Learning to Prove Theorems via Interacting with Proof Assistants

2019-05-25 Thread Philip Thrift

https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.09381 :

*Learning to Prove Theorems via Interacting with Proof Assistants*
Kaiyu Yang, Jia Deng
(Submitted on 21 May 2019)

Humans prove theorems by relying on substantial high-level reasoning and 
problem-specific insights. Proof assistants offer a formalism that 
resembles human mathematical reasoning, representing theorems in 
higher-order logic and proofs as high-level tactics. However, human experts 
have to construct proofs manually by entering tactics into the proof 
assistant. In this paper, we study the problem of using machine learning to 
automate the interaction with proof assistants. We construct CoqGym, a 
large-scale dataset and learning environment containing 71K human-written 
proofs from 123 projects developed with the Coq proof assistant. We develop 
ASTactic, a deep learning-based model that generates tactics as programs in 
the form of abstract syntax trees (ASTs). Experiments show that ASTactic 
trained on CoqGym can generate effective tactics and can be used to prove 
new theorems not previously provable by automated methods. Code is 
available at https://github.com/princeton-vl/CoqGym


developed at Princeton Vision & Learning Lab: http://pvl.cs.princeton.edu/

@philipthrift

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Re: Finitist Set Theory

2019-05-24 Thread Philip Thrift


In its proof theory.

Each variable is changed to a (dynamically-nested, indefinitely-sized) type 
variable, effectively a process where elements are added as needed.

cf. 
https://poesophicalbits.blogspot.com/2012/04/persons-without-infinities.html

Death to Platonism.

@philipthrift

On Friday, May 24, 2019 at 4:13:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 23 May 2019, at 19:17, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> If you "combine" Finitist Set Theory with Locally Finite Theories, what 
> you get is a version of Axiom of Infinity with "processes" creating bigger 
> and bigger sets with gaps in them.
>
>
> I guess you mean we get this in the meta-theory?
>
> If not explain me how you get omega, the first infinite ordinal, *in* the 
> theory, without some infinity axiom.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> @philipthrift
>
> On Thursday, May 23, 2019 at 11:34:21 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> This seems to be a strengthening of elementary finite set theory, which 
>> is the theory of Zermelo minus the axiom of infinity.
>>
>> The theory of Zermelo is ZF without the Replacement Axioms (needed to 
>> compare the well-ordering and the ordinals) and without the foundation 
>> axioms (when we reject set belonging to themselves).
>>
>> I would not say that set theory is used for the foundation of 
>> mathematics. It is mainly a theory on the infinities, lurking toward the 
>> inconsistent big unnameable one. Sort of vertical theological shortcut. 
>>
>> Elementary finite set theory is Turing complete (Turing universal).
>>
>>  It is a set theoretic version of something between RA and PA.
>>
>> It is a universal machinery with its universal machines, and all others.
>>
>> It is a what I call a universal number. Each one has its application and 
>> purpose “in life”.
>>
>> God loves them all
>>
>> (I guess)
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On 22 May 2019, at 22:08, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> Finitist Set Theory
>>
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finitist_set_theory
>>
>> "The goal of an engineer who applies FST is to select axioms which yield 
>> a model that is one-one correlated with a target domain that is to be 
>> modeled by FST, such as a range of chemical compounds or social 
>> constructions that are found in nature. ... An applied FST model is always 
>> the minimal model which satisfies the applied axioms. This guarantees that 
>> those and only those elements exist in the applied model which are 
>> explicitly constructed by the selected axioms: only those urs [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urelement ] exist which are stated to 
>> exist by assigning their number, and only those sets exist which are 
>> constructed by the selected axioms; no other elements exist in addition to 
>> these."
>>
>> From:
>> Finitist set theory in ontological modeling
>> Avril Styrman & Aapo Halko, University of Helsinki
>> Applied Ontology  (2018)
>>
>> Abstract
>> "This article introduces finitist set theory (FST) and shows how it can 
>> be applied in modeling finite nested structures. Mereology is a 
>> straightforward foundation for transitive chains of part-whole relations 
>> between individuals but is incapable of modeling antitransitive chains. 
>> Traditional set theories are capable of modeling transitive and 
>> antitransitive chains of relations, but due to their function as 
>> foundations of mathematics they come with features that make them 
>> unnecessarily difficult in modeling finite structures. FST has been 
>> designed to function as a practical tool in modeling transitive and 
>> antitransitive chains of relations without suffering from difficulties of 
>> traditional set theories, and a major portion of the functionality of 
>> discrete mereology can be incorporated in FST. This makes FST a viable 
>> collection theory in ontological modeling."
>>
>>
>> Relation of finitist sets to processes:
>>
>> The term 'partition level' and the recursive definition of n-member are 
>> adapted from: 
>> - Seibt, J. (2015) Non-transitive parthood, leveled mereology, and the 
>> representation of emergent parts of processes. 
>> - Seibt, J. (2009). Forms of emergent interaction in general process 
>> theory. 
>>
>>
>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/220607682_Forms_of_emergent_interaction_in_General_Process_Theory
>>
>> "General Process Theory (GPT) is a new (non-Whiteheadian) process 
>> ont

Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity

2019-05-24 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, May 23, 2019 at 7:00:51 PM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, May 23, 2019 at 6:08:11 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/23/2019 3:37 PM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> The Torah, Tanach and to a degree as I understand the Christian New 
>> Testament are mythic narratives meant to bring meaning to various aspects 
>> of inner mental space or psychology.
>>
>>
>> I think you impute to much cleverness there.   A lot it is, or was, 
>> intended as real history providing both provenance and justification for 
>> whatever ethics was being pushed at the time.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> The writers of these narratives were rather clever. These are done in a 
> literary "shape-shifter" fashion so that they can be interpreted in a wide 
> range of ways. The book of Exodus, or Shemot (שְׁמוֹת) in Hebrew Shem = 
> name and Shemot is plural or means the list of names, has the children of 
> Israel leave Egypt (Mitzrayim) in the narrow place (Mezaryim), narrow in 
> one meaning because of the Nile. They are lead to the Red Sea where the 
> water is separated and crash, where red is symbolic of blood. Also remember 
> one of the plagues on Egypt was the Nile turned to blood. This is a birth 
> motif, and certainly one message is this is a metaphor for the birth of 
> Israel. The Torah is packed full of this sort of thing, and it involves a 
> lot of word play. 
>
> This is not to say there are not literal meanings as well, which in 
> different ages are rather different. The American conservative Protestant 
> idea about Christianity is a peculiar redaction on the whole meaning. I 
> can't say about the Koran and what Islamic scholars think. It is not a 
> subject I have delved into, nor am I ever likely to. Samiya has posted some 
> curious stuff that equates Koranic passages with meaning about atoms and at 
> one time if I recall about the Higgs boson. So the writers there were 
> clever enough to make the narratives and poetry shift metaphors and 
> retranslate meaning into different forms as the world learns and matures. 
> It really is one reason these scriptures have remained so culturally and 
> socially powerful for many centuries.
>
> My religious background is Judaism and Catholicism. I ended up choosing 
> Judaism, simply because it is in a way more intellectual, it is more fun, 
> and Catholicism has it perks here and there but it is also rather grave and 
> grey. I generally consider myself quite agnostic about the idea of an 
> infinite disembodied entity that created and controls everything. The idea 
> simply runs into contradictions. I can still go to the minion, where it is 
> the same reason the fiddler stays on the roof (Issac B Singer) --- 
> tradition. If I were Catholic instead I think it would be the same thing. 
>
> LC
>




The advantage for being raised Protestant is that the only next step is 
atheism - the ultimate Protestantism.

Protestantism (in the US) today is split: A collection of (sometimes) 
church-going virtually-atheist liberals, and the Republican Party.

@philipthrift

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Re: Finitist Set Theory

2019-05-23 Thread Philip Thrift

If you "combine" Finitist Set Theory with Locally Finite Theories, what you 
get is a version of Axiom of Infinity with "processes" creating bigger and 
bigger sets with gaps in them.

@philipthrift

On Thursday, May 23, 2019 at 11:34:21 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> This seems to be a strengthening of elementary finite set theory, which is 
> the theory of Zermelo minus the axiom of infinity.
>
> The theory of Zermelo is ZF without the Replacement Axioms (needed to 
> compare the well-ordering and the ordinals) and without the foundation 
> axioms (when we reject set belonging to themselves).
>
> I would not say that set theory is used for the foundation of mathematics. 
> It is mainly a theory on the infinities, lurking toward the inconsistent 
> big unnameable one. Sort of vertical theological shortcut. 
>
> Elementary finite set theory is Turing complete (Turing universal).
>
>  It is a set theoretic version of something between RA and PA.
>
> It is a universal machinery with its universal machines, and all others.
>
> It is a what I call a universal number. Each one has its application and 
> purpose “in life”.
>
> God loves them all
>
> (I guess)
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> On 22 May 2019, at 22:08, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
> Finitist Set Theory
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finitist_set_theory
>
> "The goal of an engineer who applies FST is to select axioms which yield a 
> model that is one-one correlated with a target domain that is to be modeled 
> by FST, such as a range of chemical compounds or social constructions that 
> are found in nature. ... An applied FST model is always the minimal model 
> which satisfies the applied axioms. This guarantees that those and only 
> those elements exist in the applied model which are explicitly constructed 
> by the selected axioms: only those urs [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urelement ] exist which are stated to exist 
> by assigning their number, and only those sets exist which are constructed 
> by the selected axioms; no other elements exist in addition to these."
>
> From:
> Finitist set theory in ontological modeling
> Avril Styrman & Aapo Halko, University of Helsinki
> Applied Ontology  (2018)
>
> Abstract
> "This article introduces finitist set theory (FST) and shows how it can be 
> applied in modeling finite nested structures. Mereology is a 
> straightforward foundation for transitive chains of part-whole relations 
> between individuals but is incapable of modeling antitransitive chains. 
> Traditional set theories are capable of modeling transitive and 
> antitransitive chains of relations, but due to their function as 
> foundations of mathematics they come with features that make them 
> unnecessarily difficult in modeling finite structures. FST has been 
> designed to function as a practical tool in modeling transitive and 
> antitransitive chains of relations without suffering from difficulties of 
> traditional set theories, and a major portion of the functionality of 
> discrete mereology can be incorporated in FST. This makes FST a viable 
> collection theory in ontological modeling."
>
>
> Relation of finitist sets to processes:
>
> The term 'partition level' and the recursive definition of n-member are 
> adapted from: 
> - Seibt, J. (2015) Non-transitive parthood, leveled mereology, and the 
> representation of emergent parts of processes. 
> - Seibt, J. (2009). Forms of emergent interaction in general process 
> theory. 
>
>
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/220607682_Forms_of_emergent_interaction_in_General_Process_Theory
>
> "General Process Theory (GPT) is a new (non-Whiteheadian) process 
> ontology. According to GPT the domains of scientific inquiry and everyday 
> practice consist of configurations of ‘goings-on’ or ‘dynamics’ that can be 
> technically defined as concrete, dynamic, non-particular individuals called 
> general processes. The paper offers a brief introduction to GPT in order to 
> provide ontological foundations for research programs such as interactivism 
> that centrally rely on the notions of ‘process,’ ‘interaction,’ and 
> ‘emergence.’ I begin with an analysis of our common sense concept of 
> activities, which plays a crucial heuristic role in the development of the 
> notion of a general process. General processes are not individuated in 
> terms of their location but in terms of ‘what they do,’ i.e., in terms of 
> their dynamic relationships in the basic sense of one process being part of 
> another. The formal framework of GPT is thus an extensional mereology, 
> albeit a non-classical theory with a non-transitive part-relation. After a 
> b

David Chalmers' path to consciousness (via Hegel's dialectics)

2019-05-23 Thread Philip Thrift


*Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism*
David J. Chalmers
http://consc.net/papers/panpsychism.pdf

"The Hegelian argument gives good reason to take *panpsychism *and 
*panprotopsychism* seriously. if we can find a solution to the combination 
problem. [It's] the most promising solution to the mind–body problem."

@philipthrift

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Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity

2019-05-23 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, May 23, 2019 at 3:03:01 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 May 2019, at 07:35, Samiya Illias > 
> wrote:
>
> I have just read several messages on various threads in this list about 
> God. I really don't know which one to answer to, nor do I wish to debate 
> the subject. It is God to choose and guide whoever He wills; I can only 
> keep my duty by sharing the ayaat of The Quran and the knowledge I learn 
> therefrom. 
>
>
>
> I agree with you that God is the ultimate one guiding us, but God is not 
> “God”, and nobody on Earth can use its name for any temporal spiritual 
> living. It brings automatically the argument per authority, which is 
> catastrophically, especially on he fundamental research.
>
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
You don't agree with J.-P. Sartre that "Existence precedes essence." We are 
born existentialists, not "guided" by any God.

Dissolving the "free will" question, G. Strawson just says "We have the 
experience of freedom." That experience in and of itself is enough, 
regardless of any God or physics or arithmetic.

That *experience* we do know exists, except for the 
experience/consciousness deniers.


@philipthrift

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Re: Symposium on axioms of consciousness

2019-05-23 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, May 22, 2019 at 9:30:04 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/21/2019 11:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, May 21, 2019 at 6:51:48 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/21/2019 2:57 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> via Hedda Hassel Mørch @heddamorch
>> https://twitter.com/heddamorch/status/113048705070737817
>>
>>
>> A lot to read:
>>
>>
>> *On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of 
>> consciousness* 
>> Tim Bayne [ https://research.monash.edu/en/persons/timothy-bayne ]
>> https://academic.oup.com/nc/article/2018/1/niy007/5047367
>>
>> *Symposium on Bayne, “On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated 
>> information theory of consciousness”*
>>
>> http://philosophyofbrains.com/2019/05/20/symposium-on-bayne-on-the-axiomatic-foundations-of-the-integrated-information-theory-of-consciousness.aspx
>>
>>
>> includes 
>> Hedda Hassel Mørch (commentary):
>>
>> "[IIT] can also be and is in some ways better interpreted as a form of 
>> Russellian monism, the view that conscious or protoconscious properties 
>> constitute the intrinsic nature of physical properties (which physics 
>> reveals as purely extrinsic and structural), and therefore would not be 
>> (purely) physical. This could be understood as compatible with IIT’s claim 
>> that consciousness is identical with integrated information, which could be 
>> interpreted to say that consciousness is identical with integrated 
>> information understood, not as a purely physical property, but as a 
>> property that may include a non-physical intrinsic nature."
>>
>>
>> But read https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799 
>> <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scottaaronson.com%2Fblog%2F%3Fp%3D1799=D=1=AFQjCNFkrIgncRPq5YjsNnBBL1uJbVLygQ>
>>  
>> first.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> I think Scott (who wrote that in 2014) needs to read this symposium 
> article.
>
> He knows something about - and may be considered an expert in - 
> computational complexity (classical and quantum), but he doesn't know much 
> more than anyone else outside his specialty, especially - he doesn't know 
> much about the subject of consciousness.
>
>
> Neither does Tononi.  And Scott knows how to calculate integrated 
> information.
>
> Brent
>


"integrated information" (in the context of consciousness science) is not a 
well-defined term. That was part of what the underlying paper (on "axioms") 
and commentary critical of IIT was all about.

So why doesn't Scott write an update post from the one he wrote 5 years 
ago? Because he is not in the field of conscious science - his field is 
computational complexity, which is pretty useless in contributing anything 
to the subject.

@philipthrift

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Finitist Set Theory

2019-05-22 Thread Philip Thrift
Finitist Set Theory

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Finitist_set_theory

"The goal of an engineer who applies FST is to select axioms which yield a 
model that is one-one correlated with a target domain that is to be modeled 
by FST, such as a range of chemical compounds or social constructions that 
are found in nature. ... An applied FST model is always the minimal model 
which satisfies the applied axioms. This guarantees that those and only 
those elements exist in the applied model which are explicitly constructed 
by the selected axioms: only those urs [ 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Urelement ] exist which are stated to exist 
by assigning their number, and only those sets exist which are constructed 
by the selected axioms; no other elements exist in addition to these."

From:
Finitist set theory in ontological modeling
Avril Styrman & Aapo Halko, University of Helsinki
Applied Ontology  (2018)

Abstract
"This article introduces finitist set theory (FST) and shows how it can be 
applied in modeling finite nested structures. Mereology is a 
straightforward foundation for transitive chains of part-whole relations 
between individuals but is incapable of modeling antitransitive chains. 
Traditional set theories are capable of modeling transitive and 
antitransitive chains of relations, but due to their function as 
foundations of mathematics they come with features that make them 
unnecessarily difficult in modeling finite structures. FST has been 
designed to function as a practical tool in modeling transitive and 
antitransitive chains of relations without suffering from difficulties of 
traditional set theories, and a major portion of the functionality of 
discrete mereology can be incorporated in FST. This makes FST a viable 
collection theory in ontological modeling."


Relation of finitist sets to processes:

The term 'partition level' and the recursive definition of n-member are 
adapted from: 
- Seibt, J. (2015) Non-transitive parthood, leveled mereology, and the 
representation of emergent parts of processes. 
- Seibt, J. (2009). Forms of emergent interaction in general process 
theory. 

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/220607682_Forms_of_emergent_interaction_in_General_Process_Theory

"General Process Theory (GPT) is a new (non-Whiteheadian) process ontology. 
According to GPT the domains of scientific inquiry and everyday practice 
consist of configurations of ‘goings-on’ or ‘dynamics’ that can be 
technically defined as concrete, dynamic, non-particular individuals called 
general processes. The paper offers a brief introduction to GPT in order to 
provide ontological foundations for research programs such as interactivism 
that centrally rely on the notions of ‘process,’ ‘interaction,’ and 
‘emergence.’ I begin with an analysis of our common sense concept of 
activities, which plays a crucial heuristic role in the development of the 
notion of a general process. General processes are not individuated in 
terms of their location but in terms of ‘what they do,’ i.e., in terms of 
their dynamic relationships in the basic sense of one process being part of 
another. The formal framework of GPT is thus an extensional mereology, 
albeit a non-classical theory with a non-transitive part-relation. After a 
brief sketch of basic notions and strategies of the GPT-framework I show 
how the latter may be applied to distinguish between causal, mechanistic, 
functional, self-maintaining, and recursively self-maintaining 
interactions, all of which involve ‘emergent phenomena’ in various senses 
of the term."

cf. Locally Finite Theories
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2273942

@philipthrift

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Re: Allah: the One and Only Deity

2019-05-22 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, May 22, 2019 at 7:53:21 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> First we have Cosmin Visan's nonsense and now this. Is The Everything List 
> turning into Crackpot Central?
>
>  John K Clark
>



The primary world's religious texts have some poetic value at best, but 
there's a ton of humanity-damaging content in these (some more than others) 
as well.

Best to stick to stuff about real stuff: 
https://www.livescience.com/65256-first-molecule-in-the-universe.html

But for crackpottery, what a number of physicists (especially) write today 
is up there. The list is growing ...

@philipthrift

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Re: Symposium on axioms of consciousness

2019-05-22 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, May 22, 2019 at 3:38:47 AM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> IIT is just a materialistic fairy-tale.
>

But isn't Hedda's response in the symposium: 

 IIT is a physicalistic fairy-tale

?

@philipthrift 

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Re: Symposium on axioms of consciousness

2019-05-22 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, May 21, 2019 at 6:51:48 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/21/2019 2:57 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> via Hedda Hassel Mørch @heddamorch
> https://twitter.com/heddamorch/status/113048705070737817
>
>
> A lot to read:
>
>
> *On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of 
> consciousness* 
> Tim Bayne [ https://research.monash.edu/en/persons/timothy-bayne ]
> https://academic.oup.com/nc/article/2018/1/niy007/5047367
>
> *Symposium on Bayne, “On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated 
> information theory of consciousness”*
>
> http://philosophyofbrains.com/2019/05/20/symposium-on-bayne-on-the-axiomatic-foundations-of-the-integrated-information-theory-of-consciousness.aspx
>
>
> includes 
> Hedda Hassel Mørch (commentary):
>
> "[IIT] can also be and is in some ways better interpreted as a form of 
> Russellian monism, the view that conscious or protoconscious properties 
> constitute the intrinsic nature of physical properties (which physics 
> reveals as purely extrinsic and structural), and therefore would not be 
> (purely) physical. This could be understood as compatible with IIT’s claim 
> that consciousness is identical with integrated information, which could be 
> interpreted to say that consciousness is identical with integrated 
> information understood, not as a purely physical property, but as a 
> property that may include a non-physical intrinsic nature."
>
>
> But read https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799 
> <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scottaaronson.com%2Fblog%2F%3Fp%3D1799=D=1=AFQjCNFkrIgncRPq5YjsNnBBL1uJbVLygQ>
>  
> first.
>
> Brent
>



I think Scott (who wrote that in 2014) needs to read this symposium article.

He knows something about - and may be considered an expert in - 
computational complexity (classical and quantum), but he doesn't know much 
more than anyone else outside his specialty, especially - he doesn't know 
much about the subject of consciousness.

@philipthrift

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Symposium on axioms of consciousness

2019-05-21 Thread Philip Thrift

via Hedda Hassel Mørch @heddamorch
https://twitter.com/heddamorch/status/113048705070737817


A lot to read:


*On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated information theory of 
consciousness* 
Tim Bayne [ https://research.monash.edu/en/persons/timothy-bayne ]
https://academic.oup.com/nc/article/2018/1/niy007/5047367

*Symposium on Bayne, “On the axiomatic foundations of the integrated 
information theory of consciousness”*
http://philosophyofbrains.com/2019/05/20/symposium-on-bayne-on-the-axiomatic-foundations-of-the-integrated-information-theory-of-consciousness.aspx


includes 
Hedda Hassel Mørch (commentary):

"[IIT] can also be and is in some ways better interpreted as a form of 
Russellian monism, the view that conscious or protoconscious properties 
constitute the intrinsic nature of physical properties (which physics 
reveals as purely extrinsic and structural), and therefore would not be 
(purely) physical. This could be understood as compatible with IIT’s claim 
that consciousness is identical with integrated information, which could be 
interpreted to say that consciousness is identical with integrated 
information understood, not as a purely physical property, but as a 
property that may include a non-physical intrinsic nature."

@philipthrift

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Re: for Cosmin

2019-05-21 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, May 21, 2019 at 9:30:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 May 2019, at 12:31, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, May 21, 2019 at 2:13:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> I don’t see how, nor why, we could associate experience with matter. Then 
>> with mechanism, we have to explain the appearance of matter from the 
>> universal numbers and their relations. Materialism requires non-mechanism. 
>> I have never found any evidence for (weak) materialism, but there are many 
>> evidence for mechanism, and computer science provides a mathematically 
>> precise theory of 3p self, 1p self, and material selves, in a precise 
>> enough way so that it can be tested. Up to now, QM assesses mechanism, 
>> which is not the case with Laplace or Newton.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> One could have an an ontology of pure phenomenology, of pure experiences, 
> including first-person experience: "I am."
>
> Or one of pure information, of pure arithmetic/logic, from low-order PA to 
> higher-order modal and  even infinitary arithmetics/logics.
>
> The first captures the real existence of experience, but misses the 
> grounding that matter provides.
>
> The second captures all possible behavioral descriptions, but has the big 
> hole in it of missing experience itself.
>
>
> That is where you are incorrect. Arithmetic (not to be confused with human 
> theories about arithmetic) contains what is needed to assess  experiences 
> and first personhood to numbers, or more exactly to infinitely many numbers 
> relations.
>
> The universal machines already explains that she has a soul, but that she 
> cannot prove this to you, as you cannot prove that you are conscious to me, 
> even if I bet you are.
>
> Only matter supplies what is needed for both.
>
>
> It adds something we don’t understand to something we make unintelligible, 
> like a mind-body identification.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
This was posted today. If each person is in a real number, then *Watch out!*


<https://twitter.com/JDHamkins>
Joel David Hamkins
@JDHamkins
<https://twitter.com/JDHamkins>
·
7h <https://twitter.com/JDHamkins/status/1130820035080073216>
We'll be throwing darts at the real line today at the Phil Maths seminar.

@philipthrift 


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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-21 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, May 21, 2019 at 6:06:19 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 May 2019, at 10:32, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> But I claim that no zillion-processor Intel Core computer (that ultimately 
> runs programs compiled to Intel machine code) can be conscious. I also 
> claim God does not exist.
>
>
> Which God?
>
>
>
> It is this context that [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room ] is 
> correct.
>
> "The Chinese room argument holds that an executing program cannot [have] 
> consciousness, regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program 
> may make the computer behave.”
>
>
> The Chinese room argument is based on a misunderstanding of how a computer 
> work. It has been refuted correctly by Dennett and Hofstadter, since long.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
I think in 2019 Dennett may have changed from his previous "consciousness 
denier" belief, but I'm not sure. (Isn't Hofstadter a joke?)


https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/

This is how philosophers in the twentieth century came to endorse the 
Denial, the silliest view ever held in the history of human thought. 

“When I squint just right,” *Dennett *writes in 2013, “it does sort of seem 
that consciousness must be something in addition to all the things it does 
for us and to us, some special private glow or here-I-am-ness that would be 
absent in any robot… But I’ve learned not to credit the hunch. I think it 
is a flat-out mistake, a failure of imagination.” His position was 
summarized in an interview in The New York Times: “The elusive subjective 
conscious experience—the redness of red, the painfulness of pain—that 
philosophers call qualia? Sheer illusion.” If he’s right, no one has ever 
really suffered, in spite of agonizing diseases, mental illness, murder, 
rape, famine, slavery, bereavement, torture, and genocide. And no one has 
ever caused anyone else pain.

*This is the Great Silliness. We must hope that it doesn’t spread outside 
the academy, or convince some future information technologist or roboticist 
who has great power over our lives.*


@philipthfift

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Re: for Cosmin

2019-05-21 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, May 21, 2019 at 5:35:33 AM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> How does "matter" (which is just an idea in consciousness) provides 
> grounding for anything ?
>

If everything was consciousness (an ontology of pure experience), then I 
should be able to astrally project, run around in a Game of Thrones 
reality, hang out with Sherlock Holmes, ...

Matter (while being the source of consciousness) grounds and constrains 
your consciousness. Matter is why you wake up to the same world every day.

@philipthrift

 

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Re: for Cosmin

2019-05-21 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, May 21, 2019 at 2:13:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> I don’t see how, nor why, we could associate experience with matter. Then 
> with mechanism, we have to explain the appearance of matter from the 
> universal numbers and their relations. Materialism requires non-mechanism. 
> I have never found any evidence for (weak) materialism, but there are many 
> evidence for mechanism, and computer science provides a mathematically 
> precise theory of 3p self, 1p self, and material selves, in a precise 
> enough way so that it can be tested. Up to now, QM assesses mechanism, 
> which is not the case with Laplace or Newton.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
One could have an an ontology of pure phenomenology, of pure experiences, 
including first-person experience: "I am."

Or one of pure information, of pure arithmetic/logic, from low-order PA to 
higher-order modal and  even infinitary arithmetics/logics.

The first captures the real existence of experience, but misses the 
grounding that matter provides.

The second captures all possible behavioral descriptions, but has the big 
hole in it of missing experience itself.

Only matter supplies what is needed for both.

@philipthrift


 

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-20 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 6:19:54 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 2:01 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>  
>
>> *> If a program (multi-core x86 code) running on a zillion-processor 
>> Intel Core computer can be conscious, then the proposition of "Chinese 
>> room" is wrong.*
>>
>
> You want to prove that only wet squishy things can be conscious. You ask 
> that little man (who happens to have a wet squishy brain) in that gigantic 
> room if he is conscious on knowing Chinese and he says no. The only wet 
> squishy thing in that humongous room is in the little man and* you assume* 
> only wet squishy things can be conscious and so *conclude* that there is 
> no consciousness of Chinese in that astronomically large room.
>
> Assuming what you want to prove is not only wrong its STUPID. 
>
> John K Clark 
>


It's already been established how Data's positronics could be conscious. I 
don't know how "wet squishy" Data's positronics are.

https://memory-alpha.fandom.com/wiki/Positronic_matrix

*A positronic matrix was a significant part of an android's positronic 
brain, but could also be adapted for use in conjunction with a humanoid's 
brain.*

*When Data created his "daughter" Lal in 2366, during her development he 
observed some quantum variations, notably her use of contractions. Because 
her neural net was identical to Data's, he began to maintain records on her 
positronic matrix activity, behavioral norms, and verbal patterns. (TNG: 
"The Offspring") Lal subsequently "died" as a result of having an unstable 
positronic matrix.*
* ...*

@philipthrift 

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-20 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 5:45:55 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 4:40 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 4:10:12 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, May 20, 2019, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 10:39:20 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>>>>  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjCytqku18M 
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That was interesting. Data has consciousness or doesn't. It's like 
>>>> being pregnant.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> So what would you say to data, if he existed? That you're not conscious 
>>> because every other conscious being that we know of is biological?
>>>  
>>>
>>>> All examples of consciousness we have exist in living objects. (Us, for 
>>>> example.)
>>>>
>>>>
>>> True but that's not evidence
>>>  
>>>
>>>> Can something be a conscious object but not a living object?
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Depending on your definition of life, yes, I think so.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> I was only just reading about Data's positronic technology. If 
>> positronics is like biopolymers being used to make synthetic neurons today, 
>> then Data could be conscious.
>>
>> A non-living conscious being seems like a contradiction. I don't think 
>> Data would be both conscious and non-living. Data would be an example of 
>> life made of alternative biochemistry.
>>
>>
> Life usually embodies aspects such as reproduction, metabolism, etc.  A 
> mars rover or a Boltzmann brain would not meet the definition of alive, but 
> could be conscious.
>
> Jason
>


So you read the synthetic biology technology literature? Living things are 
being made in labs today.

*Engineering Microbial Living Therapeutics: The Synthetic Biology Toolbox*

https://www.cell.com/trends/biotechnology/fulltext/S0167-7799(18)30258-0


Living therapeutics have been engineered to diagnose diseases and produce 
and deliver therapeutics in situ. These therapeutics can be equipped with 
devices for sensing inputs, controlling gene expression, building memory, 
and producing and delivering an active compound. Ingenious devices 
responding to stress, temperature, quorum-sensing signals, and other small 
molecules have been built to control the production and delivery of 
therapeutic molecules. To deal with biosafety, some living therapeutics 
carry biocontainment devices based on cell auxotrophy, 
temperature-sensitive regulators, and toxin/antitoxin counteraction. Recent 
advances in synthetic biology greatly expanded the toolbox for engineering 
living therapeutics; however, new parts are still needed to help synthetic 
biologists engineer more diverse and fully functional living therapeutics. 
Microbes can be engineered to act like living therapeutics designed to 
perform specific actions in the human body. From fighting and preventing 
infections to eliminating tumors and treating metabolic disorders, 
engineered living systems are the next generation of therapeutics. In 
recent years, synthetic biologists have greatly expanded the genetic 
toolbox for microbial living therapeutics, adding sensors, regulators, 
memory circuits, delivery devices, and kill switches. These advances have 
paved the way for successful engineering of fully functional living 
therapeutics, with sensing, production, and biocontainment devices. 
However, some important tools are still missing from the box. In this 
review, we cover the most recent biological parts and approaches developed 
and describe the missing tools needed to build robust living therapeutics.

@philipthrift 

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-20 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 4:53:20 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/20/2019 10:46 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
> > All examples of consciousness we have exist in living objects. (Us, 
> > for example.) 
> > 
> > Can something be a conscious object but not a living object? 
>
> So you're going to appeal to the elan' vital as necessary to 
> consciousness? 
>
> Brent 
>



Ghosts are conscious but non-living. (They are immaterial, in fact.)

So there are those, of course.

Consciousness inhabiting a zillion-processor Intel Core computer would 
indeed be like a ghost inhabiting it.

@philipthrift

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-20 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 4:10:12 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, May 20, 2019, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 10:39:20 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>>>>  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjCytqku18M 
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> That was interesting. Data has consciousness or doesn't. It's like being 
>> pregnant.
>>
>>
>
> So what would you say to data, if he existed? That you're not conscious 
> because every other conscious being that we know of is biological?
>  
>
>> All examples of consciousness we have exist in living objects. (Us, for 
>> example.)
>>
>>
> True but that's not evidence
>  
>
>> Can something be a conscious object but not a living object?
>>
>>
> Depending on your definition of life, yes, I think so.
>
> Jason
>
>  
>

 

I was only just reading about Data's positronic technology. If positronics 
is like biopolymers being used to make synthetic neurons today, then Data 
could be conscious.

A non-living conscious being seems like a contradiction. I don't think Data 
would be both conscious and non-living. Data would be an example of life 
made of alternative biochemistry.

@philipthrift


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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-20 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 12:46:13 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 10:39:20 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>>>>  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjCytqku18M 
>>>>>
>>>>
>>
>>
>
> That was interesting. Data has consciousness or doesn't. It's like being 
> pregnant.
>
>  
>
>>
>>
Data (in your video link) apparently is synthesized with positronic links:

   https://memory-alpha.fandom.com/wiki/Positronic_link

What is the material composition of Data's positronic links?

@philipthrift


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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-20 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 11:55:40 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, May 20, 2019 at 4:32 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> >*The Chinese room argument holds that an executing program cannot* [blah 
>> blah]
>
>
> Philip, I'd really like to know why you think the Chinese room argument is 
> not imbecilic. I'm also curious why you cut and pasted all that stuff about 
> silicon biochemistry from Wikipedia.
>
>  John K Clark 
>



If a program (multi-core x86 code) running on a zillion-processor Intel 
Core computer can be conscious, then the proposition of "Chinese room" is 
wrong.

@philipthrift

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-20 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 10:39:20 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WjCytqku18M 

>>>
>
>

That was interesting. Data has consciousness or doesn't. It's like being 
pregnant.

 

>
>
>  
>
>>
>> There are several alternatives to our biochemistry, of course [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothetical_types_of_biochemistry ], even 
>> involving silicon*. (This is about the 20th time I have posted this.)
>>
>> But I claim that no zillion-processor Intel Core computer (that 
>> ultimately runs programs compiled to Intel machine code) can be conscious. 
>> I also claim God does not exist.
>>
>> It is this context that [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room ] 
>> is correct. 
>>
>
>> "The Chinese room argument holds that an executing program cannot [have] 
>> consciousness, regardless of how intelligently or human-like the program 
>> may make the computer behave."
>>
>>
> The Chinese Room Argument was thoroughly debunked by over a dozen 
> critiquers before it was published.  It has numerous flaws, none of which 
> were addressed between the time he received the critiques and when Searle 
> published.  
>
> A few examples:
>
>- It confuses the "processor" for the system as a whole.  This would 
>be like confusing the laws of physics for the human brain. The laws of 
>physics is the substrate by which the brain states are processed and 
>updated, but you would not ascribe the consciousness to the laws of 
> physics.
>- It assumes there is only one mind in the room, the human operator. 
>But this quickly falls upon closer inspection, if you interview the 
>"chinese speaking mind" you find that the opinions of this other mind are 
>not the opinions of the english speaking human operator.
>
>  
>
>> * Silicon biochemistry
>> See also: Organosilicon 
>> 
>> 
>> Structure of silane , analog of 
>> methane 
>> 
>> 
>> Structure of the silicone polydimethylsiloxane 
>>  (PDMS)
>> 
>> 
>> Marine diatoms —carbon-based 
>> organisms that extract silicon from sea water, in the form of its oxide 
>> (silica) and incorporate it into their cell walls
>>
>> The silicon atom has been much discussed as the basis for an alternative 
>> biochemical system, because silicon has many chemical properties 
>>  similar to those of 
>> carbon and is in the same group of the periodic table 
>> , the carbon group 
>> . Like carbon, silicon can 
>> create molecules that are sufficiently large to carry biological 
>> information.[10] 
>> 
>>
>> However, silicon has several drawbacks as an alternative to carbon. 
>> Silicon, unlike carbon, lacks the ability to form chemical bonds with 
>> diverse types of atoms as is necessary for the chemical versatility 
>> required for metabolism, and yet this precise inability is what makes 
>> silicon less susceptible to bond with all sorts of impurities from which 
>> carbon, in comparison, is not shielded. Elements creating organic 
>> functional groups with carbon include hydrogen, oxygen, nitrogen, 
>> phosphorus, sulfur, and metals such as iron, magnesium, and zinc. Silicon, 
>> on the other hand, interacts with very few other types of atoms.[10] 
>> 
>>  Moreover, 
>> where it does interact with other atoms, silicon creates molecules that 
>> have been described as "monotonous compared with the combinatorial universe 
>> of organic macromolecules".[10] 
>> 
>>  This 
>> is because silicon atoms are much bigger, having a larger mass 
>>  and atomic radius 
>> , and so have difficulty 
>> forming double bonds (the double-bonded carbon is part of the carbonyl 
>>  group, a fundamental motif of 
>> carbon-based bio-organic chemistry).
>>
>> Silanes , which are chemical 
>> compounds of hydrogen 
>>  and silicon that are analogous 
>> to the alkane  hydrocarbons 
>> 

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-20 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 10:03:12 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 May 2019, at 00:33, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
> Isn't  *qualia can be reduced to information processing*  the unsupported 
> assertion?
>
> The burden of proof is on those who claim qualia comes out of information 
> processing.
>
> If that claim were true, then any IP system - like a smartphone that can 
> execute programs - can have human-type qualia existing inside it.
>
>
> It is not because some “information processing” could support 
> consciousness that we can conclude that all information processing can 
> support consciousness. You need at least one reflexive loop. You need two 
> reflexive loop for having self-consciousness (Löbianity).
>
> But the information processing is not enough, you need a reality, also, be 
> it the arithmetical truth, or a physical phenomenologies which would be 
> Turing universal.
>
> The arithmetical truth must be understood as something beyond all 
> information processing possible, as we know since Gödel and Tarski.
>
> The advantage of mechanism is that we do have a theory: computer science 
> (aka Recrusion theory, or Arithmetic).
>
> That does not make Mechanism true, but it makes the problems amenable to 
> mathematical formulation and testing.
>
> Bruno
>
>  


A smartphone CPU, like Samsung's


https://www.anandtech.com/show/13599/samsung-announces-8nm-exynos-9820-with-trigroup-cpu-design

can run any "Turing" program. 

So I still don't see from your description what exactly is missing for it 
to produce|execute human qualia?

@philipthrift

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

2019-05-20 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, May 20, 2019 at 5:01:20 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 May 2019, at 14:52, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> This is what I call one form of *consciousness denial*
>
>   https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/
>
> in that information processing absent actual *first-class* entities of 
> qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs information 
> processing operating in a *material substrate* where those entities are 
> available to be combined and manipulated.
>
>
>
> What is that material substrate, and what is its role in consciousness?
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
A substrate (or stuff) like the one you (or myself, at least) are living 
and breathing in right at this moment. 

@philipthrift

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-20 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 6:50:48 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, May 19, 2019, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 2:40:04 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 1:21 PM Philip Thrift  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 10:13:22 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 5/19/2019 12:19 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation 
>>>>>> running in a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html :
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of 
>>>>> biochemical makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer 
>>>>> could never have experiences, no matter what its causal organization *
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> *A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical 
>>>>> system, it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On 
>>>>> this view, the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain 
>>>>> are 
>>>>> not directly relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they 
>>>>> may 
>>>>> be indirectly relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract 
>>>>> causal organization, an organization that might be realized in many 
>>>>> different physical substrates.*
>>>>>
>>>>> *In this paper I defend this view.*
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway. 
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Brent
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  
>>>>
>>>> That was written in 1993. (In 2019, I don't think he himself defends 
>>>> this view.)
>>>>
>>>> In any case, I read this "defense" like I read papers defending* the 
>>>> existence of God*.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> A scientist should be thrilled to find something which might show the 
>>> ideas he or she holds to be wrong, as it offers a chance to adopt a more 
>>> correct view.  Recently I have seen a lot of people on this list telling 
>>> others their idea is wrong, but not giving any reason or reasoning to 
>>> justify that assertion.
>>>
>>> This doesn't helping anyone. Telling someone else they are wrong without 
>>> providing a reason won't get them to change their mind, if anything failing 
>>> to provide a reason is just as likely to reinforce their belief. If you see 
>>> or intuit something that someone else does not, I think it is best to 
>>> either point out what it is they are missing or remain silent.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>
>>
>>
>>
> Philip,
>
> I commend you for providing your reasons below. Thank you.
>
>  
>
>>
>> We know our brains, which we examine in science to be made of a complex 
>> configuration of cells, neurons and glial, with complex neurochemistry*, 
>> produces consciousness. That is the fact we know to be the case.
>>
>
> Yes, I agree.
>  
>
>>
>> So it seems reasonable, from both a scientific and engineering stance, 
>> that a synthetic intelligence approach - one that combines 
>> synthetic-biological assembly with AI information processing to produce 
>> outputs that are actually living things - is the road to (synthetic) 
>> consciousness.
>>
>> *The belief that a conventional computer made of a zillion Intel Core 
>> chips with the right programming can be conscious is a religious belief, 
>> not a a scientific belief.*
>>
>>
> You could say it is a hypothesis for which we currently have no di

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-19 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 2:40:04 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 1:21 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 10:13:22 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/19/2019 12:19 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation running 
>>>> in a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html :
>>>
>>>
>>> *for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of biochemical 
>>> makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer could never 
>>> have experiences, no matter what its causal organization *
>>>
>>>
>>> *A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical 
>>> system, it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On 
>>> this view, the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain are 
>>> not directly relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they may 
>>> be indirectly relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract 
>>> causal organization, an organization that might be realized in many 
>>> different physical substrates.*
>>>
>>> *In this paper I defend this view.*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway. 
>>>
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> That was written in 1993. (In 2019, I don't think he himself defends this 
>> view.)
>>
>> In any case, I read this "defense" like I read papers defending* the 
>> existence of God*.
>>
>>
> A scientist should be thrilled to find something which might show the 
> ideas he or she holds to be wrong, as it offers a chance to adopt a more 
> correct view.  Recently I have seen a lot of people on this list telling 
> others their idea is wrong, but not giving any reason or reasoning to 
> justify that assertion.
>
> This doesn't helping anyone. Telling someone else they are wrong without 
> providing a reason won't get them to change their mind, if anything failing 
> to provide a reason is just as likely to reinforce their belief. If you see 
> or intuit something that someone else does not, I think it is best to 
> either point out what it is they are missing or remain silent.
>
> Jason
>



We know our brains, which we examine in science to be made of a complex 
configuration of cells, neurons and glial, with complex neurochemistry*, 
produces consciousness. That is the fact we know to be the case.

So it seems reasonable, from both a scientific and engineering stance, that 
a synthetic intelligence approach - one that combines synthetic-biological 
assembly with AI information processing to produce outputs that are 
actually living things - is the road to (synthetic) consciousness.

*The belief that a conventional computer made of a zillion Intel Core chips 
with the right programming can be conscious is a religious belief, not a a 
scientific belief.*

The burden of proof is on those with that belief to prove it, just as the 
burden of proof is on those with the belief that God exists to prove that.


* neurochemistry like the recently reported role of SATB2-expressing 
neurons in the processing of taste.

SATB2: "SATB2 is a 733 amino-acid homeodomain-containing human protein with 
a molecular weight of 82.5 kDa encoded by the SATB2 gene on 2q33."

@philipthrift

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Re: for Cosmin

2019-05-19 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 12:11:11 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 May 2019, at 12:25, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 4:44:48 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 14 May 2019, at 20:45, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 11:24:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 13 May 2019, at 20:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 12:25:38 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 10 May 2019, at 09:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> When someone says "consciousness is not a material thing" I think of 
>>>> Wile E. Coyote.
>>>>
>>>> Consciousnesses need something (matter) to hang on to. Consciousnesses 
>>>> just don't go floating around willy-nilly. The Coyote finds that out when 
>>>> he finds out he is hanging on to nothing, and looks down. 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That is nice Aristotelian poetry. But you just repeat you ontological 
>>>> commitment in a material world, where no physicist has a consistent theory 
>>>> of it, nor even have tried to test its existence. What the Aspect 
>>>> experience has only shown, is that IF there is a physicaly reality then it 
>>>> can’t be a boolean reality (which would have already annoyed Aristotle).
>>>>
>>>> Then with Mechanism, “Matter” invocation needs to add some magic 
>>>> incompatible with YD+CT.
>>>> It is like invoking a God to impeach testing simpler theories which do 
>>>> not commit a so strong ontological commitment.
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I was shooting for Epicurean poetry (or Lucretian; Lucretius's *De 
>>> rerum natur*a [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_rerum_natura ] was a 
>>> poem about the philosophy of Epicurus).
>>>
>>> Aristotle's philosophy is *confused nonsense*, especially when compared 
>>> to Epicurus’s.
>>>
>>>
>>> This is weird. I appreciate Aristotle, because it is rather clear, and 
>>> enough precise to be refuted, with in the natural science and the theology. 
>>> I tend to consider him as the inventor of the notion of primitive matter, 
>>> that is the first which postulate the existence of a physical universe (in 
>>> metaphysics), but that is also the only place where he get confused (his 
>>> metaphysics). 
>>>
>>> As a materialist (a “believer in matter”) it is astonishing you don’t 
>>> appreciate Aristotle. He is really the one who got the idea that “God” is a 
>>> physical universe, even if he add the chiquenaude divine to create the 
>>> first move.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>> The atomistic materialist Democritus came before Aristote, and Epicurus, 
>> the most advanced of the atomists (as written about by Lucretius) was about 
>> the same time as Aristotle.
>>
>> But way before them was Thales, who inspired Aristotle's thoughts on 
>> matter:
>>
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thales_of_Miletus#Water_as_a_first_principle
>>
>> Thales' most famous philosophical position was his cosmological 
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmology> thesis, which comes down to us 
>> through a passage from Aristotle 
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle>'s *Metaphysics 
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics_(Aristotle)>*. In the work 
>> Aristotle unequivocally reported Thales’ hypothesis 
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothesis> about *the nature of 
>> all matter <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matter#Historical_development> – 
>> that the originating principle of nature 
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arche> was a single material substance 
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Material_monism>*: *water*. Aristotle 
>> then proceeded to proffer a number of conjectures based on his own 
>> observations to lend some credence to why Thales may have advanced this 
>> idea (though Aristotle didn’t hold it himself).
>>
>> Aristotle laid out his own thinking about matter and form 
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism> which may shed some light 
>> on the ideas of Thales, in *Metaphysics 
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics>* 983 b6 8–11, 17–21. (The 

Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-19 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 10:13:22 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/19/2019 12:19 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation running 
>> in a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.
>>
>>
>> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.
>>
>>
>>
> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html :
>
>
> *for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of biochemical 
> makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer could never 
> have experiences, no matter what its causal organization *
>
>
> *A natural suggestion is that when experience arises from a physical 
> system, it does so in virtue of the system's functional organization. On 
> this view, the chemical and indeed the quantum substrates of the brain are 
> not directly relevant to the existence of consciousness, although they may 
> be indirectly relevant. What is central is rather the brain's abstract 
> causal organization, an organization that might be realized in many 
> different physical substrates.*
>
> *In this paper I defend this view.*
>
>
>
> That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway. 
>
>
> Brent
>

 

That was written in 1993. (In 2019, I don't think he himself defends this 
view.)

In any case, I read this "defense" like I read papers defending* the 
existence of God*.

@philipthrift
 

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-19 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 2:19:31 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation running 
>> in a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.
>>
>>
>> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.
>>
>>
>>
> http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html :
>
> *for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of biochemical 
> makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer could never 
> have experiences, no matter what its causal organization *
>
> That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway. 
>
> And it's he only thing engineers need to pay attention to, Now AI 
> engineers just want to make smart robots, not conscious robots. But if they 
> did, then that above is all that matters.
>
> (In any case, I don't think Chalmers himself believes in what he wrote in 
> papers 25 years ago, per Philip Goff.)
>
> @philipthrift 
>
 

I should say above, AI engineers want to make functionally-smart robots. 
That's a better word.

Back in the '80s I was working on autonomous smart weapons, or autonomous 
smart missiles, which could "see" on their own and make decisions  (I sort 
of hate say.) That was DARPA's name.

If a smart missile were conscious, It would be committing suicide.

@philipthrift

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-19 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, May 19, 2019 at 1:50:03 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/18/2019 11:25 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation running in 
> a big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.
>
>
> Nor can you give a reply to Chalmer's fading consciousness problem.
>
>
>
http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html :

*for a system to be conscious it must have the right sort of biochemical 
makeup; if so, a metallic robot or a silicon-based computer could never 
have experiences, no matter what its causal organization *

That from David Chalmer's paper is the only good takeaway. 

And it's he only thing engineers need to pay attention to, Now AI engineers 
just want to make smart robots, not conscious robots. But if they did, then 
that above is all that matters.

(In any case, I don't think Chalmers himself believes in what he wrote in 
papers 25 years ago, per Philip Goff.)

@philipthrift 

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-19 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 7:51:45 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/18/2019 12:19 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 10:47:15 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/17/2019 11:11 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:09:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: 
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift  
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> *> Information processing absent actual first-class entities 
>>>>>> of qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs 
>>>>>> information 
>>>>>> processing operating in a material substrate where those entities are 
>>>>>> available to be combined and manipulated.*
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "f*irst-class 
>>>>> entities of qualia*" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But 
>>>>> "*first-class 
>>>>> qualia*" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically saying 
>>>>> only conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue of 
>>>>> always 
>>>>> being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required pointless 
>>>>> repetition and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact 
>>>>> same place you started with. And that is typical of all consciousness 
>>>>> theories.
>>>>>
>>>>> John K Clark
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be 
>>>> reduced to information processing. 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what 
>>>> "reduced" means in that context.  
>>>>
>>>> (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to 
>>>> information processing, then they would derivative from information, or 
>>>> "second-class".)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain environment.  
>>>> Same with information processing.  In general it's streams of bits being 
>>>> processed being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's qualia if 
>>>> the streams are in some entity whose environment and actions give meaning 
>>>> to the information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie down."
>>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Isn't  *qualia can be reduced to information processing*  the 
>>> unsupported assertion?
>>>
>>>
>>> No.  It's very well supported.  Interfere with information processing by 
>>> drugs or electrical stimulus of the brain and qualia are changed or 
>>> eliminated.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>> *Information processing (IP) is necessary for consciousness*, but IP has 
>> to occur in a substrate that produces qualia. *Stop the IP and you stop 
>> consciousness.* But *the same IP* *in a different substrate* could be 
>> consciousnessless.  
>>
>> The above substate is the material of the brain: neurons, neurochemistry, 
>> glia, ...
>>
>>
>> Mere supposition.  It's just the complement of the claim that machines 
>> can never really think.  A pathetic hubris.
>>
>>
>> A simulation of gravity running in a smartphone does not produce gravity.
>>
>>
>> It does in the simulated world.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> People talk of telepathy and precognition as delusional - broadly 
>> speaking, it is. But the "IP delusion" (that consciousness is 
>> substate-independent IP) is up there.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>> -- 
>>
>>
> The *simulation-reality* idea - that a simulated brain is the same as a 
> naturally-evolved/material or synthetic/material brain - is worse even than 
> the* telepathy* idea (which I don't think exists in any significant way 
> anyway).
>
> The first is really much worse than the second, so the first cannot throw 
> stones (even simulated ones).
>
>
> You keeps saying it's a terrible idea...but you never given any argument 
> to support that.  Simply repeating something isn't convincing.
>
> Brent
>
 

This is exactly like those who say everything is consciousness, and 
telepathy is real, etc.

No I can't *prove *we aren't simulations, or that a simulation running in a 
big computer made of Intel Cores can't be conscious.

All those things: *We are nothing but consciousness. We are simulations. A 
program running in a computer composed of a zillion Intel Core processors 
can be conscious.*

Are are just plain *woo woo*.

People can believe any woo they want, of course.

@philipthrift


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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-05-19 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 7:27:53 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
>
>
> Bruno's work does not address this ultrafinitist case, as the CT 
> thesis is an explicit assumption. Except that the Movie Graph Argument 
> is supposedly about that case. 
>
> Cheers 
>
>
Re:The Movie Graph Argument

The Movie Graph Argument Revisited
 Russell K. Standish
 https://arxiv.org/abs/1608.07764


*Real computationalism*

 https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/30/real-computationalism/

is *compatible with materialism*.

RealComp vs. Comp (the latter being in vocabulary of the commonly expressed 
version of Church-Turing, even with the hyperarithmetical extensions) 
removes all pretenses and vestiges of Platonism.

@philipthrift





   

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 11:44:33 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 9:37 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> *A simulated human brain could read the Wikipedia article on pain [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain> ] 
>> and integrate this knowledge into its knowledge base, but it could not 
>> experience pain.*
>
>
> It's weird, perhaps it comes from watching too much Star Trek but I don't 
> understand why so many people believe it's inherently more difficult  to 
> produce emotion than intelligence when Evolution found the exact opposite 
> to be true. 
>
> John K Clark
>




Evolution of humans on Earth combined (synthesized) a very different set of 
materials than that  which computer engineers have used to make what is 
today's conventional computer hardware.

 @philipthrift

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 4:09:51 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 18, 2019 at 2:56 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 2:39:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/18/2019 6:37 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>> *A simulated human brain could describe it's back pain in every detail, 
>>> write whole paragraphs about what it's like, while according to the theory 
>>> of substrate dependence, it knows nothing of what it's writing about. Where 
>>> then does this knowledge if pain come from when the AI writes a page about 
>>> the back pain it is in?*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> A simulated human brain could read the Wikipedia article on pain [ 
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain ] and integrate this knowledge into 
>>> its knowledge base, but it could not experience pain.
>>>
>>>
>>> How do you know this so-called fact?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> My main point is that those who say it can (I say it can't) can't talk 
>> about telepathy, precognition, astral projection etc. being crazy.
>>
>>
> Perhaps you could be so kind as to point out where we erred?
>
> Jason 
>


It's not erring, so much as I think it's completely *unuseful* (of no 
practical value, unhelpful).

It's like the simulation hypothesis that comes up surprisingly often in 
science writing:

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulation_hypothesis

https://www.businessinsider.com/the-matrix-do-we-live-in-a-simulation-2019-4

*'The Matrix' hit theaters 20 years ago. Many scientists and philosophers 
still think we're living in a simulation.*

That's just one recent example one can find in science news on the 
"simulation hypothesis".

The "simulated brain could be conscious" idea is similar to the "simulation 
hypothesis" idea.

I think both are completely useless (and while there is a lot of critics of 
these, those of the faith in them them are not convinced by their 
arguments).

 Are they wrong? Ultimately one can't say anything is right or wrong.

But they are *useless*, as far as I can see.

@philipthrift



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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 2:39:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/18/2019 6:37 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
> *A simulated human brain could describe it's back pain in every detail, 
> write whole paragraphs about what it's like, while according to the theory 
> of substrate dependence, it knows nothing of what it's writing about. Where 
> then does this knowledge if pain come from when the AI writes a page about 
> the back pain it is in?*
>
>
>
> A simulated human brain could read the Wikipedia article on pain [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pain ] and integrate this knowledge into 
> its knowledge base, but it could not experience pain.
>
>
> How do you know this so-called fact?
>
> Brent
>



My main point is that those who say it can (I say it can't) can't talk 
about telepathy, precognition, astral projection etc. being crazy.

@philipthrift
 

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 10:47:15 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/17/2019 11:11 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:09:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift  
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> *> Information processing absent actual first-class entities 
>>>>> of qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs 
>>>>> information 
>>>>> processing operating in a material substrate where those entities are 
>>>>> available to be combined and manipulated.*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "f*irst-class 
>>>> entities of qualia*" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But 
>>>> "*first-class 
>>>> qualia*" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically saying 
>>>> only conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue of 
>>>> always 
>>>> being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required pointless 
>>>> repetition and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact same 
>>>> place you started with. And that is typical of all consciousness theories.
>>>>
>>>> John K Clark
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be 
>>> reduced to information processing. 
>>>
>>>
>>> That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what 
>>> "reduced" means in that context.  
>>>
>>> (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to 
>>> information processing, then they would derivative from information, or 
>>> "second-class".)
>>>
>>>
>>> Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain environment.  
>>> Same with information processing.  In general it's streams of bits being 
>>> processed being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's qualia if 
>>> the streams are in some entity whose environment and actions give meaning 
>>> to the information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie down."
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Isn't  *qualia can be reduced to information processing*  the 
>> unsupported assertion?
>>
>>
>> No.  It's very well supported.  Interfere with information processing by 
>> drugs or electrical stimulus of the brain and qualia are changed or 
>> eliminated.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> *Information processing (IP) is necessary for consciousness*, but IP has 
> to occur in a substrate that produces qualia. *Stop the IP and you stop 
> consciousness.* But *the same IP* *in a different substrate* could be 
> consciousnessless.  
>
> The above substate is the material of the brain: neurons, neurochemistry, 
> glia, ...
>
>
> Mere supposition.  It's just the complement of the claim that machines can 
> never really think.  A pathetic hubris.
>
>
> A simulation of gravity running in a smartphone does not produce gravity.
>
>
> It does in the simulated world.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>
> People talk of telepathy and precognition as delusional - broadly 
> speaking, it is. But the "IP delusion" (that consciousness is 
> substate-independent IP) is up there.
>
> @philipthrift
> -- 
>
>
The *simulation-reality* idea - that a simulated brain is the same as a 
naturally-evolved/material or synthetic/material brain - is worse even than 
the* telepathy* idea (which I don't think exists in any significant way 
anyway).

The first is really much worse than the second, so the first cannot throw 
stones (even simulated ones).

@philipthrift

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, May 18, 2019 at 8:00:42 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 18, 2019, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:09:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: 
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift  
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> *> Information processing absent actual first-class entities 
>>>>>> of qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs 
>>>>>> information 
>>>>>> processing operating in a material substrate where those entities are 
>>>>>> available to be combined and manipulated.*
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "f*irst-class 
>>>>> entities of qualia*" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But 
>>>>> "*first-class 
>>>>> qualia*" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically saying 
>>>>> only conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue of 
>>>>> always 
>>>>> being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required pointless 
>>>>> repetition and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact 
>>>>> same place you started with. And that is typical of all consciousness 
>>>>> theories.
>>>>>
>>>>> John K Clark
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be 
>>>> reduced to information processing. 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what 
>>>> "reduced" means in that context.  
>>>>
>>>> (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to 
>>>> information processing, then they would derivative from information, or 
>>>> "second-class".)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain environment.  
>>>> Same with information processing.  In general it's streams of bits being 
>>>> processed being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's qualia if 
>>>> the streams are in some entity whose environment and actions give meaning 
>>>> to the information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie down."
>>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Isn't  *qualia can be reduced to information processing*  the 
>>> unsupported assertion?
>>>
>>>
>>> No.  It's very well supported.  Interfere with information processing by 
>>> drugs or electrical stimulus of the brain and qualia are changed or 
>>> eliminated.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>> *Information processing (IP) is necessary for consciousness*, but IP has 
>> to occur in a substrate that produces qualia. *Stop the IP and you stop 
>> consciousness.* But *the same IP* *in a different substrate* could be 
>> consciousnessless.  
>>
>
> Maybe you're the only person in the world with the right gene mutation to 
> synthesize the right protein that is a substrate for consciousness, and all 
> the other philosophers of consciousness who came before you and wrote books 
> on consciousness were pzombies that had no idea about what consciousness 
> was.
>
> You might consider this situation ridiculous, but it's exactly what you 
> get when you introduce substrate dependence.  A simulated human brain could 
> describe it's back pain in every detail, write whole paragraphs about what 
> it's like, while according to the theory of substrate dependence, it knows 
> nothing of what it's writing about. Where then does this knowledge if pain 
> come from when the AI writes a page about the back pain it is in?
>  
>
>>
>> The above substate is the material of the brain: neurons, neurochemistry, 
>> glia, ...
>>
>> A simulation of gravity running in

Re: Are AI fanboys aware of the fact that consciousness is a unity ?

2019-05-18 Thread Philip Thrift


Consciousness monism is incoherent if one maintains that there is an 
objective reality at all.

If one rejects objective reality (a reality independent of oneself, or any 
self-aware conscious entity) then all bets are off.

But I guess there are "AI fanboys" (as I understand what you mean) who seem 
to dismiss consciousness, or have the delusion that it is just "information 
processing", or "patterns" of neural activity.

Even the latest neurobiology on how the brain processes taste identifies 
the critical tole of  the *neurobiochemical* SATB2 - "a 733 amino-acid 
homeodomain-containing human protein with a molecular weight of 82.5 kDa 
encoded by the SATB2 gene on 2q33." I.e. it's complicated.

But how much "unity" consciousness is is an open question:


https://www.academia.edu/34679385/PANPSYCHISM_IN_THE_FIRST_PERSON
by Michel Bitbol

A central presupposition of science is that objectivity is universal. This 
does not only create a blindspot in knowledge, but also forces one to 
ignore it. Several strategies were accordingly adopted to overcome this 
ignorance, along with the standard divide between continental and analytic 
philosophy. One of them is Phenomenology, with its project of stripping the 
layers of interpretation by way of a complete suspension of judgment 
(epochè), and evaluating any claim of knowledge from such a basis of “pure 
consciousness”. Another one is pan-experientialist metaphysics, that puts 
back pure experience in the very domain that was deprived of it by the act 
of objectification. I compare these two approaches, thereby establishing a 
hierarchy of radicality between avoiding the blindspot from the outset and 
compensating for it retrospectively.

@philipthrift

On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 4:25:30 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> Are AI fanboys aware of the fact that consciousness is a unity ? For 
> example, hearing something and seeing something don't happen in 2 
> independent consciousnesses, but happen in only 1 consciousness. Also, 
> split brain patients show 2 different consciousness, for example one being 
> theist, the other atheist, and so on. If AI is to be conscious, then what 
> will decide the unification of different "information processings" ? If for 
> example that AI has 2 modules: one that "process" sounds and one that 
> "process" images, how do you know if there are 2 conscious AIs there or 
> only 1 ? 
>
>
>

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-18 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:09:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/17/2019 3:33 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> *> Information processing absent actual first-class entities 
>>>> of qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs information 
>>>> processing operating in a material substrate where those entities are 
>>>> available to be combined and manipulated.*
>>>
>>>
>>> So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "f*irst-class 
>>> entities of qualia*" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But "*first-class 
>>> qualia*" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically saying 
>>> only conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue of 
>>> always 
>>> being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required pointless 
>>> repetition and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact same 
>>> place you started with. And that is typical of all consciousness theories.
>>>
>>> John K Clark
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be 
>> reduced to information processing. 
>>
>>
>> That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what 
>> "reduced" means in that context.  
>>
>> (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to 
>> information processing, then they would derivative from information, or 
>> "second-class".)
>>
>>
>> Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain environment.  
>> Same with information processing.  In general it's streams of bits being 
>> processed being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's qualia if 
>> the streams are in some entity whose environment and actions give meaning 
>> to the information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie down."
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> Isn't  *qualia can be reduced to information processing*  the unsupported 
> assertion?
>
>
> No.  It's very well supported.  Interfere with information processing by 
> drugs or electrical stimulus of the brain and qualia are changed or 
> eliminated.
>
> Brent
>


*Information processing (IP) is necessary for consciousness*, but IP has to 
occur in a substrate that produces qualia. *Stop the IP and you stop 
consciousness.* But *the same IP* *in a different substrate* could be 
consciousnessless.  

The above substate is the material of the brain: neurons, neurochemistry, 
glia, ...

A simulation of gravity running in a smartphone does not produce gravity.



People talk of telepathy and precognition as delusional - broadly speaking, 
it is. But the "IP delusion" (that consciousness is substate-independent 
IP) is up there.

@philipthrift

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-17 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:21:41 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/16/2019 11:51 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote: 
>>
>>
>> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> *> Information processing absent actual first-class entities 
>>> of qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs information 
>>> processing operating in a material substrate where those entities are 
>>> available to be combined and manipulated.*
>>
>>
>> So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "f*irst-class 
>> entities of qualia*" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But "*first-class 
>> qualia*" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically saying 
>> only conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue of always 
>> being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required pointless 
>> repetition and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact same 
>> place you started with. And that is typical of all consciousness theories.
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>>
>>
>>
> To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be 
> reduced to information processing. 
>
>
> That's nothing but unsupported assertion.  It's not even clear what 
> "reduced" means in that context.  
>
> (That is what I mean by "first-class". If qualia could  be reduced to 
> information processing, then they would derivative from information, or 
> "second-class".)
>
>
> Is life derivative from chemistry?  Only within a certain environment.  
> Same with information processing.  In general it's streams of bits being 
> processed being changed according to some algorithm.  But it's qualia if 
> the streams are in some entity whose environment and actions give meaning 
> to the information, like "I've got a headache and I'm going to lie down."
>
> Brent
>



Isn't  *qualia can be reduced to information processing*  the unsupported 
assertion?

The burden of proof is on those who claim qualia comes out of information 
processing.

If that claim were true, then any IP system - like a smartphone that can 
execute programs - can have human-type qualia existing inside it.

@philipthrift
 

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-17 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 5:06:29 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/17/2019 4:56 AM, John Clark wrote:
>
> If you somehow knew for a fact a brilliant being was a zombie then you 
> could immediately make one conclusion about it, the being could NOT be the 
> product of Darwinian Evolution because Natural Selection can see 
> intelligence but it can't see consciousness in others any better than we 
> can, and it can't select for something it can't see.
>
>
> I don't see how that follows.  If zombies are possible then evolution 
> could have produced brilliant zombies.  It might just be an accident that 
> evolution took the "consciousness" path at some point.  It might even vary 
> from species to species...as it might in the future when we develop 
> human-level  in AI-robots.   I can't imagine how an AI could have human 
> level intelligence without the ability to reflect on itself, but I can 
> imagine this reflection being realized in very different ways.  For 
> example, for high reliability in some space vehicles, we have provided 
> three separate computers programmed by different teams to check decisions 
> by majority voting.
>
> Brent
>


Certainly we (AI engineers) can continue to hack together increasingly 
"intelligent" robots out of conventional processing technology. They are 
all zombies (in the sense they are not conscious). A "creative" robot may 
be a challenge.

@philipthrift

@philipthrift

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-17 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 2:45:54 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 3:20 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 1:51:15 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/16/2019 11:59 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 1:42:41 AM UTC-5, telmo wrote: 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But then "panpyschism" does no work.  It's just a hypothetical property 
>>>> of matter that says if some matter does information processing then that 
>>>> matter is conscious, otherwise it's not.  But that's already what 
>>>> materialists thought.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Well said.
>>>>
>>>> Telmo.
>>>>
>>>
>>> But a robot - which is matter - that is doing very advanced, high-level 
>>> information processing - could be a winner on Jeopardy, and talk to you in 
>>> a conversation, could be a zombie.
>>>
>>> Are you a zombie?
>>>
>>>
>>> Not if human-level intelligent behavior is a mark of consciousness.   
>>> How do you tell if someone is conscious?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> There is the paper I posted here earlier. Here's the conclusion. Do you 
>> have something better?
>>
>>
>> *Information and the Origin of Qualia*
>> Roger Orpwood
>> Centre for Pain Research, Department for Health, University of Bath
>>
>>
>> ...
>>
>
>> Despite the overwhelming likelihood that all higher animals experience a 
>> degree of consciousness, the only animals we can be a 100% certain about 
>> are humans. 
>>
>
> I don't see how we can be 100% certain of this, without limiting the 
> domain of humans to the self.
>  
>
>> Therefore it is necessary ultimately to measure activity in humans that 
>> underpins conscious experience. For the theory presented here that evidence 
>> has to come from monitoring the activity of networks of individual cells, 
>> with sub-millisecond resolution, to see how they behave during conscious 
>> acts and how that differs to unconscious acts. 
>>
>
> How do they know what they think are unconscious acts aren't actually 
> conscious but disconnected from the parts of the brain that can speak?  
> Like split brain patients having two independently consciousness 
> hemispheres.
>
> Jason
>
>  
>
>> Such work would necessarily have to remove co-varying activity relating 
>> to such things as allocation of attention, activity relating to the 
>> reporting process, anticipation, etc. Techniques for population monitoring 
>> are of course developing fast, with the pioneering use of 2-photon calcium 
>> imaging. At present this technique is not quite fast enough to explore the 
>> detail firing activity of cells in networks but this is surely not far off. 
>> In the first instance such techniques can be usefully used with higher 
>> mammals who are strongly suspected of having conscious experience. Strong 
>> pointers would result from monitoring local activity such as that described 
>> in this article as the animal indicated a perception as opposed to not 
>> indicating a perception. If in parallel with such measurements a signature 
>> of that activity could be defined using EEG, MEG or ECoG that would enable 
>> human experiments to look for those signatures. Ultimately though it will 
>> be necessary to find a technique that can be used in humans, perhaps an 
>> ethically acceptable form of light imaging, that can detect the local 
>> activity described and to show that it occurs only with conscious awareness.
>>
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>>
>>

cf: https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frobt.2018.00017/full




It seems that consciousness is something that one knows is where oneself 
is,  but don't know if it is (there is a test for it being) anywhere else!


@philipthrift 

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-17 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 1:51:15 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/16/2019 11:59 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 1:42:41 AM UTC-5, telmo wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> But then "panpyschism" does no work.  It's just a hypothetical property 
>> of matter that says if some matter does information processing then that 
>> matter is conscious, otherwise it's not.  But that's already what 
>> materialists thought.
>>
>>
>> Well said.
>>
>> Telmo.
>>
>
> But a robot - which is matter - that is doing very advanced, high-level 
> information processing - could be a winner on Jeopardy, and talk to you in 
> a conversation, could be a zombie.
>
> Are you a zombie?
>
>
> Not if human-level intelligent behavior is a mark of consciousness.   How 
> do you tell if someone is conscious?
>
> Brent
>



There is the paper I posted here earlier. Here's the conclusion. Do you 
have something better?


*Information and the Origin of Qualia*
Roger Orpwood
Centre for Pain Research, Department for Health, University of Bath


...

Despite the overwhelming likelihood that all higher animals experience a 
degree of consciousness, the only animals we can be a 100% certain about 
are humans. Therefore it is necessary ultimately to measure activity in 
humans that underpins conscious experience. For the theory presented here 
that evidence has to come from monitoring the activity of networks of 
individual cells, with sub-millisecond resolution, to see how they behave 
during conscious acts and how that differs to unconscious acts. Such work 
would necessarily have to remove co-varying activity relating to such 
things as allocation of attention, activity relating to the reporting 
process, anticipation, etc. Techniques for population monitoring are of 
course developing fast, with the pioneering use of 2-photon calcium 
imaging. At present this technique is not quite fast enough to explore the 
detail firing activity of cells in networks but this is surely not far off. 
In the first instance such techniques can be usefully used with higher 
mammals who are strongly suspected of having conscious experience. Strong 
pointers would result from monitoring local activity such as that described 
in this article as the animal indicated a perception as opposed to not 
indicating a perception. If in parallel with such measurements a signature 
of that activity could be defined using EEG, MEG or ECoG that would enable 
human experiments to look for those signatures. Ultimately though it will 
be necessary to find a technique that can be used in humans, perhaps an 
ethically acceptable form of light imaging, that can detect the local 
activity described and to show that it occurs only with conscious awareness.


@philipthrift

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-17 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 6:57:35 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 2:51 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>  
>
>> *> But what is information processing?*
>>
>
> It is the process of extracting information from data, and information is 
> the resolution of uncertainty. And my unproven assumption (which will never 
> be proven but is the only thing that prevents me from becoming a solipsist) 
> is that consciousness is the way data feels when it is being processed.
>
> *> a robot - which is matter - that is doing very advanced, high-level 
>> information processing - could be a winner on Jeopardy, and talk to you in 
>> a conversation, could be a zombie.*
>
>
> If you somehow knew for a fact a brilliant being was a zombie then you 
> could immediately make one conclusion about it, the being could NOT be the 
> product of Darwinian Evolution because Natural Selection can see 
> intelligence but it can't see consciousness in others any better than we 
> can, and it can't select for something it can't see. But of course there is 
> no way you could ever know a brilliant being was a zombie or know he was 
> not a zombie either unless a important assumption is made, intelligent 
> behavior implies consciousness.  
>
> *> Are you a zombie?*
>
>
> No. But isn't that what you'd expect a philosophical zombie to say?
>
> > *Now I would just way that the jury is out about qualia ⇨ information.*
>>
>
> The jury is NOT out over the fact that if your consciousness changes the 
> informational processing of your brain changes and if the informational 
> processing of your brain changes your consciousness changes. Regarding all 
> other matters involving consciousness the jury is still out and will remain 
> out until the end of time, and that's why complex consciousness theories 
> are such a complete waste of time.  
>  
>
>> *> If the above paper is right, then it's sort of settled, right?*
>>
>
> The question of consciousness is as settled as it's ever going to be, 
> that's why the field of consciousness research has not moved an inch or 
> even a nanometer in a century. But Artificial *INTELLIGENCE* research is 
> alive and well.
>  
>
>> > *I still think the phenomenologists are right, that quaia is a 
>> different type of entity than information,*
>>
>
> Obviously they're different things but they're intimately related. 
>
> John K Clark
>





I'm not going to 

T*he Science of Consciousness 2019*
 https://www.tsc2019-interlaken.ch/

next month (so Interlaken will be without me), but there is a whole bunch 
of people who think the subject of consciousness is a serious scientific 
endeavor.

As you know I worked in an AI lab in the '80s and '90s

   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas_Instruments#Artificial_intelligence

and I have several AI patents from that time. (One of the people I worked 
with there I saw just last week is now working for an AI company making 
software for cars (e.g. self-driving) with computer vision.

AI via information processing (conventional computing) will of course get 
very good. But my sense is that experience processing becomes a matter of 
interest when the "compiled object code" is produced via biocompilers (or 
compilers to bio-like materials).

@philipthrift




 

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Re: How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ?

2019-05-17 Thread Philip Thrift

Something that might be of interest:

*On the Quest of Defining Consciousness*
Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal @rlpvimal
-  
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/233955238_On_the_Quest_of_Defining_Consciousness

How terms consciousness, qualia etc. relate:
-  https://pbs.twimg.com/media/D6waS3FXoAAnuqf?format=png=900x900

(according to @rlpvimal)

@philipthrift

On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 2:57:17 AM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> Is not the nuts and seeds per se that keep a consciousness alive. Is what 
> is behind their appearances. Whatever is there, we don't know. We don't 
> know why consciousness needs to interact with other consciousnesses in 
> order to maintain its existence in the current state. 
>
> On Friday, 17 May 2019 10:53:00 UTC+3, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 5:45 PM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List <
>> everyth...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>> See Donald Hoffman research. Evolution filters out truth. We don't live 
>>> in a "physical" world. We live in an evolutionary world. The world of 
>>> qualia we see around us is an evolutionary world constructed by 
>>> consciousness in order to keep itself alive.
>>>
>>
>> Does a Boltzmann Brain need to gather nuts and seeds on the savanna to 
>> keep alive?
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-05-17 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 1:56:05 AM UTC-5, telmo wrote:
>
>
>
> There is plenty of evidence, informally known as "the unreasonable 
> effectiveness of math". 
>

As *Max Tegmark* points out, all of our scientific theories (he was talking 
about physics, checked out on computers) do not need infinities:

http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/crux/2015/02/20/infinity-ruining-physics/ 


Our challenge as physicists is to discover this elegant way and the 
infinity-free equations describing it—the true laws of physics. To start 
this search in earnest, we need to question infinity. I’m betting that we 
also need to let go of it.

So infinity-free mathematics is what Tegmark says is the thing to do.

@philithrift 

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-17 Thread Philip Thrift

On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:17:59 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>  if you think exhibiting reflexes is the critereon for consciousness, 
> consider the example of someone who has held their breath for fifteen 
> minutes.
>
> Brent
>
>

A reflex (say in an elbow) might be considered an example of the presence 
of proto-experientiality.

@philipthrift

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Re: How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ?

2019-05-17 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 6:17:15 PM UTC-5, smitra wrote:
>
>
> We don't live in the real world, rather in the virtual world generated 
> by our brains. Illusions such as optical illusions: 
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MTpvDTWurwg 
>
> auditory illusions such as McGurk effect: 
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-lN8vWm3m0 
>
> clearly demonstrates this. The virtual representation of the real world 
> isn't perfect; because we experience the former directly and can only 
> infer something about the latter indirectly, this means that we can 
> sometimes experience things that seem to violate the laws of physics. 
>
> Saibal 
>

If  "We don't live in the real world, rather in the virtual world generated 
by our brains", where do those brains come from?

A brain is a big glob of neuronal and glial cells and chemicals and stuff. 

So all there is are brains? That's a weird picture, like from an SF movie.

@philipthrift

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Re: Precision

2019-05-17 Thread Philip Thrift

On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 6:13:37 PM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 11:57:44 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 15 May 2019, at 03:07, Lawrence Crowell  
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 9:24:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> > On 12 May 2019, at 09:08, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote: 
>>> > 
>>> > ‘I believe there are 
>>> 15,747,724,136,275,002,577,605,653,961,181,555,468,044,717,914,527,116,709,366,231,425,076,185,631,031,296
>>>  
>>> protons in the universe, and the same number of electrons.’ 
>>> > 
>>> > Eddington, Arthur S. 1939. The Philosophy of Physical Science. 
>>> Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 170. The beginning of the Chapter 
>>> XI, The Physical Universe. 
>>>
>>> Lol. 
>>>
>>>
>> The number is curiously not that different from the currently understood 
>> number.
>>
>> To be honest I think there is only one electron in the universe. All 
>> these electrons we see are just the same electron weaving through space and 
>> time.
>>
>>
>>
>> That is quite reasonable, but I am not sure an electron is a physical 
>> object, it is a locally observable invariant in some group theoretical 
>> transformation. The “electron” is a useful fiction, to send waves, or to 
>> make the atoms dialoguing into molecules and bigger strangely stable and 
>> persistent histories decorum.
>>
>> I al still curious why that number. I don’t have that book by Eddington.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> An electron is the occurrence of some quantum numbers in a small local 
> region with the occurrence of a measurement. Prior to a measurement in one 
> sense there is no such thing as the electron as a particle. There are 
> experiments where the spin of an electron can manifest itself in one place 
> and the charge somewhere else. Certain interferometers can separate the 
> electron's quantum numbers.
>
> LC
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> LC
>>  
>>
>>> I guess this concerns the observable universe, which has grown a lot 
>>> since 1939. (Cf Hubble and “Hubble) 
>>>
>>> Any idea of why that particular number? Beyond the apparent joke? 
>>>
>>> Bruno 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > 
>>>
>>>


Prior to a measurement in one sense there is no such thing as the electron 
as a particle.

That is just a quasi-theological view in the catechism some physicists.

@philipthrift

 

>
>> -
>>
>>

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-17 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, May 17, 2019 at 1:42:41 AM UTC-5, telmo wrote:
>
>
>
> But then "panpyschism" does no work.  It's just a hypothetical property of 
> matter that says if some matter does information processing then that 
> matter is conscious, otherwise it's not.  But that's already what 
> materialists thought.
>
>
> Well said.
>
> Telmo.
>

But a robot - which is matter - that is doing very advanced, high-level 
information processing - could be a winner on Jeopardy, and talk to you in 
a conversation, could be a zombie.

Are you a zombie?

@philipthrift 

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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-17 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 5:14:46 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 1:48 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> *> Information processing absent actual first-class entities of qualia (or 
>> experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs information processing 
>> operating in a material substrate where those entities are available to be 
>> combined and manipulated.*
>
>
> So something can behave intelligently but if it is lacking "f*irst-class 
> entities of qualia*" it can only be a intelligent zombie. But "*first-class 
> qualia*" sounds like  consciousness to me, so you're basically saying 
> only conscious things can be conscious. A tautology has the virtue of always 
> being true but it involves a unnecessary non-required pointless 
> repetition and reiteration of words where you end up at the exact same 
> place you started with. And that is typical of all consciousness theories.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
>
To be clearer: Qualia (the "ingredients" of consciousness) cannot be 
reduced to information processing. (That is what I mean by "first-class". 
If qualia could  be reduced to information processing, then they would 
derivative from information, or "second-class".)

But what is information processing? I just mean it in its generally and 
conventional definition as a subject:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_processing
cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information

Now can qualia be reduced to information? That is the question of central 
concern:

Information and the Origin of Qualia
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5399078/

This article argues that qualia are a likely outcome of the processing of 
information in local cortical networks. It uses an information-based 
approach and makes a distinction between information structures (the 
physical embodiment of information in the brain, primarily patterns of 
action potentials), and information messages (the meaning of those 
structures to the brain, and the basis of qualia). It develops formal 
relationships between these two kinds of information, showing how 
information structures can represent messages, and how information messages 
can be identified from structures. The article applies this perspective to 
basic processing in cortical networks or ensembles, showing how networks 
can transform between the two kinds of information. The article argues that 
an input pattern of firing is identified by a network as an information 
message, and that the output pattern of firing generated is a 
representation of that message. If a network is encouraged to develop an 
attractor state through attention or other re-entrant processes, then the 
message identified each time physical information is cycled through the 
network becomes “representation of the previous message”. Using an example 
of olfactory perception, it is shown how this piggy-backing of messages on 
top of previous messages could lead to olfactory qualia. The message 
identified on each pass of information could evolve from inner identity, to 
inner form, to inner likeness or image. The outcome is an olfactory quale. 
It is shown that the same outcome could result from information cycled 
through a hierarchy of networks in a resonant state. The argument for 
qualia generation is applied to other sensory modalities, showing how, 
through a process of brain-wide constraint satisfaction, a particular state 
of consciousness could develop at any given moment. Evidence for some of 
the key predictions of the theory is presented, using ECoG data and studies 
of gamma oscillations and attractors, together with an outline of what 
further evidence is needed to provide support for the theory.


Now I would just way that the jury is out about qualia ⇨ information. If 
the above paper is right, then it's sort of settled, right? I still think 
the phenomenologists are right, that quaia is a different type of entity 
than information, or that that matter (in particular matter with 
consciousness/qualia) has both informationality and experientiality, that 
there is a calculus of experience that the brain is processing.


But it isn't settled.

@philipthrift


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Re: Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-16 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 11:07:35 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/16/2019 6:29 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
> You still need to explain why your elbow isn't conscious.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>  
>
> The elbow (the matter that is halfway down your arm between your shoulder 
> and hand) could have proto-consciousness (or a proto-experientiality, as 
> some say): 
>
>   https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/#PanpVersPanp
>
> But the elbow will not have full consciousness (first-person) because* it 
> cannot do information processing* (at the level of the brain with all its 
> neural connectivity).
>
> *High-level (and higher-order) information processing is necessary, but 
> not sufficient for consciousness.*
>
> That is all of panpsychism in a nutshell.
>
>
> But then "panpyschism" does no work.  It's just a hypothetical property of 
> matter that says if some matter does information processing then that 
> matter is conscious, otherwise it's not.  But that's already what 
> materialists thought.
>
> Brent
>

This was prefaced by:

Information processing absent actual *first-class* entities of *qualia* (or 
experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs information processing 
operating in a *material substrate* where those entities are available to 
be combined and manipulated.



There is information processing in an elbow, but that information 
processing is not at the level of information processing in the brain.

But information processing in the brain, while at the level it needs to be 
for consciousness, needs to be operating in that substrate where the 
experiential entities are available to be combined and manipulated.

@philipthift 

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Is your elbow conscious?

2019-05-16 Thread Philip Thrift

On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 8:00:42 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/16/2019 5:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> This is what I call one form of *consciousness denial*
>
>   https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/
>
> in that information processing absent actual *first-class* entities of 
> qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs information 
> processing operating in a *material substrate* where those entities are 
> available to be combined and manipulated.
>
>
> You still need to explain why your elbow isn't conscious.
>
> Brent
>

 

The elbow (the matter that is halfway down your arm between your shoulder 
and hand) could have proto-consciousness (or a proto-experientiality, as 
some say): 

  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/#PanpVersPanp

But the elbow will not have full consciousness (first-person) because* it 
cannot do information processing* (at the level of the brain with all its 
neural connectivity).

*High-level (and higher-order) information processing is necessary, but not 
sufficient for consciousness.*

That is all of panpsychism in a nutshell.

(I've posted the research of Hedda Hassel Mørch here several times now. 
This is what she talks about.)

@philipthrift

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

2019-05-16 Thread Philip Thrift


This is what I call one form of *consciousness denial*

  https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-consciousness-deniers/

in that information processing absent actual *first-class* entities of 
qualia (or experiences) can only produce zombies. One needs information 
processing operating in a *material substrate* where those entities are 
available to be combined and manipulated.

@philipthrift

On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 7:05:53 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> The question is why does it supervene on the brain and not on the elbow.  
> What about the brain causes it to "make experiences"?  Most scientists 
> think it is because the brain does computations, i.e. information 
> processing, which is more extensive and complex that the elbow does.  Which 
> leads to Bruno's argument that if it is the information processing that 
> produces mind, then mind can be instantiated by any sufficiently complex 
> computer+program.  Since he believes in arithmetical realism, and since all 
> possible computations exist implicitly in arithmetic, it follows that all 
> possible thoughts already exist in arithmetic and we can explain reality as 
> some particular subset of those thoughts.
>
> Brent
>
>
> On 5/16/2019 12:54 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, May 15, 2019 at 6:55:08 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote: 
>>
>> mind supervenes on the brain
>> Bruce
>>
>
>
> The heart* pumps blood.
> The brain pumps experiences.
>
> The brain is an experience pump!
>
> * Actually it's more complex: blood cells are made in bone marrow signaled 
> by the kidneys and recycled by the spleen. Do it's 
> kidneys+marrow+spleen+heart that make and pump blood. The brain makes and 
> pumps experiences.
>
> @philipthrift 
>
>
>

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Re: for Cosmin

2019-05-16 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, May 16, 2019 at 4:44:48 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 May 2019, at 20:45, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 11:24:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 13 May 2019, at 20:24, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 12:25:38 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 10 May 2019, at 09:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> When someone says "consciousness is not a material thing" I think of 
>>> Wile E. Coyote.
>>>
>>> Consciousnesses need something (matter) to hang on to. Consciousnesses 
>>> just don't go floating around willy-nilly. The Coyote finds that out when 
>>> he finds out he is hanging on to nothing, and looks down. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That is nice Aristotelian poetry. But you just repeat you ontological 
>>> commitment in a material world, where no physicist has a consistent theory 
>>> of it, nor even have tried to test its existence. What the Aspect 
>>> experience has only shown, is that IF there is a physicaly reality then it 
>>> can’t be a boolean reality (which would have already annoyed Aristotle).
>>>
>>> Then with Mechanism, “Matter” invocation needs to add some magic 
>>> incompatible with YD+CT.
>>> It is like invoking a God to impeach testing simpler theories which do 
>>> not commit a so strong ontological commitment.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>
>>
>> I was shooting for Epicurean poetry (or Lucretian; Lucretius's *De rerum 
>> natur*a [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_rerum_natura ] was a poem 
>> about the philosophy of Epicurus).
>>
>> Aristotle's philosophy is *confused nonsense*, especially when compared 
>> to Epicurus’s.
>>
>>
>> This is weird. I appreciate Aristotle, because it is rather clear, and 
>> enough precise to be refuted, with in the natural science and the theology. 
>> I tend to consider him as the inventor of the notion of primitive matter, 
>> that is the first which postulate the existence of a physical universe (in 
>> metaphysics), but that is also the only place where he get confused (his 
>> metaphysics). 
>>
>> As a materialist (a “believer in matter”) it is astonishing you don’t 
>> appreciate Aristotle. He is really the one who got the idea that “God” is a 
>> physical universe, even if he add the chiquenaude divine to create the 
>> first move.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
> The atomistic materialist Democritus came before Aristote, and Epicurus, 
> the most advanced of the atomists (as written about by Lucretius) was about 
> the same time as Aristotle.
>
> But way before them was Thales, who inspired Aristotle's thoughts on 
> matter:
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thales_of_Miletus#Water_as_a_first_principle
>
> Thales' most famous philosophical position was his cosmological 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmology> thesis, which comes down to us 
> through a passage from Aristotle <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle>
> 's *Metaphysics <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics_(Aristotle)>*. In 
> the work Aristotle unequivocally reported Thales’ hypothesis 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothesis> about *the nature of 
> all matter <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matter#Historical_development> – 
> that the originating principle of nature 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arche> was a single material substance 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Material_monism>*: *water*. Aristotle then 
> proceeded to proffer a number of conjectures based on his own observations 
> to lend some credence to why Thales may have advanced this idea (though 
> Aristotle didn’t hold it himself).
>
> Aristotle laid out his own thinking about matter and form 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism> which may shed some light on 
> the ideas of Thales, in *Metaphysics 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics>* 983 b6 8–11, 17–21. (The 
> passage contains words that were later adopted by science with quite 
> different meanings.)
>
> That from which is everything that exists and from which it first becomes 
> and into which it is rendered at last, its substance remaining under it, 
> but transforming in qualities, that they say is the element and principle 
> of things that are. …For it is necessary that there be some nature (φύσις), 
> either one or more than one, from which become the other things of the 
> object being saved... Thales the f

Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

2019-05-16 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, May 15, 2019 at 6:55:08 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>
> mind supervenes on the brain
> Bruce
>


The heart* pumps blood.
The brain pumps experiences.

The brain is an experience pump!

* Actually it's more complex: blood cells are made in bone marrow signaled 
by the kidneys and recycled by the spleen. Do it's 
kidneys+marrow+spleen+heart that make and pump blood. The brain makes and 
pumps experiences.

@philipthrift 

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Re: Precision

2019-05-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, May 15, 2019 at 5:58:07 PM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, May 15, 2019 at 12:59:59 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 8:07:07 PM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 9:24:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> > On 12 May 2019, at 09:08, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote: 
>>>> > 
>>>> > ‘I believe there are 
>>>> 15,747,724,136,275,002,577,605,653,961,181,555,468,044,717,914,527,116,709,366,231,425,076,185,631,031,296
>>>>  
>>>> protons in the universe, and the same number of electrons.’ 
>>>> > 
>>>> > Eddington, Arthur S. 1939. The Philosophy of Physical Science. 
>>>> Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 170. The beginning of the 
>>>> Chapter 
>>>> XI, The Physical Universe. 
>>>>
>>>> Lol. 
>>>>
>>>>
>>> The number is curiously not that different from the currently understood 
>>> number.
>>>
>>> To be honest I think there is only one electron in the universe. All 
>>> these electrons we see are just the same electron weaving through space and 
>>> time.
>>>
>>> LC
>>>  
>>>
>>>> I guess this concerns the observable universe, which has grown a lot 
>>>> since 1939. (Cf Hubble and “Hubble) 
>>>>
>>>> Any idea of why that particular number? Beyond the apparent joke? 
>>>>
>>>> Bruno 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> \
>>>
>>>
>>
>> The number of electrons and protons stays the same?
>>
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pair_production
>>
>> Pair production is the creation of a subatomic particle and its 
>> antiparticle from a neutral boson. Examples include creating an electron 
>> and a positron, a muon and an antimuon, or a proton and an antiproton. Pair 
>> production often refers specifically to a photon creating an 
>> electron–positron pair near a nucleus. 
>>
>> In 2008 the Titan laser aimed at a 1-millimeter-thick gold target was 
>> used to generate positron–electron pairs in large numbers.
>>
>>  
>> That "there is only one electron in the universe. All these electrons we 
>> see are just the same electron weaving through space and time" would 
>> explain telepathy and precognition.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
> I have not been entirely happy with this list since Cosmin Visan showed up 
> hustling his nonsense. Now he claims the reports of moon landings are no 
> more credible than claims of the paranormal. I wish this crap would end. 
> There is no scientific basis for this rubbish, it has been put to various 
> tests since the late 19th century and nothing whatsoever has ever been 
> found. Please, don't join this chorus of morons.
>
> LC
>


But, in order:

1. Precognition.
2. Telepathy.
3. The moon landing in July, 1969 was faked.
4. There is only one electron in the universe. All these electrons we see 
are just the same electron weaving through space and time.

The tests claimed to support 1 and 2 are bogus (as far as I've ever seen). 
3 is crazy.
But 4 is in its own world of bizarre beliefs. One with that idea can't 
really say the others are "crazy", can they?

@philipthrift

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Re: Precision

2019-05-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, May 15, 2019 at 1:41:35 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/14/2019 10:59 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> That "there is only one electron in the universe. All these electrons we 
> see are just the same electron weaving through space and time" would 
> explain telepathy and precognition.
>
>
> Only the way "God did it." explains the miracles at Lourdes.
>
> Brent
>

 

If there is only *one* electron, what are you doing with *my* electron?

@philipthrift 

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-05-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, May 15, 2019 at 11:06:59 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 May 2019, at 00:11, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
> in which we can interpret the proposition. “2+2=4” is true if it is the 
> case that 2 + 2 = 4.
>
>
> Semantics is a big deal in programming language theory.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics_(computer_science)
>
>
> Yes, and that is inherited by mathematical logic, which study mainly the 
> relation w-between theories and their model (model means semantical 
> structure, in logic).
>
>
>
> Is there a calculus of experience, and a semantics of experiences (qualia)?
>
>
>
> Yes, with Mechanism, it is given by precise mathematical theories (S4Grz1, 
> Z1*, X1*). The proper non communicable parts are given by Z1* \ Z1, X1* \ 
> X1. Note that S4Grz1* = S4Grz1 (the soul agree with God about the soul).
>
>
> That's the scientific question.
>
>
> Yes.
>
> Bruno
>
> *There is a hidden code of nature—the code written into its fabric. Our 
> theories—our hypothetical code—are our evolving best-guess translations of 
> the code of nature, which remains hidden from our knowledge—within 
> nature-in-itself.*
>
> @philipthrift
>
>

On truth statements, they are only as true as the genre of fiction they are 
written in allow them to be.
(which is basically what Rorty says about "truth" 
[ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CzynRPP9XkY ])

Mathematical logic is to programming language theory as pure mathematics is 
to applied mathematics.

Your experience calculus looks like (as I mentioned before) of the type the 
MIRI/CSAIL Lob research group does:

Lob's theorem in Friendly AI   https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OMi1KkKCVCg

An Introduction to Lob’s Theorem in MIRI Research
http://intelligence.org/files/lob-notes-IAFF.pdf


@philipthrift

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-05-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, May 15, 2019 at 10:31:37 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 May 2019, at 08:55, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> There is no settled "truth" in mathematics.
>
> For example (as Hamkins shows) the CH is true in one dialect (of set 
> theory) and false in another.
>
>
> That was shown by Cohen and Gödel.
>
> Interestingly, ZFC and ZF + CH does not prove more arithmetical 
> propositions than ZF alone. The arithmetical truth is totally independent 
> of the axiom of choice or the continuum hypotheses.
>
> Now, ZF proves much more theorems in arithmetic than PA, which proves much 
> more than RA. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>

The set-theoretic multiverse of Hamkins

  https://arxiv.org/pdf/1108.4223.pdf


goes beyond the model-theoretic forcing methods of Cohen, with a framework 
for a multiverse of dialects (my word) of set theory, each with their own 
definition of "set". I'm not a set theorist, but can read the paper 
approximately  well, and it was enough to get him from City University New 
York to Oxford.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joel_David_Hamkins#Biography

In September 2018, Hamkins moved to the University of Oxford 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_of_Oxford> to become Professor of 
Logic in the Faculty of Philosophy and Sir Peter Strawson Fellow in 
Philosophy in University College, Oxford 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/University_College,_Oxford>.


@philipthrift


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Re: The anecdote of Moon landing

2019-05-15 Thread Philip Thrift

As I pointed out earlier, quantum mechanics allows for a weak (or freak) 
phenomenon of telepathy and/or precognition.

But *how weak* is the thing.

@philipthrift



On Wednesday, May 15, 2019 at 7:42:25 AM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> Also in cases of telepathy and precognitions the "technology" and the 
> "motivation" existed at the moment of their occurrence. Actually, it seems 
> that the conditions required for paranormal phenomena are being met way 
> more often that the conditions required for Moon landing. So, it appears 
> that if we are to believe such an extraordinarily unlikely event such as 
> Moon landing, that only happened a couple of time in the entire 4.5 billion 
> years history of life on planet Earth, then we are clearly to believe 
> paranormal, which happened quadrillion of times since life on Earth.
>
> On Wednesday, 15 May 2019 15:32:07 UTC+3, telmo wrote:
>>
>> We can never be 100% sure of anything except that we are conscious, but 
>> the technology existed and so did the motivation.
>>
>>

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QFT is history

2019-05-15 Thread Philip Thrift


*Fay Dowker* @DowkerFay Apr 28
[ https://twitter.com/DowkerFay/status/1122550653287579649 ]

"First of 3 lectures by Rafael Sorkin setting out the view that quantum 
theory is most fruitfully thought of as a generalization of classical 
stochastic processes and should be thought of in terms of histories."
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJb47yt9hgc


*Rafael Sorkin*

*re-formulating quantum mechanics entirely as a theory of quantal 
histories, without ever needing to call on state-vectors, measurements, or 
external agents as fundamental notions*
- https://perimeterinstitute.ca/people/rafael-sorkin

@philipthrift

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-05-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 7:29:07 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/14/2019 9:49 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> What is truth? (Pontus Pilate). Arithmetical statements are true if they 
>> are theorems derived from the axioms. 
>>
>
> This is false. In every consistent system of axioms there are statements 
> that are true but cannot be derived from the axioms. 
>
>
> That's not true. There are axiomatic systems that are complete.  
>
> In other words truth =/= proof, truth is always greater that what can be 
> proved.
>
>
> That's because you have recourse to an idea of "true" that is outside of 
> logical inference...such as "empirically true".
>
> Brent
>



An axiom system *A* being complete just means that for every (syntactically 
well-formed) sentence *s* in the language of *A*, either *s* or ~*s* can be 
proved via the rules of deduction of *A*.



BTW, while Church-Turing is not a useful "thesis", Curry-Howard is.

  proofs = programs

(The informal word "model" does not come up in programming language theory 
- PLT - that I can surmise, except in the context of a "model of 
computation/programming" - lambda calculus, pi calculus, functional, 
process-oriented. Its use in physics is a bit confusing. For example, 
regarding the equation of the Standard Model as written out by mathematical 
physicist Matilde Marcolli:

 
https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png

is the equation itself of the Standard Model here a "model", or is the 
interpretation of this equation a "model"?)

@philipthrift 

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Re: Precision

2019-05-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 8:07:07 PM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 9:24:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> > On 12 May 2019, at 09:08, Evgenii Rudnyi  wrote: 
>> > 
>> > ‘I believe there are 
>> 15,747,724,136,275,002,577,605,653,961,181,555,468,044,717,914,527,116,709,366,231,425,076,185,631,031,296
>>  
>> protons in the universe, and the same number of electrons.’ 
>> > 
>> > Eddington, Arthur S. 1939. The Philosophy of Physical Science. 
>> Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 170. The beginning of the Chapter 
>> XI, The Physical Universe. 
>>
>> Lol. 
>>
>>
> The number is curiously not that different from the currently understood 
> number.
>
> To be honest I think there is only one electron in the universe. All these 
> electrons we see are just the same electron weaving through space and time.
>
> LC
>  
>
>> I guess this concerns the observable universe, which has grown a lot 
>> since 1939. (Cf Hubble and “Hubble) 
>>
>> Any idea of why that particular number? Beyond the apparent joke? 
>>
>> Bruno 
>>
>>
>>
>> \
>
>

The number of electrons and protons stays the same?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pair_production

Pair production is the creation of a subatomic particle and its 
antiparticle from a neutral boson. Examples include creating an electron 
and a positron, a muon and an antimuon, or a proton and an antiproton. Pair 
production often refers specifically to a photon creating an 
electron–positron pair near a nucleus. 

In 2008 the Titan laser aimed at a 1-millimeter-thick gold target was used 
to generate positron–electron pairs in large numbers.

 
That "there is only one electron in the universe. All these electrons we 
see are just the same electron weaving through space and time" would 
explain telepathy and precognition.

@philipthrift

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-05-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 12:52:54 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/13/2019 11:22 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 12:14:48 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 6:55:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>> The physical model that says consciousness is the brain processing 
>>> information by neuron's firing at synapses...a very successful model. 
>>>
>>  
>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I completely missed the news of that success, explicitly stating: "a very 
>> successful model".
>>
>> Can you cite something that states that this is a scientific consensus?
>>
>> Now that is what I would call mysterian. 
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>
>
> http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness
>
> Summary 
>
> Because consciousness is a rich biological phenomenon, it is likely that a 
> satisfactory scientific theory of consciousness will require the 
> specification of detailed mechanistic models. The models of consciousness 
> surveyed in this article vary in terms of their level of abstraction as 
> well as in the aspects of phenomenal experience that they are proposed to 
> explain. At present, however, no single model of consciousness appears 
> sufficient to account fully for the multidimensional properties of 
> conscious experience. Moreover, although some of these models have gained 
> prominence, *none has yet been accepted as definitive, or even as a 
> foundation upon which to build a definitive model.*
>
>
> A successful model has predictive power and consilience in a certain 
> domain.  It doesn't have to predict everything to be successful.  Newton's 
> theory of gravity didn't explain why lead is heavier than iron or why the 
> planets had the orbits they have.  I only meant that the neurobiological 
> theory of the brain is successful in predicting that specific chemicals 
> that interact with neurotransmitters will affect conscious thoughts and 
> electrical stimulation of the brain will produce thoughts specific to the 
> location.  All the models mentioned in your link implicitly assume this 
> foundation of neural activity.   I notice however that Jeff Hawkins model 
> of memory->prediction is not included, although I think he's one of the 
> most  serious researchers  https://numenta.com/
>
> Brent 
>


"Neural-firing patterns" (information processing - which alone could be 
simulated in a conventional supercomputer - may be a big part of a theory, 
but may not be the whole thing. A chemical role is likely critical.



Consciousness: A Molecular Perspective
https://www.mdpi.com/2409-9287/2/4/26/htm

...
4. Panpsychism

Some proponents of information-processing theories have recently appealed 
to the philosophy of panpsychism In its most common form, as advocated for 
example in, panpsychism is primarily justified by philosophical reasoning, 
namely that it is unintelligible to get consciousness from unconscious 
matter. With physicalists, panpsychists share the standard intuition that 
macroscopic properties inevitably are the result of the dynamics of 
elementary, microscopic entities. However, they differ from standard 
physicalists in that they assume that matter, even in its most basic form, 
is conscious. Panpsychism could thus be distinguished from physicalism by 
its ontological commitment to some form of mentality inherent in all forms 
of matter.

There are problematic issues though. It seems implausible to just “merge” 
psychological with physical properties; the structures of physical and 
psychological theories are very different from each other. For example, on 
the (sub-)atomic scale individuality is a misnomer (something like “an 
individual electron” does not exist). On the level of psychology just the 
opposite is true: Individuals abound. Accordingly, the introduction of 
“proto-consciousness”, a precursor of consciousness in elementary physical 
systems, seems necessary.

The belief in proto-consciousness, however, brings with it a problem of 
emergence: How do higher forms of consciousness result from a complex 
combination of proto-consciousness? This has been called the “combination 
problem” for panpsychism, which becomes even more pressing once one has 
taken a molecular perspective. If quarks and electrons are 
(proto-)conscious, what about atoms and molecules? Atoms and molecules form 
cells which in turn form tissue that makes up the whole organism. This 
question thus naturally leads to the puzzle of identifying the point of 
emergence of higher forms of consciousness starting with 
proto-consciousness. Judging purely from empirical knowledge, it is 
implausible that it takes place at a lower level than

Re: for Cosmin

2019-05-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 11:24:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 13 May 2019, at 20:24, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 12:25:38 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 10 May 2019, at 09:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> When someone says "consciousness is not a material thing" I think of Wile 
>> E. Coyote.
>>
>> Consciousnesses need something (matter) to hang on to. Consciousnesses 
>> just don't go floating around willy-nilly. The Coyote finds that out when 
>> he finds out he is hanging on to nothing, and looks down. 
>>
>>
>>
>> That is nice Aristotelian poetry. But you just repeat you ontological 
>> commitment in a material world, where no physicist has a consistent theory 
>> of it, nor even have tried to test its existence. What the Aspect 
>> experience has only shown, is that IF there is a physicaly reality then it 
>> can’t be a boolean reality (which would have already annoyed Aristotle).
>>
>> Then with Mechanism, “Matter” invocation needs to add some magic 
>> incompatible with YD+CT.
>> It is like invoking a God to impeach testing simpler theories which do 
>> not commit a so strong ontological commitment.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>
>
> I was shooting for Epicurean poetry (or Lucretian; Lucretius's *De rerum 
> natur*a [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_rerum_natura ] was a poem 
> about the philosophy of Epicurus).
>
> Aristotle's philosophy is *confused nonsense*, especially when compared 
> to Epicurus’s.
>
>
> This is weird. I appreciate Aristotle, because it is rather clear, and 
> enough precise to be refuted, with in the natural science and the theology. 
> I tend to consider him as the inventor of the notion of primitive matter, 
> that is the first which postulate the existence of a physical universe (in 
> metaphysics), but that is also the only place where he get confused (his 
> metaphysics). 
>
> As a materialist (a “believer in matter”) it is astonishing you don’t 
> appreciate Aristotle. He is really the one who got the idea that “God” is a 
> physical universe, even if he add the chiquenaude divine to create the 
> first move.
>
> Bruno
>
>
The atomistic materialist Democritus came before Aristote, and Epicurus, 
the most advanced of the atomists (as written about by Lucretius) was about 
the same time as Aristotle.

But way before them was Thales, who inspired Aristotle's thoughts on matter:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thales_of_Miletus#Water_as_a_first_principle

Thales' most famous philosophical position was his cosmological 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmology> thesis, which comes down to us 
through a passage from Aristotle <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle>
's *Metaphysics <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics_(Aristotle)>*. In 
the work Aristotle unequivocally reported Thales’ hypothesis 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypothesis> about *the nature of all matter 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matter#Historical_development> – that 
the originating principle of nature 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arche> was a single material substance 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Material_monism>*: *water*. Aristotle then 
proceeded to proffer a number of conjectures based on his own observations 
to lend some credence to why Thales may have advanced this idea (though 
Aristotle didn’t hold it himself).

Aristotle laid out his own thinking about matter and form 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hylomorphism> which may shed some light on 
the ideas of Thales, in *Metaphysics 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Metaphysics>* 983 b6 8–11, 17–21. (The 
passage contains words that were later adopted by science with quite 
different meanings.)

That from which is everything that exists and from which it first becomes 
and into which it is rendered at last, its substance remaining under it, 
but transforming in qualities, that they say is the element and principle 
of things that are. …For it is necessary that there be some nature (φύσις), 
either one or more than one, from which become the other things of the 
object being saved... Thales the founder of this type of philosophy says 
that it is water.

In this quote we see Aristotle's depiction of the problem of change and the 
definition of substance <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory>. 
He asked if an object changes, is it the same or different? In either case 
how can there be a change from one to the other? The answer is that the 
substance "is saved", but acquires or loses different qualities (πάθη, the 
things you "experience").


Aristotle conjectured that Thales reached his conclusion by contemplating 

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-05-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 1:18:39 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/13/2019 10:14 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 6:55:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>
> The physical model that says consciousness is the brain processing 
>> information by neuron's firing at synapses...a very successful model. 
>>
>  
>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> I completely missed the news of that success, explicitly stating: "a very 
> successful model".
>
>
> It correctly predicts the degree of effects on consciousness from the 
> chemical affinities of molecules that will combine with neurotransmitter 
> molecules like acytelcholine.   Can you panpsychism predict that?  Can it 
> even predict that if you hold your breath long enough you will pass out?
>
>
> Can you cite something that states that this is a scientific consensus?
>
>
> Yes, it is a scientific consensus (as much as anything is)  that neuronal 
> firing that is transmitted, or inhibited, by chemicals released 
> presynaptically is necessary for conscious thought.  Have you not heard of 
> anesthsia?  What is the panpsychic theory of anesthesia?
>
> Brent
>
>
> Now that is what I would call mysterian. 
>
>

*[no model] has yet been accepted as definitive, or even as a foundation 
upon which to build a definitive model* 

http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness


I think any review of the scientific literature on *consciousness *shows 
that the scientific consensus is that there is no model yet:

The Science of Consciousness (TSC) 2019 
https://www.tsc2019-interlaken.ch/

I am really mystified that there are scientists who think there is. Where 
did this idea come from?

Perhaps that idea is just among some physicists, who perhaps have a narrow 
conception of things: There is the Standard Model of particles, and that's 
the only theory (of all matter) that is needed.

@philipthrift

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-05-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, May 14, 2019 at 12:14:48 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 6:55:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> The physical model that says consciousness is the brain processing 
>> information by neuron's firing at synapses...a very successful model. 
>>
>  
>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> I completely missed the news of that success, explicitly stating: "a very 
> successful model".
>
> Can you cite something that states that this is a scientific consensus?
>
> Now that is what I would call mysterian. 
>
> @philipthrift
>


http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness

Summary

Because consciousness is a rich biological phenomenon, it is likely that a 
satisfactory scientific theory of consciousness will require the 
specification of detailed mechanistic models. The models of consciousness 
surveyed in this article vary in terms of their level of abstraction as 
well as in the aspects of phenomenal experience that they are proposed to 
explain. At present, however, no single model of consciousness appears 
sufficient to account fully for the multidimensional properties of 
conscious experience. Moreover, although some of these models have gained 
prominence, *none has yet been accepted as definitive, or even as a 
foundation upon which to build a definitive model.*

!philipthrift 

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-05-13 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 7:04:14 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/13/2019 4:18 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: 
> > It is Bruce who accuses Platonism of being a failure, even though he 
> > is not able to name any point where physicalism succeeds and Platonism 
> > fails. It goes without saying that all of modern science is compatible 
> > with Platonism. 
>
> Because Platonism is theology.  It's all "explanation" and no 
> prediction...just like "everythingism".  It has never succeeded anywhere 
> because it never puts itself to the test.  It remains in a perfect 
> Platonic world in which ours is a corruption or a random incident.  As 
> Sean Carroll puts it, "All human progress has been made by studying the 
> shadows on the cave wall." 
>
> Brent 
>
>
The reason Sean Carroll states *that line* of course s that he* is a 
Platonist!*

@philipthrift

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-05-13 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 6:55:03 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

The physical model that says consciousness is the brain processing 
> information by neuron's firing at synapses...a very successful model. 
>
 

> Brent
>



I completely missed the news of that success, explicitly stating: "a very 
successful model".

Can you cite something that states that this is a scientific consensus?

Now that is what I would call mysterian. 

@philipthrift

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-05-13 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 4:36:18 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/13/2019 6:11 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
> Physicalism fails to account for consciousness. This is the worst possible 
> failure I can imagine, given that consciousness is the only thing I can be 
> certain to exist.
>
>
> I think this misunderstands what science does.  In the words of John von 
> Neumann, "The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  
> interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical 
> construct which, with the addition of certain verbal  interpretations, 
> describes observed phenomena. The justification of  such a mathematical 
> construct is solely and precisely that it is  expected to work."  I see two 
> approaches to this, one (of which I have been the main advocated on this 
> list) might be called "the engineering approach"  while the other is the 
> philosophical approach.  The philosophical approach either takes 
> consciousness as fundamental and incorrigible (like Cosmin) or tries to 
> equate it with something within a theory based on something else (like 
> Bruno).  One thing both approaches seem to rely on is that there can be no 
> p-zombies, i.e. intelligent behavior is a sure sign of consciousness, as 
> JKC is won't to point out.  Given that the engineering approach gave us 
> Turing, LISP, Deep Blue, Watson, and AlphaGo...while the philosophical 
> approach "predicts" various things we've know for a century or more and 
> various contradictory things about the future (as Bohr said, "Prediction is 
> hard, especially about the future.") my money is on the engineering 
> approach.
>
> Brent   
>
>

I think this is right, without getting into defining the whole 
physicalism/materialism thing.

The article  

 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/physicalism/

by Daniel Stoljar  
(who 
wrote a textbook on the subject) is as good as any, I guess.

I'lll just say one should soon become bored to death taking about the 
*definition* of physicalism/materialism.

Now it is clear scientists come up with models (and theories, and 
frameworks, and paradigms), and they take their "model" and likely 
"implement" it in some programming language and use that program to match 
to experimental or observational data, and they maybe use a statistical 
program to say"that looks like a good match".

But the elephant in the room is s*emantics*: What is the interpretation of 
the "entities" of the model.

Semantics is a big deal in programming language theory.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics_(computer_science)

Is there a calculus of experience, and a semantics of experiences (qualia)?

That's the scientific question.

*There is a hidden code of nature—the code written into its fabric. Our 
theories—our hypothetical code—are our evolving best-guess translations of 
the code of nature, which remains hidden from our knowledge—within 
nature-in-itself.*

@philipthrift

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Re: How separating mind from matter ruined mental health

2019-05-13 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 1:23:22 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 May 2019, at 08:13, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> https://aeon.co/ideas/how-the-dualism-of-descartes-ruined-our-mental-health 
> <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Faeon.co%2Fideas%2Fhow-the-dualism-of-descartes-ruined-our-mental-health=D=1=AFQjCNHE2JiWV3LHmz8TKy5ZflJKDY5x1Q>
> ...
> Nature was thereby drained of her inner life, rendered a deaf and blind 
> apparatus of indifferent and value-free law, and humankind was faced with a 
> world of inanimate, meaningless matter, upon which it projected its psyche 
> – its aliveness, meaning and purpose – only in fantasy.
> ...
> The bifurcation of mind and nature was at the root of immeasurable secular 
> progress – medical and technological advance, the rise of individual rights 
> and social justice, to name just a few. It also protected us all from being 
> bound up in the inherent uncertainty and flux of nature. It gave us a 
> certain omnipotence – just as it gave science empirical control over nature 
> – and most of us readily accept, and willingly spend, the inheritance 
> bequeathed by it, and rightly so.
>
> In the face of an indifferent and unresponsive world that neglects to 
> render our experience meaningful outside of our own minds – for 
> nature-as-mechanism is powerless to do this – 
>
>
>
> Yes, nature does not even exist as mechanism, so the notion of 
> “nature-as-mechanism” is globally non sensical, yet locally, it works for 
> person supported by highly probable computations, but nature becomes a 
> projection, like in a dream.
>
>
>
>
> our minds have been left fixated on empty representations of a world that 
> was once its source and being. 
>
>
> That is due to the reductionist conception of machine and number. Today, 
> we can defeat it, mathematically.
>
>
>
>
> All we have, if we are lucky to have them, are therapists and parents who 
> try to take on what is, in reality, and given the magnitude of the loss, an 
> impossible task.
>
>
> The loss is due to the separation of theology from science, and the 
> impeaching of the fundamental questioning for a long period. 
> That has led to the separation of human sciences and exact science, making 
> them both into pseudo-metaphysics and pseudo-religion. Then we see only the 
> “superficial” technologies, without understanding of what they implies. To 
> separate science and theologies is a con artist trick to steal your money, 
> and in passing, your soul.
>
> When “equated” with the machine, the negative pessimist will say, “oh 
> damned I am only a machine”, but the positive optimistic will say, “nice, 
> so machine can be as nice as I am”.
>
> The interesting thing is only that this can be tested. Mechanism has 
> observable consequences.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
> ...
>
> "How did we ever get the notion of the mind as something distinct from the 
> body? Why did this bad idea enter our culture?”
>
> -- Richard Rorty
> https://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/april13/rorty-041305.html
>
>
>
>
>
>
The problem (aligning with the above article by psychotherapist James 
Barnes [ https://www.linkedin.com/in/james-barnes-msc-ma-90766b159/ ]) is 
that there is no (A) mind *and* the body (or matter), there are (B) 
experiences *of* the body (matter).

Speaking in the terminology of (A) has harmed mental health.

(Now one can be an experience-monist psychotherapist - everything is 
experience - but then the therapist has to explain to the patient why they 
need a particular drug prescription.)

@philipthrift
 

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Re: for Cosmin

2019-05-13 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 12:25:38 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 10 May 2019, at 09:12, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> When someone says "consciousness is not a material thing" I think of Wile 
> E. Coyote.
>
> Consciousnesses need something (matter) to hang on to. Consciousnesses 
> just don't go floating around willy-nilly. The Coyote finds that out when 
> he finds out he is hanging on to nothing, and looks down. 
>
>
>
> That is nice Aristotelian poetry. But you just repeat you ontological 
> commitment in a material world, where no physicist has a consistent theory 
> of it, nor even have tried to test its existence. What the Aspect 
> experience has only shown, is that IF there is a physicaly reality then it 
> can’t be a boolean reality (which would have already annoyed Aristotle).
>
> Then with Mechanism, “Matter” invocation needs to add some magic 
> incompatible with YD+CT.
> It is like invoking a God to impeach testing simpler theories which do not 
> commit a so strong ontological commitment.
>
> Bruno
>


I was shooting for Epicurean poetry (or Lucretian; Lucretius's *De rerum 
natur*a [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/De_rerum_natura ] was a poem about 
the philosophy of Epicurus).

Aristotle's philosophy is *confused nonsense*, especially when compared to 
Epicurus's.

@philipthrift
 

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Re: How separating mind from matter ruined mental health

2019-05-13 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, May 13, 2019 at 8:27:38 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, May 11, 2019 at 7:21 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> > *At least now you are saying "brain activity" instead of "mind". That's 
>> progress.*
>>
>
> I think you're talking about the "difference" between 6 and half a dozen. 
> Mind is what the brain does and you can't **do** anything without the 
> activity of some thing.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>

One should always *mind* their language. :)

@philipthrift

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-05-13 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 9:40:12 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
>>
> Incompleteness disproves nominalism.  Arithmetical truth was proven not 
> only to be not human defined, but to be not human definable.
>



(This is something I posted a few days ago in another forum.)

>From Joel David Hamkins @JDHamkins - http://jdh.hamkins.org/

"Truths" in the set-theoretic multiverse (slides from a talk last week):

http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/Is-there-more-than-one-mathematical-universe.pdf


The final slides:



*The Continuum Hypothesis is settled*

On the multiverse perspective, the CH question is settled.
It is incorrect to describe it as an open question.

The answer consists of our detailed understanding of how the
CH both holds and fails throughout the multiverse, of how these
models are connected and how one may reach them from each
other while preserving or omitting certain features.

Fascinating open questions about CH remain, of course, but the
most important essential facts are known.

Ultimately, the question becomes: do we have just one
mathematical world or many



Mathematics is a language - with multiple dialects.

* Each dialect of mathematics has its own syntax *(to some extent)* 
and semantics!*



There is no settled "truth" in mathematics.

For example (as Hamkins shows) the CH is true in one dialect (of set 
theory) and false in another.

@philipthrift

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

2019-05-13 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 2:43:39 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 May 2019, at 19:57, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>   Is a theory of dark matter already lurking within TOA (Theory Of 
> Arithmetic) ready to be derived? 
>
>
> The goal was to explain where consciousness and matter comes from, in a 
> verifiable way, but for physics, we have got only that it has to exist, be 
> non trivial, non boolean and quantum like, with a highly symmetrical core 
>  where information cannot be eliminated. 
>
>
>
>
>
> -- but as for arithmetic being "universal" among cultures, arithmetical 
> abilities are also found in other animals, like birds.
>
>
> Yes. And pigeon are better than human is evaluating some (very particular) 
> arithmetical proposition. 
>
> I am glad you agree with this. Some argue against the “objectiveness” of 
> elementary arithmetical reality by pointing that some humans have not yet 
> the notion.. This has been disproved, if I remember well.
>
>
>
>
>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bird_intelligence
>
>
> Just as there is panexperientialism -- experientiality at various (proto) 
> levels is found universally in all matter 
>
>
> Below virus, I am not even sure what that could mean. With mechanism, some 
> digital code has to play a role. The continuum needs the waves to get the 
> natural numbers, and listen to the music of the prime, or the cacophony of 
> the baby universal numbers ….
>
>
>
>
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panpsychism#Panexperientialism
>
> -- and panlinguisticism -- ditto language -- there is panarithmeticalism.
>
> Matter has all these aspects: experiential, grammatical, arithmetical.
>
>
> Yes, and other aspect too, at least when we derive matter from the 
> imagination of numbers.
>
> It is like in Proclos, from the One you get an arithmogony, then a 
> psychogony, and then a cosmogony. Matter is when God loses control, and can 
> no more predict something to you, like its illustrated with the first 
> person indeterminacy. You might try the thought experience, to see what I 
> mean.
>
> Bruno 
>
> PS I see there are still a full discussion in this thread. Will read 
> later. Apology for the (3p or 1pp!) delays ...
>
>
>
>

> "The continuum needs the waves to get the natural numbers, and listen to 
the music of the prime, or the cacophony of the baby universal numbers …."


I came across this a couple of days ago:

*What is a Line?*
Can the arithmetic (the discrete) and the geometric (the continuous) get 
along?

http://vcho.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/What-is-a-Line-Axiomathes.pdf


*Since the discovery of incommensurability in ancient Greece, arithmeticism 
and geometricism constantly switched roles. ...*
 

ends 

*The spatial subject[line]-object[point] relation, embodied in a 
(delimited) linestretch, presupposes the uniqueness and irreducibility of 
the totality character of continuity (Bernays, Brouwer and Weyl), as well 
as the irreducibility of the spatial time-order of at once—and at the same 
time it highlights the mutual coherence between the aspects of number and 
space*.


> "Matter is when God loses control, and can no more predict something to 
you, like its illustrated with the first person indeterminacy."

OK. :)


@philipthrift


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Re: How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ?

2019-05-13 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 2:55:39 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/12/2019 11:26 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 12:57:17 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/12/2019 1:35 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 9:21:45 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/11/2019 6:58 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 6:52:36 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 5/11/2019 4:16 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 6:06:31 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 5/11/2019 3:45 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 3:31:19 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote: 
>>>>>>
>>>>>> How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ? In the case of 
>>>>>> consciousness <> AI, telepathy and precognition are more easily 
>>>>>> explainable, in the sense that consciousness being non-local, it can 
>>>>>> indeed 
>>>>>> create cases in which spatially and temporally separated consciousness 
>>>>>> can 
>>>>>> communicate. But in the case of local AIs, how can such phenomena have 
>>>>>> any 
>>>>>> chance of being explained ? 
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I doubt telepathy, but I do have a low-level precognition thought 
>>>>> experiment handy:
>>>>>
>>>>> In the typical EPR experiment setup, particle A goes one way, and 
>>>>> particle B goes another way, to detector-A and detector-B respectively.
>>>>>
>>>>> Now particles A and B are "entangled" (quantum-mechanically) , so that 
>>>>> detector-B settings will stochastically influence what detector-A detects 
>>>>> (and vice versa).
>>>>>
>>>>> Now suppose detector-A is placed in a person's brain (not far away) in 
>>>>> such a way that particle A (via detector-A) influences a neuron or two, 
>>>>> but 
>>>>> detector-B is light years (traveling distance) away. Can detector-B 
>>>>> settings made years in the future influence what the person's neurons do 
>>>>> in 
>>>>> the present?
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Why make it impossible to perform by placing B far away?  The only 
>>>>> relevant condition is whether Bob's setting was made space-like or 
>>>>> time-like relative to Alice's.  And that kind of experiment has been 
>>>>> done.  
>>>>> There is correlation per QM.
>>>>>
>>>>> Brent
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  
>>>>
>>>> Huh? I claimed it was possible to perform. Not impossible to perform.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You claim we can send Bob light years away to perform this 
>>>> experiment??  How?   
>>>>
>>>> And why bother since Aspect has already done it with Bob selecting his 
>>>> setting space-like relative to Alice's?  The case in which Bob's setting 
>>>> is 
>>>> done in Alice's future light cone has been done too, but isn't very 
>>>> interesting since Alice could then influence Bob's setting.   Are you 
>>>> testing whether Alice's neurons will agree with Alice's instruments?  I 
>>>> don't see what you're getting at?
>>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No. Bob could be someone on another planet (Bob will in the future of 
>>> that other planet).
>>>
>>>
>>> Or the idea already discussed, that the B particle could go out into 
>>> space and heavy masses could bend its path around and it returns to Earth. 
>>> In the future.
>>>
>>> In any case, Bob is someone in the future, not the present.
>>>
>>>
>>> So suppose Alice, in her lab makes a setting and measures her entangled 
>>> particle.   The she walks down the hall to Bob's lab and says, "Ok, Bob you 
>>> are in the future of my setting and measurements.  Go ahead and do your 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2019-05-12 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 12:31:12 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Concerning mathematical logic and theology, an incredible book is:
>
> Cohen J. Daniel, 2007. Equations from God, Pure Mathematics and Victorian 
> Faith, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore.
>
> That book shows that the whole field of mathematical logic is born from 
> Victorian Faith. I suspected this from my reading of Lewis Carroll, but I 
> did not suspect it to be so historically true. Then, it explains the way 
> this has been hidden, for the professional benefits of the whole of 
> Mathematics, but that did not help for the field of theology, alas.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>

Now that book I have never heard of before!

https://books.google.com/books/about/Equations_from_God.html?id=eYtfAQAACAAJ

Incredible. (No pun intended.) 

Throughout history, a*pplication rather than abstraction* has been the 
prominent driving force in mathematics. From the compass and sextant to 
partial differential equations, mathematical advances were spurred by the 
desire for better navigation tools, weaponry, and construction methods. But 
the religious upheaval in Victorian England and the fledgling United States 
opened the way for* the rediscovery of pure mathematics*, a tradition 
rooted in Ancient Greece.

In "Equations from God," Daniel J. Cohen captures the origins of the 
rebirth of abstract mathematics in the intellectual quest to rise above 
common existence and touch the mind of the deity. Using an array of 
published and private sources, Cohen shows how philosophers and 
mathematicians seized upon the beautiful simplicity inherent in 
mathematical laws *to reconnect with the divine* and traces the route by 
which the divinely inspired mathematics of the Victorian era begot later 
secular philosophies.

Thank you. This made my day.

@philipthrift  (Ph.D., Applied Mathematics)


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Re: How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ?

2019-05-12 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 12:57:17 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/12/2019 1:35 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 9:21:45 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/11/2019 6:58 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 6:52:36 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/11/2019 4:16 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 6:06:31 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 5/11/2019 3:45 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 3:31:19 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote: 
>>>>>
>>>>> How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ? In the case of 
>>>>> consciousness <> AI, telepathy and precognition are more easily 
>>>>> explainable, in the sense that consciousness being non-local, it can 
>>>>> indeed 
>>>>> create cases in which spatially and temporally separated consciousness 
>>>>> can 
>>>>> communicate. But in the case of local AIs, how can such phenomena have 
>>>>> any 
>>>>> chance of being explained ? 
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I doubt telepathy, but I do have a low-level precognition thought 
>>>> experiment handy:
>>>>
>>>> In the typical EPR experiment setup, particle A goes one way, and 
>>>> particle B goes another way, to detector-A and detector-B respectively.
>>>>
>>>> Now particles A and B are "entangled" (quantum-mechanically) , so that 
>>>> detector-B settings will stochastically influence what detector-A detects 
>>>> (and vice versa).
>>>>
>>>> Now suppose detector-A is placed in a person's brain (not far away) in 
>>>> such a way that particle A (via detector-A) influences a neuron or two, 
>>>> but 
>>>> detector-B is light years (traveling distance) away. Can detector-B 
>>>> settings made years in the future influence what the person's neurons do 
>>>> in 
>>>> the present?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Why make it impossible to perform by placing B far away?  The only 
>>>> relevant condition is whether Bob's setting was made space-like or 
>>>> time-like relative to Alice's.  And that kind of experiment has been done. 
>>>>  
>>>> There is correlation per QM.
>>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>> Huh? I claimed it was possible to perform. Not impossible to perform.
>>>
>>>
>>> You claim we can send Bob light years away to perform this experiment??  
>>> How?   
>>>
>>> And why bother since Aspect has already done it with Bob selecting his 
>>> setting space-like relative to Alice's?  The case in which Bob's setting is 
>>> done in Alice's future light cone has been done too, but isn't very 
>>> interesting since Alice could then influence Bob's setting.   Are you 
>>> testing whether Alice's neurons will agree with Alice's instruments?  I 
>>> don't see what you're getting at?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> No. Bob could be someone on another planet (Bob will in the future of 
>> that other planet).
>>
>>
>> Or the idea already discussed, that the B particle could go out into 
>> space and heavy masses could bend its path around and it returns to Earth. 
>> In the future.
>>
>> In any case, Bob is someone in the future, not the present.
>>
>>
>> So suppose Alice, in her lab makes a setting and measures her entangled 
>> particle.   The she walks down the hall to Bob's lab and says, "Ok, Bob you 
>> are in the future of my setting and measurements.  Go ahead and do your 
>> thing."  What difference is there between that and Bob is on another 
>> planet?  He's in Alice's future light cone.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> *The EPR thought experiment, performed with electron–positron pairs. A 
> source (center) sends particles toward two observers, electrons to Alice 
> (left) and positrons to Bob (right), who can perform spin measurements.*
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPR_paradox#Measurements_on_an_entangled_state
>
> The A particle travels 10 feet to the A-detector (Alice). 
> The 

Re: Church's Thesis

2019-05-12 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 10:49:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 May 2019, at 20:26, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 11:56:41 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 May 2019, at 01:40, cloud...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> *The Church-Turing thesis is one of the most useless ideas ever invented.*
>>
>>
>>
>> You know that?
>>
>
>
> I just say that *CTT* (as it is acronymized) is a type of dogmatic theism 
> (like YHWH <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Names_of_God_in_Judaism#YHWH>). 
>
>
> CT, or CTT if you prefer, is refutable. I am not sure YHWH is refutable, 
> although to prove this would require some thorough research. The 8 
> universal machine hypostases are embedded in the neoplatonist zephirots, as 
> I have discovered recently. The neoplatonist christians, jews, and muslims 
> are very close to the (Löbian) universal machine. 
>
>
>
> Better to ignore it.
>
>
> Have you understood the simple proof of incompleteness that I gave? CTT 
> changes everything. It is the important part of Digital Mechanism, if only 
> to define “digital” in a mathematically precise way.
>
> We can ignore it, because we could just define “computable” by 
> Turing-computable, or lambda-calculable, … but this is dishonest, and makes 
> sense only if we assume CTT.
>
> Then, there are tuns of evidences for CT, and none against it. There are 
> evidence comping from the empirical reality, and very deep theoretical 
> evidences too.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>


At least in 3 ways "against":

1. The domain of *interactions* (π calculus vs. λ calculus) exposes the 
limits of CTT.

2. The domain of *experiences *(aka *qualia*) does as well.

3. The domain of *materials*: Material computing  exploits unconventional 
physical substrates and/or unconventional computational models to perform 
physical computation in a non-silicon and/or non-Turing paradigm.
https://www.cs.york.ac.uk/nature/SpInspired/workshops/TEMC-2019-Tokyo/CallforAbstracts.html


*The Interactive Nature of Computing:*
*Refuting the Strong Church-Turing Thesis*
Dina Goldin, Peter Wegner
Brown University
http://www.cse.uconn.edu/~dgoldin/papers/strong-cct.pdf

The classical view of computing positions computation as a closed-box
transformation of inputs (rational numbers or finite strings) to outputs. 
According to the interactive view of computing, computation is an ongoing 
interactive process rather than a function-based transformation of an input 
to an output. Specifically, communication with the outside world happens 
during the computation, not before or after it. This approach radically 
changes our understanding of what is computation and how it is modeled. The 
acceptance of interaction as a new paradigm is hindered by the Strong 
Church-Turing Thesis (SCT), the widespread belief that Turing Machines 
(TMs) capture all computation, so models of computation more expressive 
than TMs are impossible. In this paper, we show that SCT reinterprets the 
original Church-Turing Thesis (CTT) in a way that Turing never intended; 
its commonly assumed equivalence to the original is a myth. We identify and 
analyze the historical reasons for the widespread belief in SCT. Only by 
accepting that it is false can we begin to adopt interaction as an 
alternative paradigm of computation. We present Persistent Turing Machines 
(PTMs), that extend TMs to capture sequential interaction. PTMs allow us to 
formulate the Sequential Interaction Thesis, going beyond the 
expressiveness of TMs and of the CTT. The paradigm shift to interaction 
provides an alternative understanding of the nature of computing that 
better reflects the services provided by today’s computing technology.

*The Church-Turing Thesis: Breaking the Myth*
Dina Goldin, Peter Wegner
pdf @ 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/221652812_The_Church-Turing_Thesis_Breaking_the_Myth

According to the interactive view of computation, communication happens 
during the computation, not before or after it. This approach, distinct 
from concurrency theory and the theory of computation, represents a 
paradigm shift that changes our understanding of what is computation and 
how it is modeled. Interaction machines extend Turing machines with 
interaction to capture the behavior of concurrent systems, promising to 
bridge these two fields. This promise is hindered by the widespread belief, 
incorrectly known as the Church-Turing thesis, that no model of computation 
more expressive than Turing machines can exist. Yet Turing’s original 
thesis only refers to the computation of functions and explicitly excludes 
other computational paradigms such as interaction. In this paper, we 
identify and analyze the historical reasons for this widespread belief. 
Only by accepting that

Re: How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ?

2019-05-12 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, May 12, 2019 at 3:35:03 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 9:21:45 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/11/2019 6:58 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 6:52:36 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/11/2019 4:16 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 6:06:31 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 5/11/2019 3:45 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 3:31:19 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote: 
>>>>>
>>>>> How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ? In the case of 
>>>>> consciousness <> AI, telepathy and precognition are more easily 
>>>>> explainable, in the sense that consciousness being non-local, it can 
>>>>> indeed 
>>>>> create cases in which spatially and temporally separated consciousness 
>>>>> can 
>>>>> communicate. But in the case of local AIs, how can such phenomena have 
>>>>> any 
>>>>> chance of being explained ? 
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I doubt telepathy, but I do have a low-level precognition thought 
>>>> experiment handy:
>>>>
>>>> In the typical EPR experiment setup, particle A goes one way, and 
>>>> particle B goes another way, to detector-A and detector-B respectively.
>>>>
>>>> Now particles A and B are "entangled" (quantum-mechanically) , so that 
>>>> detector-B settings will stochastically influence what detector-A detects 
>>>> (and vice versa).
>>>>
>>>> Now suppose detector-A is placed in a person's brain (not far away) in 
>>>> such a way that particle A (via detector-A) influences a neuron or two, 
>>>> but 
>>>> detector-B is light years (traveling distance) away. Can detector-B 
>>>> settings made years in the future influence what the person's neurons do 
>>>> in 
>>>> the present?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Why make it impossible to perform by placing B far away?  The only 
>>>> relevant condition is whether Bob's setting was made space-like or 
>>>> time-like relative to Alice's.  And that kind of experiment has been done. 
>>>>  
>>>> There is correlation per QM.
>>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
>>>
>>>  
>>>
>>> Huh? I claimed it was possible to perform. Not impossible to perform.
>>>
>>>
>>> You claim we can send Bob light years away to perform this experiment??  
>>> How?   
>>>
>>> And why bother since Aspect has already done it with Bob selecting his 
>>> setting space-like relative to Alice's?  The case in which Bob's setting is 
>>> done in Alice's future light cone has been done too, but isn't very 
>>> interesting since Alice could then influence Bob's setting.   Are you 
>>> testing whether Alice's neurons will agree with Alice's instruments?  I 
>>> don't see what you're getting at?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> No. Bob could be someone on another planet (Bob will in the future of 
>> that other planet).
>>
>>
>> Or the idea already discussed, that the B particle could go out into 
>> space and heavy masses could bend its path around and it returns to Earth. 
>> In the future.
>>
>> In any case, Bob is someone in the future, not the present.
>>
>>
>> So suppose Alice, in her lab makes a setting and measures her entangled 
>> particle.   The she walks down the hall to Bob's lab and says, "Ok, Bob you 
>> are in the future of my setting and measurements.  Go ahead and do your 
>> thing."  What difference is there between that and Bob is on another 
>> planet?  He's in Alice's future light cone.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> *The EPR thought experiment, performed with electron–positron pairs. A 
> source (center) sends particles toward two observers, electrons to Alice 
> (left) and positrons to Bob (right), who can perform spin measurements.*
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPR_paradox#Measurements_on_an_entangled_state
>
> The A particle travels 10 feet to the A-detector (Alice). 
> The B particle travels 2.939e+14 miles* (50 light years) to the B-dete

Re: How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ?

2019-05-12 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 9:21:45 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/11/2019 6:58 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 6:52:36 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/11/2019 4:16 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 6:06:31 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/11/2019 3:45 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 3:31:19 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote: 
>>>>
>>>> How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ? In the case of 
>>>> consciousness <> AI, telepathy and precognition are more easily 
>>>> explainable, in the sense that consciousness being non-local, it can 
>>>> indeed 
>>>> create cases in which spatially and temporally separated consciousness can 
>>>> communicate. But in the case of local AIs, how can such phenomena have any 
>>>> chance of being explained ? 
>>>>
>>>
>>> I doubt telepathy, but I do have a low-level precognition thought 
>>> experiment handy:
>>>
>>> In the typical EPR experiment setup, particle A goes one way, and 
>>> particle B goes another way, to detector-A and detector-B respectively.
>>>
>>> Now particles A and B are "entangled" (quantum-mechanically) , so that 
>>> detector-B settings will stochastically influence what detector-A detects 
>>> (and vice versa).
>>>
>>> Now suppose detector-A is placed in a person's brain (not far away) in 
>>> such a way that particle A (via detector-A) influences a neuron or two, but 
>>> detector-B is light years (traveling distance) away. Can detector-B 
>>> settings made years in the future influence what the person's neurons do in 
>>> the present?
>>>
>>>
>>> Why make it impossible to perform by placing B far away?  The only 
>>> relevant condition is whether Bob's setting was made space-like or 
>>> time-like relative to Alice's.  And that kind of experiment has been done.  
>>> There is correlation per QM.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> Huh? I claimed it was possible to perform. Not impossible to perform.
>>
>>
>> You claim we can send Bob light years away to perform this experiment??  
>> How?   
>>
>> And why bother since Aspect has already done it with Bob selecting his 
>> setting space-like relative to Alice's?  The case in which Bob's setting is 
>> done in Alice's future light cone has been done too, but isn't very 
>> interesting since Alice could then influence Bob's setting.   Are you 
>> testing whether Alice's neurons will agree with Alice's instruments?  I 
>> don't see what you're getting at?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
>
> No. Bob could be someone on another planet (Bob will in the future of that 
> other planet).
>
>
> Or the idea already discussed, that the B particle could go out into space 
> and heavy masses could bend its path around and it returns to Earth. In the 
> future.
>
> In any case, Bob is someone in the future, not the present.
>
>
> So suppose Alice, in her lab makes a setting and measures her entangled 
> particle.   The she walks down the hall to Bob's lab and says, "Ok, Bob you 
> are in the future of my setting and measurements.  Go ahead and do your 
> thing."  What difference is there between that and Bob is on another 
> planet?  He's in Alice's future light cone.
>
> Brent
>



*The EPR thought experiment, performed with electron–positron pairs. A 
source (center) sends particles toward two observers, electrons to Alice 
(left) and positrons to Bob (right), who can perform spin measurements.*
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EPR_paradox#Measurements_on_an_entangled_state

The A particle travels 10 feet to the A-detector (Alice). 
The B particle travels 2.939e+14 miles* (50 light years) to the B-detector 
(Bob).


Bob could be on another planet. Or on Earth, if the B particle path could 
be bent around somehow via GR.

Bob may be 30 years old. He hasn't yet been born when Alice gets the A 
particle.

* calculation via Google


But with the phenomenon of "quantum entanglement" it occurs to me that some 
*weak* form of both telepathy and precognition could occur:

*Stabilized entanglement of massive mechanical oscillators*
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-018-0038-x

But how weak, TBD.

@philipthrift

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Re: How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ?

2019-05-11 Thread Philip Thrift



On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 6:52:36 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/11/2019 4:16 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 6:06:31 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 5/11/2019 3:45 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 3:31:19 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote: 
>>>
>>> How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ? In the case of 
>>> consciousness <> AI, telepathy and precognition are more easily 
>>> explainable, in the sense that consciousness being non-local, it can indeed 
>>> create cases in which spatially and temporally separated consciousness can 
>>> communicate. But in the case of local AIs, how can such phenomena have any 
>>> chance of being explained ? 
>>>
>>
>> I doubt telepathy, but I do have a low-level precognition thought 
>> experiment handy:
>>
>> In the typical EPR experiment setup, particle A goes one way, and 
>> particle B goes another way, to detector-A and detector-B respectively.
>>
>> Now particles A and B are "entangled" (quantum-mechanically) , so that 
>> detector-B settings will stochastically influence what detector-A detects 
>> (and vice versa).
>>
>> Now suppose detector-A is placed in a person's brain (not far away) in 
>> such a way that particle A (via detector-A) influences a neuron or two, but 
>> detector-B is light years (traveling distance) away. Can detector-B 
>> settings made years in the future influence what the person's neurons do in 
>> the present?
>>
>>
>> Why make it impossible to perform by placing B far away?  The only 
>> relevant condition is whether Bob's setting was made space-like or 
>> time-like relative to Alice's.  And that kind of experiment has been done.  
>> There is correlation per QM.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>  
>
> Huh? I claimed it was possible to perform. Not impossible to perform.
>
>
> You claim we can send Bob light years away to perform this experiment??  
> How?   
>
> And why bother since Aspect has already done it with Bob selecting his 
> setting space-like relative to Alice's?  The case in which Bob's setting is 
> done in Alice's future light cone has been done too, but isn't very 
> interesting since Alice could then influence Bob's setting.   Are you 
> testing whether Alice's neurons will agree with Alice's instruments?  I 
> don't see what you're getting at?
>
> Brent
>




No. Bob could be someone on another planet (Bob will in the future of that 
other planet).


Or the idea already discussed, that the B particle could go out into space 
and heavy masses could bend its path around and it returns to Earth. In the 
future.

In any case, Bob is someone in the future, not the present.

<https://twitter.com/philipthrift>
<https://twitter.com/philipthrift>
<https://twitter.com/philipthrift>
<https://twitter.com/philipthrift>
<https://twitter.com/philipthrift>

<https://twitter.com/philipthrift>

<https://twitter.com/philipthrift>
philipthrift
<https://twitter.com/philipthrift>
@philipthrift <https://twitter.com/philipthrift>

 

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Re: How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ?

2019-05-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 6:29:20 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, May 11, 2019 at 4:31 PM 'Cosmin Visan'  List <
> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>
> *> How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ?*
>>
>
> That's easily explained. Millions of people are unscientific enough to 
> believe in the virgin birth, the infallibility of the pope, a picture of 
> Jesus in a pizza , astrology and the the evils of vaccination; so it's 
> not surprising that millions of people are unscientific enough to believe 
> in telepathy and precognition. 
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
Still, a little Feyerabend never hurts -  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul_Feyerabend 

>  
>

@philipthrift
 

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Re: How separating mind from matter ruined mental health

2019-05-11 Thread Philip Thrift



On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 6:09:08 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, May 11, 2019 at 2:34 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> *> We talk about the sun and solar activities (like fusion, magnetic 
>> propagation, etc.) but we don't talk about solar activities distinct from 
>> the sun in any weird way,*
>
>
> You can't have solar activity without the sun, and there is nothing weird 
> about that. 
>
>>  
>
>> *> like people do with brain and mental activities (of the mind).*
>>
>
> You can't have brain activity without a brain, and there is nothing weird 
> about that either. 
>  
>
>> *> If "I" is an adjective, so is "you".*
>>
>
> Yes.
>
> > *You matter speaks strangely. *
>>
>
> My and probably your third grade English teacher is the one that spoke 
> strangely 
>
> John K Clark  
>
>
>
>
At least now you are saying "brain activity" instead of "mind". That's 
progress.

Although to make a direct linguistic comparison to "solar activity" (not 
"sun activity") it would be "brainial activity". 

@philipthrift

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Re: How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ?

2019-05-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 6:06:31 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/11/2019 3:45 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 3:31:19 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote: 
>>
>> How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ? In the case of 
>> consciousness <> AI, telepathy and precognition are more easily 
>> explainable, in the sense that consciousness being non-local, it can indeed 
>> create cases in which spatially and temporally separated consciousness can 
>> communicate. But in the case of local AIs, how can such phenomena have any 
>> chance of being explained ? 
>>
>
> I doubt telepathy, but I do have a low-level precognition thought 
> experiment handy:
>
> In the typical EPR experiment setup, particle A goes one way, and particle 
> B goes another way, to detector-A and detector-B respectively.
>
> Now particles A and B are "entangled" (quantum-mechanically) , so that 
> detector-B settings will stochastically influence what detector-A detects 
> (and vice versa).
>
> Now suppose detector-A is placed in a person's brain (not far away) in 
> such a way that particle A (via detector-A) influences a neuron or two, but 
> detector-B is light years (traveling distance) away. Can detector-B 
> settings made years in the future influence what the person's neurons do in 
> the present?
>
>
> Why make it impossible to perform by placing B far away?  The only 
> relevant condition is whether Bob's setting was made space-like or 
> time-like relative to Alice's.  And that kind of experiment has been done.  
> There is correlation per QM.
>
> Brent
>

 

Huh? I claimed it was possible to perform. Not impossible to perform.

@philipthrift 

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Re: How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ?

2019-05-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 6:06:17 PM UTC-5, telmo wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sat, May 11, 2019, at 23:45, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 3:31:19 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ? In the case of 
> consciousness <> AI, telepathy and precognition are more easily 
> explainable, in the sense that consciousness being non-local, it can indeed 
> create cases in which spatially and temporally separated consciousness can 
> communicate. But in the case of local AIs, how can such phenomena have any 
> chance of being explained ? 
>
>
> I doubt telepathy, but I do have a low-level precognition thought 
> experiment handy:
>
> In the typical EPR experiment setup, particle A goes one way, and particle 
> B goes another way, to detector-A and detector-B respectively.
>
> Now particles A and B are "entangled" (quantum-mechanically) , so that 
> detector-B settings will stochastically influence what detector-A detects 
> (and vice versa).
>
> Now suppose detector-A is placed in a person's brain (not far away) in 
> such a way that particle A (via detector-A) influences a neuron or two, but 
> detector-B is light years (traveling distance) away. Can detector-B 
> settings made years in the future influence what the person's neurons do in 
> the present?
>
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No-communication_theorem
>
> Telmo.
>
>
>
Another misguided and misleading theorem of (most, not all) physicists.

*Doesn't apply because it has unjustified assumptions*:

https://arxiv.org/abs/1307.7744

@philipthrift

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Re: How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ?

2019-05-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 3:31:19 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> How do AI fanboys explain telepathy and precognition ? In the case of 
> consciousness <> AI, telepathy and precognition are more easily 
> explainable, in the sense that consciousness being non-local, it can indeed 
> create cases in which spatially and temporally separated consciousness can 
> communicate. But in the case of local AIs, how can such phenomena have any 
> chance of being explained ? 
>

I doubt telepathy, but I do have a low-level precognition thought 
experiment handy:

In the typical EPR experiment setup, particle A goes one way, and particle 
B goes another way, to detector-A and detector-B respectively.

Now particles A and B are "entangled" (quantum-mechanically) , so that 
detector-B settings will stochastically influence what detector-A detects 
(and vice versa).

Now suppose detector-A is placed in a person's brain (not far away) in such 
a way that particle A (via detector-A) influences a neuron or two, but 
detector-B is light years (traveling distance) away. Can detector-B 
settings made years in the future influence what the person's neurons do in 
the present?

@philipthrift
 

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Re: How separating mind from matter ruined mental health

2019-05-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 10:20:46 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, May 11, 2019 at 10:10 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>  
>
>> > "Brain", "mind", "psyche" are nouns. [ Wiktionary ]
>>
>
> And my third grade English teacher said "I" was a pronoun, she was 
> entirely wrong. "I" is an adjective describing how atoms behave when they 
> are organized in a johnkclarkian way,  
>
> *> What word are you referring to as an adjective?*
>>
>
> My iMac dictionary says an adjective is a word or phrase naming an 
> attribute related to a noun that modifies or describes it. This time the 
> dictionary is correct. Mind, an adjective, describes what a brain, a noun, 
> does.
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>> "Mental" and even "brainial" (uncommon) are adjectives.
>> We talk about the *sun* and *solar activities* (like fusion, magnetic 
>> propagation, etc.) but we don't talk about solar activities distinct from 
>> the sun in any weird way, like people do with brain and mental activities 
>> (of the mind).
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>>
>>
 

If "I" is an adjective, so is "you".

You matter speaks strangely. 

@philipthrift 


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Re: How separating mind from matter ruined mental health

2019-05-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 8:36:00 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sat, May 11, 2019 at 7:21 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> > *That's a start to get away from the Cartesian delusion.*
>
>
> I agree it's silly to say mind has nothing to do with matter, but it's not 
> silly to say nouns are not the same as adjectives. Brain and mind do not 
> mean the same thing.
>

> John K Clark
>
>>
>>


"Brain", "mind", "psyche" are nouns. [ Wiktionary ]

What word are you referring to as an *adjective*?

"Mental" and even "brainial" (uncommon) are adjectives.

We talk about the *sun* and *solar activities* (like fusion, magnetic 
propagation, etc.) but we don't talk about solar activities distinct from 
the sun in any weird way, like people do with brain and mental activities 
(of the mind).

@philipthrift

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Re: How separating mind from matter ruined mental health

2019-05-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 5:52:29 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> Separating mind from matter is no more ruinous than separating "fast" 
> from "racing car". Mind is what a brain does. 
>
>  John K Clark
>



"Mind" is one of those words that should be deprecated: 

The brain "does" (or processes) experiences, knowledge, intentions, ideas, 
... all that "mental" stuff.

In psychology, the *psyche* /ˈsaɪki/ is the totality of [what the brain 
"does"], conscious and unconscious.
[Wikipedia].

At least  "psyche" is not literally the word "mind". That's a start to get 
away from the Cartesian delusion.

@philipthrift






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Re: for Cosmin

2019-05-11 Thread Philip Thrift




If your consciousness is not attached to matter (your brain), you should be 
able to do this.

And report back!

@philipthrift



On Saturday, May 11, 2019 at 5:13:05 AM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> What does this has to do with the invented idea of "matter" ?
>
> On Friday, 10 May 2019 19:30:06 UTC+3, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> I tried astral projection [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astral_projection ] and unlike others here 
>> it doesn't work.
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>>

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How separating mind from matter ruined mental health

2019-05-11 Thread Philip Thrift


https://aeon.co/ideas/how-the-dualism-of-descartes-ruined-our-mental-health
...
Nature was thereby drained of her inner life, rendered a deaf and blind 
apparatus of indifferent and value-free law, and humankind was faced with a 
world of inanimate, meaningless matter, upon which it projected its psyche 
– its aliveness, meaning and purpose – only in fantasy.
...
The bifurcation of mind and nature was at the root of immeasurable secular 
progress – medical and technological advance, the rise of individual rights 
and social justice, to name just a few. It also protected us all from being 
bound up in the inherent uncertainty and flux of nature. It gave us a 
certain omnipotence – just as it gave science empirical control over nature 
– and most of us readily accept, and willingly spend, the inheritance 
bequeathed by it, and rightly so.

In the face of an indifferent and unresponsive world that neglects to 
render our experience meaningful outside of our own minds – for 
nature-as-mechanism is powerless to do this – our minds have been left 
fixated on empty representations of a world that was once its source and 
being. All we have, if we are lucky to have them, are therapists and 
parents who try to take on what is, in reality, and given the magnitude of 
the loss, an impossible task.
...

"How did we ever get the notion of the mind as something distinct from the 
body? Why did this bad idea enter our culture?"
-- Richard Rorty
https://news.stanford.edu/news/2005/april13/rorty-041305.html


@philipthrift


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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-05-10 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, May 10, 2019 at 6:34:47 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
> (Mechanism is the leading theory of mind among philosophers of mind, what 
> is your alternative?)
>  
> Jason
>
 

I don't know where people get the "*x *is the leading theory" notion from 
-- it always sounds like it's likely wrong -- but there are certainly 
alternatives:

Hedda Hassel Mørch
@heddamorch



site:  https://heddahasselmorch.com/

@philipthrift

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-05-10 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, May 10, 2019 at 5:31:05 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 12:24:56PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > Wittgenstein is sum up with his “what we cannot talk about should not be 
> talked 
> > about”, but that is self-defeating (What are you talking about Mr 
> > Wittgenstein?). 
> > 
>
> Only if he couldn't talk about what he is talking about. But it seems 
> like he could, so perhaps therefore he thought he should? 
>
>
> -- 
>

The Wittgenstein "language" quote I think of is

*The limits of my language are the limits of my world.* 

But that is young Wittgenstein. Older Wittgenstein (in his 40s and 50s) had 
moved to "the language game".

He might have revised it: *If your find your world limiting, play a new 
language.*


@philipthrift

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-05-10 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, May 10, 2019 at 1:47:35 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 5/10/2019 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 6 May 2019, at 10:25, cloud...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, May 5, 2019 at 6:55:37 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: 
>
> When I follow a recipe (a program) to make a meal, I mix the identified 
> ingredients in the specified order and cook according to the specified 
> times.
>
> The meal is tasty (hopefully). Entering the recipe into a computer (even 
> if there was some sort of recipe interpreter) does not result in a tasty 
> meal.
>
>
> That is straw man. A recipe is not an algorithm, even is sometimes it is 
> used as a pedagogical tool to explain what is an algorithm.
>
> To refute mechanism, you need to simulate both the recipe, the food and 
> the taster. 
>
>
> And the kitchen.
>
>
> Brent
>
>

*A recipe is an algorithm for cooking up bites in a kitchen.*
*An algorithm is a recipe for cooking up bytes in a computer.*



@philipthrift 

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Re: for Cosmin

2019-05-10 Thread Philip Thrift

I tried astral projection [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Astral_projection ] 
and unlike others here it doesn't work.

@philipthrift


On Friday, May 10, 2019 at 4:48:47 AM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> Why ?
>
> On Friday, 10 May 2019 10:12:10 UTC+3, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> Consciousnesses need something (matter) to hang on to. 
>>
>

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Re: for Cosmin

2019-05-10 Thread Philip Thrift


When someone says "consciousness is not a material thing" I think of Wile 
E. Coyote.

Consciousnesses need something (matter) to hang on to. Consciousnesses just 
don't go floating around willy-nilly. The Coyote finds that out when he 
finds out he is hanging on to nothing, and looks down. 

@philipthrift

On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 4:45:24 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>
> Thanks for the trip down memory lane, but I don't see your point.
>
> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 5:43 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 4:31:11 PM UTC-5, Terren Suydam wrote:
>>>
>>> Since consciousness is not a material thing, ...
>>>
>>  
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GnMvj9HETZw
>>
>>
>> @philipthrift
>>
>>
>>

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Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"

2019-05-10 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, May 9, 2019 at 2:50:49 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 2:21 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 5/9/2019 11:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, May 9, 2019 at 12:06 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 5/9/2019 3:22 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 3 May 2019, at 15:27, Terren Suydam >> > wrote:
>>>
>>> One way to get around this is to hold that consciousness is associated 
>>> with the way information is processed. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That is mechanism, but then you inherit infinitely many 
>>> body-representation in arithmetic, and the mind-body problem becomes in 
>>> part a justification of the appearances from a statistic to all 
>>> computations going through our brain. Then incompleteness explains what 
>>> this take the shape of a quantum reality.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This is substrate independent - the fact that a brain is physical is 
>>> beside the point. You could implement a brain in software, and insofar as 
>>> the same kinds of information processing occur, it would be conscious in 
>>> the same kind of way.
>>>
>>>
>>> Only if it exists in the same kind of world.
>>>
>>>
>> Church-Turing implies that the world is irrelevant, so long as it is 
>> possible to build a computer in some universe, it is possible to 
>> instantiate/access any conscious state from that universe.
>>
>>
>> But the same inference implies that all universes are the same.  
>>
>
> That doesn't follow.  It's more like saying one universe is  FORTRAN and 
> another is LISP. 
>
 

> Jason
>  
>

Our universe is more like LISP than Fortran, I think. Actually more like 
process-oriented programming* (e.g. Actor model).

* https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Process-oriented_programming

@pphilipthrift 

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