2008_ext.pdf But my comment will consist in repeating what I am always saying about free will or free decision. The

Re: Free will: Wrong entry.

2010-03-13 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/13/2010 9:17 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Mar 2010, at 23:15, Brent Meeker wrote: On 3/13/2010 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi William, OK I found it on the net: http://www.socialbehavior.uzh.ch/teaching/semsocialneurosciencespring09/Haynes_NatNeurosci_2008_ext.pdf But my comment

Re: problem of size '10

2010-03-14 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/14/2010 5:10 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 14 March 2010 08:43, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: (BTW the formatting for your last few posts looks odd when I read them with Gmail. Would it be possible to revert to plain text?) [Stathis] Does that matter here? I thought

Re: problem of size '10

2010-03-15 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/15/2010 5:37 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 15 March 2010 07:28, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: I don't think that's so clear. Everett's relative state interpretation implies consciousness is not unitary but continually splits just as the states of other quantum

Re: Health Care as a Human Right - Is Universal Health Care a Human Right?

2010-03-15 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/15/2010 6:32 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 16 March 2010 00:00, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi, This article is most troubling to be as it seems that its argument has become accepted by many people without consideration of the logical consequence.

Re: Health Care as a Human Right - Is Universal Health Care a Human Right?

2010-03-15 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/15/2010 8:45 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi Stathis and Friends, I respectfully invite you to re-read my comment. That a need becomes a right by convention or treaty or any means that enforce such is to effect the legitimation of coercion of the rights of those

Re: Health Care as a Human Right - Is Universal Health Care a Human Right?

2010-03-15 Thread Brent Meeker
:* everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-l...@googlegroups.com] *On Behalf Of *Brent Meeker *Sent:* Monday, March 15, 2010 3:25 PM *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com *Subject:* Re: Health Care as a Human Right - Is Universal Health Care a Human Right? snip First, your

Re: Health Care as a Human Right - Is Universal Health Care a Human Right?

2010-03-16 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/16/2010 4:59 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 16 March 2010 01:39, Bruno Marchalmarc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: ... I may disagree. There is a quasi-universal reason for which health should be a public care, or at least a matter of making heathy people to provide the money. Why? Because if

Re: problem of size '10

2010-03-16 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/16/2010 4:35 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 16 March 2010 05:51, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: The hypothesis is that it would have some effect, not necessarily that you would feel a little pain. Maybe the effect is that a certain thought comes into your

Re: Health Care as a Human Right - Is Universal Health Care a Human Right?

2010-03-16 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/16/2010 5:26 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 16 March 2010 02:45, Stephen P. Kingstephe...@charter.net wrote: It should not matter what the particular need is. The same reasoning can be applied to Housing, Transportation, Food, Entertainment, etc. So long as some notion of

Re: Jack's partial brain paper

2010-03-16 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/16/2010 6:03 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 16 March 2010 20:29, russell standishli...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: I've been following the thread on Jack's partial brains paper, although I've been too busy to comment. I did get a moment to read the paper this evening, and I was abruptly

Re: Jack's partial brain paper

2010-03-17 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/17/2010 3:34 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 17 March 2010 05:29, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote: I think this is a dubious argument based on our lack of understanding of qualia. Presumably one has many thoughts that do not result in any overt action. So if I lost a

Re: Jack's partial brain paper

2010-03-17 Thread Brent Meeker
On 3/17/2010 5:47 AM, HZ wrote: I'm quite confused about the state of zombieness. If the requirement for zombiehood is that it doesn't understand anything at all but it behaves as if it does what makes us not zombies? How do we not we are not? But more importantly, are there known cases of

Re: Jack's partial brain paper

2010-03-17 Thread Brent Meeker
is not ascribable to any particular implementation, but only to an abstract but precise infinity of computations, already 'realized' in elementary arithmetic. Bruno On Wed, Mar 17, 2010 at 11:34 AM, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 17 March 2010 05:29, Brent Meeker meeke

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