Re: CMBR

2019-03-17 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 6:36 AM  wrote:

> On Sunday, March 17, 2019 at 12:12:58 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>> On 3/17/2019 4:50 AM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> On Sunday, March 17, 2019 at 3:05:14 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, March 17, 2019 at 2:49:43 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

 On Sun, Mar 17, 2019 at 7:38 PM  wrote:

>
>
> On Thursday, March 14, 2019 at 8:27:58 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>>
>> IIUC, the combined mass of an electron and proton is larger than the
>> hydrogen atom they form at recombination time. Thus, I would expect a 
>> very
>> narrow pulse of energy as a result when recombination occurs. This
>> apparently being the case, why does the CMBR have a black body 
>> distribution
>> and not a pulse with a very narrow spread? TIA, AG
>>
>
> Is this a really dumb question and the reason for zero replies; or is
> it because no one here has the answer? Or maybe just no interest in 
> another
> puzzle? AG
>

 Dumb question. CMB is thermal radiation, not the recombination energy.
 It reflects the temperature at the time the universe became transparent to
 radiation of all wavelengths -- because the electron-proton plasma
 recombined to form less reactive hydrogen.

 Bruce

>>>
>>> But the recombination energy must be part of the mix at recombination
>>> time and this is never mentioned in the texts I have read. I suppose this
>>> is another dumb question. AG
>>>
>>
>> What this thread shows is that I don't understand the CMBR. Maybe no one
>> does. ISTM that the universe was cooling *prior* to recombination time
>> and therefore must have had a thermal spectrum *independent* of the
>> recombination. Yet the going assumption, AFAICT, is that the CMBR *comes
>> into existence* at recombination time, but is independent of the
>> physical recombination which is never included or mentioned as part of the
>> observed spectrum.  Can anyone explain what is actually going on in this
>> model? TIA, AG
>>
>>
>> Your mistake is assuming that this recombination is one big jump from
>> complete dissociation to bound hydrogen atom.  A hydrogen atom has lots of
>> energy states and, as the plasma cooled due to expansion, there would be a
>> continuous shift of energy from the proton/electron to the gamma rays.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> In fact, hydrogen has a countably infinite set of energy states, which I
> forgot. Is it correct to say that these recombination states form the
> thermal signature which is observed (in which case Bruce's explanation is
> misleading)? AG
>

No, that is not a correct thing to say. Recombination occurs when the
average thermal energy of particles in the plasma was below the
dissociation energy of hydrogen, which, as I recall, is around 14 eV. But
the radiation we see as CMB now is the blackbody radiation from this
initial plasma. Energy contributions from the recombination of hydrogen
atoms are present, but just form part of the thermal spectrum -- because
not all recombinations take a proton and an electron directly from the
unbound state to the lowest energy state (14.? eV). There is a range as
electrons cascade down, and many of these transitions are of much lower
energy -- red-shafted to invisibility now.

Bruce

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Re: CMBR

2019-03-17 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sun, Mar 17, 2019 at 7:38 PM  wrote:

>
>
> On Thursday, March 14, 2019 at 8:27:58 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>>
>> IIUC, the combined mass of an electron and proton is larger than the
>> hydrogen atom they form at recombination time. Thus, I would expect a very
>> narrow pulse of energy as a result when recombination occurs. This
>> apparently being the case, why does the CMBR have a black body distribution
>> and not a pulse with a very narrow spread? TIA, AG
>>
>
> Is this a really dumb question and the reason for zero replies; or is it
> because no one here has the answer? Or maybe just no interest in another
> puzzle? AG
>

Dumb question. CMB is thermal radiation, not the recombination energy. It
reflects the temperature at the time the universe became transparent to
radiation of all wavelengths -- because the electron-proton plasma
recombined to form less reactive hydrogen.

Bruce

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Re: What happens to old entanglements?

2019-03-13 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 10:50 AM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

> An entanglement can swap or a bipartite entanglement can enter into an
> entanglement with another state. So the entangled state c(|+>_1|->_2 +
> |->_1|+>_2) can couple with the system in a superposition c(|←> + |→>) to
> become, depending upon the interaction and conservation principles etc to
> be
>
> c(|+>_1|->_2 + |->_1|+>_2) + c(|←> + |→>) → b(|+>_1|←> + |->_1|→>) + d(|->_2
> + |+>_2)
>
> which would be an entanglement swap. It might however form a tripartite
> entanglement
>
> c(|+>_1|->_2 + |->_1|+>_2) + c(|←> + |→>) →
>
> b(|+>_1|->_2|←> + |->_1|+>_2|→>) + c(|->_1|+>_2|←> + |+>_1|->_2|→>).
>
> Here normalization factors can be easily calculated. For the first to
> happen there is a Hadamard gate on the two initial states. For the second
> there are CNOT type operations that creates an entanglement. CNOT gates
> demolish or generate entanglements.
>

I do not really understand this. Particles 1 and 2 are entangled, say in
the singlet state as above. But the particles are well separated, so any
interaction with a third particle can affect only one of the two originals.
This seems to be what your first possibility shows -- the interaction of
one of the entangled pair with a third particle destroys the original
entanglement, but might result in the interacting particle becoming
entangled with the third particle. Except that your expansion seems to deny
the non-separability of the initial entangled state.

The second possibility you list seems to deny the non-separability of the
initial state right from the start -- only one of the initial particles can
interact with the third particle, and that does not entangle the
non-interacting partner.

Bruce

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Re: Black holes and the information paradox

2019-03-11 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Tue, Mar 12, 2019 at 12:43 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Mar 11, 2019 at 8:42 PM Lawrence Crowell <
> goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > all the radiation emitted is entangled with the black hole, which would
>> then mean the entanglement entropy increases beyond the Bekenstein bound.
>
>
>
> Could nature be trying to tell us that the Bekenstein bound is simply
> wrong and spacetime is contentious and can store information at scales
> even smaller than the Planck area? After all as far as I know there is no
> experimental evidence the Bekenstein bound exists or that spacetime ends
> when things get smaller than 10^-35 meters.
>

Points that I have made many times, here and elsewhere. No one is
listening, it would appear. Actually, though, Penrose has worked this out
for himself. See "Roads to Reality".

Bruce

John K Clark
>

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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-04 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 4:55 PM Russell Standish 
wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 02:22:05PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 2:03 PM Russell Standish 
> wrote:
> >
> > You cannot represent n as a finite string for an arbitrary real
> number
> > n. But you can for an arbitrary integer n.
> >
> >
> > Sure. But that was not part of your definition of a 'computation'. The
> > algorithm f(x): (r-1)+1 works for all reals r as well as for finite
> strings n.
> >
> > Bruce
>
> I don't think it's 'my definition'. The usual meaning of computable
> integer is that there exists a program that outputs it. For real
> numbers, this is changed to a program exists that outputs a sequence
> of numbers that converges to the real number in question. One could
> also consider "spigot" programs for this purpose too - a program that
> outputs the decimal (or binary say) expansion of the real number. It
> is clear that this more relaxed definition is equivalent to the former
> in the integer case.
>

It seems that you are relying on the idea of 'computable' as capable of
being calculated in a finite number of steps on a finite Turing machine.
That is fine; it then rules out functions such as (r-1)+1 for reals, since
these are not representable on a finite Turing machine. But it also renders
the concept of a computable number completely trivial, and all you are left
with for the Church-Turing thesis is the concept of computable functions
which are non-trivial in the sense that the function cannot depend ab
initio on the output number.

Bruce

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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-04 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 2:03 PM Russell Standish 
wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 12:06:00PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> >
> > My problem with your idea that the function: "(n-1)+1" is a valid
> computational
> > algorithm for n is that it makes all real numbers also computable, but
> the
> > notion of Turing computability applies only to the integers. We do not
> want a
> > definition of 'computable', that makes all reals computable.
>
> You cannot represent n as a finite string for an arbitrary real number
> n. But you can for an arbitrary integer n.
>

Sure. But that was not part of your definition of a 'computation'. The
algorithm f(x): (r-1)+1 works for all reals r as well as for finite strings
n.

Bruce

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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-04 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 11:50 AM Russell Standish 
wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 10:42:00AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> > On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 10:25 AM Russell Standish 
> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 05:31:00PM -0500, John Clark wrote:
> > > On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 11:04 AM Bruno Marchal 
> wrote:
> > >
> > >
> > > >> I don't follow you. If the 8000th BB number is
> unknowable then
> > it is
> > > certainly uncomputable
> > >
> > >
> > > > That is not true. All natural number n are computable. The
> program
> > is
> > > “output n”.
> > >
> > >
> > > I think you're being silly. You're saying if you already know that
> the
> > answer
> > > to a problem is n then you can write a program that will "compute"
> the
> > answer
> > > with just a "print n" command. But that's not computing that's just
> > printing.
> >
> > OK, so what about the program "print X+1", where X is the expansion
> of
> > the number BB(8000)-1?
> >
> > If that's not computing something, then I'm sure I can cook up
> > something more complicated to compute.
> >
> >
> > I think the trouble with that, or with variations of that idea, is that
> they
> > render the notion of 'computability' vacuous. In order to write such a
> program,
> > or concoct such an algorithm, you need to know the answer in advance.
> That is
> > fine, if you just want a program to compute the number 'n', 'n' being
> given in
> > advance. But that is no help in computing a number that can be defined,
> but is
> > not known in advance.
> >
> > So what people are really looking for here is a constructive notion of
> > computability -- anything else has a tendency to render the notion of
> > 'computability' trivial.
> >
>
> Not really, as it makes a distinction with respect to real
> numbers. All integers are computable, but no real numbers are except
> for a set of measure zero. And then there are well defined numbers
> that aren't computable, such as Chaitin's Omega.
>

My problem with your idea that the function: "(n-1)+1" is a valid
computational algorithm for n is that it makes all real numbers also
computable, but the notion of Turing computability applies only to the
integers. We do not want a definition of 'computable', that makes all reals
computable.

Bruce

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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-04 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 10:25 AM Russell Standish 
wrote:

> On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 05:31:00PM -0500, John Clark wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 11:04 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> >
> >
> > >> I don't follow you. If the 8000th BB number is unknowable
> then it is
> > certainly uncomputable
> >
> >
> > > That is not true. All natural number n are computable. The program
> is
> > “output n”.
> >
> >
> > I think you're being silly. You're saying if you already know that the
> answer
> > to a problem is n then you can write a program that will "compute" the
> answer
> > with just a "print n" command. But that's not computing that's just
> printing.
>
> OK, so what about the program "print X+1", where X is the expansion of
> the number BB(8000)-1?
>
> If that's not computing something, then I'm sure I can cook up
> something more complicated to compute.
>

I think the trouble with that, or with variations of that idea, is that
they render the notion of 'computability' vacuous. In order to write such a
program, or concoct such an algorithm, you need to know the answer in
advance. That is fine, if you just want a program to compute the number
'n', 'n' being given in advance. But that is no help in computing a number
that can be defined, but is not known in advance.

So what people are really looking for here is a constructive notion of
computability -- anything else has a tendency to render the notion of
'computability' trivial.

Bruce

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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-03 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 9:13 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 8:58 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>> On 3/3/2019 1:37 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 2:52 PM Philip Thrift 
>> wrote:
>>
>> *> If a program "represents" a real number (e.g. in the spigot sense),
>>> then that could be said to "define" it.*
>>
>>
>> But for most Real Numbers there is no such program.
>>
>> * > But what does it mean for a real number to be "defined"?*
>>
>>
>> If you can point to a property that a Real Number has that no other Real
>> number does then it is defined;
>>
>>
>> The smallest real number that is not defined.
>>
>
> Ah! I sense the origin of the Meeker paradox..
>
> Bruce
>

The resolution of the proposed Meeker paradox is, however, rather trivial
-- your just point out that there is no such thing as the smallest real
number, defined or not defined.

Bruce

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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-03 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 8:58 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 3/3/2019 1:37 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 2:52 PM Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>
> *> If a program "represents" a real number (e.g. in the spigot sense),
>> then that could be said to "define" it.*
>
>
> But for most Real Numbers there is no such program.
>
> * > But what does it mean for a real number to be "defined"?*
>
>
> If you can point to a property that a Real Number has that no other Real
> number does then it is defined;
>
>
> The smallest real number that is not defined.
>

Ah! I sense the origin of the Meeker paradox..

Bruce

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Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

2019-02-22 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sat, Feb 23, 2019 at 3:08 PM  wrote:

> On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 8:13:21 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>
>> On 2/22/2019 6:04 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 4:55:41 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2/22/2019 2:40 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> Gravitons, as quanta of the metric field, are already relativistic
 particles and covariant.

>>>
>>> *I thought it's the equations of motion for the particular force, not
>>> the mediating particles, that must be covariant. On a related topic for
>>> this thread, where does GR depart from Mach's principle? That is, what did
>>> Einstein implicitly (or explicitly) deny about Mach's principle? TIA, AG *
>>>
>>>
>>> Einstein thought he would develop a theory that satisfied Mach's
>>> principle, but as it turned out GR doesn't. For example the metric of
>>> spacetime is a dynamic field and transmit momentum and energy, as shown by
>>> LIGO.  Mach's idea of spacetime as purely a relation between material
>>> events couldn't do that.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> *Were you inferring covariance simply because the mediating particle for
>> gravity, the graviton, travels at the SoL? *
>>
>>
>> GR is a covariant theory.  So it's quanta, gravitons, are covariant.
>>
>
> *I could be mistaken, but I see gravitons as being part of a distinct
> theory of gravity, which might give the same results as GR. In GR, the
> paths are determined by geometry in the absence of forces, not by mediating
> particles. AG *
>

GR, as a theory, implies the existence of gravity waves. Wave, when
quantised, give particles: these are the gravitons of the theory. Exchange
of such gravitons does not necessarily have anything to do with the forces
in the theory, or the formation of geodesics.

Bruce

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Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-13 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sat, Jan 12, 2019 at 11:14 AM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 4:51:24 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Jan 12, 2019 at 9:29 AM Lawrence Crowell <
>> goldenfield...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:18:21 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:

 On 1/10/2019 4:21 PM, John Clark wrote:

 *So even Feynman knew that there was no theoretical value for the FSC,
> alpha.*
>

 No,  he knew very well there was a theory that could come up with a
 value because his own Feynman Diagrams could do it. But what he didn't know
 and what nobody knows is why his theory came up with that particular pure
 number when he never specifically stuck that number into the rules on how
 the diagrams should operate.


 The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are
 measured independent of any Feynman diagrams of quantum field theory.  The
 calculation using Feynman diagrams is of the anamolous magnetic moment.   A
 correction to the value of g that depend on relativistic effects (hence the
 occurence of c in the denominator).  The anamolous magnetic moment can be
 measure experimentally and using Feynman's diagrams and the measured values
 of e, hbar, and c a value can be calculated that includes the relativistic
 effects of quantum field theory. That's why the agreement with measurement
 is significant.

 Brent

>>>
>>> Everyone seems to be overlooking charge renormalization.
>>>
>>
>> Do you really think that that is relevant? How?
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> The physical charge is a bare mass corrected by a correction term e = e' +
> δe. Charge adjusts with energy in a renormalization group flow of
> adjustable parameters. At EW unification energy the fine structure constant
> is around 1/128. As E → 0 the RG flow reaches an attractor point that is
> the α = e^2/4πεħc. This is computed for the renormalized physical charge e
> from all radiative corrections possible.
>


I think everyone else is aware that the fine structure constant we are
talking about is the zero energy limit of the running coupling constant.
The infinite renormalisation terms are subtracted from the bare charge to
give the experimental result. Only the zero energy measured value has
physical significance at low energies.

Bruce

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Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-11 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sat, Jan 12, 2019 at 9:29 AM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Thursday, January 10, 2019 at 7:18:21 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>> On 1/10/2019 4:21 PM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> *So even Feynman knew that there was no theoretical value for the FSC,
>>> alpha.*
>>>
>>
>> No,  he knew very well there was a theory that could come up with a
>> value because his own Feynman Diagrams could do it. But what he didn't know
>> and what nobody knows is why his theory came up with that particular pure
>> number when he never specifically stuck that number into the rules on how
>> the diagrams should operate.
>>
>>
>> The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are
>> measured independent of any Feynman diagrams of quantum field theory.  The
>> calculation using Feynman diagrams is of the anamolous magnetic moment.   A
>> correction to the value of g that depend on relativistic effects (hence the
>> occurence of c in the denominator).  The anamolous magnetic moment can be
>> measure experimentally and using Feynman's diagrams and the measured values
>> of e, hbar, and c a value can be calculated that includes the relativistic
>> effects of quantum field theory. That's why the agreement with measurement
>> is significant.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Everyone seems to be overlooking charge renormalization.
>

Do you really think that that is relevant? How?

Bruce

LC
>

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Re: Interference of probability waves

2019-01-11 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sat, Jan 12, 2019 at 8:01 AM  wrote:

> On Friday, January 11, 2019 at 7:46:19 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>
>> On 1/11/2019 2:02 AM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> If probability values are always positive and between 0 and 1, how does
>> one get destructive interference, or constructive interfering probability
>> values within the acceptable range? Brent once answered this question but I
>> have completely forgotten the answer. AG
>>
>>
>> The wave function is a complex valued field, so it's values are not in
>> [0,1).  Its complex value is usually called 'the probability *amplitude*'
>> to distinguish it from a probability value.
>>
>
> I was aware of the foregoing. I'll check out your reference. Now I want to
> see how the probability values are constrained to be in the appropriate
> range after Born's rule is applied. AG
>

It is known as "unitarity". Evolution in QM by the Schroedinger equation is
always unitary -- given by exp(-iH) -- so probabilities can never exceed
unity, because the mod-squared of the evolution operator can never exceed
unity..

Bruce

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Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-10 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Fri, Jan 11, 2019 at 12:18 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 1/10/2019 4:21 PM, John Clark wrote:
>
> *So even Feynman knew that there was no theoretical value for the FSC,
>> alpha.*
>>
>
> No,  he knew very well there was a theory that could come up with a value
> because his own Feynman Diagrams could do it. But what he didn't know and
> what nobody knows is why his theory came up with that particular pure
> number when he never specifically stuck that number into the rules on how
> the diagrams should operate.
>
>
> The fine structure constant is e^2/hbar*c.  Those three values are
> measured independent of any Feynman diagrams of quantum field theory.  The
> calculation using Feynman diagrams is of the anamolous magnetic moment.   A
> correction to the value of g that depend on relativistic effects (hence the
> occurence of c in the denominator).  The anamolous magnetic moment can be
> measure experimentally and using Feynman's diagrams and the measured values
> of e, hbar, and c a value can be calculated that includes the relativistic
> effects of quantum field theory. That's why the agreement with measurement
> is significant.
>

Right. The relation between fundamental physical constants, alpha =
e^2/hbar*c, is the closest one gets to a "theoretical" value for the FSC.
But that defines it in terms of other measured quantities. (Except that
these days, c is a defined number, not a measured physical parameter.) The
CODATA group use these theoretical relationships between constants,
together with the best available measurements, to make simultaneous fits to
all the constants and the data.That is where independent, "best values" for
these parameters come from. It is using these in the Feynman diagram
calculation of corrections to g-2 that gives the remarkable agreement
between theory and experiment. The point, though, is that the value of the
FSC used in calculating g-2 must be obtained independently of the g-2
measurement or else it is not a test of QED.. Conversely, of course, the
g-2 measurement can be use to estimate the FSC independently of other
measurements.

Bruce


> Brent
>

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Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-09 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 2:30 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 9:49 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> > *There is no theoretical value".*
>>
>
> The measure value is 137.035999139, the value obtained from 12,672 Feynman
> Diagrams is 137.035999173. If you don't like the name "theoretical value"
> for that second number then call is something else. How about "Bob"?
>
> *> All the values that we have are measured -- often in different ways, or
>> from the results of different experiments to measure the same things, such
>> as g-2, so there can be a range of measured results.*
>
>
> Nobody uses 12,672 Feynman Diagrams to find a measured result.
>

The authors of the PRL paper did!


>
>
>>  > in the final analysis, the fine structure constant is an arbitrary
>> physical constant that must be measured
>>
>
> So is the speed of light, but Maxwell's theory can calculate that speed
>

Maxwell's theory gives the speed in terms of the permittivity and
permeability of the vacuum, both of which were measured quantities in
Maxwell's day. But, because of the success of special relativity, they are
nowadays defined constants, as is the speed of light. So there is no such
comparison as between the calculated speed and the measured speed of light
-- the speed of light is a defined exact constant which is used to define
the relationship between the units of time and distance. One could,
therefore say that the speed of light is a theoretical value, not a
measured value.

and the fact that the calculated speed agrees with the measured speed tells
> us that Maxwell had a good theory. The reason scientists went to the
> considerable trouble of calculating the Fine Structure Constant from 12,672
> Feynman Diagrams when they already knew from measurement what the correct
> answer is was to test the theory and see if it still worked at that
> incredible degree of accuracy. And It did work. Why else would physicists
> have such enormous confidence in Feynman's diagrams? How else can you tell
> the difference between a good physical theory and a bad one?
>

You really ought to read the Wikipedia article more carefully, rather than
just using it to obtain the CODATA best-fit value, and the value measured
by the latest g-2 experiment. (Yes, the one calculating all 12,672 Feynman
diagrams to the tenth order.)

"The most precise value of *α* obtained experimentally (as of 2012) is
based on a measurement of *g* using a one-electron so-called "quantum
cyclotron" apparatus, together with a calculation via the theory of QED
that involved 12672 tenth-order Feynman diagrams
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Feynman_diagrams>:[6]
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fine-structure_constant#cite_note-6>
*α*−1 = 137.035999173(35)."
So that value is obtained experimentally, i.e., a measured result. It is no
more a theoretical value than is the value of the mass of the electron (or
the mass of the sun, for that matter.)

As Feynman says:
Immediately you would like to know where this number for a coupling comes
from: is it related to pi or perhaps to the base of natural logarithms?
Nobody knows. It's one of the greatest damn mysteries of physics: a magic
number that comes to us with no understanding by man. You might say the
"hand of God" wrote that number, and "we don't know how He pushed his
pencil." We know what kind of a dance to do experimentally to measure this
number very accurately, but we don't know what kind of dance to do on the
computer to make this number come out, without putting it in secretly!

So even Feynman knew that there was no theoretical value for the FSC, alpha.

Bruce

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Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-09 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 1:36 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 7:49 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> >>The following 2012 article in Physical Review letters describes a QED
>>> calculation involving 12,672 tenth order Feynman diagrams used to
>>> calculate both the magnetic moment of the electron and the inverse of the
>>> Fine Structure Constant and obtaining a value of 137.035999173 which is
>>> almost exactly the same as the experimentally derived value:
>>>
>>
>> >That is an experimentally derived value!
>>
>
> No,  the experimentally derived value is 137.035999139
>
> *>Your original claim was that the fine structure constant was
>> computable. *
>
>
> I said that was my intuition, I don't have a proof.
>
> > *it is a physical constant that must be measured.*
>
>
> I know, that's why I said the Fine Structure Constant was defined
> physically not mathematically,  and that's why any physical theory that is
> in conflict with that measured value for the FSC can not be a good theory.
> Feynman's QED is not in conflict with it, in fact it produced the closest
> agreement between experiment and theory in the entire history of science.
>
> > *But it is not computable from first principles,*
>
>
> That depends on what the first principle is, if its charged particles
> behave the way Feynman said they do then you can compute a value for the
> FSC that is very very close to the best measured one. Maybe when
> measurement becomes more precise a statistically significant discrepancy
> will show up between the experimental value and the theoretical value,
>

There is no theoretical value". All the values that we have are measured --
often in different ways, or from the results of different experiments to
measure the same things, such as g-2, so there can be a range of measured
results. The CODATA value is their best-fit value to the whole range of
different experimental measurements. But in the final analysis, the fine
structure constant is an arbitrary physical constant that must be measured
-- there is no "theoretical value".

Bruce

if so we'll have to fine something better than Feynman Diagrams because in
> science when experiment and theory fight experiment always wins.
>
>
>> *>You have to define what you mean by "computable". *
>
>
> The Fine Structure Constant is computable if and only if there exists a
> finite algorithm that can work on a finite amount of data and produce a
> number in a finite amount of time that is arbitrarily close to it.  I don't
> claim to have such a algorithm I'm just saying my hunch is it exists and
> Feynman gives us reason for optimism. But I could be wrong.
>

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Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-09 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 11:38 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 5:01 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> Rubbish. The fine structure constant is not computable by Feynman
>> diagrams. What might be confusing you is that QED calculations of
>> physically measurable  things like the Lamb Shift and g-2 for the electron
>> depend on the value of the FSC.*
>>
>
> How is using Feynman diagrams to compute the Lamb Shift Shift (which
> depends on the Fine Structure Constant) different from using Feynman
> diagrams to compute the Fine Structure Constant?  After all physics
> didn't determine the Lamb Shift from the Fine Structure Constant, they
> determined the Fine Structure Constant by looking at the Lamb Shift, in
> fact the very very fine lines in the spectrum of Hydrogen is how the Fine
> Structure Constant got its name.
>
> The following 2012 article in Physical Review letters describes a QED
> calculation involving 12,672 tenth order Feynman diagrams used to
> calculate both the magnetic moment of the electron and the inverse of the
> Fine Structure Constant and obtaining a value of 137.035999173 which is
> almost exactly the same as the experimentally derived value:
>

That is an experimentally derived value!


> Improved Value of the Fine Structure Constant
> <https://arxiv.org/abs/1205.5368>
>
> John K Clark
>

Your original claim was that the fine structure constant was computable.
But it is not computable from first principles, it is a physical constant
that must be measured. The fact that computations might be involved in
getting the value from measurements does not mean that the FSC is itself
computable.

You have to define what you mean by "computable". The FSC is a measured
quantity, not computable in the way pi or e are computable from
mathematical formulae.

Bruce

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Re: What is comparable and incomparable between casually disconnected universes?

2019-01-09 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 7:53 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Jan 9, 2019 at 1:58 PM Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>
> >> Is the Fine Structure Constant a rational number? Is it a algebraic
>>> number? Is it a transcendental number? Nobody knows.
>>
>>
>>
>> *> Is it computable at least?*
>
>
> Because the Fine Structure Constant has a physical and not a mathematical
> definition my intuition tells me it must be computable; and indeed we've
> already computed a very good approximation of it and there is no reason to
> think we couldn't do even better if we had faster computers that could sum
> up more of those Feynman diagrams.
>

Rubbish. The fine structure constant is not computable by Feynman diagrams.
What might be confusing you is that QED calculations of physically
measurable  things like the Lamb Shift and g-2 for the electron depend on
the value of the FSC. Comparing the calculations with experiment gives an
accurate value for the FSC. the fine structure constant itself is an
arbitrary constant of nature, and not directly callable.

Bruce

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Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2019-01-06 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Jan 7, 2019 at 9:42 AM  wrote:

> On Saturday, December 8, 2018 at 2:46:41 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>>
>> On Thursday, December 6, 2018 at 5:46:13 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 10:13:57 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>> wrote:

 On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 9:42:51 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:52 PM  wrote:
>
>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 11:42:06 AM UTC,
>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:

 On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM  wrote:

>
> *Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of
> interference and coherence, without introducing your theory of
> consciousness. Mainstream thinking today is that decoherence does 
> occur,
> but this seems to imply preexisting coherence, and therefore 
> interference
> among the component states of a superposition. If the superposition is
> expressed using eigenfunctions, which are mutually orthogonal -- 
> implying
> no mutual interference -- how is decoherence possible, insofar as
> coherence, IIUC, doesn't exist using this basis? AG*
>

 I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it is
 used off an expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal
 eigenvectors. The expansion in some eigenvector basis is written as

|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)

 where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the dimension
 of the Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are the complex 
 numbers
 a_i. Since these are complex coefficients, they contain inherent 
 phases. It
 is the preservation of these phases of the expansion coefficients that 
 is
 meant by "maintaining coherence". So it is the coherence of the 
 particular
 expansion that is implied, and this has noting to do with the mutual
 orthogonality or otherwise of the basis vectors themselves. In 
 decoherence,
 the phase relationships between the terms in the original expansion are
 lost.

 Bruce

>>>
>>> I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my error --
>>> confusing orthogonality with interference and coherence. Let me have 
>>> your
>>> indulgence on a related issue. AG
>>>
>>
>> Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its
>> superposition expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with variable
>> p. Does the phase of the original wf carry over into the eigenfunctions 
>> as
>> identical for each, or can each component in the superposition have
>> different phases? I ask this because the probability determined by any
>> complex amplitude is independent of its phase. TIA, AG
>>
>
> The phases of the coefficients are independent of each other.
>

 When I formally studied QM, no mention was made of calculating the
 phases since, presumably, they don't effect probability calculations. Do
 you have a link which explains how they're calculated? TIA, AG

>>>
>>> I found some links on physics.stackexchange.com which show that
>>> relative phases can effect probabilities, but none so far about how to
>>> calculate any phase angle. AG
>>>
>>
>> Here's the answer if anyone's interested. But what's the question? How
>> are wf phase angles calculated? Clearly, if you solve for the
>> eigenfunctions of some QM operator such as the p operator, any phase angle
>> is possible; its value is completely arbitrary and doesn't effect a
>> probability calculation. In fact, IIUC, there is not sufficient information
>> to solve for a unique phase. So, I conclude,that the additional information
>> required to uniquely determine a phase angle for a wf, lies in boundary
>> conditions. If the problem of specifying a wf is defined as a boundary
>> value problem, then, I believe, a unique phase angle can be calculated.
>> CMIIAW. AG
>>
>>>
> Bruce
>

> I could use a handshake on this one. Roughly speaking, if one wants to
> express the state of a system as a superposition of eigenstates, how does
> one calculate the phase angles of the amplitudes for each eigenstate? AG
>

One doesn't. The phases are arbitrary unless one interferes the system with
some other system.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2019-01-05 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 7:50 PM  wrote:

> On Saturday, January 5, 2019 at 6:49:43 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>
>> On 1/4/2019 9:20 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> *Still a little murky. Does coordinate time ever differ from proper time?
>> TIA, AG *
>>
>>
>> Of course.  That's like asking does change in longitude ever differ from
>> distance sailed.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>> *Suppose I imagine a path in spacetime, say with loops, returning to the
>> same spatial location. *
>>
>>
>> Ok.  Like the traveling twin.
>>
>> *Some amount of proper time will have elapsed*
>>
>>
>> Along that path.
>>
>> *, invariant for all observers, but the elapsed coordinate time will in
>> general be different, with proper time and coordinate time initialized to
>> identical but arbitrary values as the path in spacetime is traversed. *
>>
>>
>
>   You can set proper time and coordinate time to the same value at one
> event (the initial event).  But I don't know what you mean by
> "intialized...as the path  is traversed".
>
> * That's all I meant, as in your first sentence above. AG*
>
> *The other imagined coordinate clocks can't be synchronized since they
> relate to different events in spacetime, *
>
>
> I don't know what this means.  In generic spacetimes there are no
> "coordinate clocks".
>
> *OK, no coordinate clocks. The coordinate t is just the time label for an
> event. AG*
>
> Coordinates are just smooth functions that provide labels to each point in
> 4-space.  Since they don't have any physical significance, in general there
> isn't any physical clock that keeps "coordinate time".   I don't know what
> you mean by "relate to different events in spacetime".  Clocks just mark
> intervals along their paths.
>
> *so something is wrong with this model, specifically if the imagined path
> in spacetime does not return to its initial spatial position. TIA, AG*
>
>
> But you hypothesized that it did.  Now you're worrying that it didn't??
> Remember that clocks measure intervals between EVENTS (things that have
> four coordinate values), not between PLACES (things that have three
> coordinate values).
>
> * This is my problem; maybe a non problem; for any path between two
> events, the proper time interval is invariant, meaning the same for all
> observers, but it will be different depending on the paths. But the elapsed
> coordinate time intervals are the same, since the endpoints represent the
> same pair of events. So there doesn't seem to be any relationship between
> elapsed proper time and elapsed coordinate time. AG*
>

Got it in one!

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2019-01-04 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sat, Jan 5, 2019 at 1:41 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Jan 3, 2019 at 9:08 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> In JC's formula: d^2 = r^2 - t^2*   [...]
>>
>
> That's not my formula, I used d^2 = r^2 - (ct)^2 , that way the units
> always come out right.
>

I did make it clear that I use natural units -- or do you not know what
those are?

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2019-01-03 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Fri, Jan 4, 2019 at 1:03 PM  wrote:

> On Thursday, January 3, 2019 at 8:58:14 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 3, 2019 at 12:00 PM John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Jan 2, 2019 at 5:50 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>>
>>> *> That's like saying if two people drove different cars from L.A. to
 New York and their odometers registered different distances then one of the
 odometers must have measured miles differently than the other...ignoring
 the fact that they took different routes.*

>>>
>>> No it's more like you claiming the odometer which measures miles is
>>> telling you the time which is measures in seconds. Or it's like saying the
>>> readings on any odometer that went from L.A. to New York is a invariant and
>>> so will always give the same reading regardless of the path took, even
>>> though they *don't have the same reading*. In other words its nonsense
>>>
>>>
>>> >> The spacetime distance d is *not* the proper time, the
> spacetime distance is an invariant, it's the same for all observers, but
> proper time is *not* invariant;


 * > Sure it is.   It's path dependent, but it's an invariant of a given
 path. *

>>>
>>> Obviously!! If you take the same path through spacetime then you've not
>>> only traveled the exact same distance through time but moved the exact same
>>> distance through space too, otherwise it wouldn't be the same path through
>>> spacetime. But Einstein told us something much more interesting than X=X,
>>> If we travel between event A  and event B by different paths we'll disagree
>>> on the distance through space that was required and disagree on the
>>> distance through time that was required but we'll both agree on the
>>> distance through spacetime we traversed; that's why it's a invariant and
>>> that's why it's useful.
>>>
>>>
 *> The "spacetime distance" between two timelike events is the length
 of the longest proper time path between them.*

>>>
>>> Brent, this is getting silly.  If  d^2 =  r^2 - (ct)^2 is the formula
>>> for spacetime distance (*AND IT IS!*) then there is no way on god's
>>> green earth the proper time can be the spacetime distance, one is a
>>> invariant and the other isn't and the two things don't even have the same
>>> units. I really don't know what else I can tell you except that there is no
>>> disgrace in being wrong but there is disgrace in refusing to admit
>>> error or learn from it.
>>>
>>
>> So learn from this!
>> The 't' in your formula above is the coordinate time, not the proper
>> time. Learn the difference! The proper time is defined as the time kept by
>> a perfect clock travelling on a geodesic. And a geodesic is the path along
>> which the rate of time is constant.
>>
>
> *If time is what is read on a clock, who, what, where, is the observer who
> reads coordinate time, or the clock recording coordinate time? TIA, AG *
>

For the observer sitting at rest in the one location, his clock reads both
coordinate time and proper time. For an observer in motion, his clock reads
only proper time, not coordinate time.

In JC's formula: d^2 = r^2 - t^2, d = t if and only if r = 0. (natural
units).

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2019-01-03 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Fri, Jan 4, 2019 at 7:06 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Thu, Jan 3, 2019 at 3:58 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>
>> *> The 't' in your formula above is the coordinate time, not the proper
>> time. *
>>
>
> What the hell are you talking about? If I travel from event A to event B
> and use the formula x^2 + y^2 + z^2 -(ct)^2  where x,y,and z are the
> differences in spatial coordinates I observe and *t is the proper time*
> it took for me to make the trip I will get an invariant.  If you also
> travel between event A and B but use a different path you will get entirely
> different numbers for x, y and z and you will get a different number for *the
> proper time t,* but when you plug in your numbers into x^2 + y^2 + z^2
> -(ct)^2  you will get the exact same value I do.
>

You clearly do not know =what 'proper time' is.


>
>
>> *> The proper time is defined as the time kept by a perfect clock
>> travelling on a geodesic.*
>>
>
> No it is not! The  proper time is defined as the time measured by a clock
> along ANY line through spacetime and it doesn't matter a hoot in hell if
> that line is a geodesic or not. And you said "*Proper time is the
> distance through spacetime*" but every book on physics on the planet will
> tell you that the distance through spacetime is an invariant; but proper
> time is NOT a invariant,
>

Wikipedia thinks that it is.at least in non-curved space-times.


> different observers can have different proper times, even you know this
> because you said "*two different orbits of the Earth, both geodesics, can
> coincide at a pair of events.  They will measure different proper times
> between those events*". So your ideas are not self consistent but then
> they had to be, spacetime distance and proper time aren't even in the same
> units.
>
> The reason you need both a odometer and a clock in your car is that they
> measure different things. And no matter how hard you try you're never going
> to be able to subtract seconds from meters, so why are we still arguing
> about this when it's obvious you're wrong?
>

Have you never heard of natural units, units in which c = 1?

Bruce


> > *And a geodesic is the path along which the rate of time is constant.*
>>
>
> What the hell?! Obviously the rate of time is always constant for any
> observer in the same reference frame as the clock regardless if the path is
> a geodesic or not, it will always change at the rate of one second per
> second . It doesn't take a Einstein to know that.
>
> John K Clark
>

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2019-01-03 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Jan 3, 2019 at 12:00 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Jan 2, 2019 at 5:50 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
> *> That's like saying if two people drove different cars from L.A. to New
>> York and their odometers registered different distances then one of the
>> odometers must have measured miles differently than the other...ignoring
>> the fact that they took different routes.*
>>
>
> No it's more like you claiming the odometer which measures miles is
> telling you the time which is measures in seconds. Or it's like saying the
> readings on any odometer that went from L.A. to New York is a invariant and
> so will always give the same reading regardless of the path took, even
> though they *don't have the same reading*. In other words its nonsense
>
>
> >> The spacetime distance d is *not* the proper time, the
>>> spacetime distance is an invariant, it's the same for all observers, but
>>> proper time is *not* invariant;
>>
>>
>> * > Sure it is.   It's path dependent, but it's an invariant of a given
>> path. *
>>
>
> Obviously!! If you take the same path through spacetime then you've not
> only traveled the exact same distance through time but moved the exact same
> distance through space too, otherwise it wouldn't be the same path through
> spacetime. But Einstein told us something much more interesting than X=X,
> If we travel between event A  and event B by different paths we'll disagree
> on the distance through space that was required and disagree on the
> distance through time that was required but we'll both agree on the
> distance through spacetime we traversed; that's why it's a invariant and
> that's why it's useful.
>
>
>> *> The "spacetime distance" between two timelike events is the length of
>> the longest proper time path between them.*
>>
>
> Brent, this is getting silly.  If  d^2 =  r^2 - (ct)^2 is the formula for
> spacetime distance (*AND IT IS!*) then there is no way on god's green
> earth the proper time can be the spacetime distance, one is a invariant and
> the other isn't and the two things don't even have the same units. I really
> don't know what else I can tell you except that there is no disgrace in
> being wrong but there is disgrace in refusing to admit error or learn
> from it.
>

So learn from this!
The 't' in your formula above is the coordinate time, not the proper time.
Learn the difference! The proper time is defined as the time kept by a
perfect clock travelling on a geodesic. And a geodesic is the path along
which the rate of time is constant.

Bruce

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Re: CMBR and Horizon Problem

2018-12-28 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sat, Dec 29, 2018 at 12:01 PM  wrote:

> On Saturday, December 29, 2018 at 12:28:58 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Dec 29, 2018 at 11:17 AM John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, Dec 28, 2018 at 4:53 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> >> If the creation of the inflaton required conditions that existed
>>>>> when the universe was 10^-44 seconds old and inflation had decayed away
>>>>> when it was 10^-35 seconds old then the particle associated with the
>>>>> inflation field would have decayed away too and we wouldn't expect to see
>>>>> it today even at places where we can reproduce conditions the universe was
>>>>> in when it was 10^-17 seconds old. If it still existed it would still be
>>>>> strongly connected to regular matter but we could not detect it but the
>>>>> universe could and would still be expanding at an exponential rate and
>>>>> galaxies stars and planets would not exist, we couldn't detect it
>>>>> because we wouldn't exist either.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *> Very good reasons for saying that no such field or particle exists,
>>>> or have ever existed.*
>>>>
>>>
>>> Or has ever existed? How do you figure that?
>>>
>>
>> If they had ever existed, they would couple strongly to ordinary matter,
>> and we would see such inflatons now. We don't, which is a very good reason
>> for saying that they do not exist -- now or ever.
>>
>>>
>>> *> I hope you understand the difference between thermal fluctuations and
>>>> quantum fluctuations*
>>>>
>>>
>>> The thermal fluctuations that have been actually observed in the Cosmic
>>> Microwave Background Radiation is consistent with them being caused by
>>> random quantum fluctuations. Do you have an explanation for these
>>> variations in temperature that does not involve random quantum
>>> fluctuations?
>>>
>>
>> There are no such things as such quantum fluctuations: such fluctuations
>> would be local, and violate energy conservation.
>>
>
>
> *If you measure the energy of a region repeatedly, the measurements will
> vary due to the UP. How is this a violation of energy conservation? It
> would be if it were explained by "borrowing" of energy for short times, but
> these measurements in fact vary, so IMO it's not a violation of energy
> conservation unless one appeals to the fallacious explanation of
> "borrowing". Moreover, how can these variations, or fluctuations in energy
> be independent of temperature fluctuations as you seem to suggest? AG*
>

Variations between the results of different measurements are OK because
that merely reflects  a superposition of different energy states.
Fluctuations absent repeated measurements are not OK. Thermal fluctuations
are just the result of the distribution of different energies between
particles in a gas or the like.

Bruce

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Re: CMBR and Horizon Problem

2018-12-28 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sat, Dec 29, 2018 at 11:17 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 28, 2018 at 4:53 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> >> If the creation of the inflaton required conditions that existed when
>>> the universe was 10^-44 seconds old and inflation had decayed away when it
>>> was 10^-35 seconds old then the particle associated with the inflation
>>> field would have decayed away too and we wouldn't expect to see it today
>>> even at places where we can reproduce conditions the universe was in when
>>> it was 10^-17 seconds old. If it still existed it would still be strongly
>>> connected to regular matter but we could not detect it but the universe
>>> could and would still be expanding at an exponential rate and galaxies
>>> stars and planets would not exist, we couldn't detect it because we
>>> wouldn't exist either.
>>>
>>
>> *> Very good reasons for saying that no such field or particle exists, or
>> have ever existed.*
>>
>
> Or has ever existed? How do you figure that?
>

If they had ever existed, they would couple strongly to ordinary matter,
and we would see such inflatons now. We don't, which is a very good reason
for saying that they do not exist -- now or ever.

>
> *> I hope you understand the difference between thermal fluctuations and
>> quantum fluctuations*
>>
>
> The thermal fluctuations that have been actually observed in the Cosmic
> Microwave Background Radiation is consistent with them being caused by
> random quantum fluctuations. Do you have an explanation for these
> variations in temperature that does not involve random quantum
> fluctuations?
>

There are no such things as such quantum fluctuations: such fluctuations
would be local, and violate energy conservation. The fluctuations in the
CMB are thermal, and were always so.


> > *In GR, energy is not conserved in non-static space-times. *
>>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>> *> But energy is exactly conserved locally.*
>>
>
> True but Irrelevant. Were talking about the most non-local thing we can
> observe, the Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation. Before inflation all
> parts of the CMB were locally connected and reached thermal equilibrium,
> but even so due to quantum variation you could have found slight
> differences in temperature if you had a sensitive enough thermometer and
> looked at a small enough volume.
>

But you have just described seeing thermal fluctuations. Collections of
particles in thermal equilibrium still show random fluctuations on the
smallest scales -- Boltzmann distribution and all that.

Bruce


> But then after everything had expanded faster than light for 10^-35
> seconds and doubled in size 100 times things that were once causally
> connected no longer were, that is to say they were no longer local and
> never would be again. And then after things had expanded for another
> 380,000 years at the far more sedate pace we see today we'd expect those
> super tiny spots of slightly higher and lower temperature (2.724K to 2.726
> K) would no longer be super tiny, but none of them would be larger than
> 380,000 light years across, and that's just what we do see.
>
> John K Clark
>

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-28 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sat, Dec 29, 2018 at 9:50 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 28, 2018 at 4:09 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> From: Jason Resch 
>>
>>
>> Clock desycnhronization is a different phenomenon and has a different
>> cause and explanation than time dilation.
>>
>> Because of the relativity of simultaneity in SR, clock synchronization is
>> not a global phenomenon -- it depends on the way in which the clocks are
>> synchronized. So clocks synchronized by one method in one frame will not
>> necessarily be synchronized in different frames. The time read on such
>> clocks is local only, so will they will not necessarily agree when they are
>> brought together.
>>
>
> You would agree that two atomic clocks in the same reference frame, 100
> meters away synchronized by a flash of light exactly in between them are
> synchronized, right?
>
> Now assume there are two clocks each in both the front and rear of the
> rocket, as well as a 5th clock exactly in the middle.  Roughly this is as
> follows:
>
>
> Clock1---Clock3---Clock4
> Clock2Clock5
>
> Clocks 2, 3, and 5 are atomic clocks, which count the number of vibrations
> of some atom per second, and increment the nanosecond counter displayed on
> the clock face when it has seen enough vibrations of that atom.  Clocks 1
> and 4 are not atomic clocks, but are mere counters.  Every time clock 3
> measures a vibration of the atom, it sends a light pulse to a sensor in
> clock 1 and clock 4.  Clock 1 and clock 4 count these light pulses, and
> when there have been enough light pulses to represent a nanosecond, they
> too increment the nanosecond counter on the clock face.
>
> At some time = 0, the rocket is at rest, and clock1 and clock4 are set to
> 0, then clock 3 turns on and sends the light pulses and clocks 1 and 4
> begin counting.  The moment clock1 counts 1, clock2 is activated and sets
> its counter to 1, and thereafter counts the vibrations of its own atom
> under measurement. Likewise, the moment clock 4 measures its first light
> flash, clock 5 is activated and begins counting its own atom's vibrations.
>
> Do you agree at this point, all 5 clocks are synchronized, within their
> own reference frame?
>
> Now what happens from an external frame as this rocket accelerates to 0.8
> c in the direction facing rightwards? Outside this frame, one will see the
> light flashes take slightly longer to reach clock4 which is moving away
> from the light source of clock3, while clock1 will begin receiving the
> light flashes slightly faster the absolute number or difference in timings
> is proportional to both the length separating the clocks, as well as the
> absolute speed of the rocket. This results in a permanent discrepancy
> between clocks 1 and 4.
>
> Now what of clocks 2 and 5? Do they not remain in complete agreement with
> their local "light flash counting clocks" throughout this process?
>
> What happens when the rocket comes to a rest, from the perspective of the
> external at-rest observer, do the clocks not all resynchronize?
>
> Can not everything in this experiment be explained in terms of special
> relativity?
>

No, not if the rocket changes velocity at some point. That brings GR into
the picture. But I think I disagree overall: the relativity of simultaneity
in SR means that clocks that are synchronized in some way will not
necessarily be synchronized in some other frame. So rockets synchronized at
the ends of a moving rocket will not necessarily be synchronized when
brought together in some other frame. There are some similarities with the
twin paradox here -- clocks disagree because they have followed different
spacetime paths.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-28 Thread Bruce Kellett

From: *Jason Resch* mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>


Clock desycnhronization is a different phenomenon and has a different 
cause and explanation than time dilation.


Because of the relativity of simultaneity in SR, clock synchronization 
is not a global phenomenon -- it depends on the way in which the clocks 
are synchronized. So clocks synchronized by one method in one frame will 
not necessarily be synchronized in different frames. The time read on 
such clocks is local only, so will they will not necessarily agree when 
they are brought together.


The effects of time dilation are dependent on relative speed. But 
whether I bring the clocks together moving one of them at either 1 
meter/second or 1 mm per year, they will still appear synchronized to 
the person on the ground.  You can calculate the time dilation effects 
of moving at 1 meter per second over the ship's length of 100 meters, 
it won't account for the 266.85 nanoseconds of clock descynrhonization 
that the observer on the ground sees.


The effect is more related to length contraction than anything. If you 
see a length contracted object, you are simultaneously seeing "older" 
and "newer" parts of that object, the rear part of the object will be 
newer in time, while the forward part of the object will be the older 
part of the object.  Consider the observer on the ground watching the 
rocket gradually slow.  The entire part of the rocket is slowing at 
the exact same rate, but by the time it stops both clocks will again 
be perfectly synchronized.  This resynchronization cannot be explained 
in terms of time dilation or different relative velocities.


There are no "older" or "newer" parts of an object, because there is no 
such thing as an absolute time. Time is a purely local phenomenon:  
apparent clock rates are affected by relative motions.


Because of general relativistic effects, slowing the rocket will cause 
the clock rates at the front and rear of the rocket to be different, so 
they will not remain synchronized, even if that concept made any sense 
in the first place.



However, it can be explained in terms of objects in spacetime being 
4-dimensional, and viewing acceleration or deceleration as the 
rotation of those 4-dimensional objects. (which also explains the 
phenomenon of length contraction)



4-dimensional space-time is a construct that sometimes has heuristic 
value, but it cannot be said to be the 'explanation' for anything. The 
only explanations that SR gives are in terms of the effects of Lorentz 
transformations. When we introduce general relativity, we see that 
Lorentz symmetry is only ever a local effect, so 4-dim space-time 
becomes insignificant.


Bruce

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Re: CMBR and Horizon Problem

2018-12-28 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sat, Dec 29, 2018 at 2:06 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 28, 2018 at 5:14 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> > Why has the inflation not been seen at LHC?
>>>>
>>>
>>> >> The LHC just went offline, when it comes back online after 2 years
>>> of upgrades it should reach energies close to 15 TeV which corresponds to a
>>> temperature of 10^17 Kelvin, and that is the temperature the entire
>>> universe was in when it was about 10^-17 seconds old. But inflation was
>>> over by the time the universe was 10^-35 seconds old. To inflation the
>>> universe was already ancient when it was 10^-17 seconds old.
>>>
>>
>> *> I meant to write that the "inflaton", the particle associated with the
>> inflation field, would have been seen at LHC since it must couple strongly
>> to normal matter, *
>>
>
> If the creation of the inflaton required conditions that existed when the
> universe was 10^-44 seconds old and inflation had decayed away when it was
> 10^-35 seconds old then the particle associated with the inflation field
> would have decayed away too and we wouldn't expect to see it today even at
> places where we can reproduce conditions the universe was in when it was
> 10^-17 seconds old. If it still existed it would still be strongly
> connected to regular matter but we could not detect it but the universe
> could and would still be expanding at an exponential rate and galaxies
> stars and planets would not exist, we couldn't detect it because we
> wouldn't exist either.
>

Very good reasons for saying that no such field or particle exists, or have
ever existed.


> *> Getting density fluctuations from quantum mechanics would violate
>> energy conservation.*
>>
>
> If there were no density fluctuations in a gas you could know both the
> position and velocity of every particle in it and that would most certainly
> violate the laws of quantum mechanics.
>

I hope you understand the difference between thermal fluctuations and
quantum fluctuations


> And we've had experimental confirmation for nearly a century that at the
> cosmological scale energy is not conserved. The expansion of the universe
> causes all photons to be redshifted and lose energy, a clear violation of
> energy conservation. And there are theoretical reasons for thinking so too.
> Noether's theorem says for every symmetry in physics there is a
> corresponding conservation law, so if the laws of physics don't change with
> time then energy is conserved. But General Relativity says the space a
> particle is moving through* can* change with time so energy is *not*
> conserved. If spacetime is curved the energy associated with a point in it
> doesn't even have a unique definition.
>

In GR, energy is not conserved in non-static space-times. But energy is
exactly conserved locally. Again, study the difference between these
situations.

Bruce

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Re: CMBR and Horizon Problem

2018-12-28 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 10:52 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 4:35 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> > *You seem to be convinced by inflation theory. *
>>
>
> No I'm just playing devil's advocate. I'm not convinced it's right I'm
> just not convinced it's dead wrong as you seem to be.
>

I think the many problem with inflationary theory are too easily overlooked.


>
> *> Why has the inflation not been seen at LHC?*
>>
>
> The LHC just went offline, when it comes back online after 2 years of
> upgrades it should reach energies close to 15 TeV which corresponds to a
> temperature of 10^17 Kelvin, and that is the temperature the entire
> universe was in when it was about 10^-17 seconds old. But inflation was
> over by the time the universe was 10^-35 seconds old. To inflation the
> universe was already ancient when it was 10^-17 seconds old.
>

I meant to write that the "inflaton", the particle associated with the
inflation field, would have been seen at LHC since it must couple strongly
to normal matter, but Google's autocorrect got the better of me, and
correct "inflaton" to "inflation". Reach big bang temperatures at the LHC
is not the issue here.



> This may be related to the fact that no particle accelerator has found
> anything surprising in 50 years; but telescopes have, they've revealed new
> physics to us.
>
>
>> *> At the end of the inflationary period, the temperature was absolute
>> zero everywhere -- no fluctuations.*
>>
>
> If something was at absolute zero it would violate the third law of
> thermodynamics. It would also violate quantum mechanics because you'd know
> exactly what the velocity of a particle was (zero) and therefore its
> position would not be meaningful because division by zero is not defined.
>

Inflation is a semiclassical theory, and the field is treated classically,
except when people want to introduce fluctuations. But they forget that
there are no such things as quantum fluctuations -- there are only
different results obtained from repeated measurement of the same state.
Getting density fluctuations from quantum mechanics would violate energy
conservation.

Bruce

>
>

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-28 Thread Bruce Kellett

From: *Jason Resch* mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>
On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 4:24 PM Bruce Kellett <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 4:59 AM Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 12:30 AM Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 4:03 PM Jason Resch
mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 11:06 PM Brent Meeker
mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:

On 12/23/2018 7:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> How can this be? The rocket is a rigid
structure, the front and rear
> clocks accelerate at the same rate.

First, there are no rigid objects in relativity
theory.  Otherwise they
could be used for  FTL signaling.  Second, there
is no simultaneity at
different places, like the front and rear of the
rocket.  So it is frame
dependent whether the two ends of the rocket begin
to accelerate at the
same time.


The level of clock desynchronization is proportional
to the speed and the length of the rocket.   That it
is one rocket doesn't even matter, it could be two
rockets, which both separately accelerate at the same
time given by a signal initiated from immediately
between them. This is just showing that length
contraction is only a spatial length contraction. The
length through space time is constant, but when moving
through space, an object's length will partially
extend through space and partially extend through
time.  To the extent that an object's length contracts
you will see a corresponding increase in the reach
through time. (this is unrelated to acceleration
effects, or rigidness).

If it were related to rigidness, then the effect would
disappear with the two separate rockets, but it
doesn't. Similarly, if it were related to acceleration
rates, rather than absolute velocity, it would be
unrelated to the distance separating the clocks but
it's not.  Here is an example of what I am talking
about, just to be clear.

If a 100 meter rocket accelerates to 80% of c, then it
will length contract to 60 meters, but will also
extend 80 meters through the dimension of time.  The
total length remains 100 meters (0.6^2 + 0.8^2 = 1).
However, clocks that were initially synchronized
between the fore and aft parts of the rocket are
separated by (80 meters / c) = 266.85 nanoseconds. If
you take the clock from the front to the back you will
see it speed up and resynchronize with the clock in
the back when brought into proximity with the clock in
the rear, likewise if you bring the clock from the
rear towards the front it will slow until it
resynchronizes with the clock in the front by the time
it is brought into proximity with it.  You are
carrying the clock through the time dimension as you
move it towards the front or back of the ship.


I don't understand this. If the two clocks are moving at
the same velocity there is no difference in clock rate
between them. That's why I thought you were talking about
the acceleration phase -- clock rates can differ then, but
if the two clocks are at either end of the rocket moving
inertially, and at rest wrt each other, then their rates
are the same, regardless of the distance apart.


As seen by someone who perceives the rocket to be length
contracted, the clocks will not appear to be in sync.


That is factually wrong. The special relativistic apparent change
in clock rates depends only on the relative motion, so from the
point of view of someone at rest on the ground, the clocks at the
front and rear of the coasting rocket will be travelling at the
same velocity relative to him. So they will both appear to  be
going either faster or slower at exactly the same rate, depending
on the direction of the relative motion.


Then what is the meaning of this problem on page 42: 
https://www.relativity.li/uploads/pdf/English/Epstein_en.pdf


Two ro

Re: CMBR and Horizon Problem

2018-12-24 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 8:44 AM  wrote:

> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 9:35:05 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 4:43 AM John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 5:38 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> *> Flatness is explained if the unknown parameter k in the FRW solution
>>>> is set to zero. The the universe is always flat, no need to fine tune.
>>>> Setting k = 1 or k = -1 is just as fine-tuned or not as k=0.*
>>>>
>>>
>>> There are an infinite number of ways space could have been curved but
>>> you picked one particular way (no curvature at all) for your initial
>>> conditions and did so for no particular reason other than to make the
>>> theory fit the facts that you already knew. Inflation explains why
>>> spacetime curvature could have any finite value whatsoever when the
>>> universe first came into existence and it would still look flat today even
>>> with our most sensitive instruments. It didn't have to start out with
>>> spacetime being zero or anything close to it, and that doesn't sound
>>> fined-tuned to me.
>>>
>>> And the same thing is true of temperature, why are things at the same
>>> temperature when there was no time for them to come into thermal
>>> equilibrium? Inflation explains why, your explanation is they just did.
>>> Inflation says that  10^-35 seconds after the start of the universe and it
>>> had doubled in size about a hundred times  (and 10^35 seconds is a long
>>> long time compared to the Planck Time of 10^-43 seconds) the difference in
>>> temperature in our part of the universe would be almost zero but not
>>> precisely zero due to random quantum variations, and quantum theory allows
>>> you to calculate the intensity and size of what those temperature
>>> variations should have been. And you can also calculate what those
>>> temperature variations would evolve into after the universe has been
>>> expanding for 380,000 years, and what we calculate and what we see are the
>>> same.
>>>
>>> That's also how we know that at the very largest scale the universe is
>>> in general flat. They did this by looking at the oldest thing we can
>>> see, the Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation (CMBR) formed just 380,000
>>> years after the Big Bang. So if we look at a map of that background
>>> radiation the largest structure we could see on it would be 380,000 light
>>> years across, spots larger than that wouldn't have had enough time to form
>>> because nothing, not even gravity can move faster than light, a larger lump
>>> wouldn't even have enough time to know it was a lump.
>>>
>>> So how large would an object 13.8 billion light years away appear to us
>>> if it's size was 380,000 light years across? The answer is one degree of
>>> arc, but ONLY if the universe is flat. If it's not flat and parallel lines
>>> converge or diverge then the image of the largest structures we can see in
>>> the CMBR could appear to be larger or smaller than one degree depending on
>>> how the image was distorted, and that would depend on if the universe is
>>> positively or negatively curved.  But we see no distortion at all, in this
>>> way the WMAP and Planck satellite proved that the universe is in general
>>> flat, or at least isn't curved much, over a distance of 13.8 billion light
>>> years if the universe curves at all it is less than one part in 100,000.
>>>
>>>
>>>> >> It would seem to me that if two theories can explain observations
>>>>> then the one with the simpler initial conditions is the superior.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *> The trouble is that inflation is not  a simple theory. Where does
>>>> the inflation potential come from?*
>>>>
>>>
>>> From the same place gravitational potential does I suppose, but
>>> inflation would be simpler, in General Relativity gravity needs a tensor
>>> field but inflation only needs a scalar field.
>>>
>>>
>>>>  > *Why don't we see the inflaton?*
>>>>
>>>
>>> Maybe we do see it, maybe the acceleration of the universe we see today
>>> is the inflation field at work having undergone a  phase change when the
>>> universe was 10^-35 sec old and switched into a much lower gear. Or maybe
>>> not. Andrei Linde thinks the inflation field decayes away like radioactive
>>> half life, and after th

Re: CMBR and Horizon Problem

2018-12-24 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 4:43 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 5:38 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> Flatness is explained if the unknown parameter k in the FRW solution is
>> set to zero. The the universe is always flat, no need to fine tune. Setting
>> k = 1 or k = -1 is just as fine-tuned or not as k=0.*
>>
>
> There are an infinite number of ways space could have been curved but you
> picked one particular way (no curvature at all) for your initial conditions
> and did so for no particular reason other than to make the theory fit the
> facts that you already knew. Inflation explains why spacetime curvature
> could have any finite value whatsoever when the universe first came into
> existence and it would still look flat today even with our most sensitive
> instruments. It didn't have to start out with spacetime being zero or
> anything close to it, and that doesn't sound  fined-tuned to me.
>
> And the same thing is true of temperature, why are things at the same
> temperature when there was no time for them to come into thermal
> equilibrium? Inflation explains why, your explanation is they just did.
> Inflation says that  10^-35 seconds after the start of the universe and it
> had doubled in size about a hundred times  (and 10^35 seconds is a long
> long time compared to the Planck Time of 10^-43 seconds) the difference in
> temperature in our part of the universe would be almost zero but not
> precisely zero due to random quantum variations, and quantum theory allows
> you to calculate the intensity and size of what those temperature
> variations should have been. And you can also calculate what those
> temperature variations would evolve into after the universe has been
> expanding for 380,000 years, and what we calculate and what we see are the
> same.
>
> That's also how we know that at the very largest scale the universe is in
> general flat. They did this by looking at the oldest thing we can see,
> the Cosmic Microwave Background Radiation (CMBR) formed just 380,000 years
> after the Big Bang. So if we look at a map of that background radiation the
> largest structure we could see on it would be 380,000 light years across,
> spots larger than that wouldn't have had enough time to form because
> nothing, not even gravity can move faster than light, a larger lump
> wouldn't even have enough time to know it was a lump.
>
> So how large would an object 13.8 billion light years away appear to us if
> it's size was 380,000 light years across? The answer is one degree of arc,
> but ONLY if the universe is flat. If it's not flat and parallel lines
> converge or diverge then the image of the largest structures we can see in
> the CMBR could appear to be larger or smaller than one degree depending on
> how the image was distorted, and that would depend on if the universe is
> positively or negatively curved.  But we see no distortion at all, in this
> way the WMAP and Planck satellite proved that the universe is in general
> flat, or at least isn't curved much, over a distance of 13.8 billion light
> years if the universe curves at all it is less than one part in 100,000.
>
>
>> >> It would seem to me that if two theories can explain observations
>>> then the one with the simpler initial conditions is the superior.
>>>
>>
>> *> The trouble is that inflation is not  a simple theory. Where does the
>> inflation potential come from?*
>>
>
> From the same place gravitational potential does I suppose, but inflation
> would be simpler, in General Relativity gravity needs a tensor field but
> inflation only needs a scalar field.
>
>
>>  > *Why don't we see the inflaton?*
>>
>
> Maybe we do see it, maybe the acceleration of the universe we see today is
> the inflation field at work having undergone a  phase change when the
> universe was 10^-35 sec old and switched into a much lower gear. Or maybe
> not. Andrei Linde thinks the inflation field decayes away like radioactive
> half life, and after the decay the universe expanded at a much much more
> leisurely pace. But for that idea to work Guth's the inflation field had to
> expand faster than it decayed, Linde called it "Eternal Inflation". Linde
> showed that for every volume in which the inflation field decays away 2
> other volumes don't decay. So one universe becomes 3, the field decays in
> one universe but not in the other 2, then both of those two universes
> splits in 3 again and the inflation field decays away in two of them but
> doesn't decay in the other 4.  And it goes on like this forever creating a
> multiverse.
>
> If any of this is true we may be able to prove it because Eternal
> Inflation would create gra

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-24 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Tue, Dec 25, 2018 at 4:59 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 12:30 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 4:03 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 11:06 PM Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On 12/23/2018 7:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>> >
>>>> > How can this be? The rocket is a rigid structure, the front and rear
>>>> > clocks accelerate at the same rate.
>>>>
>>>> First, there are no rigid objects in relativity theory.  Otherwise they
>>>> could be used for  FTL signaling.  Second, there is no simultaneity at
>>>> different places, like the front and rear of the rocket.  So it is
>>>> frame
>>>> dependent whether the two ends of the rocket begin to accelerate at the
>>>> same time.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> The level of clock desynchronization is proportional to the speed and
>>> the length of the rocket.   That it is one rocket doesn't even matter, it
>>> could be two rockets, which both separately accelerate at the same time
>>> given by a signal initiated from immediately between them.  This is just
>>> showing that length contraction is only a spatial length contraction. The
>>> length through space time is  constant, but when moving through space, an
>>> object's length will partially extend through space and partially extend
>>> through time.  To the extent that an object's length contracts you will see
>>> a corresponding increase in the reach through time.  (this is unrelated to
>>> acceleration effects, or rigidness).
>>>
>>> If it were related to rigidness, then the effect would disappear with
>>> the two separate rockets, but it doesn't. Similarly, if it were related to
>>> acceleration rates, rather than absolute velocity, it would be unrelated to
>>> the distance separating the clocks but it's not.  Here is an example of
>>> what I am talking about, just to be clear.
>>>
>>> If a 100 meter rocket accelerates to 80% of c, then it will length
>>> contract to 60 meters, but will also extend 80 meters through the dimension
>>> of time.  The total length remains 100 meters (0.6^2 + 0.8^2 = 1).
>>> However, clocks that were initially synchronized between the fore and aft
>>> parts of the rocket are separated by (80 meters / c) = 266.85 nanoseconds.
>>> If you take the clock from the front to the back you will see it speed up
>>> and resynchronize with the clock in the back when brought into proximity
>>> with the clock in the rear, likewise if you bring the clock from the rear
>>> towards the front it will slow until it resynchronizes with the clock in
>>> the front by the time it is brought into proximity with it.  You are
>>> carrying the clock through the time dimension as you move it towards the
>>> front or back of the ship.
>>>
>>
>> I don't understand this. If the two clocks are moving at the same
>> velocity there is no difference in clock rate between them. That's why I
>> thought you were talking about the acceleration phase -- clock rates can
>> differ then, but if the two clocks are at either end of the rocket moving
>> inertially, and at rest wrt each other, then their rates are the same,
>> regardless of the distance apart.
>>
>>
> As seen by someone who perceives the rocket to be length contracted, the
> clocks will not appear to be in sync.
>

That is factually wrong. The special relativistic apparent change in clock
rates depends only on the relative motion, so from the point of view of
someone at rest on the ground, the clocks at the front and rear of the
coasting rocket will be travelling at the same velocity relative to him. So
they will both appear to  be going either faster or slower at exactly the
same rate, depending on the direction of the relative motion.

I think you have been totally confused by your ideas about everything going
at a constant speed through either space or time. I thought you had a basic
confusion when you appended those rather silly diagrams a post or so ago.
You have to go back to the basic equations of the Lorentz transformation to
get these things straight.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-23 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 4:03 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 11:06 PM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>> On 12/23/2018 7:17 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> >
>> > How can this be? The rocket is a rigid structure, the front and rear
>> > clocks accelerate at the same rate.
>>
>> First, there are no rigid objects in relativity theory.  Otherwise they
>> could be used for  FTL signaling.  Second, there is no simultaneity at
>> different places, like the front and rear of the rocket.  So it is frame
>> dependent whether the two ends of the rocket begin to accelerate at the
>> same time.
>>
>>
> The level of clock desynchronization is proportional to the speed and the
> length of the rocket.   That it is one rocket doesn't even matter, it could
> be two rockets, which both separately accelerate at the same time given by
> a signal initiated from immediately between them.  This is just showing
> that length contraction is only a spatial length contraction. The length
> through space time is  constant, but when moving through space, an object's
> length will partially extend through space and partially extend through
> time.  To the extent that an object's length contracts you will see a
> corresponding increase in the reach through time.  (this is unrelated to
> acceleration effects, or rigidness).
>
> If it were related to rigidness, then the effect would disappear with the
> two separate rockets, but it doesn't. Similarly, if it were related to
> acceleration rates, rather than absolute velocity, it would be unrelated to
> the distance separating the clocks but it's not.  Here is an example of
> what I am talking about, just to be clear.
>
> If a 100 meter rocket accelerates to 80% of c, then it will length
> contract to 60 meters, but will also extend 80 meters through the dimension
> of time.  The total length remains 100 meters (0.6^2 + 0.8^2 = 1).
> However, clocks that were initially synchronized between the fore and aft
> parts of the rocket are separated by (80 meters / c) = 266.85 nanoseconds.
> If you take the clock from the front to the back you will see it speed up
> and resynchronize with the clock in the back when brought into proximity
> with the clock in the rear, likewise if you bring the clock from the rear
> towards the front it will slow until it resynchronizes with the clock in
> the front by the time it is brought into proximity with it.  You are
> carrying the clock through the time dimension as you move it towards the
> front or back of the ship.
>

I don't understand this. If the two clocks are moving at the same velocity
there is no difference in clock rate between them. That's why I thought you
were talking about the acceleration phase -- clock rates can differ then,
but if the two clocks are at either end of the rocket moving inertially,
and at rest wrt each other, then their rates are the same, regardless of
the distance apart.

Bruce

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Re: CMBR and Horizon Problem

2018-12-23 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 4:02 PM  wrote:

> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 4:47:02 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 3:33 PM  wrote:
>>
>>> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 4:22:24 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>> wrote:

 On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 3:50:33 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
> On 12/23/2018 4:47 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> *If by "flat", you mean mathematically flat, like a plane extending
> infinitely in all directions, as opposed to asymptotically flat like a 
> huge
> and expanding sphere,  you have to reconcile an infinitesimally tiny
> universe at the time of the BB, and simultaneously an infinitely large
> universe extending infinitely in all directions. AG*
>
>
> All that's "infinitesimally tiny" is the visible universe.  You must
> know that the Friedmann equation just defines the dynamics of a scale
> factor, not a size.
>

 *Are you claiming the visible universe at the BB was infinitesimally
 tiny, but the non visible part was infinitely large (mathematically flat),
 or huge (asymptotically flat)? AG *

>>>
>>> *Bruce says the universe is always flat if k=1. How can it be everywhere
>>> flat if there's a region which is infinitely tiny; hence not flat in the
>>> visible region? How are we to imagine this? TIA, AG *
>>>
>>
>> That's a bit confused. k=0 corresponds to a universe that is everywhere
>> flat (in space, but not necessarily in the time dimension - i.e., it might
>> be expanding. Our current visible universe originated in a small (tiny)
>> region of the total structure, which might be infinite in extent, but flat
>> everywhere, even in our tiny region.
>>
>
> *Not to split hairs, but how can the tiny visible region also be flat and
> infinite in extent, if its age is finite? I can imagine the visible region
> to be asymptotically (but not mathematically) flat, and therefore finite in
> extent. AG *
>

I said that the total structure might be infinite in extent, not the region
that became our visible universe. Flatness is a mathematical property --
imagination readily fails to visualise these things.

Bruce

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Re: "No black-hole singularities" in an undated loop-quantum-gravity theory

2018-12-23 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 3:45 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Sat, Dec 22, 2018 at 9:33 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>> On 12/22/2018 12:04 PM, Philip Thrift wrote
>>
>>
>> https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2018-12/lsu-be122018.php
>>
>> Theoretical physicists developed a theory called loop quantum gravity in
>> the 1990s that marries the laws of microscopic physics, or quantum
>> mechanics, with gravity, which explains the dynamics of space and time.
>> Ashtekar, Olmedos and Singh's new equations describe black holes in loop
>> quantum gravity and showed that black hole singularity does not exist.
>>
>>
>> "In Einstein's theory, space-time is a fabric that can be divided as
>> small as we want. This is essentially the cause of the singularity where
>> the gravitational field becomes infinite. In loop quantum gravity, the
>> fabric of space-time has a *tile-like structure*, which cannot be
>> divided beyond the smallest tile. My colleagues and I have shown that this
>> is the case inside black holes and therefore there is no singularity,"
>> Singh said.
>>
>> "These tile-like units of geometry--called 'quantum excitations'-- which
>> resolve the singularity problem are orders of magnitude smaller than we can
>> detect with today's technology, but we have precise mathematical equations
>> that predict their behavior," said Ashtekar, who is one of the founding
>> fathers of loop quantum gravity.
>>
>>
>> But is this consistent with https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.5191v2 which
>> showed spacetime to be smooth down to 1/525 of the Planck length?
>>
>
> Brent,
>
> Wouldn't this be a successful prediction of Bruno's theory?  In another
> thread you said it had only made retrodictions, but wasn't one of Bruno's
> predictions that space and time would be continuous (not discrete),
> therefore it would predict LQG is false, and then
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1109.5191v2 would be a confirmation of that.
>

How did Bruno predict that from a digital (integral) model)? And where did
he make such a prediction?

Bruce

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Re: CMBR and Horizon Problem

2018-12-23 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 3:33 PM  wrote:

> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 4:22:24 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, December 24, 2018 at 3:50:33 AM UTC, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>> On 12/23/2018 4:47 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> *If by "flat", you mean mathematically flat, like a plane extending
>>> infinitely in all directions, as opposed to asymptotically flat like a huge
>>> and expanding sphere,  you have to reconcile an infinitesimally tiny
>>> universe at the time of the BB, and simultaneously an infinitely large
>>> universe extending infinitely in all directions. AG*
>>>
>>>
>>> All that's "infinitesimally tiny" is the visible universe.  You must
>>> know that the Friedmann equation just defines the dynamics of a scale
>>> factor, not a size.
>>>
>>
>> *Are you claiming the visible universe at the BB was infinitesimally
>> tiny, but the non visible part was infinitely large (mathematically flat),
>> or huge (asymptotically flat)? AG *
>>
>
> *Bruce says the universe is always flat if k=1. How can it be everywhere
> flat if there's a region which is infinitely tiny; hence not flat in the
> visible region? How are we to imagine this? TIA, AG *
>

That's a bit confused. k=0 corresponds to a universe that is everywhere
flat (in space, but not necessarily in the time dimension - i.e., it might
be expanding. Our current visible universe originated in a small (tiny)
region of the total structure, which might be infinite in extent, but flat
everywhere, even in our tiny region.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-23 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 2:18 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 8:20 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 12:06 PM Jason Resch 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 7:51 PM Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> That's what I thought you wanted to conclude.  But it doesn't follow.
>>>> The specious present is just a mathematical construct and has no physical
>>>> significance.  It says no more than that one can make a 4D map.
>>>>
>>>
>>> So do you believe that presentism is compatible under relativity?  If
>>> one puts two synchronized clocks (one at the front, and one at the read) of
>>> a rocket, and then the rocket accelerates, the rocket attains a tilted
>>> direction in space time, and while the rocket remains at a positive
>>> velocity, the rear-ward clock will be "ahead in time" of the forward
>>> clock.  The rocket is reaching through the dimension of time which explains
>>> the discrepancy of the clocks.  When the rocket comes to rest, the rocket
>>> will have "0" reach through the proper time dimension, and the clocks will
>>> again appear synchronized.  If something can have an extent through the
>>> proper time dimension, how can this be compatible with presentism?
>>>
>>
>>
>> Your example does not require any such conclusion. If you have a clock at
>> the front of an accelerating rocket, and one at the rear, the rear of the
>> rocket has to accelerate at a slightly greater rate or else the rocket will
>> fall apart.
>>
>
> How can this be? The rocket is a rigid structure, the front and rear
> clocks accelerate at the same rate.
>

No, that is not the case. In an accelerating rocket, the front and rear
accelerate at different rates. This is an important property of the Rindler
frame for accelerating systems. Greg Egan has an interesting an informative
tutorial on this (as well as other things):

http://http://www.gregegan.net/SCIENCE/Rindler/RindlerHorizon.html


In the greater acceleration field, the rear clock will run slower than the
>> clock at the nose. When the rocket comes to rest again, the two clocks will
>> have travelled different non-geodesic paths, so they will no longer be
>> synchronized the rear clock will show a smaller elapsed proper time than
>> the forward clock.
>>
>
> They will again be synchronized when the rocket comes to a rest.
>

No. That travel different spacetime paths, so the proper time along each
trajectory (clock from) is different. Note that this is specifically for
accelerated frames, not inertial frames, which I think you might have in
mind.


What is it, exactly, that you want to conclude from this? Time is what is
>> measured on a clock, and clocks at different relative velocities, or
>> different acceleration fields, will record different times. So the only
>> reasonably objective "present" is that read on  your local clock -- other
>> clocks may well record different "presents".
>>
>>
> The idea of time as a dimension separate from the spatial dimensions
> explains clock-descynchronization after acceleration (and
> re-synchronization when coming to rest), length contraction, time dilation,
> etc.  If an object can reach through time (just as it reach through space)
> then you have clear evidence of the reality of multiple points in time.
>

This just seems like simple Lorentz transformation stuff. That does not
require a block view of space-time. Your diagrams are not actually very
helpful.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-23 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 12:06 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 7:51 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>> That's what I thought you wanted to conclude.  But it doesn't follow.
>> The specious present is just a mathematical construct and has no physical
>> significance.  It says no more than that one can make a 4D map.
>>
>
> So do you believe that presentism is compatible under relativity?  If one
> puts two synchronized clocks (one at the front, and one at the read) of a
> rocket, and then the rocket accelerates, the rocket attains a tilted
> direction in space time, and while the rocket remains at a positive
> velocity, the rear-ward clock will be "ahead in time" of the forward
> clock.  The rocket is reaching through the dimension of time which explains
> the discrepancy of the clocks.  When the rocket comes to rest, the rocket
> will have "0" reach through the proper time dimension, and the clocks will
> again appear synchronized.  If something can have an extent through the
> proper time dimension, how can this be compatible with presentism?
>


Your example does not require any such conclusion. If you have a clock at
the front of an accelerating rocket, and one at the rear, the rear of the
rocket has to accelerate at a slightly greater rate or else the rocket will
fall apart. In the greater acceleration field, the rear clock will run
slower than the clock at the nose. When the rocket comes to rest again, the
two clocks will have travelled different non-geodesic paths, so they will
no longer be synchronized the rear clock will show a smaller elapsed proper
time than the forward clock.

What is it, exactly, that you want to conclude from this? Time is what is
measured on a clock, and clocks at different relative velocities, or
different acceleration fields, will record different times. So the only
reasonably objective "present" is that read on  your local clock -- other
clocks may well record different "presents".

Bruce

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Re: CMBR and Horizon Problem

2018-12-23 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Dec 24, 2018 at 1:38 AM John Clark  wrote:

> On Sat, Dec 22, 2018 at 11:32 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> The point is that inflation only solves the problem given certain
>> initial conditions. We have no independent knowledge of those initial
>> conditions, *
>
>
> From observations I think we do have a little knowledge about what those
> initial conditions must have been, they could not have been fractal and
> infinitely complex as Penrose postulated because then the universe would
> also have started out in a condition of maximum possible entropy and could
> not have evolved to be in the much lower entropy state we see today.
>
> > *so it could well be that the initial condition was that everything was
>> always at a uniform temperature,*
>
>
> It's not just temperature, the initial conditions would also be that
> spacetime was uniformly flat. Today the observed density of matter/energy
> in the universe is very close to what would be needed to achieve overall
> spacetime flatness; for this to be true today the early universe must have
> been closer than one part in 10^62 to that critical density point.
> Coincidence? Maybe, but I doubt it.
>
>
>> > *and there was no need for something, such as inflation, to render the
>> CMB uniform everywhere.*
>
>
> So inflation can't fix things if the universe started out with infinite
> complexity and entropy, but nothing else could either and yet the universe
> we see today is not in a maximum entropy state. And inflation is not needed
> if the initial conditions were at a uniform temperature and the mass/energy
> density was within one part in 10^62 of the critical point.
>

Flatness is explained if the unknown parameter k in the FRW solution is set
to zero. The the universe is always flat, no need to fine tune. Setting k =
1 or k = -1 is just as fine-tuned or not as k=0.



> It would seem to me that if two theories can explain observations then the
> one with the simpler initial conditions is the superior.
>

The trouble is that inflation is not  a simple theory. Where does the
inflation potential come from? (Do you even know what it is? Why don't we
see the inflaton?)The slow roll parameters have to be fine-tuned to a
remarkable degree to get agreement with observation, etc, etc.  All you
have to do without inflation is have smooth initial conditions with k=0 --
very much simpler.

Bruce

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Re: CMBR and Horizon Problem

2018-12-22 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 3:05 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Sat, Dec 22, 2018 at 10:04 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> >>Regardless of how non-uniform the entire early universe may have been
>>> if you kept looking at smaller and smaller volumes you'd eventually find a
>>> size where thing were pretty uniform.
>>>
>>
>> *> On what do you bas that assumption? *
>>
>
> Observational evidence. We know that the temperature 13.8 light years to
> your left and 13.8 light years to your right differ by less than one part
> in 100,000. The universe is only 13.8 billion years old so I don't see how
> they came to thermal equilibrium (or nearly so) if inflation didn't
> happen.
>
>
>
>> > *Penrose makes the point that there is no reason to suppose that the
>> initial state is not fractal -- grossly unsmooth on any scale, right down
>> to the smallest!*
>>
>
>
> If you examine a copper plate today its temperature does not display a
> fractal pattern, in fact I can't think of anything that does, so something
> certainly changed, if not inflation then what?. And if the early universe
> was as  Penrose said the universe once was then I don't see how complex
> structures like you and me that are capable of making calculations could
> ever make an appearance.
>

The point is that inflation only solves the problem given certain initial
conditions. We have no independent knowledge of those initial conditions,
so it could well be that the initial condition was that everything was
always at a uniform temperature, and there was no need for something, such
as inflation, to render the CMB uniform everywhere.

Bruce

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Re: CMBR and Horizon Problem

2018-12-22 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 1:17 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Sat, Dec 22, 2018 at 6:46 AM  wrote:
>
> *> If the temperature was non uniform when the BB occurred, if it
>> occurred, why would a sudden increase in its volume, aka inflation, erase
>> or wash out those non uniformities?*
>>
>
> Regardless of how non-uniform the entire early universe may have been if
> you kept looking at smaller and smaller volumes you'd eventually find a
> size where thing were pretty uniform.
>

On what do you bas that assumption? Penrose makes the point that there is
no reason to suppose that the initial state is not fractal -- grossly
unsmooth on any scale, right down to the smallest!


> If inflation theory is correct that small nearly uniform part of the
> universe started to expand exponentially; that is to say it had a fixed
> doubling time, every 10^-37 seconds the diameter of that small part of the
> universe doubled, and in 10^-35 seconds it doubled a hundred times and
> became our observable universe. It has continued to expand to this day but
> at a much much more leisurely rate.
>

It has been pointed out many times that inflation is a model in search of a
problem to solve. Monopoles and flatness are not really problems, and
inflation does not solve the smoothness problem - vide above.

Bruce


>
>
>> > *OTOH, if the initial temperature were uniform, would that obviate the
>> need for inflation, or would non uniformities tend to become manifest were
>> it not for inflation?*
>>
>
> Without inflation its very hard to understand how the temperature could be
> uniform because there wasn't enough time for the temperature to equalize,
> the distance parts of the universe were neven is causal comtact and yet
> they are at the same temperature to one part in 100,000.
>
> John K Clark
>

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-22 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 11:29 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 10:01 PM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> That's words.  How shall they determine whether event X in distant galaxy
>> Y is simultaneous with their clock reading Z?  Is their "direction through
>> spacetime" constant over billions of years?
>>
>
> If the event occurred N-light years away, and light from that event
> arrives in N-years, then it can be considered simultaneous with the
> observer.
>

That is not the way in which the plane of simultaneity is normally defined.
Your idea gives events that are not simultaneous in any frame!

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-22 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Sun, Dec 23, 2018 at 9:08 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 12/21/2018 10:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> ...
>
> With Mechanism, physics has to be the same for all “observers” aka
> universal machines, and indeed physics has to be independent of the initial
> theory (phi_independent, or “machine independent” in the sense of
> theoretical computer scientist (recursion theory does not depend on which
> universal machinery we talk about).
>
> Indeed, physics becomes simply the “measure one expectation” of the
> universal machine on all computations going through (any) of its states.
> All the rest will be contingent and can be called geographical and/or
> historical. Our mundane consciousness requires long and deep histories.
>
>
> So what expectation has measure 1.0?  Can you show that it includes
> conservation of energy-momentum for example?
>
>
> It could have been possible that the logic of physics would have collapsed
> into classical logic,
>
>
> No.  It could have been possible that your theory incorrectly predicted
> the logic of physics collapsed.  Which would have been bad for  your
> theory, but would have had no effect on physics.
>
> for example if incompleteness was false and arithmetic complete, in that
> case there would be a infinite “landscape” of geographies/histories
> possible, and the laws of physics would be trivial somehow, that is empty.
> Thanks to incompleteness the logic of physics (that is, the logic of the
> measure one on the sigma_1 sentences (the logic of []p & <>t); obeys a non
> trivial logic quantum, and orthomodular logic suggesting the probabilities
> are not trivial, and suggesting also that the logico-physical bottom (the
> leaves of the UD, the sigma_1 true sentences) is symmetrical from that
> “observable” view point.
>
>
> But the probabilities you've derived are either zero or one...which I'd
> say are trivial.
>
>
> The core physical laws are invariant for all universal (Löbian) machine
> (in the Classical Digital Frame of course). It is first person plural
> indeterminacy on all relative computations.
>
> That is why we can detect experimentally if mechanism is false (assuming
> that we are not in a malevolent second order emulation, where we are just
> lied) by comparing the physics “sum on all computations”
>
>
> But what does it mean to "sum on all computations"?
>
> with the physics of the “actually” observable predictions.
>
>
> What is an observation in these computations?
>
> If there is a discrepancy, mechanism is refuted, or we are in the normal
> (gaussian) world, but “captured in some simulation trying to prevent we got
> the right laws of physics (something rather absurde, and which requires an
> infinite work on the par of the liar).
>
> If Planck constant is derivable from mathematical constant coming from the
> semantics of the “material hypostases” (the S4Grz1, Z1*, X1* logics), then
> it is part of the laws. If the Planck constant is shown to be not derivable
> from them, then it is “geographical”, and some region of the
> “multi-multi-verse” might have a different one.
>
>
> That's just saying either my theory applies to X, or X is an exception.
>
>
> The quantum seems to be the digital seen from inside. Mechanism saves the
> quantum and symmetries from being contingent geographies. The laws of
> physics are laws, indeed, mathematical laws derivable from the mathematics
> of the universal (Gödel-Löbian) machines.
>
> Number theory might suggest shortcut toward physics, and explain why group
> theory plays a so big role in physics, and why it seems the unitary group
> imposes itself and how this is related to a measure one on a universal
> Turing structure. The particles are group invariants, so that light help to
> get the bosons and the fermions.
>
>
> The particles are (local) Lorentz invariants.  But how do Lorentz
> transformations show up in the computations (of the Ud?)?
>

It's all just burble, Brent. He has no idea how to get any useful results
from any of this...

Bruce

>

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-20 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 4:59 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:44 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:28 PM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> I have no evidence that they exist now, since all I am currently aware
>>> of is the record of their past existence as it is present to me now. The
>>> evidence is that they existed in the past. Why is that not sufficient? I
>>> tend not to believe in things, like fairies, for which I have no current
>>> evidence.
>>>
>>
>> This seems to be a trend that explains all aspects of your philosophy.
>> For example, rejecting many-worlds, rejecting other universes, rejecting
>> other points in time, rejecting mathematical objects. It's based purely on
>> what you can see.  It is a theory of minimizing the number of objects in
>> reality. But to me this is not a correct application of Occam, which was
>> about simplifying theories by reducing their unnecessary assumptions,
>> rather than reducing the ontologies of those theories.
>>
>
A little more research on Ockham, the early 14th century scholastic
philosopher, brought the following to light.
"It is quite often stated by Ockham in the form: 'Plurality is not to be
posited without necessity' (Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate),
and also, although seldom: 'What can be explained by the assumption of
fewer things is vainly explained by the assumption of more things' (Frustra
fit per plura quod protest fiere per pauciora). The form usually given,
'Entities must not be multiplied without necessity' (Entia non sunt
multiplicanda sine necessitate), does not seem to have been used by Ockham."

Bruce

SImplicity is in the eye of the beholder. "Theories should be as simple as
> possible, but no simpler." Besides Occam's tag is "Entia non sun
> multiplicanda praeter necessitatem" -- Entities should not be multiplied
> beyond necessity. This is certainly about the ontology. Modern tendencies
> to think Ockham was talking about hypotheses is a misrepresentation of the
> context of his remark
>
> On another front, Newton's idea was that the laws should be deduced from
> the phenomena, or data. When he was unable to deduce any simple laws from
> the available data on cometary motion, he left it at that, saying
> "Hypotheses non fingo": I do not feign hypotheses, declaring that 'whatever
> is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis.'
>
> So all, the things you seem to want would be ruled out by both Ockham and
> Newton as not being deduced from the data.
>
> Bruce
>
>
>
>> So by lobbing off the assumption that some points in the past stop
>> existing, you get a larger universe, more points in spacetime exist (but
>> this is simpler, as you don't have to add a theory of how different events
>> come into or out of existence), or with many-worlds, if you drop the
>> collapse postulate, you get the same predictions, and a simpler theory (but
>> a huge number of unseen histories).  With this different philosophy/value
>> system I don't think we will ever agree on what makes for a better theory,
>> for in all these cases that we disagree, it comes down to my preference for
>> a simpler theory, and your preference for a simpler ontology.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-20 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:44 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:28 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> I have no evidence that they exist now, since all I am currently aware of
>> is the record of their past existence as it is present to me now. The
>> evidence is that they existed in the past. Why is that not sufficient? I
>> tend not to believe in things, like fairies, for which I have no current
>> evidence.
>>
>
> This seems to be a trend that explains all aspects of your philosophy.
> For example, rejecting many-worlds, rejecting other universes, rejecting
> other points in time, rejecting mathematical objects. It's based purely on
> what you can see.  It is a theory of minimizing the number of objects in
> reality. But to me this is not a correct application of Occam, which was
> about simplifying theories by reducing their unnecessary assumptions,
> rather than reducing the ontologies of those theories.
>

SImplicity is in the eye of the beholder. "Theories should be as simple as
possible, but no simpler." Besides Occam's tag is "Entia non sun
multiplicanda praeter necessitatem" -- Entities should not be multiplied
beyond necessity. This is certainly about the ontology. Modern tendencies
to think Ockham was talking about hypotheses is a misrepresentation of the
context of his remark

On another front, Newton's idea was that the laws should be deduced from
the phenomena, or data. When he was unable to deduce any simple laws from
the available data on cometary motion, he left it at that, saying
"Hypotheses non fingo": I do not feign hypotheses, declaring that 'whatever
is not deduced from the phenomena must be called a hypothesis.'

So all, the things you seem to want would be ruled out by both Ockham and
Newton as not being deduced from the data.

Bruce



> So by lobbing off the assumption that some points in the past stop
> existing, you get a larger universe, more points in spacetime exist (but
> this is simpler, as you don't have to add a theory of how different events
> come into or out of existence), or with many-worlds, if you drop the
> collapse postulate, you get the same predictions, and a simpler theory (but
> a huge number of unseen histories).  With this different philosophy/value
> system I don't think we will ever agree on what makes for a better theory,
> for in all these cases that we disagree, it comes down to my preference for
> a simpler theory, and your preference for a simpler ontology.
>
> Jason
>

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-20 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 1:07 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:11 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:49 AM Jason Resch 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Do you believe other locations in space exist?
>>>
>>
>> They exist, but there is no sense in which they are simultaneous with my
>> existence.
>>
>
> There are certain senses in which you could, but I mostly agree (as they
> are not objective).
>
>
>> They exist because events at other locations in my past light cone can
>> affect me, and I can affect events at other locations in my future light
>> cone.
>>
>
> Okay, no problem with this.
>
>
>> Do you believe other locations in time exist?
>>>
>>
>> I believe that I have a past, and will have a future, but I do not
>> believe that these exist in my present. Such an idea is clearly a
>> linguistic confusion.
>>
>
> I agree.
>
>
>> (I answer yes to both questions, that is all I mean by block time -- that
>>> there is no privileged part of space time blessed with the property of
>>> existence).
>>>
>>
>> The present is all that you can know exists. All else is idle
>> speculation.
>>
>
> But you just said there is no such thing as the present (since there is no
> objective notion of simultaneity)
>

I have never said that there is no such thing as the present. All I have
said is that the notion of a space-like hyper-surface of simultaneity is
not an objective notion. The print moment exists now for ev very one of us
individually.

Of course, you can construct imaginary theories in which unicorns, fairies,
>> and Hogwarts Castle exist, but you would not have any evidence for any of
>> these.
>>
>
> You just said you have evidence for the existence of objects in your past
> light cone.  Why presume that they would disappear from existence?  What is
> the motivation/justification for such an idea?
>

I have no evidence that they exist now, since all I am currently aware of
is the record of their past existence as it is present to me now. The
evidence is that they existed in the past. Why is that not sufficient? I
tend not to believe in things, like fairies, for which I have no current
evidence.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-20 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 1:03 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 7:05 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:45 AM Jason Resch 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> 1. It is a prediction of eternal inflation and string theory.
>>>
>>
>> String theory and its "landscape" are very speculative, and unlikely to
>> have any relation to the real world -- there is no evidence that string
>> theory is even a coherent theory! Eternal inflation, although popular, is
>> only one possibility for inflation, and even inflationary theory itself is
>> not well-established science.
>>
>
> I agree they are speculative, but they are on the side many many universes.
> Meanwhile there is no evidence for "the only universe that exists is the
> one I can see".
>

The universe we see is the only one for which we have any concrete
evidence, and that evidence is indubitable.


>
> 2. There is no known principal that prohibits other systems ruled by
>>> different laws.
>>>
>>
>> The idea that everything that is not forbidden must exist is a silly
>> metaphysical notion.
>>
>>
> That's not the position I was advocating, though I think that notion is
> less silly than the idea that we should expect to be in a position to see
> everything that exists.
>

Why? That is, in fact, all we have any direct evidence for.


>
> 3. The digits of the dimensionless constants at significance levels not
>>> important to life appear to be randomly distributed
>>>
>>
>> Appearances can be deceptive -- vide flat earth.
>>
>>
>
> What do you think determines the dimensionless constants?
>

They may not be determined by some theory. Or they may be determined by
some TOE. Who knows?


>
> 4. It is highly surprising that the dimensionless constants hold the
>>> values they do as if they were even slightly different, the universe would
>>> be too simple for any life to exist
>>>
>>
>> How do you know that?
>>
>>
> It is difficult to create systems that develop spontaneous complexity, as
> any programmer could tell you.  That our universe is such a system is
> surprising, given that most systems do not yield spontaneous complexity.
>
>
>> Look, the Bayesian prior for any argument about the nature of the
>> universe is that we exist. So there is nothing in the least surprising
>> about the fact that the universe we observe is compatible with our
>> existence. Anything else is just idle speculation.
>>
>
> But that's not the correct prior to use.
>

It is, you know. If you did not exist you could not be arguing about this.
So your existence must be part of any prior about the nature of the
universe we see. The prior must include total evidence available.


> Your assumption is that one and only one universe exists.
>

That is all we have evidence for, but it is not so much an assumption as a
well-founded conclusion.


> Starting from that assumption you must then ask what is the probability
> that life will exist in that one and only one universe.  Given that the
> probability is low, would suggest the initial assumption is wrong.  Of the
> 26 dimensionless constants, lets say each one had a 50/50 chance of leading
> to catastrophe (no life) if in an invalid range.  Then the probability that
> all constants would be in the correct range is (1/2)^26 = 1 in 67 million.
> We should then be (1 - (1/2)^26) sure that the universe we can see is not
> the only one.
>

That is fallacious reasoning, since we do not have any evidence that the
parameters were selected randomly from unknown distributions.

Why do you believe there is only one inevitable possibility for the laws of
>>> physics? I've never heard any justification for that idea.
>>>
>>
>> Why do you think I believe that?
>>
>
> You seemed to reject the idea of other possible physical systems ruled by
> different laws, and that the dimensionless constants are not from some
> random distribution.
>

I reject these notions because there is no evidence for them. And if you
assume this, it does not actually answer any questions, since you know that
the universe in which you exist must be compatible with your existence.



> One idea about the end-point of physics is that there is a TOE that will
>> explain everything -- predict the values of all constants and so on, maybe
>> even specify a lot of the boundary conditions. Why do you believe that such
>> a TOE is not possible?
>>
>
> I realize that is the dream of many physicists, but science has provided
> no justification for the success that initiative, and substantial evi

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-20 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:49 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 3:30 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 2:38 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 5:05 AM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:21 PM Jason Resch 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:19 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If you include all events as as present moments, and say that they
>>>>>>> all exist, then how is this different from the block-time view (which 
>>>>>>> says
>>>>>>> only that all points in time exist and are real)?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> They differ in exactly the same was a 10^80 protons differs from one
>>>>>> proton. The block-time view claims that all moments exist timelessly and
>>>>>> simultaneously.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I think your addition of the word "simultaneously" is invalid and
>>>>> incorrect. It is enough to say timelessly.  Simultaneously is an 
>>>>> observer's
>>>>> reference-frame dependent phenomenon.  It has no objective meaning.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  The trouble is that the very concept of "timeless" involves some
>>>> "super time" dimension. The only possible interpretation is that the
>>>> unchanging block endures for ever in some other temporal dimension. Any
>>>> slice of that temporal dimension across the block is a moment of
>>>> simultaneity. The very notion of "timeless" is a temporal concept.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> As I see block time, there is no need to add any super time dimension.
>>> It is only to say other points in time are real, just as other points in
>>> space are real.  And that "here" is as much a property of me as is "now".
>>> That is, there is spacetime (that's it).  I happen to be in one point in
>>> space time (here and now), but other people and events are in other theres
>>> and thens.
>>>
>>
>> I don't think you understand my objection to the very notion of
>> "timeless" in connection with the universe. The universe is not timeless,
>> and arbitrary imaginary constructions involving the universe always are
>> built with a concept of time. You have no evidence that other points in
>> time are "real", whatever that might mean. It is just a notion, without any
>> basis.
>>
>
> Do you believe other locations in space exist?
>

They exist, but there is no sense in which they are simultaneous with my
existence. They exist because events at other locations in my past light
cone can affect me, and I can affect events at other locations in my future
light cone.

Do you believe other locations in time exist?
>

I believe that I have a past, and will have a future, but I do not believe
that these exist in my present. Such an idea is clearly a linguistic
confusion.

(I answer yes to both questions, that is all I mean by block time -- that
> there is no privileged part of space time blessed with the property of
> existence).
>

The present is all that you can know exists. All else is idle speculation.
Of course, you can construct imaginary theories in which unicorns, fairies,
and Hogwarts Castle exist, but you would not have any evidence for any of
these.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-20 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:45 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 3:26 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 2:35 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 5:01 AM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:18 PM Jason Resch 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:34 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 4:21 AM Bruno Marchal 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 19 Dec 2018, at 12:59, Bruce Kellett 
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Dynamics is the study of matter in motion. There are no clocks in
>>>>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Of course there is clock. The successor function implements it out
>>>>>>> of time and space.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The fact that you can use one ordered sequence to index another
>>>>>> ordered sequence does not constitute a clock.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Nothing exists out of time and space, not even time and space
>>>>>> themselves.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Accordingly, you must reject:
>>>>>
>>>>>- Membranes
>>>>>- String theory landscape
>>>>>- Eternal inflation
>>>>>- The inside of black holes (yet another observer-dependent
>>>>>phenomenon)
>>>>>- Other universes with different physics (it's amazing that our
>>>>>universe allows for life, assuming it's the only universe that exists)
>>>>>
>>>>> All of these ideas have at least some motivation/support. Why reject
>>>>> them out of hand?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This is a very mixed list! Some of these have no evidential support,
>>>> some are mere speculation, and other universes with different physics is a
>>>> long stretch, not at all in accordance with present knowledge.  I do not
>>>> reject all these possibilities, but we do need more data on some of them.
>>>> None of them exist outside of space-time, however.
>>>>
>>>
>>>  What do you think about the apparent fine-tuning of the universe? e.g.
>>> https://www.amazon.com/Just-Six-Numbers-Forces-Universe-ebook/dp/B00CW0H6JY
>>>
>>> Isn't this a very strong statistical argument that other universes with
>>> different physical laws must exist?
>>>
>>
>> No. there is no evidence for that at all. Why should the constants of
>> nature be a random selection from some distribution?
>>
>>
> 1. It is a prediction of eternal inflation and string theory.
>

String theory and its "landscape" are very speculative, and unlikely to
have any relation to the real world -- there is no evidence that string
theory is even a coherent theory! Eternal inflation, although popular, is
only one possibility for inflation, and even inflationary theory itself is
not well-established science.


> 2. There is no known principal that prohibits other systems ruled by
> different laws.
>

The idea that everything that is not forbidden must exist is a silly
metaphysical notion.

3. The digits of the dimensionless constants at significance levels not
> important to life appear to be randomly distributed
>

Appearances can be deceptive -- vide flat earth.


> 4. It is highly surprising that the dimensionless constants hold the
> values they do as if they were even slightly different, the universe would
> be too simple for any life to exist
>

How do you know that?

Look, the Bayesian prior for any argument about the nature of the universe
is that we exist. So there is nothing in the least surprising about the
fact that the universe we observe is compatible with our existence.
Anything else is just idle speculation.


> Why do you believe there is only one inevitable possibility for the laws
> of physics? I've never heard any justification for that idea.
>

Why do you think I believe that? One idea about the end-point of physics is
that there is a TOE that will explain everything -- predict the values of
all constants and so on, maybe even specify a lot of the boundary
conditions. Why do you believe that such a TOE is not possible?

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-20 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 11:07 AM Philip Thrift 
wrote:

> On Thursday, December 20, 2018 at 3:40:53 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:13 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>
>> Is not 333’s oddness timeless?
>>
>>
>> Category error.
>>
>>
>
> On category error:
>
> I've never understood "category error" [
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_mistake ]. (Some philosopher I
> read about recently gave a talk on the non-existence of category errors.
> Good.)
>

Philosophers will say anything to earn a quid!


>
> *Is 333's oddness timeless? *is a perfectly reasonable question.
>
> To the immaterialist, the answer could be "yes".
> To the materialist, the answer could not be "no".
>
> It all depends.
>
> There is a type of dualists who say 333 is one category (nonphysical) and
> time (as in spacetime) is in another category (physical), but this dualism
> is just mixed-up confusion to me.
>

That's what a category error is -- a mixed-up confusion. To say that the
"number 3" is red is a category error, unless one is talking about a
child's play number set, in which the wooden block in the shape of "3"
might well be coloured red. As you say, whether or not something is a
category error often depends on the context.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-20 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 8:40 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:13 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 19 Dec 2018, at 23:36, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:33 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:18 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> From: Jason Resch 
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Of course they differ: in one case you have a purely local concept of
>>>>> the present; in the other case you require some global notion of a
>>>>> "present", which cannot even be uniquely defined.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> What exists?
>>>>
>>>> A: *naive presentism*: only a 3-dimensional space evolving in time
>>>> (some particular "slice" of spacetime exists, which constantly changes)
>>>> B: *local-presents*: Events, each in their position in space time,
>>>> each in their own present time
>>>> C: *block-time*: Events, each in their position in space time
>>>>
>>>> We both agree relativity rules out A.  But I struggle to see the
>>>> difference between B and C (ontologically speaking), unless you are
>>>> proposing the view that the only thing that exists is a single event (I
>>>> don't think you are though).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There are of the order of 10^80 protons in the visible universe. One
>>>> does not confuse this fact by imagining that there is only one proton..
>>>>
>>>> I think your problem with the ontology of the strictly local "present"
>>>> is that you still have in you mind some notion of an absolute, external
>>>> time, in which all these "presents" exist. Your description of "block time"
>>>> in C above makes precisely this mistake.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I am only asking what exists in your theory, given you reject the notion
>>> of the present as a global space-like hyperplane.
>>>
>>
>> The universe exists -- an infinity of present moments. Nothing exists
>> timelessly because that is incoherent.
>>
>>
>>
>> Is not the block-universe timeless?
>>
>
> No. The concept of "timeless" involves an underlying time -- it means
> "unchanging in time".
>
> Are not the physical laws supposed to be timeless?
>>
>
> No.
>

I might have been a bit quick here. This example is a good illustration of
what I mean by the word "timeless" depending on an underlying concept of
time. When you claim that the laws of physics are timeless, what you really
mean is that the laws of physics (the supposed real ones as opposed to our
current approximations) apply for all times (and at all places). So
"timeless" here clearly means "unchanging for all times". Other
applications of the word "timeless", such as to the block universe, have a
similar underlying meaning -- viz., unchanging for all time.

Bruce


> Is not 333’s oddness timeless?
>>
>
> Category error.
>
>
>>  Even out of the category of things to which the notion of time can be
>> applied.
>>
>> Of course, you *assume* a primary physical universe.
>>
>> To use such a strong ontological hypothesis to prevent the testing of a
>> simpler theory, which do not assume anything like that, is a poor use of
>> philosophy.
>>
>
> No, it is a sensible way to get useable results.
>
>
>> It is just saying to people that there is nothing interesting there.
>>
>
> Yes, investigation shows that there is nothing to see here.
>
>
>> You are saying that your case is so true that there is no need for an
>> investigation.
>>
>
> No, I am not saying anything of the sort. All theories need to be tested,
> revised and improved.
>
>
>> It is an invalid appeal to the argument per authority to prevent the
>> search of the truth.
>>
>
> You are one to speak about appeals to authority.
> That is all you ever do. You do not provide evidence, you provide
> authorities, and tell us to go and read the authoritative texts..
>
> Bruce
>

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-20 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 3:13 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 19 Dec 2018, at 23:36, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>


> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:33 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:18 PM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> From: Jason Resch 
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Of course they differ: in one case you have a purely local concept of
>>>> the present; in the other case you require some global notion of a
>>>> "present", which cannot even be uniquely defined.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> What exists?
>>>
>>> A: *naive presentism*: only a 3-dimensional space evolving in time
>>> (some particular "slice" of spacetime exists, which constantly changes)
>>> B: *local-presents*: Events, each in their position in space time, each
>>> in their own present time
>>> C: *block-time*: Events, each in their position in space time
>>>
>>> We both agree relativity rules out A.  But I struggle to see the
>>> difference between B and C (ontologically speaking), unless you are
>>> proposing the view that the only thing that exists is a single event (I
>>> don't think you are though).
>>>
>>>
>>> There are of the order of 10^80 protons in the visible universe. One
>>> does not confuse this fact by imagining that there is only one proton..
>>>
>>> I think your problem with the ontology of the strictly local "present"
>>> is that you still have in you mind some notion of an absolute, external
>>> time, in which all these "presents" exist. Your description of "block time"
>>> in C above makes precisely this mistake.
>>>
>>
>> I am only asking what exists in your theory, given you reject the notion
>> of the present as a global space-like hyperplane.
>>
>
> The universe exists -- an infinity of present moments. Nothing exists
> timelessly because that is incoherent.
>
>
>
> Is not the block-universe timeless?
>

No. The concept of "timeless" involves an underlying time -- it means
"unchanging in time".

Are not the physical laws supposed to be timeless?
>

No.

Is not 333’s oddness timeless?
>

Category error.


>  Even out of the category of things to which the notion of time can be
> applied.
>
> Of course, you *assume* a primary physical universe.
>
> To use such a strong ontological hypothesis to prevent the testing of a
> simpler theory, which do not assume anything like that, is a poor use of
> philosophy.
>

No, it is a sensible way to get useable results.


> It is just saying to people that there is nothing interesting there.
>

Yes, investigation shows that there is nothing to see here.


> You are saying that your case is so true that there is no need for an
> investigation.
>

No, I am not saying anything of the sort. All theories need to be tested,
revised and improved.


> It is an invalid appeal to the argument per authority to prevent the
> search of the truth.
>

You are one to speak about appeals to authority.
That is all you ever do. You do not provide evidence, you provide
authorities, and tell us to go and read the authoritative texts..

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-20 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 2:46 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 19 Dec 2018, at 23:33, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 4:21 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 19 Dec 2018, at 12:59, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>> Dynamics is the study of matter in motion. There are no clocks in
>> arithmetic.
>>
>> Of course there is clock. The successor function implements it out of
>> time and space.
>>
>
> The fact that you can use one ordered sequence to index another ordered
> sequence does not constitute a clock.
>
>
> But it is all you need to implement a clock similar to the one used in,
> say, a von Neumann computer.
>

No, a clock is a physical device, not a sequence of imaginary objects.

>
> Nothing exists out of time and space, not even time and space themselves.
>
> Assuming such absolute space and time exists in some absolute way, and for
> this you need to assume that the brain is not Turing emulable, and you are
> out of working hypothesis.
>

You can have your hypothesis. But I am talking about what works in the
world, not some arbitrary hypothesis.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-20 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 2:38 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 5:05 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:21 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:19 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> If you include all events as as present moments, and say that they all
>>>>> exist, then how is this different from the block-time view (which says 
>>>>> only
>>>>> that all points in time exist and are real)?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> They differ in exactly the same was a 10^80 protons differs from one
>>>> proton. The block-time view claims that all moments exist timelessly and
>>>> simultaneously.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I think your addition of the word "simultaneously" is invalid and
>>> incorrect. It is enough to say timelessly.  Simultaneously is an observer's
>>> reference-frame dependent phenomenon.  It has no objective meaning.
>>>
>>
>>  The trouble is that the very concept of "timeless" involves some "super
>> time" dimension. The only possible interpretation is that the unchanging
>> block endures for ever in some other temporal dimension. Any slice of that
>> temporal dimension across the block is a moment of simultaneity. The very
>> notion of "timeless" is a temporal concept.
>>
>>
> As I see block time, there is no need to add any super time dimension.  It
> is only to say other points in time are real, just as other points in space
> are real.  And that "here" is as much a property of me as is "now".  That
> is, there is spacetime (that's it).  I happen to be in one point in space
> time (here and now), but other people and events are in other theres and
> thens.
>

I don't think you understand my objection to the very notion of "timeless"
in connection with the universe. The universe is not timeless, and
arbitrary imaginary constructions involving the universe always are built
with a concept of time. You have no evidence that other points in time are
"real", whatever that might mean. It is just a notion, without any basis.

 Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-20 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Fri, Dec 21, 2018 at 2:35 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 5:01 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:18 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:34 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 4:21 AM Bruno Marchal 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On 19 Dec 2018, at 12:59, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Dynamics is the study of matter in motion. There are no clocks in
>>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>>
>>>>> Of course there is clock. The successor function implements it out of
>>>>> time and space.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The fact that you can use one ordered sequence to index another ordered
>>>> sequence does not constitute a clock.
>>>>
>>>> Nothing exists out of time and space, not even time and space
>>>> themselves.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Accordingly, you must reject:
>>>
>>>- Membranes
>>>- String theory landscape
>>>- Eternal inflation
>>>- The inside of black holes (yet another observer-dependent
>>>phenomenon)
>>>- Other universes with different physics (it's amazing that our
>>>universe allows for life, assuming it's the only universe that exists)
>>>
>>> All of these ideas have at least some motivation/support. Why reject
>>> them out of hand?
>>>
>>
>> This is a very mixed list! Some of these have no evidential support, some
>> are mere speculation, and other universes with different physics is a long
>> stretch, not at all in accordance with present knowledge.  I do not reject
>> all these possibilities, but we do need more data on some of them. None of
>> them exist outside of space-time, however.
>>
>
>  What do you think about the apparent fine-tuning of the universe? e.g.
> https://www.amazon.com/Just-Six-Numbers-Forces-Universe-ebook/dp/B00CW0H6JY
>
> Isn't this a very strong statistical argument that other universes with
> different physical laws must exist?
>

No. there is no evidence for that at all. Why should the constants of
nature be a random selection from some distribution?

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-20 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:44 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:25 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:57 AM Jason Resch 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:19 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:09 AM Jason Resch 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If you include all events as as present moments, and say that they all
>>>>> exist, then how is this different from the block-time view (which says 
>>>>> only
>>>>> that all points in time exist and are real)?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> They differ in exactly the same was a 10^80 protons differs from one
>>>> proton. The block-time view claims that all moments exist timelessly and
>>>> simultaneously. As well as being inconsistent with the relativity of
>>>> simultaneity, the notion is incoherent.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Why is it incoherent?  What does moments popping out of existence do to
>>> make the conception more coherent?
>>>
>>
>> The notion of present moments "popping into and out of existence" makes
>> sense only in terms of some external concept of time. If the present moment
>> is all that exists at the moment, then it can't be said to "pop" from
>> anywhere because it doesn't exist in any external timeless sense. If time
>> is simply what you read on your local clock, the idea of a block universe
>> becomes incoherent, because it requires time to be something other than
>> that which you read on your local clock.
>>
>
> I would say that if time is simply what you read on your local clock, then
> the idea of a block universe becomes the only coherent view.
>

You might very well say that, but I couldn't possibly agree.


> I don't know why you think block-time somehow redefines what time is.  It
> merely says events in space time don't pop into or out of existence, they
> simply exist.
>

Who said moments in time pop into and out of existence. I rejected that
idea a nonsensical a long time ago. All your block universe ideas rely on
an unstated underlying notion of Newtonian absolute time.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-20 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:21 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:19 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>> If you include all events as as present moments, and say that they all
>>> exist, then how is this different from the block-time view (which says only
>>> that all points in time exist and are real)?
>>>
>>
>> They differ in exactly the same was a 10^80 protons differs from one
>> proton. The block-time view claims that all moments exist timelessly and
>> simultaneously.
>>
>
> I think your addition of the word "simultaneously" is invalid and
> incorrect. It is enough to say timelessly.  Simultaneously is an observer's
> reference-frame dependent phenomenon.  It has no objective meaning.
>

 The trouble is that the very concept of "timeless" involves some "super
time" dimension. The only possible interpretation is that the unchanging
block endures for ever in some other temporal dimension. Any slice of that
temporal dimension across the block is a moment of simultaneity. The very
notion of "timeless" is a temporal concept.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-20 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:18 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:34 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 4:21 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>> On 19 Dec 2018, at 12:59, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>>
>>> Dynamics is the study of matter in motion. There are no clocks in
>>> arithmetic.
>>>
>>> Of course there is clock. The successor function implements it out of
>>> time and space.
>>>
>>
>> The fact that you can use one ordered sequence to index another ordered
>> sequence does not constitute a clock.
>>
>> Nothing exists out of time and space, not even time and space themselves.
>>
>>
> Accordingly, you must reject:
>
>- Membranes
>- String theory landscape
>- Eternal inflation
>- The inside of black holes (yet another observer-dependent phenomenon)
>- Other universes with different physics (it's amazing that our
>universe allows for life, assuming it's the only universe that exists)
>
> All of these ideas have at least some motivation/support. Why reject them
> out of hand?
>

This is a very mixed list! Some of these have no evidential support, some
are mere speculation, and other universes with different physics is a long
stretch, not at all in accordance with present knowledge.  I do not reject
all these possibilities, but we do need more data on some of them. None of
them exist outside of space-time, however.

Bruce


>
> Jason
>
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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-20 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 8:12 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:39 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:47 AM Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On 12/18/2018 6:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>> That wasn't my question.  Do you believe your experience rules out the
>>> block universe?
>>>
>>> If you mean a pre-determined universe, I think that is ruled out by
>>> quantum randomness.  But I don't think our experience rules out there being
>>> a 4-dimensional map of all events.
>>>
>>
>> Sure. General relativity gives us the idea of a 4-dimensional Lorentzian
>> manifold, over which one can lay a coordinate chart.
>> But that is not an ontology.
>>
>>
> But my point is it could be (and that it is a simpler theory if it is).
>

No, a coordinate system is not an ontology. Simplicity always gives way to
correctness.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-19 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:57 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 5:19 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:09 AM Jason Resch 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> If you include all events as as present moments, and say that they all
>>> exist, then how is this different from the block-time view (which says only
>>> that all points in time exist and are real)?
>>>
>>
>> They differ in exactly the same was a 10^80 protons differs from one
>> proton. The block-time view claims that all moments exist timelessly and
>> simultaneously. As well as being inconsistent with the relativity of
>> simultaneity, the notion is incoherent.
>>
>
> Why is it incoherent?  What does moments popping out of existence do to
> make the conception more coherent?
>

The notion of present moments "popping into and out of existence" makes
sense only in terms of some external concept of time. If the present moment
is all that exists at the moment, then it can't be said to "pop" from
anywhere because it doesn't exist in any external timeless sense. If time
is simply what you read on your local clock, the idea of a block universe
becomes incoherent, because it requires time to be something other than
that which you read on your local clock.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-19 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:47 AM Brent Meeker  wrote:

> On 12/18/2018 6:34 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> That wasn't my question.  Do you believe your experience rules out the
> block universe?
>
> If you mean a pre-determined universe, I think that is ruled out by
> quantum randomness.  But I don't think our experience rules out there being
> a 4-dimensional map of all events.
>

Sure. General relativity gives us the idea of a 4-dimensional Lorentzian
manifold, over which one can lay a coordinate chart.
But that is not an ontology.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-19 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 10:09 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:53 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:38 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:36 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:33 AM Jason Resch 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:18 PM Bruce Kellett <
>>>>> bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> From: Jason Resch 
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Of course they differ: in one case you have a purely local concept
>>>>>>> of the present; in the other case you require some global notion of a
>>>>>>> "present", which cannot even be uniquely defined.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> What exists?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A: *naive presentism*: only a 3-dimensional space evolving in time
>>>>>> (some particular "slice" of spacetime exists, which constantly changes)
>>>>>> B: *local-presents*: Events, each in their position in space time,
>>>>>> each in their own present time
>>>>>> C: *block-time*: Events, each in their position in space time
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We both agree relativity rules out A.  But I struggle to see the
>>>>>> difference between B and C (ontologically speaking), unless you are
>>>>>> proposing the view that the only thing that exists is a single event (I
>>>>>> don't think you are though).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There are of the order of 10^80 protons in the visible universe. One
>>>>>> does not confuse this fact by imagining that there is only one 
>>>>>> proton..
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think your problem with the ontology of the strictly local
>>>>>> "present" is that you still have in you mind some notion of an absolute,
>>>>>> external time, in which all these "presents" exist. Your description of
>>>>>> "block time" in C above makes precisely this mistake.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I am only asking what exists in your theory, given you reject the
>>>>> notion of the present as a global space-like hyperplane.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The universe exists -- an infinity of present moments. Nothing exists
>>>> timelessly because that is incoherent.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> So what defines this the set of present moments?  Does it include all
>>> events in spacetime?  Or only some of them?
>>>
>>
>> Why would you leave any out?
>>
>>
> If you include all events as as present moments, and say that they all
> exist, then how is this different from the block-time view (which says only
> that all points in time exist and are real)?
>

They differ in exactly the same was a 10^80 protons differs from one
proton. The block-time view claims that all moments exist timelessly and
simultaneously. As well as being inconsistent with the relativity of
simultaneity, the notion is incoherent.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-19 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:38 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:36 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:33 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:18 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> From: Jason Resch 
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Of course they differ: in one case you have a purely local concept of
>>>>> the present; in the other case you require some global notion of a
>>>>> "present", which cannot even be uniquely defined.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> What exists?
>>>>
>>>> A: *naive presentism*: only a 3-dimensional space evolving in time
>>>> (some particular "slice" of spacetime exists, which constantly changes)
>>>> B: *local-presents*: Events, each in their position in space time,
>>>> each in their own present time
>>>> C: *block-time*: Events, each in their position in space time
>>>>
>>>> We both agree relativity rules out A.  But I struggle to see the
>>>> difference between B and C (ontologically speaking), unless you are
>>>> proposing the view that the only thing that exists is a single event (I
>>>> don't think you are though).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There are of the order of 10^80 protons in the visible universe. One
>>>> does not confuse this fact by imagining that there is only one proton..
>>>>
>>>> I think your problem with the ontology of the strictly local "present"
>>>> is that you still have in you mind some notion of an absolute, external
>>>> time, in which all these "presents" exist. Your description of "block time"
>>>> in C above makes precisely this mistake.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I am only asking what exists in your theory, given you reject the notion
>>> of the present as a global space-like hyperplane.
>>>
>>
>> The universe exists -- an infinity of present moments. Nothing exists
>> timelessly because that is incoherent.
>>
>>
> So what defines this the set of present moments?  Does it include all
> events in spacetime?  Or only some of them?
>

Why would you leave any out?

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-19 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 9:33 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 4:18 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> From: Jason Resch 
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Of course they differ: in one case you have a purely local concept of
>>> the present; in the other case you require some global notion of a
>>> "present", which cannot even be uniquely defined.
>>>
>>>
>> What exists?
>>
>> A: *naive presentism*: only a 3-dimensional space evolving in time (some
>> particular "slice" of spacetime exists, which constantly changes)
>> B: *local-presents*: Events, each in their position in space time, each
>> in their own present time
>> C: *block-time*: Events, each in their position in space time
>>
>> We both agree relativity rules out A.  But I struggle to see the
>> difference between B and C (ontologically speaking), unless you are
>> proposing the view that the only thing that exists is a single event (I
>> don't think you are though).
>>
>>
>> There are of the order of 10^80 protons in the visible universe. One does
>> not confuse this fact by imagining that there is only one proton..
>>
>> I think your problem with the ontology of the strictly local "present" is
>> that you still have in you mind some notion of an absolute, external time,
>> in which all these "presents" exist. Your description of "block time" in C
>> above makes precisely this mistake.
>>
>
> I am only asking what exists in your theory, given you reject the notion
> of the present as a global space-like hyperplane.
>

The universe exists -- an infinity of present moments. Nothing exists
timelessly because that is incoherent.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-19 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Thu, Dec 20, 2018 at 4:21 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 19 Dec 2018, at 12:59, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> Dynamics is the study of matter in motion. There are no clocks in
> arithmetic.
>
> Of course there is clock. The successor function implements it out of time
> and space.
>

The fact that you can use one ordered sequence to index another ordered
sequence does not constitute a clock.

Nothing exists out of time and space, not even time and space themselves.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-19 Thread Bruce Kellett

From: *Jason Resch* mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>
On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 6:00 AM Bruce Kellett <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:



Of course they differ: in one case you have a purely local concept
of the present; in the other case you require some global notion
of a "present", which cannot even be uniquely defined.


What exists?

A: *naive presentism*: only a 3-dimensional space evolving in time 
(some particular "slice" of spacetime exists, which constantly changes)
B: *local-presents*: Events, each in their position in space time, 
each in their own present time

C: *block-time*: Events, each in their position in space time

We both agree relativity rules out A.  But I struggle to see the 
difference between B and C (ontologically speaking), unless you are 
proposing the view that the only thing that exists is a single event 
(I don't think you are though).


There are of the order of 10^80 protons in the visible universe. One 
does not confuse this fact by imagining that there is only one proton..


I think your problem with the ontology of the strictly local "present" 
is that you still have in you mind some notion of an absolute, external 
time, in which all these "presents" exist. Your description of "block 
time" in C above makes precisely this mistake.


Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-19 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 10:40 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 11:14 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> From: Jason Resch 
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 7:27 PM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 12:19 PM Jason Resch 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:45 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:27 AM Jason Resch 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:05 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:02 AM Jason Resch 
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:23 PM John Clark 
>>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Arithmetical computations don't change so there can't be a
>>>>>>>>> correspondence between them and the evolution of spacetime or
>>>>>>>>> with anything else that can change.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation of "oddness".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for *y* all possible
>>>>>>>> odd numbers.  *y* changes with respect to increasing values of *x*,
>>>>>>>> just as John Clark's brain changes with respect to increasing values of
>>>>>>>> *t*.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> How does 'x' change?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> With respect to y, and vice versa (like your brain state and your
>>>>>> location in spacetime).
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Poor analogy. Change in the physical world is governed by dynamics,
>>>>> described by equations with a veritable 't', called time. Time is probably
>>>>> only a local phenomenon, but I do not see any 'time' variable in 
>>>>> arithmetic.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It depends on the equation.
>>>>
>>>
>>> What equation? There are no dynamics in arithmetic.
>>>
>>
>> There are computations.
>>
>> But no dynamics.
>>
>
> I'm not sure what this means.  Not dynamic in what sense?
>

Dynamics is the study of matter in motion. There are no clocks in
arithmetic.


> The analogy with the block universe idea is useless, because the block
>>>>> universe idea is only a picture, not a reality. Special relativity merely
>>>>> abolishes any notion of Newtonian absolute time, it does not prove that 
>>>>> all
>>>>> instants of time are equally and simultaneously existent. The whole notion
>>>>> of simultaneity is abolished in relativity. Minkowski's block universe was
>>>>> a response to this, but not a very good picture in the final analysis,
>>>>> because it completely fails to capture the local dynamical aspect of the
>>>>> time variable.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Did you read https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/11921131.pdf ?
>>>>
>>>
>>> No. Why should I?
>>>
>>
>> Because you believe relativity cannot be used to justify the block
>> universe concept.
>>
>>
>> I do not have the time or inclination to rebut every argument that is
>> presented in arbitrary papers. But if you abandon the idea of
>> 'simultaneity' as used in this paper, the objections to the idea of "the
>> present" as a ourely local concept collapse.
>>
>>
> Then you have already abandoned the idea of a 3-dimensional space evolving
> in time.  How does this not leave "block time" as the only view that
> preserves an objective global spacetime?  Why give up an objective realist
> view that captures all of spacetime when you do't have to?
>

In what sense has this given up an objective global spacetime? All that has
been abandoned is the concept of a universal time parameter which could
give unique sense to global time slices. One can imagine such a foliation
of space like hyper surfaces if one wants to, but it is not imposed by
relativity. The problem with the "objective realist view" to which you seem
to wish to cling is that not only is it not

Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-18 Thread Bruce Kellett

From: *Jason Resch* mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>
On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 7:27 PM Bruce Kellett <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 12:19 PM Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:45 PM Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:27 AM Jason Resch
mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:

    On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:05 PM Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>>
wrote:

On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:02 AM Jason Resch
mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:23 PM John Clark
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote:


Arithmetical computationsdon't change so
there can't be a correspondence between
them and the evolution of spacetime or
with anything else that can change.


"y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation
of "oddness".

Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for
*y* all possible odd numbers. *y* changes with
respect to increasing values of *x*, just as
John Clark's brain changes with respect to
increasing values of *t*.


How does 'x' change?


With respect to y, and vice versa (like your brain
state and your location in spacetime).


Poor analogy. Change in the physical world is governed by
dynamics, described by equations with a veritable 't',
called time. Time is probably only a local phenomenon, but
I do not see any 'time' variable in arithmetic.


It depends on the equation.


What equation? There are no dynamics in arithmetic.


There are computations.


But no dynamics.


The analogy with the block universe idea is useless,
because the block universe idea is only a picture, not a
reality. Special relativity merely abolishes any notion of
Newtonian absolute time, it does not prove that all
instants of time are equally and simultaneously existent.
The whole notion of simultaneity is abolished in
relativity. Minkowski's block universe was a response to
this, but not a very good picture in the final analysis,
because it completely fails to capture the local dynamical
aspect of the time variable.


Did you read https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/11921131.pdf ?


No. Why should I?


Because you believe relativity cannot be used to justify the block 
universe concept.


I do not have the time or inclination to rebut every argument that is 
presented in arbitrary papers. But if you abandon the idea of 
'simultaneity' as used in this paper, the objections to the idea of "the 
present" as a ourely local concept collapse.



What is your interpretation of the
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rietdijk%E2%80%93Putnam_argument ?


The "present" is a local concept which cannot be extended to
global hyperplanes.


Which would means there is no such thing as a present point in time.


No, the idea has no such implication.


Remember, the only sensible definition of "time" is an operational
definition -- "time is what is measured on a clock". This is a
purely local concept.


So then you have reduced the present to a point in spacetime, a single 
event.


Strictly speaking, yes. But for practical purposes, the spatial extent 
of the "present" can be defined as that region over which the travel 
time of a light signal is negligible compared to the characteristic time 
scale of the processes of interest.



Do you agree in principal, that human experience of a
dynamically evolving universe cannot be used to decide between
block time and presentism?


Special relativity certainly cannot be used to justify the block
universe concept.


That wasn't my question.  Do you believe your experience rules out the 
block universe?


No, neither do I believe that my experience necessitates a block 
universe view. Special relativity renders the idea of global 
simultaneity otiose. So global hypersurfaces of simultaneity make little 
sense. They make even less sense in general relativity, where the local 
nature of the concept of time is even more evident.


Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-18 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 12:19 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:45 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:27 AM Jason Resch 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:05 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:02 AM Jason Resch 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:23 PM John Clark 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Arithmetical computations don't change so there can't be a
>>>>>> correspondence between them and the evolution of spacetime or with
>>>>>> anything else that can change.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation of "oddness".
>>>>>
>>>>> Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for *y* all possible odd
>>>>> numbers.  *y* changes with respect to increasing values of *x*, just
>>>>> as John Clark's brain changes with respect to increasing values of *t*
>>>>> .
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> How does 'x' change?
>>>>
>>>
>>> With respect to y, and vice versa (like your brain state and your
>>> location in spacetime).
>>>
>>
>> Poor analogy. Change in the physical world is governed by dynamics,
>> described by equations with a veritable 't', called time. Time is probably
>> only a local phenomenon, but I do not see any 'time' variable in arithmetic.
>>
>
> It depends on the equation.
>

What equation? There are no dynamics in arithmetic.


> The analogy with the block universe idea is useless, because the block
>> universe idea is only a picture, not a reality. Special relativity merely
>> abolishes any notion of Newtonian absolute time, it does not prove that all
>> instants of time are equally and simultaneously existent. The whole notion
>> of simultaneity is abolished in relativity. Minkowski's block universe was
>> a response to this, but not a very good picture in the final analysis,
>> because it completely fails to capture the local dynamical aspect of the
>> time variable.
>>
>
> Did you read https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/11921131.pdf ?
>

No. Why should I?


> What is your interpretation of the
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rietdijk%E2%80%93Putnam_argument ?
>

The "present" is a local concept which cannot be extended to global
hyperplanes.
Remember, the only sensible definition of "time" is an operational
definition -- "time is what is measured on a clock". This is a purely local
concept.


> Do you agree in principal, that human experience of a dynamically evolving
> universe cannot be used to decide between block time and presentism?
>

Special relativity certainly cannot be used to justify the block universe
concept.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-18 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:27 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:05 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:02 AM Jason Resch 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:23 PM John Clark  wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Arithmetical computations don't change so there can't be a
>>>> correspondence between them and the evolution of spacetime or with
>>>> anything else that can change.
>>>>
>>>
>>> "y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation of "oddness".
>>>
>>> Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for *y* all possible odd
>>> numbers.  *y* changes with respect to increasing values of *x*, just as
>>> John Clark's brain changes with respect to increasing values of *t*.
>>>
>>
>> How does 'x' change?
>>
>
> With respect to y, and vice versa (like your brain state and your location
> in spacetime).
>

Poor analogy. Change in the physical world is governed by dynamics,
described by equations with a veritable 't', called time. Time is probably
only a local phenomenon, but I do not see any 'time' variable in
arithmetic. The analogy with the block universe idea is useless, because
the block universe idea is only a picture, not a reality. Special
relativity merely abolishes any notion of Newtonian absolute time, it does
not prove that all instants of time are equally and simultaneously
existent. The whole notion of simultaneity is abolished in relativity.
Minkowski's block universe was a response to this, but not a very good
picture in the final analysis, because it completely fails to capture the
local dynamical aspect of the time variable.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-18 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 19, 2018 at 11:02 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:23 PM John Clark  wrote:
>
>>
>> Arithmetical computations don't change so there can't be a correspondence 
>> between
>> them and the evolution of spacetime or with anything else that can
>> change.
>>
>
> "y = 2x+1" defines the arithmetical relation of "oddness".
>
> Solutions to this equation yield (compute) for *y* all possible odd
> numbers.  *y* changes with respect to increasing values of *x*, just as
> John Clark's brain changes with respect to increasing values of *t*.
>

How does 'x' change?

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-18 Thread Bruce Kellett

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 18 Dec 2018, at 01:14, Bruce Kellett <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:15 AM Bruno Marchal <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:


On 17 Dec 2018, at 08:50, Bruce Kellett mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:


What I am curious to know is how how many of these
statements you agree with:

"2+2 = 4" was true:
1. Before I was born
2. Before humans formalized axioms and found a proof of it
3. Before there were humans
4. Before there was any conscious life in this universe
5. As soon as there were 4 physical things to count
6. Before the big bang / before there were 4 physical things


"2+2=4" is a tautology, true because of the meanings of the
terms involved. So its truth is not independent of the
formulation of the question and the definition of the terms
involved.


What about ExEyEz (x^3 + y^3 +z^3 = 33) ?


What about it? Not all syntactically correct formulae are either true 
or false; some are undecidable.


A is undecidable means ~[]A & ~[]~A.

It does not mean ~A & ~~A.

That A (= ExEyEx(x^3 + y^3 + z^3)) is either true or false is a direct 
consequence of the excluded middle. Either such numbers exists or they 
don’t. If it is undecidable in PA, it means that PA cannot decide it, 
but it does not mean that ZF or ZF+kappa could not decide it. And even 
if they couldn’t, it is still does not mean that A is not true, or 
false, which it is, certainly.


So you have no idea whether it is true or not, because you do not know 
in which system the Turing program designed to search all possible 
combinations of integers to find an (x,y,z) combination with the 
required properties would halt, or in which systems the similar Turing 
machine would not halt, and you could not prove halting or not in any 
system. Then the problem becomes totally trivial, we could define a 
system in which your A above is an axiom, or one in which ~A is an 
axiom. In either case the question is trivially decidable, but not in 
any useful sense -- such systems still do not produce the required 
triple of integers



Unless and until you find some x,y,z that satisfy this relationship, 
the statement is neither true nor false.


In intuitionist logic. I have made clear that I use classical logic 
(indeed, in mathematical theology, we can expect many statement to be 
undecidable by the finite creatures/theories). Same already in 
theoretical computer science. The notion of totality is non 
constructive, “halting” is non constructive, in fact all attribute of 
programs can be shown to be necessarily non constructive. I recursion 
theory, constructive is equivalent to limiting research in the 
security zone of some RE subset of TOT. Machines have no right to 
search for a number which might not exist.


Who gets to say what rights machine may or may not have? I can write a 
program to search all possible integer combinations for a solution to 
(x^3 + y^3 +z^3 = 33). But I cannot determine whether this program will 
halt or not. You cannot claim that I do not have a right to write such a 
program.



Unperformed experiments have no results!


Even in physics, this is doubtful and indeed contradict Einstein’s 
physical realism.


Einsteinian realism is already contradicted by experiment. The rejection 
of counterfactual definiteness is intrinsic to quantum mechanics, even 
in MWI.


No problem, as we know it has to be tampered with the Mechanist 
assumption.


You might assume this, but you cannot know it!

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-18 Thread Bruce Kellett

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 17 Dec 2018, at 14:57, Jason Resch <mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Monday, December 17, 2018, Bruce Kellett <mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 7:06 PM Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 1:50 AM Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 5:59 PM Jason Resch
mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:


What I am curious to know is how how many of these
statements you agree with:

"2+2 = 4" was true:
1. Before I was born
2. Before humans formalized axioms and found a proof
of it
3. Before there were humans
4. Before there was any conscious life in this universe
5. As soon as there were 4 physical things to count
6. Before the big bang / before there were 4 physical
things


"2+2=4" is a tautology, true because of the meanings of
the terms involved. So its truth is not independent of
the formulation of the question and the definition of the
terms involved.


So would you say it was false before it was asked and the
terms defined?


The true/false dichotomy is not applicable to undefined terms. As
in QM, "Unperformed experiments have no results!"

Was the 10^100th bit of Pi set only at such time that Pi was
defined, or did it have a set value before humans defined Pi?


Before pi was defined, the question had no meaning.


But was it not in a certain sense inevitable that we would get "3" as 
the first digit?


Only after Pi is defined, of course. But (of course again) that is 
true for physical objects too. Before the moon is defined, the 
question “does the moon exist” had no meaning.


That is simply a matter of words. Before there was language, and the 
word "moon", one could not form that sentence.


That does not make the moon not existing when the man were not there, 
nor does the human definition of Pi makes Pi different from 3,141592… 
before the human discovered and defined it. The circumference of a 
circle divided by diameter is a transcendant number, independently of 
the fact that some mammals or some alien ever get the fact.


The problem there is that the idea of a circle is a man-made concept:  
there are no perfect circles in nature, so there are no existing objects 
for which the ratio of the circumference to the diameter is exactly the 
number we call "pi". The arithmetical or mathematical realm did not 
exist before it was invented. "pi" is the ratio of the circumference to 
the diameter only in the Platonic realm of perfect forms. We can reject 
Platonism because there is no evidence, direct or indirect, for such a 
realm of forms. It could only be by magic that we could ever know about 
such a realm, Socrates and Plato notwithstanding. Consequently, these 
ideas were rejected because there was no evidence for them.


Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-17 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 5:42 PM  wrote:

> On Tuesday, December 18, 2018 at 5:31:06 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>
>>
>> But we are talking about definitions of objects, not axioms of a theory.
>> We know that any axiomatic theory will necessarily be incomplete -- there
>> will be formulae in the theory that are neither theorems nor the negation
>> of theorems.
>>
>
> *Based on the examples I previously offered, that QM and SR are axiomatic
> theories, can we conclude they're incomplete? AG*
>

Such theories of physics are not axiomatic theories. The things you
referred to are broad principles, not axioms.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-17 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 4:12 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 10:54 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:38 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 12:26 PM Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> But mathematical objects are completely defined by their axioms.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Are they?
>>>
>>> Two is a mathematical object.
>>> One of the properties of two is the number of primes it separates.  For
>>> example "3 and 5", "5 and 7", etc.
>>>
>>
>> Definitions do not necessarily specify all the relationships into which
>> things can enter -- if that was necessary for a definition, no definition
>> would be possible. Clearly, common ostensive definitions do not have to
>> specify all the properties of an object, or even what it is made of: "That
>> is a rock" is a useful ostensive definition, but it does not commit one to
>> a full geological understanding of rocks, their formation and properties.
>>
>
> But shouldn't the system that "completely defines" some mathematical
> object, allow one to learn and discover those properties?  Would you be
> satisfied with a physical theory that billed itself as completely defining
> all any physical phenomena, but couldn't tell us what the mass of the
> electron was?
>

Definitions may be the starting point for a theory, but they are not the
complete theory.


If mathematical objects are completely defined by their axioms, then
>>> shouldn't this property be defined and known for two?  Yet we don't even
>>> know the answer to this question, we don't know if it is infinite or
>>> finite.  It might even be that no proof exists under the axioms we
>>> currently use.
>>>
>>
>> Mathematical objects may be completely defined by their definitions, in
>> that the definition corresponds to that unique object. But that does not
>> commit one to knowledge of all the relationships that might be true about
>> that object. You are requiring too much from a definition.
>>
>
> Let me update my example:
> Instead of considering "2", consider "Object T" which is "The number of
> primes separated by 2".
> Wouldn't this be a mathematical object that might be undefined by the
> axioms?
>

The concept of twin primes has a simple definition. And the definition
uniquely specifies the object -- one would know one whenever one met one,
and that without ambiguity or error. But that does not mean that the
definition, of itself, should tell you whether the number of primes that
satisfy this definition of twin primes is finite or infinite, or even if
there are any such pairs of primes.

But we are talking about definitions of objects, not axioms of a theory. We
know that any axiomatic theory will necessarily be incomplete -- there will
be formulae in the theory that are neither theorems nor the negation of
theorems.




> There is no possibility of ostensive or empirical definition.  That's the
>>>> strength of mathematics; it's "truths" are independent of reality, they are
>>>> part of language.
>>>>
>>>> But in any case, the axioms don't define arithmetical truth, which is
>>>> my only point.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> No, but they define arithmetic, without which "arithmetical truth"
>>>> would be meaningless.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Was the physical universe meaningless before Newton?
>>>
>>
>> The physical universe is defined ostensively -- neither Newton not
>> Einstein brought it into  existence.
>>
>
> I think that of the Integers.  I'm open to any arguments you have that
> could change my mind.
>

What is an ostensive definition of an integer?

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-17 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:38 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 12:26 PM Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> But mathematical objects are completely defined by their axioms.
>>
>
> Are they?
>
> Two is a mathematical object.
> One of the properties of two is the number of primes it separates.  For
> example "3 and 5", "5 and 7", etc.
>

Definitions do not necessarily specify all the relationships into which
things can enter -- if that was necessary for a definition, no definition
would be possible. Clearly, common ostensive definitions do not have to
specify all the properties of an object, or even what it is made of: "That
is a rock" is a useful ostensive definition, but it does not commit one to
a full geological understanding of rocks, their formation and properties.


If mathematical objects are completely defined by their axioms, then
> shouldn't this property be defined and known for two?  Yet we don't even
> know the answer to this question, we don't know if it is infinite or
> finite.  It might even be that no proof exists under the axioms we
> currently use.
>

Mathematical objects may be completely defined by their definitions, in
that the definition corresponds to that unique object. But that does not
commit one to knowledge of all the relationships that might be true about
that object. You are requiring too much from a definition.



> There is no possibility of ostensive or empirical definition.  That's the
>> strength of mathematics; it's "truths" are independent of reality, they are
>> part of language.
>>
>> But in any case, the axioms don't define arithmetical truth, which is my
>> only point.
>>
>>
>> No, but they define arithmetic, without which "arithmetical truth" would
>> be meaningless.
>>
>
> Was the physical universe meaningless before Newton?
>

The physical universe is defined ostensively -- neither Newton not Einstein
brought it into  existence.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-17 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 3:32 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

>
> I have no idea what you mean by "an incorrect computation".
>

Have you never made an arithmetical error?

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-17 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Tue, Dec 18, 2018 at 6:15 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 17 Dec 2018, at 08:50, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>
>
>> What I am curious to know is how how many of these statements you agree
>> with:
>>
>> "2+2 = 4" was true:
>> 1. Before I was born
>> 2. Before humans formalized axioms and found a proof of it
>> 3. Before there were humans
>> 4. Before there was any conscious life in this universe
>> 5. As soon as there were 4 physical things to count
>> 6. Before the big bang / before there were 4 physical things
>>
>
> "2+2=4" is a tautology, true because of the meanings of the terms
> involved. So its truth is not independent of the formulation of the
> question and the definition of the terms involved.
>
>
> What about ExEyEz (x^3 + y^3 +z^3 = 33) ?
>

What about it? Not all syntactically correct formulae are either true or
false; some are undecidable.  Unless and until you find some x,y,z that
satisfy this relationship, the statement is neither true nor false.
Unperformed experiments have no results!

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-17 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 7:06 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 1:50 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 5:59 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> What I am curious to know is how how many of these statements you agree
>>> with:
>>>
>>> "2+2 = 4" was true:
>>> 1. Before I was born
>>> 2. Before humans formalized axioms and found a proof of it
>>> 3. Before there were humans
>>> 4. Before there was any conscious life in this universe
>>> 5. As soon as there were 4 physical things to count
>>> 6. Before the big bang / before there were 4 physical things
>>>
>>
>> "2+2=4" is a tautology, true because of the meanings of the terms
>> involved. So its truth is not independent of the formulation of the
>> question and the definition of the terms involved.
>>
>
> So would you say it was false before it was asked and the terms defined?
>

The true/false dichotomy is not applicable to undefined terms. As in QM,
"Unperformed experiments have no results!"


> Was the 10^100th bit of Pi set only at such time that Pi was defined, or
> did it have a set value before humans defined Pi?
>

Before pi was defined, the question had no meaning.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-16 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 5:59 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 12:03 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 4:30 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 9:39 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 1:50 PM Jason Resch 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 7:21 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Are you claiming that there is an objective arithmetical realm that
>>>>>> is independent of any set of axioms?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes. This is partly why Gödel's result was so shocking, and so
>>>>> important.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> And our axiomatisations are attempts to provide a theory of this
>>>>>> realm? In which case any particular set of axioms might not be true of
>>>>>> "real" mathematics?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It will be either incomplete or inconsistent.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Sorry, but that is silly. The realm of integers is completely defined
>>>>>> by a set of simple axioms -- there is no arithmetic "reality" beyond 
>>>>>> this.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>> The integers can be defined, but no axiomatic system can prove
>>>>> everything that happens to be true about them.  This fact is not commonly
>>>>> known and appreciated outside of some esoteric branches of mathematics, 
>>>>> but
>>>>> it is the case.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> All that this means is that theorems do not encapsulate all "truth".
>>>>
>>>
>>> Where does truth come from, if not the formalism of the axioms?
>>>
>>
>> You are equivocating on the notion of "truth". You seem to be claiming
>> that "truth" is encapsulated in the axioms, and yet the axioms and the
>> given rules of inference do not encapsulate all "truth".
>>
>> I think I worded that badly.  What I mean is given that truth does not
> come from axioms (since they cannot encapsulate all of it), then where does
> it come from?  Does it have an independent, uncaused, transcendent
> existence?
>

I don't know what that would mean. I don't think the truth of arithmetical
statements comes from some underlying consistent model in which the axioms
are "true". How do you determine the truth of the Godel sentence in some
axiomatic system? Only by going to some more general system, not by
reference to some underlying model.


Do you agree that arithmetical truth has an existence independent of the
>>> axiomatic system?
>>>
>>
Since truth does not equal 'theorem of the system', there is a sense in
which this is true. But it does not mean that the truth of any
syntactically correct statement is independent of any axiom set.


>
>> I agree that there are true statements in arithmetic that are not
>> theorems in any particular axiomatic system. This does not mean that
>> arithmetic has an existence beyond its definition in terms of some set of
>> axioms. You cannot go from "true" to "exists", where "exists" means
>> something more than the existential quantifier over some set. Confusing the
>> existential quantifier with an ontology is a common mistake among some
>> classes of mathematicians.
>>
>
> I agree, let us ignore "exists" for now as I think it is distracting from
> the current question of whether "true statements are true" (independent of
> thinking about them, defining them, uttering them, etc.).
>

True statements are true by definition!



> What I am curious to know is how how many of these statements you agree
> with:
>
> "2+2 = 4" was true:
> 1. Before I was born
> 2. Before humans formalized axioms and found a proof of it
> 3. Before there were humans
> 4. Before there was any conscious life in this universe
> 5. As soon as there were 4 physical things to count
> 6. Before the big bang / before there were 4 physical things
>

"2+2=4" is a tautology, true because of the meanings of the terms involved.
So its truth is not independent of the formulation of the question and the
definition of the terms involved.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-16 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 4:30 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 9:39 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 1:50 PM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 7:21 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>> Are you claiming that there is an objective arithmetical realm that is
>>>> independent of any set of axioms?
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes. This is partly why Gödel's result was so shocking, and so important.
>>>
>>>
>>>> And our axiomatisations are attempts to provide a theory of this realm?
>>>> In which case any particular set of axioms might not be true of "real"
>>>> mathematics?
>>>>
>>>
>>> It will be either incomplete or inconsistent.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> Sorry, but that is silly. The realm of integers is completely defined
>>>> by a set of simple axioms -- there is no arithmetic "reality" beyond this.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> The integers can be defined, but no axiomatic system can prove
>>> everything that happens to be true about them.  This fact is not commonly
>>> known and appreciated outside of some esoteric branches of mathematics, but
>>> it is the case.
>>>
>>
>> All that this means is that theorems do not encapsulate all "truth".
>>
>
> Where does truth come from, if not the formalism of the axioms?
>

You are equivocating on the notion of "truth". You seem to be claiming that
"truth" is encapsulated in the axioms, and yet the axioms and the given
rules of inference do not encapsulate all "truth".

Do you agree that arithmetical truth has an existence independent of the
> axiomatic system?
>

I agree that there are true statements in arithmetic that are not theorems
in any particular axiomatic system. This does not mean that arithmetic has
an existence beyond its definition in terms of some set of axioms. You
cannot go from "true" to "exists", where "exists" means something more than
the existential quantifier over some set. Confusing the existential
quantifier with an ontology is a common mistake among some classes of
mathematicians.

There are syntactically correct statements in the system that are not
>> theorems, and neither are their negation theorems.
>>
>
> Yes.
>
>
>> Godel's theorem merely shows that some of these statements may be true in
>> a more general system.
>>
>
> So isn't this like scientific theories attempting to better describe the
> physical world, with ever more general and more powerful theories?
>

Except that physics is not an axiomatic system, and does not confuse
theorems with truth. It is not useful to classify physical theories as
'true' or 'false', even though this is often done in mistaken homage to
Popper. The descriptions of the phenomena that physical theories give are
either consistent with the data or not -- even adequate descriptions are
not necessarily "true" in any sense.



> That does not mean that the integers are not completely defined by some
>> simple axioms. It means no more than that 'truth' and 'theorem' are not
>> synonyms.
>>
>>
> I agree with this.
>

Good.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-16 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 1:50 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 7:21 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>
>> Are you claiming that there is an objective arithmetical realm that is
>> independent of any set of axioms?
>>
>
> Yes. This is partly why Gödel's result was so shocking, and so important.
>
>
>> And our axiomatisations are attempts to provide a theory of this realm?
>> In which case any particular set of axioms might not be true of "real"
>> mathematics?
>>
>
> It will be either incomplete or inconsistent.
>
>
>
>> Sorry, but that is silly. The realm of integers is completely defined by
>> a set of simple axioms -- there is no arithmetic "reality" beyond this.
>>
>>
> The integers can be defined, but no axiomatic system can prove everything
> that happens to be true about them.  This fact is not commonly known and
> appreciated outside of some esoteric branches of mathematics, but it is the
> case.
>

All that this means is that theorems do not encapsulate all "truth". There
are syntactically correct statements in the system that are not theorems,
and neither are their negation theorems. Godel's theorem merely shows that
some of these statements may be true in a more general system. That does
not mean that the integers are not completely defined by some simple
axioms. It means no more than that 'truth' and 'theorem' are not synonyms.

Bruce



> For example:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_incompleteness_theorems
>
> "*Gödel's incompleteness theorems* are two theorems
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theorem> of mathematical logic
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_logic> that demonstrate the
> inherent limitations of every formal axiomatic system
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiomatic_system> capable of modelling
> basic arithmetic <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arithmetic>. These
> results, published by Kurt Gödel
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurt_G%C3%B6del> in 1931, are important
> both in mathematical logic and in the philosophy of mathematics
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics>. The theorems
> are widely, but not universally, interpreted as showing that Hilbert's
> program <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilbert%27s_program> to find a
> complete and consistent set of axioms
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom> for all mathematics
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematics> is impossible."
>
>
> And
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting_problem#G%C3%B6del's_incompleteness_theorems
>
> "Since we know that there cannot be such an algorithm, it follows that
> the assumption that there is a consistent and complete axiomatization of
> all true first-order logic statements about natural numbers must be false."
>
>
> Jason
>

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-16 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 11:36 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 4:14 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 9:04 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 4:01 PM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 8:56 AM Jason Resch 
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:28 PM Brent Meeker 
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But a system that is consistent can also prove a statement that is
>>>>>> false:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> axiom 1: Trump is a genius.
>>>>>> axiom 2: Trump is stable.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> theorem: Trump is a stable genius.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So how is this different from flawed physical theories?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Physical theories do not claim to prove theorems - they are not systems
>>>> of axioms and theorems. Attempts to recast physics in this form have always
>>>> failed.
>>>>
>>>>
>>> Physical theories claim to describe models of reality.
>>>
>>
>> Physical theories are models of reality -- using the word "model" in the
>> physicists sense.
>>
>>
>>> You can have a fully consistent physical theory that nevertheless fails
>>> to accurately describe the physical world,
>>>
>>
>> Like Brent's example of an axiomatic description of Trump..
>>
>>
>>> or is an incomplete description of the physical world.  Likewise, you
>>> can have an axiomatic system that is consistent, but fails to accurately
>>> describe the integers, or is less complete than we would like.
>>>
>>
>> Axiomatic system are always going to fail to capture everything we would
>> like to capture about any domain. That is why attempted axiomatisation of
>> physics have been rather unsuccessful.
>>
>>
>>> It is a completely analogous situation. If you hold the physical reality
>>> is real because we can study it objectively and refine our understanding of
>>> it through observations,
>>>
>>
>> That is not "why" I hold the physical world to be real. I take the
>> physical world to be real because that is the definition of reality.
>>
>
> There is no evidence that physics reality marks the end of our ability to
> explain anything deeper.
>

And there is no evidence that any deeper explanation is possible. Let's
face it, you could make such a claim about any theory -- there is no
evidence that there is not some deeper explanation -- unless, that is, your
theory does not account for all the facts. Physics itself is not a theory.
We have theories about physical phenomena that are more or less successful,
but the theories are not the physical reality.


>
>
>> then the same would hold for the mathematical reality.
>>>
>>
>> No, mathematical "reality" (note the scare quotes) is a derived realm,
>> entirely dependent on the set of axioms chosen in any instance. So it is
>> not in any way analogous to physics.
>>
>>
> Did you miss my earlier posts to Brent on this?  The integers and their
> relations are not modeled by any axiomatic system, they transcend the
> axioms and therefore we must conclude have a reality independent from our
> attempts to model them.
>

It is interesting, then, that Bruno is very proud of the fact that
arithmetic depends only on a small set of axioms, or even just on the
properties of a pair of combinators. Are you claiming that there is an
objective arithmetical realm that is independent of any set of axioms? And
our axiomatisations are attempts to provide a theory of this realm? In
which case any particular set of axioms might not be true of "real"
mathematics?

Sorry, but that is silly. The realm of integers is completely defined by a
set of simple axioms -- there is no arithmetic "reality" beyond this.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-16 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 9:04 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 4:01 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 8:56 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:28 PM Brent Meeker 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> But a system that is consistent can also prove a statement that is
>>>> false:
>>>>
>>>> axiom 1: Trump is a genius.
>>>> axiom 2: Trump is stable.
>>>>
>>>> theorem: Trump is a stable genius.
>>>>
>>>
>>> So how is this different from flawed physical theories?
>>>
>>
>> Physical theories do not claim to prove theorems - they are not systems
>> of axioms and theorems. Attempts to recast physics in this form have always
>> failed.
>>
>>
> Physical theories claim to describe models of reality.
>

Physical theories are models of reality -- using the word "model" in the
physicists sense.


> You can have a fully consistent physical theory that nevertheless fails to
> accurately describe the physical world,
>

Like Brent's example of an axiomatic description of Trump..


> or is an incomplete description of the physical world.  Likewise, you can
> have an axiomatic system that is consistent, but fails to accurately
> describe the integers, or is less complete than we would like.
>

Axiomatic system are always going to fail to capture everything we would
like to capture about any domain. That is why attempted axiomatisation of
physics have been rather unsuccessful.


> It is a completely analogous situation. If you hold the physical reality
> is real because we can study it objectively and refine our understanding of
> it through observations,
>

That is not "why" I hold the physical world to be real. I take the physical
world to be real because that is the definition of reality.


> then the same would hold for the mathematical reality.
>

No, mathematical "reality" (note the scare quotes) is a derived realm,
entirely dependent on the set of axioms chosen in any instance. So it is
not in any way analogous to physics.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-16 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Mon, Dec 17, 2018 at 8:56 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Sun, Dec 16, 2018 at 3:28 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>> But a system that is consistent can also prove a statement that is false:
>>
>> axiom 1: Trump is a genius.
>> axiom 2: Trump is stable.
>>
>> theorem: Trump is a stable genius.
>>
>
> So how is this different from flawed physical theories?
>

Physical theories do not claim to prove theorems - they are not systems of
axioms and theorems. Attempts to recast physics in this form have always
failed.

Bruce

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Re: What is more primary than numbers?

2018-12-11 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 8:44 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 1:20 PM Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>>
>> And they produce no results since they run both ways.  They are not even
>> computations in the CT sense.
>>
>
> I am not sure about that. There is the concept of reversible Turing
> machines:
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reversible_computing#Logical_reversibility
>

Why don't they build a perpetual motion machine while they are at it?

Bruce

Jason
>

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Re: Measuring a system in a superposition of states vs in a mixed state

2018-12-05 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 11:01 PM  wrote:

> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 5:39:43 AM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 3:53 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 10:28:39 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:

 On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 3:45:32 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 6:58 AM Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 1:53:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/4/2018 12:25 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> 1. Histories originate at an emitter e and end at screen locations s
>>> on a screen S.
>>> 2. At each s there is a history bundle histories(s). A weight w(s)
>>> is computed from the bundle by summing the unit complex numbers of the
>>> histories and taking the modulus.
>>> 3. The weight w(s) is sent back in time over a single history h*(s)
>>> selected at random (uniformly) from histories(s).
>>> 4. At e, the weights w(s) on backchannel of h*(s) are received (in
>>> the "present" time)
>>> 5. A single history h*(s*) is then selected from the distribution in
>>> 4.
>>>
>>>
>>> How is it selected?  Above you said "at random".  But that implies
>>> there is already a probability measure defined on the histories.  How is
>>> this probability measure determined?  Or put another way how do you
>>> determine what histories to consider to form the bundles in step 2?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> Selection happens via quantum Darwinism.
>>
>
>
> Do you have even the faintest understanding of Quantum Darwinism?
>
> Bruce
>

 How is *sum over histories with Darwinian selection*  (as defined) not
 quantum Darwinism?

 Operationally, what is different?

 - pt

>>>
>>> *Sum over histories with Darwinian selection* is consistent with *Quantum
>>> Darwinism as a Darwinian process*  [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1001.0745 ].
>>>
>>
>> No, you clearly don't understand Quantum Darwinism! Zurek's Darwinism is
>> selection of pointer states, not one history from a bundle.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> Wiki isn't clear in its definition of pointer states. WRT the double slit
> experiment, would it be correct to say the impacts with very high
> probability are "pointer states" and those with a low or zero probability
> are respectively less, or not at all pointer states? TIA, AG
>

No. Pointer states are those corresponding to the basis that is stable
against environmental decoherence. In the double slit experiment, the
pointer states are positions on the screen -- some are occupied and some
not, but that is not a distinction that is relevant to the formation of the
pointer states.

Bruce

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Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2018-12-05 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 10:52 PM  wrote:

> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 11:42:06 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 9:57:41 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM  wrote:
>>>

 *Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of
 interference and coherence, without introducing your theory of
 consciousness. Mainstream thinking today is that decoherence does occur,
 but this seems to imply preexisting coherence, and therefore interference
 among the component states of a superposition. If the superposition is
 expressed using eigenfunctions, which are mutually orthogonal -- implying
 no mutual interference -- how is decoherence possible, insofar as
 coherence, IIUC, doesn't exist using this basis? AG*

>>>
>>> I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it is used off
>>> an expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal eigenvectors. The
>>> expansion in some eigenvector basis is written as
>>>
>>>|psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)
>>>
>>> where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the dimension of the
>>> Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are the complex numbers a_i.
>>> Since these are complex coefficients, they contain inherent phases. It is
>>> the preservation of these phases of the expansion coefficients that is
>>> meant by "maintaining coherence". So it is the coherence of the particular
>>> expansion that is implied, and this has noting to do with the mutual
>>> orthogonality or otherwise of the basis vectors themselves. In decoherence,
>>> the phase relationships between the terms in the original expansion are
>>> lost.
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>
>> I appreciate your reply. I was sure you could ascertain my error --
>> confusing orthogonality with interference and coherence. Let me have your
>> indulgence on a related issue. AG
>>
>
> Suppose the original wf is expressed in terms of p, and its superposition
> expansion is also expressed in eigenfunctions with variable p. Does the
> phase of the original wf carry over into the eigenfunctions as identical
> for each, or can each component in the superposition have different phases?
> I ask this because the probability determined by any complex amplitude is
> independent of its phase. TIA, AG
>

The phases of the coefficients are independent of each other.

Bruce

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Re: Measuring a system in a superposition of states vs in a mixed state

2018-12-04 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 6:08 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 12:53:45 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 5:43 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 12:28:19 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

 On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 5:19 PM Philip Thrift 
 wrote:

> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 12:00:18 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 4:51 PM Philip Thrift 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 11:39:43 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

 On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 3:53 PM Philip Thrift 
 wrote:

> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 10:28:39 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift
> wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 3:45:32 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 6:58 AM Philip Thrift 
>>> wrote:
>>>

 On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 1:53:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
> On 12/4/2018 12:25 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> 1. Histories originate at an emitter e and end at screen
> locations s on a screen S.
> 2. At each s there is a history bundle histories(s). A weight
> w(s) is computed from the bundle by summing the unit complex 
> numbers of the
> histories and taking the modulus.
> 3. The weight w(s) is sent back in time over a single history
> h*(s) selected at random (uniformly) from histories(s).
> 4. At e, the weights w(s) on backchannel of h*(s) are received
> (in the "present" time)
> 5. A single history h*(s*) is then selected from the
> distribution in 4.
>
>
> How is it selected?  Above you said "at random".  But that
> implies there is already a probability measure defined on the 
> histories.
> How is this probability measure determined?  Or put another way 
> how do you
> determine what histories to consider to form the bundles in step 
> 2?
>
> Brent
>

 Selection happens via quantum Darwinism.

>>>
>>>
>>> Do you have even the faintest understanding of Quantum Darwinism?
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>
>> How is *sum over histories with Darwinian selection*  (as
>> defined) not quantum Darwinism?
>>
>> Operationally, what is different?
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
> *Sum over histories with Darwinian selection* is consistent with 
> *Quantum
> Darwinism as a Darwinian process*  [
> https://arxiv.org/abs/1001.0745 ].
>

 No, you clearly don't understand Quantum Darwinism! Zurek's
 Darwinism is selection of pointer states, not one history from a 
 bundle.

 Bruce

>>>
>>>  Histories are (hidden) states.
>>>
>>
>> It becomes obvious that you don't really understand consistent
>> histories, either.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> I've never once mentioned *consistent histories*, only *sum over
> histories*.
>

 Inconsistent histories?


> (Did you watch the lecture by Fay Dowker?)
>

 No, I don't watch utube videos.

 Pointer states [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.04101 ] can best be
> understood as related to histories via the *Reflective Path Integral*
> interpretation of the EPR experiment.
>

 Your arxiv references do not support your case. Reverse causation, as
 it seems to be required in your account, is simply a nonsense. Huw Price
 lost the plot a long time ago.

 There is no competition between the different paths between the initial
 and final state -- which is what is used to calculate probabilities in the
 path integral approach. So there is no Darwinian (or other) selection of
 one such path over others. Quantum Darwinism is about something quite
 different. Even Wikipedia agrees! Read Zurek's papers on this.

 Bruce

>>>
>>>
>>> OK. As Kay Dowker stated in her presentation: The path integral
>>> interpretation is still under development.
>>>
>>
>> As has been pointed out, path integrals are a calculational tool, not an
>> interpretation.
>>
>
>
> Oh,* that* again. It's like Groundhog Day (the movie).
>

Given your repetitive harping on half-baked path integral ideas, I thought
repetition was the way forward.

Bruce



>> My (retrocausal) version of Darwinian selection w.r.t. multiple histories
>>>  *is* *the next
>>> development.*
>>>
>>
>> I see, it is not actually a coherent proposition at the 

Re: Measuring a system in a superposition of states vs in a mixed state

2018-12-04 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 5:43 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 12:28:19 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 5:19 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 12:00:18 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

 On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 4:51 PM Philip Thrift 
 wrote:

> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 11:39:43 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 3:53 PM Philip Thrift 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 10:28:39 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift
>>> wrote:

 On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 3:45:32 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 6:58 AM Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 1:53:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/4/2018 12:25 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> 1. Histories originate at an emitter e and end at screen
>>> locations s on a screen S.
>>> 2. At each s there is a history bundle histories(s). A weight
>>> w(s) is computed from the bundle by summing the unit complex 
>>> numbers of the
>>> histories and taking the modulus.
>>> 3. The weight w(s) is sent back in time over a single history
>>> h*(s) selected at random (uniformly) from histories(s).
>>> 4. At e, the weights w(s) on backchannel of h*(s) are received
>>> (in the "present" time)
>>> 5. A single history h*(s*) is then selected from the
>>> distribution in 4.
>>>
>>>
>>> How is it selected?  Above you said "at random".  But that
>>> implies there is already a probability measure defined on the 
>>> histories.
>>> How is this probability measure determined?  Or put another way how 
>>> do you
>>> determine what histories to consider to form the bundles in step 2?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> Selection happens via quantum Darwinism.
>>
>
>
> Do you have even the faintest understanding of Quantum Darwinism?
>
> Bruce
>

 How is *sum over histories with Darwinian selection*  (as defined)
 not quantum Darwinism?

 Operationally, what is different?

 - pt

>>>
>>> *Sum over histories with Darwinian selection* is consistent with 
>>> *Quantum
>>> Darwinism as a Darwinian process*  [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1001.0745
>>> ].
>>>
>>
>> No, you clearly don't understand Quantum Darwinism! Zurek's Darwinism
>> is selection of pointer states, not one history from a bundle.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
>  Histories are (hidden) states.
>

 It becomes obvious that you don't really understand consistent
 histories, either.

 Bruce

>>>
>>> I've never once mentioned *consistent histories*, only *sum over
>>> histories*.
>>>
>>
>> Inconsistent histories?
>>
>>
>>> (Did you watch the lecture by Fay Dowker?)
>>>
>>
>> No, I don't watch utube videos.
>>
>> Pointer states [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.04101 ] can best be
>>> understood as related to histories via the *Reflective Path Integral*
>>> interpretation of the EPR experiment.
>>>
>>
>> Your arxiv references do not support your case. Reverse causation, as it
>> seems to be required in your account, is simply a nonsense. Huw Price lost
>> the plot a long time ago.
>>
>> There is no competition between the different paths between the initial
>> and final state -- which is what is used to calculate probabilities in the
>> path integral approach. So there is no Darwinian (or other) selection of
>> one such path over others. Quantum Darwinism is about something quite
>> different. Even Wikipedia agrees! Read Zurek's papers on this.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
>
> OK. As Kay Dowker stated in her presentation: The path integral
> interpretation is still under development.
>

As has been pointed out, path integrals are a calculational tool, not an
interpretation.


> My (retrocausal) version of Darwinian selection w.r.t. multiple histories
>  *is* *the next
> development.*
>

I see, it is not actually a coherent proposition at the moment...

Bruce

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Re: Measuring a system in a superposition of states vs in a mixed state

2018-12-04 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 5:19 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> On Wednesday, December 5, 2018 at 12:00:18 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 4:51 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 11:39:43 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

 On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 3:53 PM Philip Thrift 
 wrote:

> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 10:28:39 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 3:45:32 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 6:58 AM Philip Thrift 
>>> wrote:
>>>

 On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 1:53:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
> On 12/4/2018 12:25 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> 1. Histories originate at an emitter e and end at screen locations
> s on a screen S.
> 2. At each s there is a history bundle histories(s). A weight w(s)
> is computed from the bundle by summing the unit complex numbers of the
> histories and taking the modulus.
> 3. The weight w(s) is sent back in time over a single history
> h*(s) selected at random (uniformly) from histories(s).
> 4. At e, the weights w(s) on backchannel of h*(s) are received (in
> the "present" time)
> 5. A single history h*(s*) is then selected from the distribution
> in 4.
>
>
> How is it selected?  Above you said "at random".  But that implies
> there is already a probability measure defined on the histories.  How 
> is
> this probability measure determined?  Or put another way how do you
> determine what histories to consider to form the bundles in step 2?
>
> Brent
>

 Selection happens via quantum Darwinism.

>>>
>>>
>>> Do you have even the faintest understanding of Quantum Darwinism?
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>
>> How is *sum over histories with Darwinian selection*  (as defined)
>> not quantum Darwinism?
>>
>> Operationally, what is different?
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
> *Sum over histories with Darwinian selection* is consistent with *Quantum
> Darwinism as a Darwinian process*  [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1001.0745
> ].
>

 No, you clearly don't understand Quantum Darwinism! Zurek's Darwinism
 is selection of pointer states, not one history from a bundle.

 Bruce

>>>
>>>
>>>  Histories are (hidden) states.
>>>
>>
>> It becomes obvious that you don't really understand consistent histories,
>> either.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> I've never once mentioned *consistent histories*, only *sum over
> histories*.
>

Inconsistent histories?


> (Did you watch the lecture by Fay Dowker?)
>

No, I don't watch utube videos.

Pointer states [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1508.04101 ] can best be understood
> as related to histories via the *Reflective Path Integral* interpretation
> of the EPR experiment.
>

Your arxiv references do not support your case. Reverse causation, as it
seems to be required in your account, is simply a nonsense. Huw Price lost
the plot a long time ago.

There is no competition between the different paths between the initial and
final state -- which is what is used to calculate probabilities in the path
integral approach. So there is no Darwinian (or other) selection of one
such path over others. Quantum Darwinism is about something quite
different. Even Wikipedia agrees! Read Zurek's papers on this.

Bruce

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Re: Measuring a system in a superposition of states vs in a mixed state

2018-12-04 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 4:51 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 11:39:43 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 3:53 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 10:28:39 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:

 On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 3:45:32 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 6:58 AM Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 1:53:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 12/4/2018 12:25 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> 1. Histories originate at an emitter e and end at screen locations s
>>> on a screen S.
>>> 2. At each s there is a history bundle histories(s). A weight w(s)
>>> is computed from the bundle by summing the unit complex numbers of the
>>> histories and taking the modulus.
>>> 3. The weight w(s) is sent back in time over a single history h*(s)
>>> selected at random (uniformly) from histories(s).
>>> 4. At e, the weights w(s) on backchannel of h*(s) are received (in
>>> the "present" time)
>>> 5. A single history h*(s*) is then selected from the distribution in
>>> 4.
>>>
>>>
>>> How is it selected?  Above you said "at random".  But that implies
>>> there is already a probability measure defined on the histories.  How is
>>> this probability measure determined?  Or put another way how do you
>>> determine what histories to consider to form the bundles in step 2?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> Selection happens via quantum Darwinism.
>>
>
>
> Do you have even the faintest understanding of Quantum Darwinism?
>
> Bruce
>

 How is *sum over histories with Darwinian selection*  (as defined) not
 quantum Darwinism?

 Operationally, what is different?

 - pt

>>>
>>> *Sum over histories with Darwinian selection* is consistent with *Quantum
>>> Darwinism as a Darwinian process*  [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1001.0745 ].
>>>
>>
>> No, you clearly don't understand Quantum Darwinism! Zurek's Darwinism is
>> selection of pointer states, not one history from a bundle.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
>
>  Histories are (hidden) states.
>

It becomes obvious that you don't really understand consistent histories,
either.

Bruce

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Re: Measuring a system in a superposition of states vs in a mixed state

2018-12-04 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 3:53 PM Philip Thrift  wrote:

> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 10:28:39 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 3:45:32 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 6:58 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>

 On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 1:53:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
> On 12/4/2018 12:25 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> 1. Histories originate at an emitter e and end at screen locations s
> on a screen S.
> 2. At each s there is a history bundle histories(s). A weight w(s) is
> computed from the bundle by summing the unit complex numbers of the
> histories and taking the modulus.
> 3. The weight w(s) is sent back in time over a single history h*(s)
> selected at random (uniformly) from histories(s).
> 4. At e, the weights w(s) on backchannel of h*(s) are received (in the
> "present" time)
> 5. A single history h*(s*) is then selected from the distribution in 4.
>
>
> How is it selected?  Above you said "at random".  But that implies
> there is already a probability measure defined on the histories.  How is
> this probability measure determined?  Or put another way how do you
> determine what histories to consider to form the bundles in step 2?
>
> Brent
>

 Selection happens via quantum Darwinism.

>>>
>>>
>>> Do you have even the faintest understanding of Quantum Darwinism?
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>
>> How is *sum over histories with Darwinian selection*  (as defined) not
>> quantum Darwinism?
>>
>> Operationally, what is different?
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
> *Sum over histories with Darwinian selection* is consistent with *Quantum
> Darwinism as a Darwinian process*  [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1001.0745 ].
>

No, you clearly don't understand Quantum Darwinism! Zurek's Darwinism is
selection of pointer states, not one history from a bundle.

Bruce

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Re: Coherent states of a superposition

2018-12-04 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 2:36 AM  wrote:

>
> *Thanks, but I'm looking for a solution within the context of interference
> and coherence, without introducing your theory of consciousness. Mainstream
> thinking today is that decoherence does occur, but this seems to imply
> preexisting coherence, and therefore interference among the component
> states of a superposition. If the superposition is expressed using
> eigenfunctions, which are mutually orthogonal -- implying no mutual
> interference -- how is decoherence possible, insofar as coherence, IIUC,
> doesn't exist using this basis? AG*
>

I think you misunderstand the meaning of "coherence" when it is used off an
expansion in terms of a set of mutually orthogonal eigenvectors. The
expansion in some eigenvector basis is written as

   |psi> = Sum_i (a_i |v_i>)

where |v_i> are the eigenvectors, and i ranges over the dimension of the
Hilbert space. The expansion coefficients are the complex numbers a_i.
Since these are complex coefficients, they contain inherent phases. It is
the preservation of these phases of the expansion coefficients that is
meant by "maintaining coherence". So it is the coherence of the particular
expansion that is implied, and this has noting to do with the mutual
orthogonality or otherwise of the basis vectors themselves. In decoherence,
the phase relationships between the terms in the original expansion are
lost.

Bruce

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Re: Measuring a system in a superposition of states vs in a mixed state

2018-12-04 Thread Bruce Kellett
On Wed, Dec 5, 2018 at 6:58 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:

>
> On Tuesday, December 4, 2018 at 1:53:15 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 12/4/2018 12:25 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> 1. Histories originate at an emitter e and end at screen locations s on a
>> screen S.
>> 2. At each s there is a history bundle histories(s). A weight w(s) is
>> computed from the bundle by summing the unit complex numbers of the
>> histories and taking the modulus.
>> 3. The weight w(s) is sent back in time over a single history h*(s)
>> selected at random (uniformly) from histories(s).
>> 4. At e, the weights w(s) on backchannel of h*(s) are received (in the
>> "present" time)
>> 5. A single history h*(s*) is then selected from the distribution in 4.
>>
>>
>> How is it selected?  Above you said "at random".  But that implies there
>> is already a probability measure defined on the histories.  How is this
>> probability measure determined?  Or put another way how do you determine
>> what histories to consider to form the bundles in step 2?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Selection happens via quantum Darwinism.
>


Do you have even the faintest understanding of Quantum Darwinism?

Bruce

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Re: Where Max Tegmark is really wrong

2018-11-09 Thread Bruce Kellett

From: *Brent Meeker* mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>


You're dodging my point.  The "issue" of how we have subjective 
experience only seems to be an issue because in comparison to the 
"objective" experience of matter where we can trace long, 
mathematically define causal chains down to...a Lagrangian and 
coupling constants or something similar, which is long enough and 
esoteric enough that almost everyone loses interest along the way.  
But some people (like Vic) are going to say, "But where does the 
Langrangian and coupling constants come from?"  and "Why a Lagrangian 
anyway?" My point is that when we can give a similarly deep and 
detailed account of why you think of an elephant when reading this, 
then nobody will worry about "the hard problem of consciousness"; just 
like they don't worry about "the hard problems of matter" like where 
that Lagrangian comes from or why a complex Hilbert space.


Why can't I worry about those things? Where does the Lagrangian come 
from? And why use a complex Hilbert space? I don't think this is the 
underlying reason for saying that the "hard problem" of consciousness 
dissolves on solving the engineering problems. Solving the engineering 
problems will enable us to produce a fully conscious AI -- but will we 
then know how it works? We will certainly know where it came from.


Bruce

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2018-11-05 Thread Bruce Kellett

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>


We cannot identify first person notion with third person notion. A 
subtlety is that physics is, eventually, shown to be first person 
plural, and not third person as usually believed today.


That is merely a consequence of your idiosyncratic definitions of theses 
terms. Your definitions were devised to cope with the person duplication 
scenarios, where it is individuals that are duplicated, not worlds. So 
if you duplicate a number of persons so that they share this experience, 
then that is first person plural, and you can still have other 
non-duplicated people outside of the experiment who can take a third 
person view of things.


This is not how it works in the real world -- we do not duplicate just 
people. In MWI it is worlds that are duplicated, together with all the 
people in them. So there can be no analogy of the third person view of 
someone outside the duplication. The terminology then becomes useless, 
and we revert to the normal grammatical meaning of the terms: first, 
second, and third person; first person being one's personal view, second 
person is the person you talk to, and the third person is anyone else. 
It is a category error to use your idiosyncratic terminology in normal 
physics talk.


Bruce

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