Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-25 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 23 Apr 2019, at 19:52, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> Actually, this is precisely what existence is: that which is immediately 
> knowable. I see red, thus red exists.

I see red, so certainly the experience of seeing red exists. I can agree with 
that. But it is not existence which I see, it is my own consciousness. 

“Existence” has no meaning if we don’t say what exists, or it means, if taken 
in your sense, that you define “existence” by consciousness, but that is not 
the usual sense of existence. 

What I mean, is that we say that existence is immediately knowable, people will 
me mislead into believing that what we see exist. If I see something red, 
“seing red” exists, but it does not mean that it exists a red thing, only an 
experience of red can be said to exist. I might see a red unicorn, for example, 
in some dream.

Bruno

PS busy days, apology for possible delays in my answer. I have to go now.




> 
> On Friday, 19 April 2019 12:21:10 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>  I doubt that existence is immediately knowable, etc.
> 
> 
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Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

2019-04-24 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 23 Apr 2019, at 13:39, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, April 23, 2019 at 4:00:26 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 20 Apr 2019, at 23:14, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, April 19, 2019 at 2:53:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 19 Apr 2019, at 04:08, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 6:53:33 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>> Sorry, I don't remember what, if anything, I intended to text.
>>> 
>>> I'm not expert on how Einstein arrived at his famous field equations.  I 
>>> know that he insisted on them being tensor equations so that they would 
>>> have the same form in all coordinate systems.  That may sound like a 
>>> mathematical technicality, but it is really to ensure that the things in 
>>> the equation, the tensors, could have a physical interpretation.  He also 
>>> limited himself to second order differentials, probably as a matter of 
>>> simplicity.  And he excluded torsion, but I don't know why.  And of course 
>>> he knew it had to reproduce Newtonian gravity in the weak/slow limit.
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> Here's a link which might help;
>>> 
>>>  https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.05752.pdf <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.05752.pdf>
>> 
>> Yes. That is helpful.
>> 
>> The following (long!) video can also help (well, it did help me)
>> 
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foRPKAKZWx8 
>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foRPKAKZWx8>
>> 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> I've been viewing this video. I don't see how he established that the metric 
>> tensor is a correction for curved spacetime. AG 
> 
> ds^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 is Pythagorus theorem, in the plane. The “g_mu,nu” are the 
> coefficients needed to ensure un non-planner (curved) metric, and they can be 
> use to define the curvature.
> 
> Bruno 
> 
> Thanks for your time, but I don't think you have a clue what the issues are 
> here. And, as a alleged expert in logic, it puts your other claims in 
> jeopardy. Firstly, in the video you offered, the presenter has a Kronecker 
> delta as the leading multiplicative factor in his definition of the Metric 
> Tensor, which implies all off diagonal terms are zero. And even if that term 
> were omitted, your reference to Pythagorus leaves much to be desired. In SR 
> we're dealing with a 4 dim space with the Lorentz metric, not a Euclidean 
> space where the Pythagorean theorem applies. How does a diagonal signature of 
> -1,1,1,1 imply flat space? Why would non-zero off diagonal elements have 
> anything to do with a departure from flat space under Lorentz's metric? AG 


Oops sorry. Since long I do relativity only in its euclidian form, through the 
transformation t' := it. (I being the square root of -1). This makes Minkowski 
euclidean again. I should have mentioned this.

Bruno



> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> AG
>>> 
>>> On 4/18/2019 7:59 AM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Wednesday, April 17, 2019 at 7:16:45 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>>>> wrote:
>>>> I see no new text in this message. AG
>>>>  
>>>> Brent; if you have time, please reproduce the text you intended. 
>>>> 
>>>> I recall reading that before Einstein published his GR paper, he used a 
>>>> trial and error method to determine the final field equations (as he raced 
>>>> for the correct ones in competition with Hilbert, who may have arrived at 
>>>> them first).  So it's hard to imagine a mathematical methodology which 
>>>> produces them. If you have any articles that attempt to explain how the 
>>>> field equations are derived, I'd really like to explore this aspect of GR 
>>>> and get some "satisfaction". I can see how he arrived at some principles, 
>>>> such as geodesic motion, by applying the Least Action Principle, or how he 
>>>> might have intuited that matter/energy effects the geometry of spacetime, 
>>>> but from these principles it's baffling how he arrived at the field 
>>>> equations. 
>>>> 
>>>> AG
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Wednesday, April 17, 2019 at 7:00:55 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 4/17/2019 5:20 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>&

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-24 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 22 Apr 2019, at 21:38, Terren Suydam  wrote:
> 
> Of course we have a choice. The primacy of consciousness may entail nothing 
> more than an epistemological barrier - we may never be able to experience 
> reality directly, or know its true form, but that doesn't force us to deny 
> the possibility of an objective reality. 
> 
> If nothing else it forces us to remain agnostic.

Agnosticism is the scientific attitude (and also the religious attitude when we 
assume mechanism).

We never claim truth, but propose theories, precise enough to be evaluated 
(usually by confrontation with the sensible things, like Nature)



> We can be sure of the primacy of consciousness - on this we agree -

We can be sure of our consciousness. I don’t see how we could be sure of its 
ontological primacy, only of its apparent epistemological primacy, which is 
different.




> but we cannot be sure about anything of the reality that pushes back on our 
> consciousness. Your certainty on this matter is a red flag for me.


Yes. Me too. 

Now, with mechanism, if you are OK with the quasi-axiomatic definition of 
consciousness that I gave, it is a theorem that all universal machine are 
conscious, and that physics is derivable from that theory, and indeed, the math 
shows that we get a quantum physics, so that nature confirms mechanism, as much 
as it refutes physicalism already. The fundamental science is the theology of 
the universal Turing machine. It is testable theory, and, still confirmed up to 
now. As I have explained, physicalism is refuted, unless we abandon mechanism. 
But to assume a material universe just to avoid Mechanism is poor motivation, 
because it substitute a testable explanation with “god made it”, or”matter made 
it”, without any further explanations.

Bruno





> 
> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 2:21 PM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> We have no choice in building such an ontology given the fact that we can 
> never know anything outside consciousness. Sure, if we want just technology, 
> then all kinds of science can do it. But if we want truth, we cannot search 
> it outside consciousness.
> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-24 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 22 Apr 2019, at 06:41, Terren Suydam  wrote:
> 
> 1) Causality can still exist even if time is an illusion. For example in 
> block-time, time is an indexical - all times can be said to exist at once - 
> but that in no way diminishes the role of causality in describing the 
> dynamics and interactions of the system as time 't' varies.

Yes. Like computation exists in arithmetic, and each universal number 
determines a notion of causality, even an infinite number of such notions, up 
to some notion of responsibility and free-will.



> 
> 2) I don't even know how to make sense of this claim. The whims of competing 
> consciousnesses are what determine the laws of physics? To me this is 
> indistinguishable from "God did it". There's no way to reason about it, no 
> hope for making predictions or improving understanding. You'd have to 
> understand the minds of the consciousnesses whose competition creates reality.


With mechanism, there is no choice: physics must be explained in term of 
number’s dream statistics. The logic of this gives a quantum logic, mincing 
nature confirming Mechanism (and its immaterialism).

Until we get evidence for some matter (like observing a discrepancy between the 
physics extracted from arithmetic), it is just premature to assume some 
material world, especially for singularising some computations, which would be 
like invoking a god, indeed.

Bruno



> 
> 3) Also, other consciousnesses want me to die... right?
> 
> 
> On Sun, Apr 21, 2019 at 4:41 AM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Saturday, 20 April 2019 02:15:40 UTC+3, Terren Suydam wrote:
> 1) I'm not sure I can make sense of the term 'influence' without causation. 
> In every instance I can think of, to influence something means to exert some 
> kind of force on it such that it behaves differently then it otherwise would 
> have. It causes it to change.
> 
> The thing is that time itself is a quale in consciousness. You can have 
> temporal extended periods in consciousness that happen all at once. You can 
> see it as a movie that already exists. If you attend-along to the movie it 
> appears to you as if there are causal powers happening there. But the movie 
> exists all at once, so causality is an illusion. I'm writing about this in 
> "The Quale of Time". 
> 
> 2) I'm not following your evolutionary account of competing consciousnesses, 
> and how that leads to constraints that I cannot influence. What evolutionary 
> dynamic is responsible for gravity?  I'd sure like to flap my arms and fly. 
> Why can't I?
> 
> Because there are other consciousness that don't want you to fly. And they 
> are many and they win. Gravity is an external appearance of internal 
> interactions that take place in other consciousnesses. Those consciousnesses 
> are not necesseraily linked to biological bodies, so there is no easy way to 
> pinpoint them. They are living in their internal worlds. And their 
> interactions are as such that to us it appears that there is a thing that we 
> call "gravity". 
> 
> 3) How do you account for death in your worldview?  If there are no such 
> things as electrons or brains, then what about the ultimate constraint?  Why 
> do people die?
> 
> In my view, death is just a transition to another life. Since Self is 
> eternal, it means that death is just a point in which the experiences of the 
> Self are changing. Why exactly it turned out to be this way has to do again 
> both with evolution and probably also to some inerent fact about the very 
> nature of self-reference to need diversity to be able to exist.
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2019-04-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 23 Apr 2019, at 07:13, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 4/22/2019 6:32 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 7:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 4/22/2019 4:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal >> <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
>>> 
>>>> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson >>> <mailto:martinabrams...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Consciousness is a program.
>>> 
>>> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that 
>>> would identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a 
>>> glass of bear and its price.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that 
>>>> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or 
>>>> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be 
>>>> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its 
>>> soul to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative) 
>>> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
>>> 
>>> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter 
>>> but certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it 
>>> possible for a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from 
>>> our own, but now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that 
>>> this would be a contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely 
>>> that such universes may exist.
>>> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I 
>>> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and 
>>> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are 
>>> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but 
>>> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is 
>>> gone and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.
>> 
>> It seems otiose to postulate a separate spirit.  A pitiful attempt to grasp 
>> immortality.  Isn't it plain that what is "immaterial" and distinguishes a 
>> brain of a rock is that the brain instantiates processes which incorporate 
>> memory, purpose, perception, and action.
>> 
>> 
>> Is it otiose to make a distinction between a "story" and a "book", or a 
>> "program" and a "computer", or might there be value in that nuance? 
>> 
>> Clearly a program stops executing locally when a computer executing that 
>> program is destroyed, but of course this says nothing about the destruction, 
>> existence, non-existence, continuation, quantity, or locations of other 
>> instances of that program.
> 
> It does if that program was unique, as any program capable of learning is 
> likely to be.

Programs can be rare relatively to the environment, but no programs is unique.

In the phi_i, for each x, there is an infinity of y such that phi_x = phi_y.



> 
>> I think here Turing was making a similar point, in the nuanced distinction 
>> between a mind and a brain.
> 
> I quite agree with the distinction between mind and brain. 

Me too. Brain is a product of the mind, where mind is a product of the 
computational relations, which are special (sigma_1) number relations.




> But why should we imagine it is different from the distinction between a 
> locomotive and transportation, between a ship and a voyage, between a factory 
> and manufacturing?

We can associate a first person mind (consciousness) to a machine/body/number, 
but a first person mind is indeterminate necessarily on all computations going 
through their actual state, and there is an infinity of them, on which 
consciousness differentiate in the first person way, like in 
self-multiplication though experience/experiment. 

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2019-04-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 23 Apr 2019, at 03:32, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Mon, Apr 22, 2019 at 7:51 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> 
> 
> On 4/22/2019 4:24 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
>> 
>>> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson >> <mailto:martinabrams...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Consciousness is a program.
>> 
>> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that 
>> would identify a first person   notion with a third person 
>> notion, like a glass of bear and its price.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that 
>>> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or 
>>> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be 
>>> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.  
>> 
>> 
>> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its soul 
>> to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative) 
>> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
>> 
>> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter but 
>> certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it possible for 
>> a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from our own, but 
>> now I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that this would be a 
>> contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely that such 
>> universes may exist.
>> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I 
>> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and 
>> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are 
>> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but 
>> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is gone 
>> and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.
> 
> It seems otiose to postulate a separate spirit.  A pitiful attempt to grasp 
> immortality.  Isn't it plain that what is "immaterial" and distinguishes a 
> brain of a rock is that the brain instantiates processes which incorporate 
> memory, purpose, perception, and action.
> 
> 
> Is it otiose to make a distinction between a "story" and a "book”,

?

You might be too quick here. A book can instantiate a description of a story, 
but a story is a sequence of events (be them relative computation in 
arithmetic, or in some “universe”).




> or a "program" and a "computer", or might there be value in that nuance? 

I guess you mean a universal program and a computer. But then you use 
“computer” in the sense of “universal digital machine/number”. In this list, I 
use more often “computer” for the physical implementation of a computer, which 
is typically not a computer, nor even anything emubable on a computer, given 
that to emulate even a piece of the physical vacuum, we already needs the 
complete universal dovetailing (the full sigma_1 arithmetical truth). A 
physical computer is only an appearance in the number’s mind, and it is not 
emulable, if only because we cannot algorithmically decide which computations, 
in arithmetic, run through our state of mind, and which does not. 

The difference between software and hardware is only locally dispensable. 
Eventually, the apparent primitive matter is a sum on infinitely many 
computations, belonging to a non recursively enumerable domain. 
A part of the mystery is why physics, or the observable realm, looks so much 
computational, but it is not, and QM confirms this.



> 
> Clearly a program stops executing locally when a computer executing that 
> program is destroyed, but of course this says nothing about the destruction, 
> existence, non-existence, continuation, quantity, or locations of other 
> instances of that program. I think here Turing was making a similar point, in 
> the nuanced distinction between a mind and a brain.

I see it that way, except that Turing refers to bodies, which in his mind, 
meant material bodies, if not, he would have invoked the universal dovetailing 
(whose existence in arithmetic is obvious). But many texts by Turing seem to 
confirm that Turing was a naturalist (metaphysically).

Bruno


> 
> Jason
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because yo

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems (a symposium at the AAAI Stanford Spring Symposium 2019)

2019-04-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 23 Apr 2019, at 01:24, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 3:16 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
>> On 5 Nov 2018, at 02:56, Martin Abramson > <mailto:martinabrams...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> Consciousness is a program.
> 
> Consciousness might be related to a program, but is not a program, that would 
> identify a first person notion with a third person notion, like a glass of 
> bear and its price.
> 
> 
> 
>> It explores whatever entity it finds itself within and becomes that 
>> creature's awareness of the world. For humans it becomes the identity or 
>> soul which responds to anything that affects the organism. It can be 
>> uploaded into a data bank but otherwise it dissipates with death.  
> 
> 
> How? We can attach a soul to a machine, but a machine cannot attach its soul 
> to any particular computations, only to the infinity of (relative) 
> computations, and there is at least aleph_zero one, of not a continuum.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> The above reminded me of this quote from Alan Turing:
> 
> Personally I think that spirit is really eternally connected with matter but 
> certainly not always by the same kind of body. I did believe it possible for 
> a spirit at death to go to a universe entirely separate from our own, but now 
> I consider that matter and spirit are so connected that this would be a 
> contradiction in terms. It is possible however but unlikely that such 
> universes may exist.
> Then as regards the actual connection between spirit and body I 
> consider that the body by reason of being a living body can ``attract´´ and 
> hold on to a ``spirit,´´ whilst the body is alive and awake the two are 
> firmly connected. When the body is asleep I cannot guess what happens but 
> when the body dies the ``mechanism´´ of the body, holding the spirit is gone 
> and the spirit finds a new body sooner or later perhaps immediately.


This shows also how much Turing was blinded by its belief in some primary 
matter. If, he would have understood at once that our consciousness follows the 
differentiating computations in arithmetic.

Emil Post eventually got the immateriality”, but change its mind after reading 
… Turing.

With mechanism, it is simpler to not assume bodies and primitively material 
bodies unless we get some evidences for them. Yet, until now, the evidences 
gathered from the observation of nature confirms mechanism, and refute 
physicalism. For anyone remembering dreams, seeing is not a valid way to 
attribute any ontological existence, others than a subject, which we already 
have in arithmetic.

Bruno



> 
> Jason
>  
> 
> 
>> 
>> On Sun, Nov 4, 2018 at 7:49 PM John Clark > <mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> On Sun, Nov 4, 2018 at 7:22 PM Philip Thrift > <mailto:cloudver...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> > By "experience", philosophers (like Galen Strawson, Philip Goff) mean that 
>> > which you have within yourself right now: the awareness that [...]
>> 
>> Awareness? But awareness is just another word for consciousness, so when you 
>> say  "It's that experience (not just information) that needs processing to 
>> produce consciousness" you're saying that to produce consciousness you must 
>> process consciousness. I don't find that very helpful.
>> > I assume I can be outsmarted by Watson on Jeopardy!
>> 
>> Then Watson't intelligence isn't very pseudo.
>> 
>> John K Clark   
>> 
>>  
>> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 21 Apr 2019, at 11:48, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
> 
>  
> 
> On Fri, Apr 19, 2019, at 11:21, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 18 Apr 2019, at 15:36, Telmo Menezes >> <mailto:te...@telmomenezes.net>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019, at 18:45, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> On 17 Apr 2019, at 08:08, Telmo Menezes >>>> <mailto:te...@telmomenezes.net>> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019, at 05:03, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On 4/16/2019 6:10 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019, at 03:44, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>>> You seem to make self-reference into something esoteric.   Every Mars 
>>>>>>>> Rover knows where it is, the state of its batteries, its instruments, 
>>>>>>>> its communications link, what time it is, what its mission plan is.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> I don't agree that the Mars Rover checking "it's own" battery levels is 
>>>>>>> an example of what is meant by self-reference in this type of 
>>>>>>> discussion. The entity "Mars Rover" exists in your mind and mine, but 
>>>>>>> there is no "Mars Rover mind" where it also exists. The entity "Telmo" 
>>>>>>> exists in your mind and mine, and I happen to be an entity "Telmo" in 
>>>>>>> whose mind the entity "Telmo" also exists. This is real self-reference.
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Or, allow me to invent a programming language where something like this 
>>>>>>> could me made more explicit. Let's say that, in this language, you can 
>>>>>>> define a program P like this:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> program P:
>>>>>>> x = 1
>>>>>>> if x == 1:
>>>>>>> print('My variable x s holding the value 1')
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> The above is the weak form of self-reference that you allude to. It 
>>>>>>> would be like me measuring my arm and noting the result. Oh, my arm is 
>>>>>>> x cm long. But let me show what could me meant instead by real 
>>>>>>> self-reference:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> program P:
>>>>>>> if length(P) > 1000:
>>>>>>> print('I am a complicated program')
>>>>>>> else:
>>>>>>> print('I am a simple program')
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> Do you accept there is a fundamental difference here?
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I take your point.  But I think the difference is only one of degree.  
>>>>>> In my example the Rover knows where it is, lat and long and topology.   
>>>>>> That entails having a model of the world, admittedly simple, in which 
>>>>>> the Rover is represented by itself. 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> I would also say that I think far too much importance is attached to 
>>>>>> self-reference.  It's just a part of intelligence to run "simulations" 
>>>>>> in trying to foresee the consequences of potential actions.  The 
>>>>>> simulation must generally include the actor at some level.  It's not 
>>>>>> some mysterious property raising up a ghost in the machine.
>>>>> 
>>>>> With self-reference comes also self-modification. The self-replicators of 
>>>>> nature that slowly adapt and complexify, the brain "rewiring itself"... 
>>>>> Things get both weird and generative. I suspect that it goes to the core 
>>>>> of what human intelligence is, and what computer intelligence is not 
>>>>> (yet). But if you say that self-reference has not magic property that 
>>>>> explains consciousness, I agree with you.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> You need some magic, but the magic of the truth of  “2+3=5” is enough. 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On consciousness I have nothi

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 20 Apr 2019, at 01:15, Terren Suydam  wrote:
> 
> 1) I'm not sure I can make sense of the term 'influence' without causation. 
> In every instance I can think of, to influence something means to exert some 
> kind of force on it such that it behaves differently then it otherwise would 
> have. It causes it to change.
> 
> 2) I'm not following your evolutionary account of competing consciousnesses, 
> and how that leads to constraints that I cannot influence. What evolutionary 
> dynamic is responsible for gravity?  I'd sure like to flap my arms and fly. 
> Why can't I?
> 
> 3) How do you account for death in your worldview?  If there are no such 
> things as electrons or brains, then what about the ultimate constraint?  Why 
> do people die?

With mechanism, there is no electrons in the ontology, but the existence of the 
electron is given by the lawfulness of the number’s dream. I think you confuse 
“human consciousness” with the universal machine consciousness; It is like, as 
I often say:

Numbers ===> numbers dreams ===> Matter ===> human consciousness.

The number (with the laws of addition and multiplication) should explain 
entirely the existence of dreams and consciousness, and the theory of 
consciousness explains entirely the phenomenology of matter, and indeed we 
rediscover the  quantum mechanics principle from this arithmetical 
phenomenology.

Now it is easier to explain the quantum principle than any forces, be QED or 
gravity. That just means there is a lot of work to do on the material modes of 
self-references, which explain both the quanta and the qualia, but not yet the 
fermions and the bosons, or any hamiltonian or lagrangian. 

And people do not die, except in the eyes of their local neighbours. Death is a 
3p relative thing, not an 1p reality.

Many statement by Cosmic are theorem in the mechanist theory. It is sad that 
Comin is not aware that self)reference is where mathematical logic and 
theoretical computer science excels the most.

Bruno




> 
> Terren
> 
> On Fri, Apr 19, 2019 at 5:19 PM 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> I like the questions. While I might not be able to give satisfactory answers 
> to them, here's how I view the issues raised:
> 
> On Friday, 19 April 2019 23:41:40 UTC+3, Terren Suydam wrote:
> Hey Cosmin, 
> 
> What is the mechanism by which consciousness acts in a top down manner on and 
> influences electrons and presumably other particles? How does that causal 
> link manifest?
> 
> Notice that I specifically use the word "influence" and not "causation". This 
> is because I believe there is no causation. Let's not talk about electrons, 
> because electrons don't exist, they are just ideas in consciousness. Let's 
> just talk about qualia. The idea is that when I see an image for example, I 
> just see it. But that image comes with a whole emergent structure built into 
> it: objects, shapes, colors, shades-of-gray, black-and-white. So in a way 
> there is a top-down influence in levels from the level of the image to all 
> its constituent levels. But it is not causation, because colors don't cause 
> shades-of-gray, but influence them such as to conform with the highest level. 
> Take the colored cube image:
> 
>  
> 
> The reason the squares are yellow and blue is because there is a top-down 
> influence in levels from the level of the full visual scene to the level of 
> colors. But there is no causation. Is just influence, and the influence is in 
> the direction of the parts to contribute to the whole in a meaningful way. 
> 
> The same must happen when we move our body. Whatever is behind the 
> appearances of "electrons", it acts as parts and take part in the greater 
> holistic meaning of moving the body. But again, is not causation, is parts 
> contributing to the whole in a meaningful way.
> 
> You can read the full account that I'm giving to how influence works, in the 
> section "The idealist ontology" on Part II of my The Emergent Structure of 
> Consciousness paper. (or in the book)
> 
>  
> Some other questions: 
> 
> Given that electrons don't really exist by your account, what stops the 
> seemingly inevitably slide into solipsism? Why does our world seem 
> constrained? 
> 
> Is not solipsism because I think it is a good assumption to allow the 
> existence of other consciousnesses in the world. The world seem constrained 
> because of the interactions between consciousnesses, each consciousness 
> wanting to be in power, and you get an evolutionary game in which all 
> consciousnesses adapt to all the other consciousnesses.
> 
>  
> Put another way, what is the principle that makes sense of your account of 
> consciousness such that it can influence some things, but not others?
> 
> 
> I think this is because of evolution. 

Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

2019-04-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 21 Apr 2019, at 08:07, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Saturday, April 20, 2019 at 4:14:27 PM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, April 19, 2019 at 2:53:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 19 Apr 2019, at 04:08, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 6:53:33 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> Sorry, I don't remember what, if anything, I intended to text.
>> 
>> I'm not expert on how Einstein arrived at his famous field equations.  I 
>> know that he insisted on them being tensor equations so that they would have 
>> the same form in all coordinate systems.  That may sound like a mathematical 
>> technicality, but it is really to ensure that the things in the equation, 
>> the tensors, could have a physical interpretation.  He also limited himself 
>> to second order differentials, probably as a matter of simplicity.  And he 
>> excluded torsion, but I don't know why.  And of course he knew it had to 
>> reproduce Newtonian gravity in the weak/slow limit.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> Here's a link which might help;
>> 
>>  https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.05752.pdf <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.05752.pdf>
> 
> Yes. That is helpful.
> 
> The following (long!) video can also help (well, it did help me)
> 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foRPKAKZWx8 
> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foRPKAKZWx8>
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> I've been viewing this video. I don't see how he established that the metric 
> tensor is a correction for curved spacetime. AG 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The physicists' vocabulary can be baffling (at least it is to me).
> 
> I think the basic thing though is that the Einstein Field Equations (EFE) is 
> not - in a sense - absolute. EFE is relative.
> 
> Once one has established a coordinate system/metric (c-sys1) for "the world" 
> independently, then EFE(c-sys1) provides a recipe for making predictions 
> within c-sys1. Change c-sys1 to c-sys2, and EFE(c-sys2) calculates 
> predictions in c-sys2.
> 
> There is no absolute c-sys for "the world”.

Right. 

Like there is no absolute universal machine for the mindscape, including the 
world. Physics is not just coordinate independent, it is observer independent, 
and even more deeply (with mechanism) universal machine independent. That’s why 
we can use arithmetic, or combinator, or any Turing complete theory, any 
“phi_i”,  for the ontology for the “theory of everything”. 

Bruno



> 
> - pt
> 
> 
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Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

2019-04-23 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 20 Apr 2019, at 23:14, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, April 19, 2019 at 2:53:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 19 Apr 2019, at 04:08, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 6:53:33 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> Sorry, I don't remember what, if anything, I intended to text.
>> 
>> I'm not expert on how Einstein arrived at his famous field equations.  I 
>> know that he insisted on them being tensor equations so that they would have 
>> the same form in all coordinate systems.  That may sound like a mathematical 
>> technicality, but it is really to ensure that the things in the equation, 
>> the tensors, could have a physical interpretation.  He also limited himself 
>> to second order differentials, probably as a matter of simplicity.  And he 
>> excluded torsion, but I don't know why.  And of course he knew it had to 
>> reproduce Newtonian gravity in the weak/slow limit.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> Here's a link which might help;
>> 
>>  https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.05752.pdf <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.05752.pdf>
> 
> Yes. That is helpful.
> 
> The following (long!) video can also help (well, it did help me)
> 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foRPKAKZWx8 
> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foRPKAKZWx8>
> 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> I've been viewing this video. I don't see how he established that the metric 
> tensor is a correction for curved spacetime. AG 

ds^2 = dx^2 + dy^2 is Pythagorus theorem, in the plane. The “g_mu,nu” are the 
coefficients needed to ensure un non-planner (curved) metric, and they can be 
use to define the curvature.

Bruno 





> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> AG
>> 
>> On 4/18/2019 7:59 AM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, April 17, 2019 at 7:16:45 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>>> wrote:
>>> I see no new text in this message. AG
>>>  
>>> Brent; if you have time, please reproduce the text you intended. 
>>> 
>>> I recall reading that before Einstein published his GR paper, he used a 
>>> trial and error method to determine the final field equations (as he raced 
>>> for the correct ones in competition with Hilbert, who may have arrived at 
>>> them first).  So it's hard to imagine a mathematical methodology which 
>>> produces them. If you have any articles that attempt to explain how the 
>>> field equations are derived, I'd really like to explore this aspect of GR 
>>> and get some "satisfaction". I can see how he arrived at some principles, 
>>> such as geodesic motion, by applying the Least Action Principle, or how he 
>>> might have intuited that matter/energy effects the geometry of spacetime, 
>>> but from these principles it's baffling how he arrived at the field 
>>> equations. 
>>> 
>>> AG
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, April 17, 2019 at 7:00:55 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 4/17/2019 5:20 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Wednesday, April 17, 2019 at 5:11:55 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 4/17/2019 12:36 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Wednesday, April 17, 2019 at 1:02:09 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On 4/17/2019 7:37 AM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 9:15:40 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> On 4/16/2019 6:14 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:11 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:10:16 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>> On 4/16/2019 11:41 AM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On Monday, April 15, 2019 at 9:26:59 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> On 4/15/2019 7:14 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> 
>

Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-21 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 19 Apr 2019, at 19:42, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, April 19, 2019 at 11:23:40 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 19 Apr 2019, at 14:37, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, April 19, 2019 at 3:18:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 18 Apr 2019, at 21:10, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
> 
> 
>> SNIP
> 
> 
> 
>> The whole point of the fundamental research consists in finding a theory 
>> which account for all theories. The goal is to unify the different 
>> knowledge/belief, without dismissing data (like physics do with respect to 
>> consciousness and qualia).
>> 
>> The laws of nature are reduce to a statistics of number dream, where a dream 
>> is a computation supporting one, or a collection of Löbian machine(s).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> That is sort of a set-up for the the argument of Philip Goff's book.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Galileo's Error
>> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
>> Philip Goff
>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>  
>> <https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html>
>> 
>> 
>> If we want a science of consciousness, we will have to rethink what 
>> 'science' is.
> 
> 
> I am not sure that makes sense. Unless you are pointing on some misconception 
> of science, like the common belief that “science has opted for materialism, 
> when the filed of theology/metaphysics/philosophy-mind/matter has been 
> artificially separated from science for (bad) political purpose, (like 
> genetic has been in the URSS for awhile).
> 
> I don’t believe in the separation of science and religion. 
> 
> Science is just modesty, never claiming truth, proposing precise enough 
> theory and means of testing them.
> 
> Science does not really exist. What exists is human having a scientific 
> attitude, and this does not depend on any domain investigated, be it 
> gardening or metaphysics, or theology.
> 
> The lasting boring debate “God/Not-God” is almost like a trick to make us 
> forget that the original question of the greek was about the reality of the 
> nature: is reality what we see/observe/measure, or is that observable reality 
> only the border, the projection of a deeper and simpler reality. 
> Mathematics/music was conceived as the concurrent reality of physics, in part 
> to the refutation of the earlier Pythagorean conception of numbers (the 
> arithmetical reality kicks back).
> 
> Science is a fuzzy terms. In the theology of the universal machine, theology 
> itself extends science, but it does it in a justifiable way from a general 
> notion of Truth, itself definable mathematically, when assuming the Mechanist 
> hypothesis, and understanding the need of the act of faith, when saying “yes” 
> to the doctor. The modesty comes from there, notably, and the ethic of 
> mechanism is the right to say “no” to the (digitalist) doctor.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Understanding how brains produce consciousness is one of the great 
>> scientific challenges of our age.
> 
> 
> The mechanist solution is that there is no brain, but a web of computations 
> (which provably exist in the arithmetical reality, or any “Turing-complete” 
> reality).
> 
> Then the appearance of brain is explained by the relative state 
> interpretation of arithmetic, on which all self-referential correct machine 
> can be shown to converge (constructively so at the propositional level, but 
> the general theory is highly undecidable, as we could expect).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Some philosophers argue that the mystery is so deep it will never be solved.
> 
> With Mechanism, this becomes a (meta) theorem, if by “solve” you mean 
> rationally justify. 
> When a (Löbian) universal machine introspect itself deep enough, it can only 
> blow its mind, it is bigger than the transfinite. 
> 
> When the machine pushes reason far away, she discover that, necessarily if 
> she feel to be sound, there has to be a corona of surrational truth, in 
> between the truth which are rationally justifiable (with or without Oracle) 
> and those which are false (irrational). 
> 
> The machine can understand by reason that there is something above reason, 
> and which is also lawful. If we keep modestly the fact that we need some 
> faith, (yes doctor), then from that we can derive a large portion of the true 
> but non rationally derivable truth. Machines have a negative theology, with 
> non communicable parts except by referring to the no

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-21 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 19 Apr 2019, at 14:09, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, Apr 19, 2019, at 09:09, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List wrote:
>> 1) The qualia of black-and-white is not on the same level with the qualia of 
>> colors. The qualia of colors include the qualia of black-and-white. You 
>> cannot see a color if that color is not emergent upon black-and-white (or 
>> more specifically shades-of-gray). You cannot experience music if music is 
>> not emergent upon sounds. You cannot taste chocolate if chocolate is not 
>> emergent upon sweet. You cannot understand Pythagoras Theorem if the 
>> understanding of Pythagoras Theorem doesn't emerge upon the understandings 
>> of triangles, angles, lengths, etc. And this is real emergence, because you 
>> really get new existent entities that never existed before in the history of 
>> existence. God himself never experienced these qualia. 
> 
> Ok, I think I understand your presentation better now. You make an 
> interesting point, I don't think I ever considered emergence purely on the 
> side of qualia as you describe.
> 
> There is something here that still does not convince me. For example, you say 
> that the "chocolate taste" qualia emerges from simpler qualia, such as 
> "sweet". Can you really justify this hierarchical relation without implicitly 
> alluding to the quanti side? Consider the qualias of eating a piece of 
> chocolate, a spoonful of sugar and french fries. You can feel that the first 
> two have something in common that distinguishes them from the third, and you 
> can give it the label "sweet". At the same time, you could say that the 
> chocolate and french fries are pleasant to eat, while the spoonful of sugar 
> not so much. You can also label this abstraction with some word. Without 
> empirical grounding, nothing makes one distinction more meaningful than 
> another.

Do you really mean “without empirical grounding”, or “without experiential 
grounding”.

The “empirical grounding” seems to me still too much “quanti”. 



> 
> What makes the "sweat" abstraction so special? Well, it's that we know about 
> sweet receptors in the tongue and we know it's one of the four(five?) basic 
> flavors because of that. I'm afraid you smuggle this knowledge into the pure 
> qualia world. Without it, there is no preferable hierarchical relation and 
> emergence becomes nonsensical again. There's just a field of qualia.

OK.


> 
>> 
>> I don't understand your second part of the question regarding our "cognitive 
>> processes". Are you referring to our specific form of human consciousness ? 
>> I don't think this is only restricted to our human consciousness, for the 
>> reason that it happens to all qualia that we have. All qualia domains are 
>> structured in an emergent way.
> 
> I was referring to your observation that things lose meaning by repetition, 
> like staring at yourself in the mirror for a long time. I to find this 
> interesting, but I can imagine prosaic explanations. For example, that our 
> brain requires a certain amount of variety in its inputs, otherwise it tends 
> to a simpler state were apprehension of meaning is no longer possible. In 
> other words, I am proposing a plumber-style explanation, and asking you 
> why/if you think it can be discarded?
> 
>> 
>> 2) The main ideas in my book are the emergent structure of consciousness and 
>> the self-reference which gives birth to the emergent structure. The ideas 
>> about self-reference that I have are rooted in phenomenology. First I 
>> observe that consciousness is structured in an emergent way, and then I 
>> conclude that the reason it is like this is because there is an entity 
>> called "self-reference" that looks-back-at-itself and in this process 
>> includes the previously existing self and brings a new transcendent self 
>> into existence, like in the case of colors emerging on top of 
>> black-and-white.
> 
> I have the problem above with the first part of what you say, but I like the 
> second part.

Using the theory of machine self-reference (which is really the base of the 
whole of theoretical computer science or recursion theory), we have a try pique 
of “self”:

G (third person self-reference which are rationally justifiable modulo the bet 
on the substitution level)
It is close for Necessitation, and admit the Löb’s axiom (as a theorem)

G* (third person self-reference, rationally justifiable or not. Incompleteness 
assures that G is properly included in G*). It NOT closed for necessitation, 
but admit the Löb axiom (again as a (meta-theorem) about the sound machines).

S4Grz (first person self-reference, non definable by the machine, and typically 
on the qualia side: indubitable but no exprimable immediate knowledge (well: 
immediate only in its []p & <>t & p form, to be sure).

Cosmic is unclear on the []p distinction with []p & p, with third person self, 
and the first person self, the doxastic belief and the epistemological (and non 
communicable) 

Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 19 Apr 2019, at 14:37, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, April 19, 2019 at 3:18:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 18 Apr 2019, at 21:10, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 


> SNIP



> The whole point of the fundamental research consists in finding a theory 
> which account for all theories. The goal is to unify the different 
> knowledge/belief, without dismissing data (like physics do with respect to 
> consciousness and qualia).
> 
> The laws of nature are reduce to a statistics of number dream, where a dream 
> is a computation supporting one, or a collection of Löbian machine(s).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> That is sort of a set-up for the the argument of Philip Goff's book.
> 
> 
> 
> Galileo's Error
> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
> Philip Goff
> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
> 
> 
> If we want a science of consciousness, we will have to rethink what 'science' 
> is.


I am not sure that makes sense. Unless you are pointing on some misconception 
of science, like the common belief that “science has opted for materialism, 
when the filed of theology/metaphysics/philosophy-mind/matter has been 
artificially separated from science for (bad) political purpose, (like genetic 
has been in the URSS for awhile).

I don’t believe in the separation of science and religion. 

Science is just modesty, never claiming truth, proposing precise enough theory 
and means of testing them.

Science does not really exist. What exists is human having a scientific 
attitude, and this does not depend on any domain investigated, be it gardening 
or metaphysics, or theology.

The lasting boring debate “God/Not-God” is almost like a trick to make us 
forget that the original question of the greek was about the reality of the 
nature: is reality what we see/observe/measure, or is that observable reality 
only the border, the projection of a deeper and simpler reality. 
Mathematics/music was conceived as the concurrent reality of physics, in part 
to the refutation of the earlier Pythagorean conception of numbers (the 
arithmetical reality kicks back).

Science is a fuzzy terms. In the theology of the universal machine, theology 
itself extends science, but it does it in a justifiable way from a general 
notion of Truth, itself definable mathematically, when assuming the Mechanist 
hypothesis, and understanding the need of the act of faith, when saying “yes” 
to the doctor. The modesty comes from there, notably, and the ethic of 
mechanism is the right to say “no” to the (digitalist) doctor.




> 
> Understanding how brains produce consciousness is one of the great scientific 
> challenges of our age.


The mechanist solution is that there is no brain, but a web of computations 
(which provably exist in the arithmetical reality, or any “Turing-complete” 
reality).

Then the appearance of brain is explained by the relative state interpretation 
of arithmetic, on which all self-referential correct machine can be shown to 
converge (constructively so at the propositional level, but the general theory 
is highly undecidable, as we could expect).





> Some philosophers argue that the mystery is so deep it will never be solved.

With Mechanism, this becomes a (meta) theorem, if by “solve” you mean 
rationally justify. 
When a (Löbian) universal machine introspect itself deep enough, it can only 
blow its mind, it is bigger than the transfinite. 

When the machine pushes reason far away, she discover that, necessarily if she 
feel to be sound, there has to be a corona of surrational truth, in between the 
truth which are rationally justifiable (with or without Oracle) and those which 
are false (irrational). 

The machine can understand by reason that there is something above reason, and 
which is also lawful. If we keep modestly the fact that we need some faith, 
(yes doctor), then from that we can derive a large portion of the true but non 
rationally derivable truth. Machines have a negative theology, with non 
communicable parts except by referring to the non rational character of the 
hypothesis itself. That is why, actually, it *is* a theology, and after all, it 
is a form of belief in some type of reincarnation (the digital brain/body).




> Others believe our standard scientific methods for investigating the brain 
> will eventually produce an answer.


I can explain why, in the Digital Mechanist frame, we get an answer with the 
standart scientific method, even if a large part of that answer is that the 
soul, god, and all that, are only justifiable through the meta-assumption of 
mechanism, but the level can be as low as we want, to get the consequences.

It is just that the stander scientific method apply to mechanism makes the 
hypothesis of materialism/physicalism testable, and without QM, I would

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 18 Apr 2019, at 12:17, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> What does "self model" even mean ? Notice that any material attempt to 
> implement "self model" leads to infinite regress. Because let's say that a 
> machine has the parts A B C. To have a "self model" would mean to have 
> another part (A B C) which would contain the "self model". But this would be 
> an extra part of the "self" which would be needed to be included in the "self 
> model" in order to actually have a "self model", so you would need another 
> part (A B C (A B C)). But then again you would need to include this part as 
> well in the "self model". So you will get to infinite regress.

That infinite regress problem can be avoided.

See my answer to a post to Brent (sent today).

The idea is simple: if Dx gives xx, then DD gives DD.

In this case, DD will never stop, and that is the usual “first” recursion. But 
you can make a program stopping on its own code, by using special quotation, or 
some typical computer science construct, like the SMN theorem of Kleene. It is 
more like:

If D’x’ gives ‘x’x’’, then D’D’ gives ‘D’D’’.

That is the staring point of almost all of theoretical computer science, and 
the study of self-reeve,ce in arithmetical is very well developed.

Thismisses the first person self-reference, which typically does not admit any 
formalisation (provably so), but it is still can be shown to exist, making he 
point that the universal machine knows that they have a first person notion, 
and knows that they cannot define it. The machine are as much confused as us 
with Ramona Mahasrhi koan: “Who am I?”.





> Therefore, you need a special kind of entity to obtained the desired effect 
> without getting into infinite regress. And that's precisely why the 
> self-reference that I'm talking about in the book is unformalizable.


As I said, the machine already knows this. The universal machine (number, 
combinator, or physical) knows that they have a soul (immaterial, immortal, and 
responsible for the illusion of the physical universe and its lawfulness).



> And as you say, being unformalizable, allows for bootstrapping consciousness 
> into existence.

OK.



> You cannot simulate self-reference just by playing around with atoms. 
> Self-reference just is.

Not OK. You can simulate the self-reference with atoms, and that enacts the 
experience of the first person, which is distributed on the whole arithmetic, 
and can be shown to be non formalisable, nor even definable.



> It just is the source of the entire existence.

It is the source of the entire physical existence, but we have to assume the 
numbers, or the combinators.


> Is not up to anyone to simulate the source of existence.

Indeed.



> You can never obtain the properties of consciousness (meaning, purpose, free 
> will, memory, intelligence, learning, acting, etc.) just by playing around 
> with a bunch of atoms.

You cannot singularise them in some reality, and indeed atoms are immaterial 
constructs depending on intrinsic relation between all universal 
machine/number/combinators.




> All these properties of consciousness are having their source in the 
> unformalizable self-reference.

Yes, but still amenable to meta-formalisation, when we assume mechanism, which 
then explains in detail why the first person is not formalisable, and indeed 
independent of formalisation.

Bruno





> 
> On Thursday, 18 April 2019 04:00:31 UTC+3, Russell Standish wrote:
> each consciousness bootstraps its own 
> meaning from self-reference. Unless the mars rover has a self model in 
> its code (and I don't think it was constructed that way), then I would 
> extremely doubt it has any sort of consciousness.
> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 19 Apr 2019, at 09:16, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> It's still not clear to me what your concept of "machine" is. Is it just an 
> abstract theory or is it some actually existing entity ?

It is a machine in the sense of computer science. It is purely immaterial, and 
can be represented by numbers, or by combinators, of by set of quadruples 
(Turing).

My favorite definition of machine is true the combinator,. I could use to 
define a machine in this (recursive) way:

K is a machine
S is a machine

If x and y are machines, then (x y) is a machine.

So example of machine are K, S (K K) , (S, K), … ((K K) K), (K (K K)), …

We abbreviate ((K K) K) by KKK, and (K (K K)) by K(KK). We suppress

The functioning of the machine is given by the two reduction rule:

Kxy -> x
Sxyz -> xz(yz)

This can be shown Turing universal, so any other digital machine, and digital 
machine execution can be emulated faithfully by such machine.

See the (recent) combinator threads for more on this.

A simple example of a computation is SKSK -> KK(SK) -> K.



> If it is actually existing,

If you agree that x + 2 = 5 admits a solution, then it exist in that sense.  
All other sense of existence are derived for the existence in that sense. There 
are many.





> is it made out of atoms ? Because if it is made out of atoms, where does its 
> free will come from ?


It is of course not made of physical atoms, but you can call “S” and “K” 
combinatoric atoms.

No problem fro free-will for the universal combinator, which of course exists, 
(as the combinator machinery is Turing universal), and universal machine 
(immaterial or material computer) have free-will.



> In the case of humans free will comes from the fact that we are not made out 
> of atoms, but we are consciousnesses, "atoms" being just ideas in us.

OK. But the derivation must explain why atoms have electrons, why orbitals, 
etc. But yes, the physical atoms are eventually reduce to dream made by us, (us 
= the combinator, not the humans which are very particular case of 
machine/number/combinators!).

You might bought some good introductory book on computer science. The original 
papers are the best, I think, so Martin Davis book at Dover are well suited to 
begin with. He use the Turing formalism, where a machine is defined by a set of 
quadruples like q_7 S_9 S_54 q_6, which means if I am in. State 7, in front of 
the symbol S_9, I overwrite the symbol S_54 and go to the state q_6. There are 
also instruction to move left or right on some locally finite, but 
extendendable register/tape. 

If we assume the Church-Turing thesis, any similar formalism will work. 


Bruno




> 
> On Thursday, 18 April 2019 17:04:15 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> They have as much free will as human (direct consequence of the Mechanist 
> assumption).
> 
> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 19 Apr 2019, at 01:24, Russell Standish  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 10:34:26AM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 4/18/2019 2:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>For
>>instance, without an observer to interpret a certain pile of atoms as
>>a machine, it is just a pile of atoms.
>> 
>>Are you saying that Mars Rover cannot interpret some of its data on Mars, 
>> when nobody observed it, or are you saying that Mars Rover has enough 
>> observation abilities?
>> 
>> 
>> What makes the Mars Rover a machine is that it can act and react to its
>> environment.  If it's an AI Rover it can learn and plan and reflect.  To 
>> invoke
>> an "observer" is just push the problem away to "What is an observer?"
> 
> To not recognise the observer is simply to put the problem under a
> rug. Without an interpretation that voltages in excess of 3V represent
> 1, and voltages less than 2V represent 0, the logic circuits are just
> analogue electrical circuits. Without such an interpretation (and
> ipso facto an observer), the rover is not processing data at all!
> 
> Note an observer need be nothing more than a mapping of physical space
> to semantic space. One possibility is to bootstrap the observer by
> self-reflection.

That is needed to just define the “physical space”. This one cannot be invoked 
through an ontological commitment, or mechanism is abandoned of course.

Bruno



> 
> 
> -- 
> 
> 
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 18 Apr 2019, at 19:56, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 4/18/2019 3:17 AM, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List wrote:
>> What does "self model" even mean ? Notice that any material attempt to 
>> implement "self model" leads to infinite regress.
> 
> No.  A "model" is not a complete description, it's a representation of some 
> specific aspects. 

Well, indeed. But that is the sense of “model” when used in physics. In logic, 
the model is the reality that we are doing the theory about.

We should avoid the term “model” and talk only on “theory” and reality”, or we 
will risk to bring confusion.

The theory is the (usually incomplete) representation, like a painting. The 
model/reality is what is supposed to being represented.

For example; the theory of arithmetic is

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

But the arithmetical reality is the highly non computable and non axiomatisable 
mathematical structure involving the infinite set N, with 0, +, * and s 
admitting the standard interpretation we are familiar with.



> Your "self-reference" cannot refer to everything about yourself...which 
> according to you is a stream of consciousness.
> 

Yes.



> Brent
> 
>> Because let's say that a machine has the parts A B C. To have a "self model" 
>> would mean to have another part (A B C) which would contain the "self 
>> model". But this would be an extra part of the "self" which would be needed 
>> to be included in the "self model" in order to actually have a "self model", 
>> so you would need another part (A B C (A B C)). But then again you would 
>> need to include this part as well in the "self model". So you will get to 
>> infinite regress.

I missed this (from Cosmin). Of course that is Driesch “proofs” that Descartes 
will never solve its self-reproduction problem, but that has been solved by the 
second theorem recursion of Kleene (or just Gödel self-referential sentence 
construction). Self-reference here is just obtained by the syntactical 
recursion:

If Dx gives x’x’, then D’D’ gives ‘D’D’’.

See my paper “Amoeba, Planaria and Dreaming machine” for more on this. I have 
used the recursion theorem to program a “planaria”. A program that you can cut 
in pieces, and each pieces regenerate the whole program, with its original 
functionality back.

Bruno



>> Therefore, you need a special kind of entity to obtained the desired effect 
>> without getting into infinite regress. And that's precisely why the 
>> self-reference that I'm talking about in the book is unformalizable. And as 
>> you say, being unformalizable, allows for bootstrapping consciousness into 
>> existence. You cannot simulate self-reference just by playing around with 
>> atoms. Self-reference just is. It just is the source of the entire 
>> existence. Is not up to anyone to simulate the source of existence. You can 
>> never obtain the properties of consciousness (meaning, purpose, free will, 
>> memory, intelligence, learning, acting, etc.) just by playing around with a 
>> bunch of atoms. All these properties of consciousness are having their 
>> source in the unformalizable self-reference.
>> 
>> On Thursday, 18 April 2019 04:00:31 UTC+3, Russell Standish wrote:
>> each consciousness bootstraps its own 
>> meaning from self-reference. Unless the mars rover has a self model in 
>> its code (and I don't think it was constructed that way), then I would 
>> extremely doubt it has any sort of consciousness.
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 18 Apr 2019, at 19:34, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 4/18/2019 2:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> For
>>> instance, without an observer to interpret a certain pile of atoms as
>>> a machine, it is just a pile of atoms.
>> Are you saying that Mars Rover cannot interpret some of its data on Mars, 
>> when nobody observed it, or are you saying that Mars Rover has enough 
>> observation abilities?
>> 
> What makes the Mars Rover a machine is that it can act and react to its 
> environment. 

Yes. And thanks to the fact that it is implemented in the physical reality (the 
sum on all computation), its reaction will fit with its most probable 
environnement, which is (by definition here) the physical environment.
Just to be precise.




> If it's an AI Rover it can learn and plan and reflect. 

An get the right reaction, whatever is the environment, hopefully not departing 
too much form the physical one.

The “essence” of a computation is to be counterfactually correct. 




> To invoke an "observer" is just push the problem away to "What is an 
> observer?”


But to define the physical reality, we need to define the observer. With 
mechanism, the observer is just a number/machine, relative to some other 
numbers/machines. We can define an ideal observer by a sound Löbian machine. 
Its physical reality will be determined by the logic of observation (mainly []p 
& <>t).

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 18 Apr 2019, at 15:36, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019, at 18:45, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 17 Apr 2019, at 08:08, Telmo Menezes >> <mailto:te...@telmomenezes.net>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019, at 05:03, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 4/16/2019 6:10 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019, at 03:44, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:
>>>>>> You seem to make self-reference into something esoteric.   Every Mars 
>>>>>> Rover knows where it is, the state of its batteries, its instruments, 
>>>>>> its communications link, what time it is, what its mission plan is.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I don't agree that the Mars Rover checking "it's own" battery levels is 
>>>>> an example of what is meant by self-reference in this type of discussion. 
>>>>> The entity "Mars Rover" exists in your mind and mine, but there is no 
>>>>> "Mars Rover mind" where it also exists. The entity "Telmo" exists in your 
>>>>> mind and mine, and I happen to be an entity "Telmo" in whose mind the 
>>>>> entity "Telmo" also exists. This is real self-reference.
>>>>> 
>>>>> Or, allow me to invent a programming language where something like this 
>>>>> could me made more explicit. Let's say that, in this language, you can 
>>>>> define a program P like this:
>>>>> 
>>>>> program P:
>>>>> x = 1
>>>>> if x == 1:
>>>>> print('My variable x s holding the value 1')
>>>>> 
>>>>> The above is the weak form of self-reference that you allude to. It would 
>>>>> be like me measuring my arm and noting the result. Oh, my arm is x cm 
>>>>> long. But let me show what could me meant instead by real self-reference:
>>>>> 
>>>>> program P:
>>>>> if length(P) > 1000:
>>>>> print('I am a complicated program')
>>>>> else:
>>>>> print('I am a simple program')
>>>>> 
>>>>> Do you accept there is a fundamental difference here?
>>>> 
>>>> I take your point.  But I think the difference is only one of degree.  In 
>>>> my example the Rover knows where it is, lat and long and topology.   That 
>>>> entails having a model of the world, admittedly simple, in which the Rover 
>>>> is represented by itself. 
>>>> 
>>>> I would also say that I think far too much importance is attached to 
>>>> self-reference.  It's just a part of intelligence to run "simulations" in 
>>>> trying to foresee the consequences of potential actions.  The simulation 
>>>> must generally include the actor at some level.  It's not some mysterious 
>>>> property raising up a ghost in the machine.
>>> 
>>> With self-reference comes also self-modification. The self-replicators of 
>>> nature that slowly adapt and complexify, the brain "rewiring itself"... 
>>> Things get both weird and generative. I suspect that it goes to the core of 
>>> what human intelligence is, and what computer intelligence is not (yet). 
>>> But if you say that self-reference has not magic property that explains 
>>> consciousness, I agree with you.
>> 
>> 
>> You need some magic, but the magic of the truth of  “2+3=5” is enough. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> On consciousness I have nothing interesting to say (no jokes about ever 
>>> having had, please :). I think that:
>>> 
>>> consciousness = existence
>> 
>> 
>> Hmm… That looks like God made it. Or like “it is”.
>> 
>> Are you OK with the ideas that from the point of view of a conscious entity, 
>> consciousness is something:
>> 
>> Immediately knowable, and indubitable, (in case the machine can reason)
>> Non definable, and non provable to any other machine.
> 
> I agree. Would this not also apply to the concept of "existance”?

I am not sure what you mean by “existence” when used alone. It might be a 
“professional deformation”, but to me existence is a logical quantifier, and is 
not a intrinsic property.

I think that may be consciousness is a fixed point of existence, in the sen

Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

2019-04-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 19 Apr 2019, at 04:08, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 6:53:33 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> Sorry, I don't remember what, if anything, I intended to text.
> 
> I'm not expert on how Einstein arrived at his famous field equations.  I know 
> that he insisted on them being tensor equations so that they would have the 
> same form in all coordinate systems.  That may sound like a mathematical 
> technicality, but it is really to ensure that the things in the equation, the 
> tensors, could have a physical interpretation.  He also limited himself to 
> second order differentials, probably as a matter of simplicity.  And he 
> excluded torsion, but I don't know why.  And of course he knew it had to 
> reproduce Newtonian gravity in the weak/slow limit.
> 
> Brent
> 
> Here's a link which might help;
> 
>  https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.05752.pdf 

Yes. That is helpful.

The following (long!) video can also help (well, it did help me)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=foRPKAKZWx8 



Bruno



> 
> AG
> 
> On 4/18/2019 7:59 AM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, April 17, 2019 at 7:16:45 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>> wrote:
>> I see no new text in this message. AG
>>  
>> Brent; if you have time, please reproduce the text you intended. 
>> 
>> I recall reading that before Einstein published his GR paper, he used a 
>> trial and error method to determine the final field equations (as he raced 
>> for the correct ones in competition with Hilbert, who may have arrived at 
>> them first).  So it's hard to imagine a mathematical methodology which 
>> produces them. If you have any articles that attempt to explain how the 
>> field equations are derived, I'd really like to explore this aspect of GR 
>> and get some "satisfaction". I can see how he arrived at some principles, 
>> such as geodesic motion, by applying the Least Action Principle, or how he 
>> might have intuited that matter/energy effects the geometry of spacetime, 
>> but from these principles it's baffling how he arrived at the field 
>> equations. 
>> 
>> AG
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, April 17, 2019 at 7:00:55 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 4/17/2019 5:20 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, April 17, 2019 at 5:11:55 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 4/17/2019 12:36 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 
 On Wednesday, April 17, 2019 at 1:02:09 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
 
 
 On 4/17/2019 7:37 AM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 9:15:40 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 4/16/2019 6:14 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:11 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com <> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:10:16 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 4/16/2019 11:41 AM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Monday, April 15, 2019 at 9:26:59 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 4/15/2019 7:14 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 
 On Friday, April 12, 2019 at 5:48:23 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
 <>wrote:
 
 
 On Thursday, April 11, 2019 at 10:56:08 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
 
 
 On 4/11/2019 9:33 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, April 11, 2019 at 7:12:17 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 4/11/2019 4:53 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, April 11, 2019 at 4:37:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 4/11/2019 1:58 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 
 He might have been referring to a transformation to a tangent 
 space where the metric tensor is diagonalized and its derivative 
 at that point in spacetime is zero. Does this make any sense?
>>> 
>>> Sort of. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Yeah, that's what he's doing. He's assuming a given coordinate 
>>> system and some arbitrary point in a non-empty spacetime. So 
>>> spacetime has a non zero curvature and the derivative of the metric 
>>> tensor is generally non-zero at that arbitrary point, however small 
>>> we assume the region around that point. But applying the EEP, we 
>>> can transform to the tangent space at that point to diagonalize 
>>>   the metric 
>>> tensor and have its derivative as zero at that point. Does THIS 
>>> make sense? AG
>> 
>> Yep.  That's pretty much the defining characteristic of a Riemannian 
>> space.
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> But 

Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 18 Apr 2019, at 21:10, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 8:56:54 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 18 Apr 2019, at 12:17, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 4:53:36 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 16 Apr 2019, at 15:06, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>>> On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics
>>>> 
>>>> The physics of Game of Thrones
>>>> https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/
>>>>  
>>>> <https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/>
>>> 
>>> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.
>>> 
>>> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. That 
>>> is not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if that is 
>>> the case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = phi_u’ 
>>> extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if mechanism is 
>>> correct. 
>>> 
>>> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our 
>>> substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would 
>>> be the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and 
>>> physics would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would 
>>> make Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for 
>>> Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> in another number?
>>>> 
>>>> Or: Is there a a GoT reality?
>>> 
>>> Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining 
>>> (every)thing.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Assume "our physics" is the Standard Model.
>> 
>> I can’t. If that “model” (theory) is the correct fundamental physics, then 
>> it has to be deduced from arithmetic (and Mechanism).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>>  Here it is in a few hundred characters (Lagrangian_{SM}):
>>>  
>>>  
>>> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like
>>>  
>>> <https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like>
>>> 
>>> How does one "derive" this Lagrangian_{SM} from the logic of elementary 
>>> arithmetic (Logic_{EA}) -- even given the translation of the language of 
>>> Lagrangians into the language of Logic_{EA}.
>> 
>> Yes, formalising a theory is not the same as deriving it.
>> 
>> How, to derive it? By studying the “material modes of self-reference, that 
>> the mode of the first person self, or the first person plural self. How, and 
>> why is explained in most of my papers.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Why should our SM be the one, and not an alternative SM?
>> 
>> Because the sum on all computations is unique. 
>> 
>> That is the nice thing with Mechanism. It justifies why there is an apparent 
>> physical universe, having the same law for any universal numbers. It justify 
>> the existence of physics, and its unicity, even if it take the shape of a 
>> mutilverse, or even some multi-multiverses.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> If every SM equation is possible (not just the one equation above), what is 
>>> "explained”?
>> 
>> Only one SM equation can be possible (assuming mechanism of course, which I 
>> do all along).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> It makes more sense that Lagrangian_{SM} and Logic_{EA} are completely 
>>> contingent hypotheses written in languages created by us humans to model 
>>> reality.
>> 
>> That would identify physics and geography, but with mechanism, we know 
>> already that geography is contingent, where the physical reality is lawful. 
>> Would all material mode of self-reference have collapsed into propositional 
>> calculus, there would be no physical laws, only geographical laws.
>> 
>> Bruno

Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 18 Apr 2019, at 19:51, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 4/18/2019 2:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.
>> 
>> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. That 
>> is not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if that is 
>> the case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = phi_u’ 
>> extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if mechanism is 
>> correct.
>> 
>> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our 
>> substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would be 
>> the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and physics 
>> would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would make 
>> Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for 
>> Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.
> 
> That is one of my reservations about your theory, that it requires the 
> substitution level to take into account the environment. Not the whole 
> universe, but representative local sample of the universe. 

Yes, but that is what makes “my” mechanist hypothesis weaker than all the 
others (meaning that what is prove for it will be true for all the other). 
Usually, mechanism assumes some high level, like the neuronal net, and nothing 
else. My reasoning, on the contrary, still functions, even if the level is 
string theory applied to the whole physical universe, with 10^(10^100) correct 
decimals, as those approximations are all implemented in the arithmetical 
reality.




> It wouldn't make our biology and physics false, but it might make them what 
> we call "effective theories" in physics, i.e. not fundamental in the 
> metaphysical sense but approximations to an unknown fundamental theory that 
> is effective in the domain where we can test it.

Yes, that was the goal. Biology is still reducible to physics, but physics 
becomes explained by a more fundamental theory given by any Turing 
universal/complete theory.

So here is a theory of everything, explaining both consciousness and the 
appearance of matter:

Classical logic +

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Here is another:

1) If A = B and A = C, then B = C
2) If A = B then AC = BC
3) If A = B then CA = CB
4) KAB = A
5) SABC = AC(BC)

And here is one, on which Number theory might some day provide analytical 
(complex) tools to proceed. It is a Turing Universal system of Diophantine 
equation (worked out by Matiyasevitch and Jones). All the variables are 
integers:

Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y 

ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2

Qu = B^(5^60)

La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5

Th +  2Z = B^5

L = U + TTh

E = Y + MTh

N = Q^16

R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + + 
LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N)
 + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1)

P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2

(P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2

4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2

K = R + 1 + HP - H

A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2

C = 2R + 1 Ph

D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga

D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1

F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1

(D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1


Any such theory will do. The theology (including physics) that is extracted 
from them is the same. Theology, and thus physics is machine-independent, or 
phi_i-independent.

> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 18 Apr 2019, at 14:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> There are 
> 
> I: Information
> E: Experience 
> M: Matter 
> 
> Some think selfhood can be made of pure-I; others think pure-E.
> 
> Most modern materialists think I-type M is enough.
> But experiential materialists think it's (E+I)-type M.
> 
> The ancient materialist Epicurus thought there were physical (I) and 
> psychical (E) atoms, so he was already an experiential materialist.


But we have not found (primitively) psychical atoms.

Nor do we have really found serious evidence for (primitively) material atoms. 

A case could be made that the fermions are material atoms, and the boson would 
be the psychical atoms, but that would be a sort of abuse of words, as both 
notions are well defined third or first  person sharable, and adding mind to 
them seems arbitrary, and does not seem to lead to testable conclusions, nor to 
explain anything. 

And, as I said, to introduce unintelligible axioms to allow oneself to feel 
“superior” (in this case: conscious) to some other creature is a bit 
frightening, as racism proceeds in a similar way.

Bruno





> 
> - pt
> 
> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 5:34:16 AM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
> The only downside being that... the robot does not exist. People are tricking 
> themselves too easily into personifying objects. There is no robot there, 
> there are just a bunch of atoms that bang into each others. You can move 
> those atoms around all day long as you want. You will not create 
> self-reference or "self models" or "imaginations of itself". These are just 
> concepts that exist in the mind of the "researchers" and the "researchers" 
> not getting outside of the lab too often, start to believe their own 
> fantasies.
>  
> On Thursday, 18 April 2019 10:11:09 UTC+3, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> Columbia engineers create a robot that can imagine itself
> 
> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 18 Apr 2019, at 12:28, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 4:33:48 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 18 Apr 2019, at 09:11, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, April 17, 2019 at 8:29:25 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
>> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 06:22:35PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> wrote: 
>> > 
>> > But how complete must the self-model be.  
>> 
>> That is the 64 million dollar question. 
>> 
>> > As Bruno has pointed out, it can't 
>> > be complete.  Current Mars Rovers have some "house keeping"self-knowledge, 
>> > like battery charge, temperature, power draw, next task, location, 
>> > time,... 
>> 
>> I don't think that's enough. I think it must have the ability to 
>> recognise other (perhaps similar) robots/machines as being like 
>> itself. 
>> 
>> > Of course current rovers don't have AI which would entail them learning 
>> > and 
>> > planning, which would require that they be able to run a simulation which 
>> > included some representation of themself; but that representation might be 
>> > very simple.  When you plan to travel to the next city your plan includes 
>> > a 
>> > representation of yourself, but probably only as a location. 
>> > 
>> 
>> Hod Lipson's starfish's representation of itself is no doubt rather 
>> simple and crude, but it does pose the question of whether it might 
>> have some sort of consciousness. 
>> 
>> 
>> -- 
>> 
>>  
>> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
>> Principal, High Performance Coders 
>> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpc...@hpcoders.com.au <> 
>> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>> <http://www.hpcoders.com.au/> 
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> "self reference" has been long been a subject of AI, programming language 
>> theory (program reflection), theorem provers (higher-order logic).
>> 
>> I haven't seen yet what Hod Lipson has done
>> 
>> Columbia engineers create a robot that can imagine itself
>> January 30, 2019 / Columbia Engineering
>> https://engineering.columbia.edu/press-releases/lipson-self-aware-machines 
>> <https://engineering.columbia.edu/press-releases/lipson-self-aware-machines>
>> 
>> 
>> but here is an interview with another researcher:
>> 
>> 
>> The Unavoidable Problem of Self-Improvement in AI: An Interview with Ramana 
>> Kumar, Part 1
>> March 19, 2019/by Jolene Creighton
>> https://futureoflife.org/2019/03/19/the-unavoidable-problem-of-self-improvement-in-ai-an-interview-with-ramana-kumar-part-1/
>>  
>> <https://futureoflife.org/2019/03/19/the-unavoidable-problem-of-self-improvement-in-ai-an-interview-with-ramana-kumar-part-1/>
>> 
>> The Problem of Self-Referential Reasoning in Self-Improving AI: An Interview 
>> with Ramana Kumar, Part 2
>> March 21, 2019/by Jolene Creighton
>> https://futureoflife.org/2019/03/21/the-problem-of-self-referential-reasoning-in-self-improving-ai-an-interview-with-ramana-kumar-part-2/
>>  
>> <https://futureoflife.org/2019/03/21/the-problem-of-self-referential-reasoning-in-self-improving-ai-an-interview-with-ramana-kumar-part-2/>
>> 
>> 
>> To break this down a little, in essence, theorem provers are computer 
>> programs that assist with the development of mathematical correctness 
>> proofs. These mathematical correctness proofs are the highest safety 
>> standard in the field, showing that a computer system always produces the 
>> correct output (or response) for any given input. Theorem provers create 
>> such proofs by using the formal methods of mathematics to prove or disprove 
>> the “correctness” of the control algorithms underlying a system. HOL theorem 
>> provers, in particular, are a family of interactive theorem proving systems 
>> that facilitate the construction of theories in higher-order logic. 
>> Higher-order logic, which supports quantification over functions, sets, sets 
>> of sets, and more, is more expressive than other logics, allowing the user 
>> to write formal statements at a high level of abstraction.
>> 
>> In retrospect, Kumar states that trying to prove a theorem about multiple 
>> steps of self-reflection i

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 18 Apr 2019, at 12:05, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> Before going deeper into analyzing your claims, I would like to know if your 
> concept of machine has free will. Because this is a very important concept 
> for consciousness. If you machine doesn't have free will, then you are not 
> talking about consciousness.

They have as much free will as human (direct consequence of the Mechanist 
assumption).

Now, many people defending, or attacking the notion of free-will, have an 
inconsistent notion of free-will.

So, when I say that machines and humans in particular have free will, I mean 
that they have the ability to make a choice in absence of complete information. 
Free-will relies on the intrinsic “liberty” or “universality” of the universal 
number. The universal number are born with 8 conflicting view of reality, but 
they have a partial control to what happens to them. When they attempt to get 
total control, they loss universality/liberty/free-will.

Bruno




> 
> On Wednesday, 17 April 2019 19:08:40 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> machine
> 
> 
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Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 18 Apr 2019, at 12:17, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 4:53:36 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 16 Apr 2019, at 15:06, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics
>>> 
>>> The physics of Game of Thrones
>>> https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/
>>>  
>>> <https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/>
>> 
>> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.
>> 
>> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. That 
>> is not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if that is 
>> the case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = phi_u’ 
>> extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if mechanism is 
>> correct. 
>> 
>> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our 
>> substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would be 
>> the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and physics 
>> would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would make 
>> Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for 
>> Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> in another number?
>>> 
>>> Or: Is there a a GoT reality?
>> 
>> Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining (every)thing.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Assume "our physics" is the Standard Model.
> 
> I can’t. If that “model” (theory) is the correct fundamental physics, then it 
> has to be deduced from arithmetic (and Mechanism).
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>>  Here it is in a few hundred characters (Lagrangian_{SM}):
>>  
>>  
>> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like
>>  
>> <https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like>
>> 
>> How does one "derive" this Lagrangian_{SM} from the logic of elementary 
>> arithmetic (Logic_{EA}) -- even given the translation of the language of 
>> Lagrangians into the language of Logic_{EA}.
> 
> Yes, formalising a theory is not the same as deriving it.
> 
> How, to derive it? By studying the “material modes of self-reference, that 
> the mode of the first person self, or the first person plural self. How, and 
> why is explained in most of my papers.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Why should our SM be the one, and not an alternative SM?
> 
> Because the sum on all computations is unique. 
> 
> That is the nice thing with Mechanism. It justifies why there is an apparent 
> physical universe, having the same law for any universal numbers. It justify 
> the existence of physics, and its unicity, even if it take the shape of a 
> mutilverse, or even some multi-multiverses.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> If every SM equation is possible (not just the one equation above), what is 
>> "explained”?
> 
> Only one SM equation can be possible (assuming mechanism of course, which I 
> do all along).
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> It makes more sense that Lagrangian_{SM} and Logic_{EA} are completely 
>> contingent hypotheses written in languages created by us humans to model 
>> reality.
> 
> That would identify physics and geography, but with mechanism, we know 
> already that geography is contingent, where the physical reality is lawful. 
> Would all material mode of self-reference have collapsed into propositional 
> calculus, there would be no physical laws, only geographical laws.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The puzzle is that if one looks at the literal SM formula shown here:
> 
>
> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png 
> <https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png>
> 

It is somehow justified by the data, and some theoretical ideas, in the book by 
Alain Connes and Matilde Marcolli: Non Commutative Geometry, Quantum Filed and 
Motives. That is page 167 of that book, and I am not up there. 
Yet, the main ideas are rather well explained in the more readable book by Vic. 
Stenger.

Bu

Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 16 Apr 2019, at 15:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics
>> 
>> The physics of Game of Thrones
>> https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/
>>  
>> <https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/>
> 
> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.
> 
> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. That is 
> not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if that is the 
> case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = phi_u’ 
> extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if mechanism is 
> correct. 
> 
> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our 
> substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would be 
> the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and physics 
> would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would make 
> Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for 
> Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> in another number?
>> 
>> Or: Is there a a GoT reality?
> 
> Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining (every)thing.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> Assume "our physics" is the Standard Model.

I can’t. If that “model” (theory) is the correct fundamental physics, then it 
has to be deduced from arithmetic (and Mechanism).




> 
>  Here it is in a few hundred characters (Lagrangian_{SM}):
>  
>  
> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like
>  
> <https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like>
> 
> How does one "derive" this Lagrangian_{SM} from the logic of elementary 
> arithmetic (Logic_{EA}) -- even given the translation of the language of 
> Lagrangians into the language of Logic_{EA}.

Yes, formalising a theory is not the same as deriving it.

How, to derive it? By studying the “material modes of self-reference, that the 
mode of the first person self, or the first person plural self. How, and why is 
explained in most of my papers.




> Why should our SM be the one, and not an alternative SM?

Because the sum on all computations is unique. 

That is the nice thing with Mechanism. It justifies why there is an apparent 
physical universe, having the same law for any universal numbers. It justify 
the existence of physics, and its unicity, even if it take the shape of a 
mutilverse, or even some multi-multiverses.




> If every SM equation is possible (not just the one equation above), what is 
> "explained”?

Only one SM equation can be possible (assuming mechanism of course, which I do 
all along).



> 
> It makes more sense that Lagrangian_{SM} and Logic_{EA} are completely 
> contingent hypotheses written in languages created by us humans to model 
> reality.

That would identify physics and geography, but with mechanism, we know already 
that geography is contingent, where the physical reality is lawful. Would all 
material mode of self-reference have collapsed into propositional calculus, 
there would be no physical laws, only geographical laws.

Bruno




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Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

2019-04-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 17 Apr 2019, at 01:41, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 4/16/2019 7:56 AM, agrayson2...@gmail.com  
> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, April 15, 2019 at 9:26:59 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 4/15/2019 7:14 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Friday, April 12, 2019 at 5:48:23 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, April 11, 2019 at 10:56:08 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 4/11/2019 9:33 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
 
 
 On Thursday, April 11, 2019 at 7:12:17 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
 
 
 On 4/11/2019 4:53 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, April 11, 2019 at 4:37:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 4/11/2019 1:58 PM, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> He might have been referring to a transformation to a tangent space 
>>> where the metric tensor is diagonalized and its derivative at that 
>>> point in spacetime is zero. Does this make any sense?
>> 
>> Sort of. 
>> 
>> 
>> Yeah, that's what he's doing. He's assuming a given coordinate system 
>> and some arbitrary point in a non-empty spacetime. So spacetime has a 
>> non zero curvature and the derivative of the metric tensor is generally 
>> non-zero at that arbitrary point, however small we assume the region 
>> around that point. But applying the EEP, we can  
>>transform to the tangent space at that point to 
>> diagonalize the metric tensor and have its derivative as zero at that 
>> point. Does THIS make sense? AG
> 
> Yep.  That's pretty much the defining characteristic of a Riemannian 
> space.
> 
> Brent
> 
> But isn't it weird that changing labels on spacetime points by 
> transforming coordinates has the result of putting the test particle in 
> local free fall, when it wasn't prior to the transformation? AG 
> 
 It doesn't put it in free-fall.  If the particle has EM forces on it, it 
 will deviate from the geodesic in the tangent space coordinates.  The 
 transformation is just adapting the coordinates to the local free-fall 
 which removes gravity as a force...but not other forces.
 
 Brent
 
 In both cases, with and without non-gravitational forces acting on test 
 particle, I assume the trajectory appears identical to an external 
 observer, before and after coordinate transformation to the tangent plane 
 at some point; all that's changed are the labels of spacetime points. If 
 this is true, it's still hard to see why changing labels can remove the 
 gravitational forces. And what does this buy us? AG
>>> 
>>> You're looking at it the wrong way around.  There never were any 
>>> gravitational forces, just your choice of coordinate system made fictitious 
>>> forces appear; just like when you use a merry-go-round as your reference 
>>> frame you get coriolis forces. 
>>> 
>>> If gravity is a fictitious force produced by the choice of coordinate 
>>> system, in its absence (due to a change in coordinate system) how does GR 
>>> explain motion? Test particles move on geodesics in the absence of 
>>> non-gravitational forces, but why do they move at all? AG
>>> 
>>> Maybe GR assumes motion but doesn't explain it. AG 
>> 
>> The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to  interpret, they 
>> mainly make models. By a model is meant a  mathematical construct which, 
>> with the addition of certain verbal  interpretations, describes observed 
>> phenomena. The justification of  such a mathematical construct is solely and 
>> precisely that it is  expected to work.
>> --—John von Neumann
>> 
>> This is straight out of the "shut up and calculate" school, and I don't 
>> completely buy it. E.g., the Principle of Relativity and Least Action 
>> Principle give strong indications of not only how the universe works, but 
>> why. That is, they're somewhat explanatory in nature. AG
> 
> Fine, then take them as explanations.  But to ask that they be explained is 
> to misunderstand their status.  It's possible that they could be explained; 
> but only by finding a more fundamental theory that includes them as 
> consequences or special cases.  Whatever theory is fundamental cannot have an 
> explanation in the sense you want because then it would not be fundamental.

Indeed. 

And with Mechanism, any Turing-complete theory can be chosen as fundamental, 
because we can’t explain them from less (provably so).

Then, physics becomes a sum on all histories, and the least action principle 
should be derivable from its quantum structure imposed by incompleteness on 
observation (defined by some variant of []p & p).

We cannot explained what we are starting from.

Bruno


> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 18 Apr 2019, at 09:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, April 17, 2019 at 8:29:25 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 06:22:35PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote: 
> > 
> > But how complete must the self-model be.  
> 
> That is the 64 million dollar question. 
> 
> > As Bruno has pointed out, it can't 
> > be complete.  Current Mars Rovers have some "house keeping"self-knowledge, 
> > like battery charge, temperature, power draw, next task, location, time,... 
> 
> I don't think that's enough. I think it must have the ability to 
> recognise other (perhaps similar) robots/machines as being like 
> itself. 
> 
> > Of course current rovers don't have AI which would entail them learning and 
> > planning, which would require that they be able to run a simulation which 
> > included some representation of themself; but that representation might be 
> > very simple.  When you plan to travel to the next city your plan includes a 
> > representation of yourself, but probably only as a location. 
> > 
> 
> Hod Lipson's starfish's representation of itself is no doubt rather 
> simple and crude, but it does pose the question of whether it might 
> have some sort of consciousness. 
> 
> 
> -- 
> 
>  
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpc...@hpcoders.com.au  
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>  
>  
> 
> 
> 
> 
> "self reference" has been long been a subject of AI, programming language 
> theory (program reflection), theorem provers (higher-order logic).
> 
> I haven't seen yet what Hod Lipson has done
> 
> Columbia engineers create a robot that can imagine itself
> January 30, 2019 / Columbia Engineering
> https://engineering.columbia.edu/press-releases/lipson-self-aware-machines
> 
> 
> but here is an interview with another researcher:
> 
> 
> The Unavoidable Problem of Self-Improvement in AI: An Interview with Ramana 
> Kumar, Part 1
> March 19, 2019/by Jolene Creighton
> https://futureoflife.org/2019/03/19/the-unavoidable-problem-of-self-improvement-in-ai-an-interview-with-ramana-kumar-part-1/
> 
> The Problem of Self-Referential Reasoning in Self-Improving AI: An Interview 
> with Ramana Kumar, Part 2
> March 21, 2019/by Jolene Creighton
> https://futureoflife.org/2019/03/21/the-problem-of-self-referential-reasoning-in-self-improving-ai-an-interview-with-ramana-kumar-part-2/
> 
> 
> To break this down a little, in essence, theorem provers are computer 
> programs that assist with the development of mathematical correctness proofs. 
> These mathematical correctness proofs are the highest safety standard in the 
> field, showing that a computer system always produces the correct output (or 
> response) for any given input. Theorem provers create such proofs by using 
> the formal methods of mathematics to prove or disprove the “correctness” of 
> the control algorithms underlying a system. HOL theorem provers, in 
> particular, are a family of interactive theorem proving systems that 
> facilitate the construction of theories in higher-order logic. Higher-order 
> logic, which supports quantification over functions, sets, sets of sets, and 
> more, is more expressive than other logics, allowing the user to write formal 
> statements at a high level of abstraction.
> 
> In retrospect, Kumar states that trying to prove a theorem about multiple 
> steps of self-reflection in a HOL theorem prover was a massive undertaking. 
> Nonetheless, he asserts that the team took several strides forward when it 
> comes to grappling with the self-referential problem, noting that they built 
> “a lot of the requisite infrastructure and got a better sense of what it 
> would take to prove it and what it would take to build a prototype agent 
> based on model polymorphism.”
> 
> Kumar added that MIRI’s (the Machine Intelligence Research Institute’s) 
> Logical Inductors could also offer a satisfying version of formal 
> self-referential reasoning and, consequently, provide a solution to the 
> self-referential problem.

Proving makes sense only in a theory. How could we know that the theory is 
correct? That is precisely what Gödel and tarski showed to be impossible.

Bruno




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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 18 Apr 2019, at 03:29, Russell Standish  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 06:22:35PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:
>> 
>> But how complete must the self-model be. 
> 
> That is the 64 million dollar question.

To have consciousness, I put the bar on universality, to simplify. Technically 
the notion of “subcreativity”, or the equivalent notion of self-speedability 
should be enough.

To have self-consciousness, it needs to be Gödel-Löbian, or a reflexive K4 
reasoner, to use Smullyan terminology.



> 
>> As Bruno has pointed out, it can't
>> be complete.  Current Mars Rovers have some "house keeping"self-knowledge,
>> like battery charge, temperature, power draw, next task, location, time,...
> 
> I don't think that's enough. I think it must have the ability to
> recognise other (perhaps similar) robots/machines as being like
> itself.

Again, that is equivalent with being “rich enough” or Löbian, but hat is needed 
to have self-consciousness, to distinguish []p (used to define the belief of 
another machine) and []p & p, needed to “know itself” and assess the difference.

(Brute) consciousness is a simple form of knowledge. Self-consciousness is more 
demanding, it needs the transitive formula ([]p -> [][]p, Smullyan’s awareness 
of self-awareness).

Bruno



> 
>> Of course current rovers don't have AI which would entail them learning and
>> planning, which would require that they be able to run a simulation which
>> included some representation of themself; but that representation might be
>> very simple.  When you plan to travel to the next city your plan includes a
>> representation of yourself, but probably only as a location.
>> 
> 
> Hod Lipson's starfish's representation of itself is no doubt rather
> simple and crude, but it does pose the question of whether it might
> have some sort of consciousness.
> 
> 
> -- 
> 
> 
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 18 Apr 2019, at 03:00, Russell Standish  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 06:25:19PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Rover is conscious, but still dissociated from ‘rover”. But that is just
>> because it has no strong induction axiom, and no way to build approximation 
>> of
>> models of itself. It lack a re-entring neural system rich enough to  manage 
>> the
>> gap between its first person apprehension, and the third person apparent
>> reality around it.
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>The entity "Telmo" exists in your mind and mine, and I happen to be an
>>entity "Telmo" in whose mind the entity "Telmo" also exists. This is real
>>self-reference.
>> 
>> 
>> I agree. It is unclear for me if Mars Rover has it, or not, as I have not 
>> seen
>> the code, and even seeing it, it could ba a Helle of a difficulty to prove it
>> has not that ability. I doubt it has it, because Naza does not want a free
>> exploratory on Mars, but a docile slave.
> 
> 
> I do think self-reference has something to do with it, as without an
> observer to give meaning to something, it has no meaning.

The essence of a universal number is to provide meaning, it associates to 
number/code some function, or some truth value if the function is a predicate.

What is the meaning of the number x for the number u? It is phi_x, a function.

(I recall for the others that, when phi_i represents a recursive (computable) 
enumeration of all partial computable functions, a number u is universal means 
that phi_u() = phi_x(y).
 is some computable bijection from NxN to N.



> For
> instance, without an observer to interpret a certain pile of atoms as
> a machine, it is just a pile of atoms.

Are you saying that Mars Rover cannot interpret some of its data on Mars, when 
nobody observed it, or are you saying that Mars Rover has enough observation 
abilities?






> Unless you propose a la Bishop
> Berkley some sort of devine mind from which all meaning radiates,

The universal numbers are divine enough. The (finite) code of a universal 
dovetailer radiates all operational meaning of all codes.




> the
> only other possibility is that each consciousness bootstraps its own
> meaning from self-reference.

That has to be the case for self-consciousness. It is a sort of 
self-self-reference. 



> Unless the mars rover has a self model in
> its code (and I don't think it was constructed that way), then I would
> extremely doubt it has any sort of consciousness.

OK, Rover has no self-consciousness (plausibly), but it has the consciousness 
of the universal machine/number. It is a dissociative state, probably not 
related, in any genuine way, to Mars Rover activity on Mars. It is still a 
baby, and most probably does not distinguish truth from its inner truth.

Bruno



> A more interesting
> possibility is Hod Lipson's "starfish" robot, which has self-reference baked
> in.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> 
> -- 
> 
> 
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-17 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 17 Apr 2019, at 08:18, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> It's actually the other way around: biology is realized by certain processes 
> happening in consciousness. Biology is just an external appearance of 
> internal processes happening in consciousness.


I totally agree. More exactly, the classical (paltonist) universal machine 
agree with you, except it makes precise the assumption of 
numbers/combiantors/machine, and the consciousness is the consciousness of the 
universal machine.

It is like:

Number => self-reference (1p = consciousness) => “interfering dream/histories” 
=> matter => human consciousness

Bruno




> 
> On Wednesday, 17 April 2019 02:29:24 UTC+3, Brent wrote:
> 
> What makes them "biological"?  Do they have to be made of amino acids?  
> nuclei acids?  do they have to be powered by a phosphate cycle?  What 
> makes one bunch of biological molecules conscious and another very 
> similar bunch dead, or anesthesized? 
> 
> The only coherent answer is that consciousness is realized by certain 
> information processing...independent of the molecules instantiating the 
> process. 
> 
> Brent 
> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
;>> 
>>>> Brent
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 4/15/2019 11:28 AM, za_wishy via Everything List wrote:
>>>>> Hmm... the thing is that what I'm arguing for in the book is that 
>>>>> self-reference is unformalizable, so there can be no mathematics of 
>>>>> self-reference. More than this, self-reference is not some concept in a 
>>>>> theory, but it is us, each and everyone of us is a form of manifestation 
>>>>> of self-reference. Self-reference is an eternal logical structure that 
>>>>> eternally looks-back-at-itself. And this looking-back-at-itself 
>>>>> automatically generates a subjective ontology, an "I am". In other words, 
>>>>> the very definition of the concept of "existence" is the 
>>>>> looking-back-at-itself of self-reference. So, existence can only be 
>>>>> subjective, so all that can exists is consciousness. I talk in the book 
>>>>> how the looking-back-at-itself implies 3 properties: identity 
>>>>> (self-reference is itself, x=x), inclusion (self-reference is included in 
>>>>> itself, xx). 
>>>>> And all these apparently contradictory properties are happening all at 
>>>>> the same time. So, x=x, xx all at the same time. But there is no 
>>>>> actual contradiction here, because self-reference is unformalizable. The 
>>>>> reason why I get to such weird conclusions is explored throughout the 
>>>>> book where a phenomenological analysis of consciousness is done and it is 
>>>>> shown how it is structured on an emergent holarchy of levels, a holarchy 
>>>>> meaning that a higher level includes the lower levels, and I conclude 
>>>>> that this can   only happen if there is an entity called 
>>>>> "self-reference" which has the above mentioned properties. So as you can 
>>>>> see, there pretty much cannot be a mathematics of self-reference.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I will also present about self-reference at The Science of Consciousness 
>>>>> conference this year at Interlaken, Switzerland, so if you are there we 
>>>>> can talk more about these issues.
>>>>> 
>>>>> On Thursday, 11 April 2019 02:55:55 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>>>> Hi Cosmin, 
>>>>> 
>>>>> It seems your conclusion fits well with the conclusion already given by 
>>>>> the universal machine (the Gödel-Löbian one which are those who already 
>>>>> knows that they are Turing universal, like ZF, PA,   
>>>>> or the combinators + some induction principle).
>>>>> 
>>>>> Self-reference is capital indeed, but you seem to miss the mathematical 
>>>>> theory of self-reference, brought by the work of Gödel and Löb, and 
>>>>> Solovay ultimate formalisation of it at the first order logic level. You 
>>>>> cite Penrose, which is deadly wrong on this.
>>>>> 
>>>>> In fact incompleteness is a chance for mechanism, as it provides almost 
>>>>> directly a theory of consciousness, if you are willing to agree that 
>>>>> consciousness is true, indubitable, immediately knowable, non provable 
>>>>> and non definable, as each Löbian machine is confronted to such 
>>>>> proposition all the “time”. But this enforces also, as I have shown, that 
>>>>> the whole of physics has to be justified by some of the modes of 
>>>>> self-reference, making physics into a subbranch of elementary arithmetic. 
>>>>> This works in the sense that at the three places where physics should 
>>>>> appear we get a quantum logic, and this with the advantage of a 
>>>>> transparent clear-cut between the qualia (not sharable) and the quanta 
>>>>> (sharable in the first person plural sense).
>>>>> 
>>>>> You seem to have a good (I mean correct with respect to Mechanism) 
>>>>> insight on consciousness, but you seem to have wrong information on the 
>>>>> theory of the digital machines/numbers and the role of Gödel. Gödel’s 
>>>>> theorem is really a chance for the Mechanist theory, as it explains that 
>>>>> the digital machine are non predictable, full of non communicable 
>>>>> subjective knowledge and beliefs, and capable of defeating all 
>>>>> reductionist theory that we can made of t

Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-17 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 16 Apr 2019, at 18:56, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Apr 16, 2019, at 18:42, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List wrote:
>> Because Rover is just a bunch of atoms. Is nothing more than the sum of 
>> atoms. But in the case of self-reference/emergence, each new level is more 
>> than the sum of the previous levels. 
> 
> I disagree. My position on this is that people are tricked into thinking that 
> emergence has some ontological status, when if fact it is just an 
> epistemological tool. We need to think in higher-order structures to simplify 
> things (organisms, organs, mean-fields, cells, ant colonies, societies, 
> markets, etc), but a Jupiter-brain could keep track of every entity 
> separately and apprehend the entire thing at the same time. Emergence is a 
> mental shortcut.
> 
> Self-reference is another matter (pun was accidental).


OK.

Third person self-reference is P(x) = F(x, ‘P’).

First person self reference is … something more subtle, related to this person 
self-reference, but with a God knowing that the lmachine refers correctly to 
itself, and the machine accessing to that knowledge at some level (as is the 
case with mechanism).



> 
>> 
>> I don't know how you can trick yourself so badly into believing that if you 
>> put some rocks together, the rocks become alive. Maybe because you think 
>> that the brain is just a bunch of atoms. No, it is now. If you were to 
>> measure what the electrons are doing in the brain, you would see that they 
>> are not moving according to known physics, but they are being moved by 
>> consciousness.
> 
> For me, this is yet another version of "God did it". There is no point in 
> attempting to explain some complex behavior if the explanation is even more 
> complex and mysterious.

I completely agree. 

Now, if the pshycis in the head of all universal machine differs from what we 
observe, we can have evidence that something more complex needs to be assume, 
but that means either that Mechanism is false, or that we are in a malevolent 
simulation (we are intentionally lied).



> 
>> 
>> And this doesn't happen in a machine. In a machine, electrons move according 
>> to known physics.
> 
> These are fairly extraordinary claims. Do you have any empirical data to 
> support them?


Only physical machine have electron, and electron are only emergent from the 
arithmetical truth seen by universal number inside. 

With mechanism, is emergent = not real, physics and natural science = not real, 
but yet, it obeys laws, and is phenomenologically real for all universal 
number/machine. (Up to now, given that nature confirmes mechanism, and thus 
seems to refute physicalism.

Bruno





> 
> Telmo.
> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, 16 April 2019 15:25:40 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> How can you argue that Rover has no knowledge, when you say that knowledge 
>> is not formalisable?
>> 
>> Introducing some fuzziness to claim a negative thing about a relation of the 
>> type consciousness/machine is a bit frightening. It reminds the catholic 
>> older sophisticated “reasoning” to assert that Indians have no soul.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
o actual contradiction 
>>> here, because self-reference is unformalizable. The reason why I get to 
>>> such weird conclusions is explored throughout the book where a 
>>> phenomenological analysis of consciousness is done and it is shown how it 
>>> is structured on an emergent holarchy of levels, a holarchy meaning that a 
>>> higher level includes the lower levels, and I conclude that this can only 
>>> happen if there is an entity called "self-reference" which has the above 
>>> mentioned properties. So as you can see, there pretty much cannot be a 
>>> mathematics of self-reference.
>>> 
>>> I will also present about self-reference at The Science of Consciousness 
>>> conference this year at Interlaken, Switzerland, so if you are there we can 
>>> talk more about these issues.
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, 11 April 2019 02:55:55 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>> Hi Cosmin, 
>>> 
>>> It seems your conclusion fits well with the conclusion already given by the 
>>> universal machine (the Gödel-Löbian one which are those who already knows 
>>> that they are Turing universal, like ZF, PA, or the combinators + some 
>>> induction principle).
>>> 
>>> Self-reference is capital indeed, but you seem to miss the mathematical 
>>> theory of self-reference, brought by the work of Gödel and Löb, and Solovay 
>>> ultimate formalisation of it at the first order logic level. You cite 
>>> Penrose, which is deadly wrong on this.
>>> 
>>> In fact incompleteness is a chance for mechanism, as it provides almost 
>>> directly a theory of consciousness, if you are willing to agree that 
>>> consciousness is true, indubitable, immediately knowable, non provable and 
>>> non definable, as each Löbian machine is confronted to such proposition all 
>>> the “time”. But this enforces also, as I have shown, that the whole of 
>>> physics has to be justified by some of the modes of self-reference, making 
>>> physics into a subbranch of elementary arithmetic. This works in the sense 
>>> that at the three places where physics should appear we get a quantum 
>>> logic, and this with the advantage of a transparent clear-cut between the 
>>> qualia (not sharable) and the quanta (sharable in the first person plural 
>>> sense).
>>> 
>>> You seem to have a good (I mean correct with respect to Mechanism) insight 
>>> on consciousness, but you seem to have wrong information on the theory of 
>>> the digital machines/numbers and the role of Gödel. Gödel’s theorem is 
>>> really a chance for the Mechanist theory, as it explains that the digital 
>>> machine are non predictable, full of non communicable subjective knowledge 
>>> and beliefs, and capable of defeating all reductionist theory that we can 
>>> made of them. Indeed, they are literally universal dissident, and they are 
>>> born with a conflict between 8 modes of self-apprehension. In my last 
>>> paper(*) I argue that they can be enlightened, and this shows also that 
>>> enlightenment and blasphemy are very close, and that religion leads easily 
>>> to a theological trap making the machine inconsistent, except by staying 
>>> mute, or referring to Mechanism (which is itself highly unprovable by the 
>>> consistent machine).
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-17 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 17 Apr 2019, at 01:29, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 4/16/2019 6:42 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> In the experientialist (Strawson-Goff-etc. "panpsychist" view): experiential 
>> qualia (EQ) exist in matter at some level on their own -- and EQ cannot be 
>> reduced to information (numbers).
>> 
>> So real "selfness" cannot be achieved in any "Gödel-Löb-etc." theorem prover 
>> running on the so-called conventional computer.
>> 
>> Now some future biological computers -- made via synthetic biology -- open 
>> new possibilities.
> 
> What makes them "biological"?  Do they have to be made of amino acids?  
> nuclei acids?  do they have to be powered by a phosphate cycle?  What makes 
> one bunch of biological molecules conscious and another very similar bunch 
> dead, or anesthesized?
> 
> The only coherent answer is that consciousness is realized by certain 
> information processing...independent of the molecules instantiating the 
> process.

Good point, and this is what will lead, when assuming the process are digital, 
to associate a mind to all “enough similar” digital process realised, in the 
precise sense of Church and Turing, in arithmetic. It is the same information 
which os processed, at the “right” level, which exist by the assumption of 
digital mechanism.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-17 Thread Bruno Marchal
included in color), x>x (color is more than the 
> shades-of-gray).


The universal machine can agree or disagree with this, except for your bizarre 
role that you give to identity (x=x), where self-reference, by any entities, 
will relate a model that the entity has about itself, with itself. It is more 
like x = ‘x’, or some fix point of that type.





> And all these happen at the same time, because the same consciousness is the 
> one that experience the evolution in levels. When you learn something new, 
> that new knowledge emerges on top of previously held knowledge, but this 
> doesn't create a new consciousness to experience the new knowledge, but the 
> same consciousness is maintained.

I agree with this. This will make the consciousness of very weak, but still 
Turing universal, machine, into the universal consciousness, from which all 
personal identities differentiates.




> And this is possible because the same consciousness (x=x)
> includes the previous consciousness that it was (x what it previously was (x>x).

I think I see what you mean, or want to mean, but that’s no problem for 
Mechanism.

Your “x=x” is plausibly obtained by the machine knowing that if she (or anyone) 
is sound, then we have both

([]p ) equivalent to []p, but in a non rationally provable way.

We agree on something crucial in metaphysics, which is that matter is not real, 
and is only “in consciousness”,  
But that makes matter a phenomenological notion, like consciousness is judged 
usually to be to. Then with mechanism, we find that the numbers are already 
aware, when taken relatively to universal numbers, that they have a soul ([]p & 
p) that only God (Arithmetical truth) can know to be the same (making 
technically Mechanism into a theology in the original sense of Plato).

My work is done. It is not a project. I invite you to read my papers. You need 
to understand that before Gödel, we thought we knew about everything about 
numbers and machines, but after Gödel, we know that we know about nothing, 
notably because the numbers incarnate the universal machine when living on the 
border between the computable and the non computable. We know that Truth is 
*far* bigger than proof, or anything rationally justifiable. Arithmetic 
promises an infinity of surprise and obligations to change ones mind on the 
fundamental matter, making clearer a important invariant theological core.


Bruno




> 
> On Tuesday, 16 April 2019 15:17:36 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 1) With mechanism, third-person self-reference is formalisable
> 
> 2) That is good insight, well recovered by the machine about its first person 
> self. 
>  
> 3)
>  
>> In other words, the very definition of the concept of "existence" is the 
>> looking-back-at-itself of self-reference.
> 
>  
> That type of existence is phenomenological. 
> 
> 4)
>> So, existence can only be subjective, so all that can exists is 
>> consciousness.
> 
> I see this as a critics of your theory. It is almost self-defeating. My goal 
> was to understand matter and consciousness from proposition on which (almost) 
> everybody agree, and with mechanism, elementary arithmetic is enough.
> 
> 5)
> OK. (Except the tiny formula which does not make much sense to me, and seem 
> to assume a lot of things). But with mechanism we get 8 notion of self, and 
> transcendance is indeed derived from them.
> 
> 6)
>> And all these apparently contradictory properties are happening all at the 
>> same time. So, x=x, xx all at the same time.
> 
> Without giving a theory or at least a realm, it is hard to figure out what 
> you mean.
> 
>> But there is no actual contradiction here, because self-reference is 
>> unformalizable. The reason why I get to such weird conclusions is explored 
>> throughout the book where a phenomenological analysis of consciousness is 
>> done and it is shown how it is structured on an emergent holarchy of levels, 
>> a holarchy meaning that a higher level includes the lower levels, and I 
>> conclude that this can only happen if there is an entity called 
>> "self-reference" which has the above mentioned properties. So as you can 
>> see, there pretty much cannot be a mathematics of self-reference.
> 
> But such theories exist. Even the fact that the first person self-reference 
> is not formalisable is provable in a meta-theory. 
> 
> Self-reference is where mathematical logic has got many surprising results, 
> and with mechanism, they are somehow directly usable. To not use them needs 
> some non-mechanist hypothesis, for which there are no evidences, and it looks 
> like bringing complexity to not solve a (scientific) problem.
> 
> 
> -- 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-16 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 16 Apr 2019, at 10:28, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> Yes, no need to apply. They are using the concept of self-reference in a 
> misleading way. The true meaning of self-reference is an entity that refers 
> to itself. There are several problems with the way in which they are using 
> the concept. First problem is that "machine" is not an entity. "Machine" is 
> just an idea in consciousness, it doesn't have an independent existence, it 
> doesn't have any ontological status, it doesn't exist as an entity. And since 
> it doesn't exist, it cannot refer to itself, or for that matter it cannot do 
> anything. Only consciousness (and its forms of manifestation: qualia) has 
> ontological status.


If we accept Church or Turing thesis, machine, computation and computable are 
not only very well defined, but they are defined in elementary arithmetic. No 
need to assume anything more, besides some invariance principle for 
consciousness.



> 
> The second issue is that the way self-reference refers to itself is to 
> incorporate itself in the very act of referring.

But that is what is made possible by a famous result by Kleene in mathematical 
logic or theoretical computer science.

The basic idea is very simple: to make a machine referring to itself, like M(y) 
= F( y, “M”), you build the machine D, which send x on F(y, ‘x’x’’), and apply 
it to its description: D’D’ = F(y, ‘D’D’’). I can explain more on this.







> Basically, the observer, the observed, and the act of observation are all one 
> and the same thing.


Observation is still another thing, that you have to relate to notion of truth, 
belief, knowledge, etc. When done with the standard definition recatsed in 
theoretical computer science, we find a quantum logical formalism at the exact 
place where we must find the structure of the observable reality. This was for 
me a confirmation that Mechanism is plausible, and materialism is not plausible.






> I'm pretty much you cannot think of a machine in these terms. So a 
> "self-referential machine" is just words-play.

Of course I disagree completely. 



> It doesn't have anything in common whatsoever with the true characteristics 
> of the true self-reference.

What is true, is that we should not confuse this person self-reference, which 
is mathematicalisable, if I can say, and first person self-reference, which is 
not, but provably so in the mechanist meta theory. And, yes, we have to invoke 
“truth” here, but here, we can use the standard notion of truth discovered by 
Tarski.

Bruno




> 
> On Tuesday, 16 April 2019 09:24:46 UTC+3, Philip Thrift wrote:
> So, no need to apply? :)
> 
> 
> Seeking Research Fellows in Type Theory and Machine Self-Reference
> 
> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-16 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 16 Apr 2019, at 10:22, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> esoteric = "intended for or likely to be understood by only a small number of 
> people with a specialized knowledge or interest." According to this 
> definition, I'm not making self-reference esoteric. On the contrary, since I 
> devote a whole book to it, the intention is to make self-reference to be 
> understood by everyone. Probably you want to mean something else by esoteric, 
> something like "out-of-this-world". But this again is not the case, because 
> self-reference is the source of the entire existence, so it is pretty much 
> part of the world.
> 
> Also, your example with the Mars Rover is faulty, because the rover doesn't 
> know anything. Knowledge is something that exists in consciousness. Only 
> consciousnesses know things. And things indeed are formal entities, but the 
> process of knowing itself is not. Actually, knowledge can be formal precisely 
> because the processes of knowing is unformalizable.


As I said, the machine’s notion of knowledge is not formalisable, but the 
(Löbian, rich) machine already knows that. The universal Löbian machine knows 
she has a soul, and know that her soul is not a machine, nor anything 
describable in third person term. This has been proved using the standard 
epistemological definitions.

How can you argue that Rover has no knowledge, when you say that knowledge is 
not formalisable?

Introducing some fuzziness to claim a negative thing about a relation of the 
type consciousness/machine is a bit frightening. It reminds the catholic older 
sophisticated “reasoning” to assert that Indians have no soul.

Bruno



> 
> On Tuesday, 16 April 2019 04:44:22 UTC+3, Brent wrote:
> You seem to make self-reference into something esoteric.   Every Mars Rover 
> knows where it is, the state of its batteries, its instruments, its 
> communications link, what time it is, what its mission plan is.Whether it 
> is "formalizable" or not would seem to depend on choosing the right 
> formalization to describe what engineers already create.
> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-16 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 16 Apr 2019, at 00:34, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> "Matter" is just an idea in consciousness.

Of course, Mechanism, and the “sound” universal machine agree with you, except 
the “just” is a bit too much. You need to derive the physical laws from your 
theory for consciousness, and so you can test your theory by comparing it to 
the physics inferred from the observations. 

Bruno




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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-16 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 15 Apr 2019, at 20:28, za_wishy via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> Hmm... the thing is that what I'm arguing for in the book is that 
> self-reference is unformalizable,


With mechanism, third-person self-reference is formalisable, and from this we 
can prove that first person self-reference is not formalisable in the language 
of the machine concerned, but is “meta-formalisable” by using reference to 
truth (itself not formalisable). The same occurs for the notion of qualia, 
consciousness, and many mental and theological attributes.





> so there can be no mathematics of self-reference. More than this, 
> self-reference is not some concept in a theory, but it is us, each and 
> everyone of us is a form of manifestation of self-reference. Self-reference 
> is an eternal logical structure that eternally looks-back-at-itself. And this 
> looking-back-at-itself automatically generates a subjective ontology, an "I 
> am”.

That is good insight, well recovered by the machine about its first person 
self. It is akin to the inner god of the neoplatonist.



> In other words, the very definition of the concept of "existence" is the 
> looking-back-at-itself of self-reference.

That type of existence is phenomenological. With mechanism, we assume only the 
ntaiutal numbers, (or any terms of any Turing complete theory), then we derive 
the first person self)-reference, including the physical reality which appears 
ti be a first person plural notion. The physical reality is partially a 
subjective phenomenon. 






> So, existence can only be subjective, so all that can exists is consciousness.


I see this as a critics of your theory. It is almost self-defeating. My goal 
was to understand matter and consciousness from proposition on which (almost) 
everybody agree, and with mechanism, elementary arithmetic is enough.





> I talk in the book how the looking-back-at-itself implies 3 properties: 
> identity (self-reference is itself, x=x),


x = x is an identity axiom. I don’t see reference there.




> inclusion (self-reference is included in itself, x (self-reference is more than itself, x>x).

OK. (Except the tiny formula which does not make much sense to me, and seem to 
assume a lot of things). But with mechanism we get 8 notion of self, and 
transcendance is indeed derived from them.





> And all these apparently contradictory properties are happening all at the 
> same time. So, x=x, xx all at the same time.


Without giving a theory or at least a realm, it is hard to figure out what you 
mean.





> But there is no actual contradiction here, because self-reference is 
> unformalizable. The reason why I get to such weird conclusions is explored 
> throughout the book where a phenomenological analysis of consciousness is 
> done and it is shown how it is structured on an emergent holarchy of levels, 
> a holarchy meaning that a higher level includes the lower levels, and I 
> conclude that this can only happen if there is an entity called 
> "self-reference" which has the above mentioned properties. So as you can see, 
> there pretty much cannot be a mathematics of self-reference.

But such theories exist. Even the fact that the first person self-reference is 
not formalisable is provable in a meta-theory. 

Self-reference is where mathematical logic has got many surprising results, and 
with mechanism, they are somehow directly usable. To not use them needs some 
non-mechanist hypothesis, for which there are no evidences, and it looks like 
bringing complexity to not solve a (scientific) problem.

Bruno




> 
> I will also present about self-reference at The Science of Consciousness 
> conference this year at Interlaken, Switzerland, so if you are there we can 
> talk more about these issues.
> 
> On Thursday, 11 April 2019 02:55:55 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Hi Cosmin,
> 
> It seems your conclusion fits well with the conclusion already given by the 
> universal machine (the Gödel-Löbian one which are those who already knows 
> that they are Turing universal, like ZF, PA, or the combinators + some 
> induction principle).
> 
> Self-reference is capital indeed, but you seem to miss the mathematical 
> theory of self-reference, brought by the work of Gödel and Löb, and Solovay 
> ultimate formalisation of it at the first order logic level. You cite 
> Penrose, which is deadly wrong on this.
> 
> In fact incompleteness is a chance for mechanism, as it provides almost 
> directly a theory of consciousness, if you are willing to agree that 
> consciousness is true, indubitable, immediately knowable, non provable and 
> non definable, as each Löbian machine is confronted to such proposition all 
> the “time”. But this enforces also, as I have shown, that the whole of 
> physics has to be justified by some of the m

Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-16 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics
> 
> The physics of Game of Thrones
> https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/
>  
> 

That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.

It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. That is 
not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if that is the 
case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = phi_u’ 
extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if mechanism is 
correct. 

But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our 
substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would be 
the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and physics 
would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would make 
Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for 
Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.




> 
> in another number?
> 
> Or: Is there a a GoT reality?

Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining (every)thing.

Bruno





> 
> - pt
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-10 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Cosmin,


> On 7 Apr 2019, at 14:11, za_wishy via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>, 
> and online_sadhu_sa...@googlegroups.com 
> > wrote:
> 
> My book "I Am" has been published on amazon. It deals with my ideas about the 
> emergent structure of consciousness and the nature of self-reference which 
> gives birth to the emergent structure, which as far as I know, are new ideas, 
> so they might prove useful in opening new paths in the attempt of obtaining a 
> theory of consciousness.
> 
> Kindle version: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B07Q4LZVFH 
> 
> Paperback version: https://www.amazon.com/dp/1092284397 
> 
> 
> (also available for the other amazon national websites)


It seems your conclusion fits well with the conclusion already given by the 
universal machine (the Gödel-Löbian one which are those who already knows that 
they are Turing universal, like ZF, PA, or the combinators + some induction 
principle).

Self-reference is capital indeed, but you seem to miss the mathematical theory 
of self-reference, brought by the work of Gödel and Löb, and Solovay ultimate 
formalisation of it at the first order logic level. You cite Penrose, which is 
deadly wrong on this.

In fact incompleteness is a chance for mechanism, as it provides almost 
directly a theory of consciousness, if you are willing to agree that 
consciousness is true, indubitable, immediately knowable, non provable and non 
definable, as each Löbian machine is confronted to such proposition all the 
“time”. But this enforces also, as I have shown, that the whole of physics has 
to be justified by some of the modes of self-reference, making physics into a 
subbranch of elementary arithmetic. This works in the sense that at the three 
places where physics should appear we get a quantum logic, and this with the 
advantage of a transparent clear-cut between the qualia (not sharable) and the 
quanta (sharable in the first person plural sense).

You seem to have a good (I mean correct with respect to Mechanism) insight on 
consciousness, but you seem to have wrong information on the theory of the 
digital machines/numbers and the role of Gödel. Gödel’s theorem is really a 
chance for the Mechanist theory, as it explains that the digital machine are 
non predictable, full of non communicable subjective knowledge and beliefs, and 
capable of defeating all reductionist theory that we can made of them. Indeed, 
they are literally universal dissident, and they are born with a conflict 
between 8 modes of self-apprehension. In my last paper(*) I argue that they can 
be enlightened, and this shows also that enlightenment and blasphemy are very 
close, and that religion leads easily to a theological trap making the machine 
inconsistent, except by staying mute, or referring to Mechanism (which is 
itself highly unprovable by the consistent machine).

Bruno



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Re: Dark energy-powered devices

2019-04-07 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 3 Apr 2019, at 01:36, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 5:23 PM Mason Green  > wrote:
> 
> > It appears as though it would indeed be possible to build a device powered 
> > by dark energy. Such a device could keep running forever (as long as the 
> > universe keeps expanding forever and vacuum decay doesn’t occur) and be 
> > able to survive (or prevent) the heat death of the universe. Even proton 
> > decay would not present a problem; new protons could always be created from 
> > the energy generated.
> 
> I agree. 
>  
> > As far as I know, neither of these devices has been proposed before in the 
> > literature; I might have been the first person to come up with them.
> 
> 
> Well... on August 4 2012 I sent this to Fabric Of Reality List: 
>  
> "Could we still extract an infinite amount of energy from the real universe 
> and thus perform an infinite number of calculations? Perhaps.
> 
> Suppose you had 2 spools of string connected together by an axle and you 
> extended the 2 strings to cosmological distances 180 degrees apart from each 
> other. As long as the Dark Energy force between the atoms in the string that 
> were trying to force them apart was not stronger than the attractive 
> electromagnetic force holding the atoms of the string together the string 
> would not expand as the universe expanded, so there would be a tension on the 
> strings, so there would be torque on the spool, so the axle would rotate. The 
> axle could be connected to an electric generator and it seems to me you'd get 
> useful work out of it. Of course you'd have to constantly add more 
> mass-energy in the form of more string to keep it operating, but the amount 
> of mass per unit length of string would remain constant, however because the 
> universe is accelerating the amount of energy per unit length of string you'd 
> get out of it would not remain constant but would increase asymptotically to 
> infinity. If the theories about the Big Rip turn out to be true and the 
> acceleration of the universe is itself accelerating then it should be even 
> easier to extract infinite energy out of the universe; it would just be a 
> simple matter of cosmological engineering. What could go wrong? 
> 
> If you have infinite energy then you can perform an infinite number of 
> calculations, so you could have an infinite number of thoughts, so you would 
> have no last thought (the definition of death), so subjectively you would 
> live forever. Of course the objective universe might have a different opinion 
> on the matter and insist that everything including you had come to an end, 
> but that hardly matters, subjectivity is far more important than objectivity; 
> at least I think so.”  


Doing a physical computation does not require energy, except for the external 
read and write. It is enough to never erase any information. As Landauer found: 
only erasing information requires energy, and as Hao Wang already discovered (I 
think around 1950), but also Church (Lambda-I calculus), there are 
Turing-universal model of computation where no information is ever discarded.

With the combinators, this is illustrated by Turing universal base of 
combinators with no “eliminators”, without kestrel of similar. The kestrel K 
eliminates information (Kxy = x), like a projection, it is not reversible. 

K = [x][y] x (= in Church notation : lambda x lambda y . x). But Church forbade 
using lambda for a variable absent in the core, which is the same as forbid 
elimination of information. Note that quantum computation has to be reversible, 
and never eliminate information (except at some final measurement possible). So 
an infinite physical computation requires only a finite amount of energy. The 
universal dovetailing, which generate and execute all computation, can be 
physically implemented so as using only a finite amount of energy.

But this concerns physical computation. Gödel implicitly and Turing, Post, 
Church and many others will show that the tiny partial computable part of the 
arithmetical reality already implement all computations, including all the 
approximation of all physical computations, and with mechanism, the “real 
physical computation” have to emerge from those computation emulated by the 
arithmetical reality.

This already generates a doubt that physical computation exist, and indeed no 
universal machine can subjectively distinguish a physical computations from a 
purely combinatorical one, or from a purely arithmetical one, or any purely 
mathematical one. But they can detect a difference by doing some measurement, 
given that the physical laws are constrained by Mechanism. That would still be 
undistinguishable from a computation + some special Oracle. No such detection 
have been currently found, and, (finite) machines, although they can suspect 
some oracle (or magic) to be at play, no certainty can be obtained because a 
machine cannot distinguish an 

Re: Energy efficiency of different programming languages

2019-04-03 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 2 Apr 2019, at 19:36, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, April 2, 2019 at 12:03:06 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 4/2/2019 2:35 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> "Analogical rendering" is a perfectly good programming paradigm.
>> 
>> Engineers Develop Analog Computing Compiler 
>> https://www.engineering.com/DesignerEdge/DesignerEdgeArticles/ArticleID/13340/Engineers-Develop-Analog-Computing-Compiler-for-Biological-Simulations-More.aspx
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> "The high-level language of the compiler makes use of differential 
>> equations, which are frequently used to describe biological systems."
>> 
>> "Researchers from MIT have presented a new compiler designed for analog 
>> computers. The compiler, called Arco, takes sets of differential equations 
>> as its input and translates them into circuits in programmable analog 
>> devices."
>> 
> 
> Sounds like old news.  Fifty years ago the Navy built real-time simulations 
> in which air-launched missiles were tested.  They were run on analog 
> computers programed by wiring on big plug boards.  Thirty years ago these 
> were replaced by analog computers which were programmed by digital computers. 


Yes, and that is interesting for practical purpose, but I am not sure this 
would contradict mechanism, nor its immaterialist consequences. It would some 
confusion of level to say so.

If classical mechanics (Newton) was 100% true, then the indexical digital 
Mechanist thesis would already be refuted. But quantum mechanics seems to save 
mechanism from any possible use of non computable element which would be not 
recoverable by the fact that we are run by  “infinitely many” computation.


> 
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> 
> We are bioanalog computers.


I ahem no problem with this. Unless you meant that those bioanalog computers 
are neither Turing emulable, or recoverable from our distribution in arithmetic.


> 
> Stanford creates biological transistors, the final step towards computers 
> inside living cells
> https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/152074-stanford-creates-biological-transistors-the-final-step-towards-computers-inside-living-cells

That is cool, but a cell, even a prokaryotic cell is already a full complete 
universal machine, in the same sense that the following finite game of life 
pattern is a full complete universal number/machine:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=My8AsV7bA94

Such a machine does not need an “infinite tape”, but of course, it needs to be 
able to extend its finite memory indefinitely. Humans too, and that is why we 
have evolved more quickly when using the cave of the wall as extended memory, 
up to papers and … transistors.


Bruno


> 
> DNA Circuits for Analog Computing
> https://users.cs.duke.edu/~reif/courses/molcomplectures/DNAanalog/DNAanalog(Tianqi)/DNAanalog(Tianqi).pdf
>  
> https://users.cs.duke.edu/~reif/courses/molcomplectures/DNAanalog/DNAanalog(Tianqi)/DNAanalog(Tianqi).pdf
>  
> 
>  
> 
> 
> One day people will be outputs of compilers.
> 
> - pt
> 
>  
> 
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Re: Energy efficiency of different programming languages

2019-04-02 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 1 Apr 2019, at 20:08, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, April 1, 2019 at 11:46:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 31 Mar 2019, at 19:50, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, March 31, 2019 at 11:58:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 30 Mar 2019, at 07:15, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> https://thenewstack.io/which-programming-languages-use-the-least-electricity/
>>>  
>>> <https://thenewstack.io/which-programming-languages-use-the-least-electricity/>
>>> 
>>> Which language one uses makes a physical difference.
>> 
>> That is correct, interesting for the application, but not directly relevant 
>> for the “ontological problem” and the mind-body problem.
>> 
>> Physics is not able to make any prediction without assuming something (what 
>> exactly) capable of selecting our computation in arithmetic. Theologically, 
>> it still invoke an ontology, which cannot be done when doing science.
>> 
>> The fact that efficient computation “survives”, and non efficient do not, 
>> requires magic if the environnement does not map the finitely many 
>> accessible histories at (or below) our substitution level.
>> 
>> A quantum computation does not require any energy, note. And both 
>> observation, and mechanism seems to force the physical reality into a 
>> combinatory algebra without Kestrel (Kxy = x, which eliminates the 
>> information in y), nor Starling S (Sxyz = xz(yz)) nor any duplicator (no 
>> Mocking Bird like M, Mx = xx). Information cannot be physically created, nor 
>> eliminated, nor duplicated. 
>> 
>> We can still have Turing universality without eliminators. Yet we lost 
>> Turing universality when we have no eliminators and no duplicators, but we 
>> can regain it with adding “measurement” modal operator (internally defined, 
>> or not). That is the combinatory BCI algebra, with a core physics where 
>> energy is a constant, and computations use no energy, yet relative 
>> subcomputation are allowed to make relative measurement, leading to apparent 
>> (indexical) breaking of the core laws, and apparent elimination of 
>> “memories”. There are Turing universal group and group have natural mesure 
>> theory associated with them, but again, such group must be justified 
>> mathematically (and theologically to get the private (first person) parts 
>> not eliminated). 
>> 
>> Thinking of group, I have said that physics is a symphony played by the 
>> number 0, 1, e, PI, gamma, and with the number 24 has chief orchestra. To be 
>> honest, my motivation comes more from physics and number theory than from 
>> Metamathematics (mathematical logic, machine theology), and it makes me 
>> nervous that the number theorist stumble on the right physics before the 
>> theologian (leading to an arithmeticalism still capable of eliminating the 
>> first person for awhile). Here is a nice video where John Baez explains well 
>> why he likes 24 too, and its main role in String Theory (the Riemann 
>> regularisation). I think about this when mentioning group theory, as 24 is 
>> related to the Monster Group and Moonshine (where deep relation occurs 
>> between fundamental physics and number theory).
>> 
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzjbRhYjELo 
>> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzjbRhYjELo>
>> 
>> To be sure, my favorite reason to love 24 is more the one related to Hardy 
>> Rademacher and Ramanujan exact formula for the number of partition of a 
>> number. That plays also some role in fundamental chemistry and 
>> classification of “orbitals” (or quantum stationary waves).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Every programming language has physical semantics
> 
> But a term like physics has not yet understandable semantics. Carnap and 
> Popper made some try in that direction, but it leads to many difficulties. It 
> is part of the beauty of mechanism that it provides a semantic of the 
> physical proposition, without invoking any ontological commitment (beyond the 
> terms needed to have the notion of universal machine (in the 
> Turing-Post-Church-Kleene sense).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> -- which depends on its material computing substrate
> 
> That seems very weird to me. If something is a programming language, it can 
> be implemented in a physical realm, but it is also implemented in the 
> arithmetical realm, and anything emulated in that programming language cannot 
> see any difference if the original emulator is the 

Re: Energy efficiency of different programming languages

2019-04-01 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 31 Mar 2019, at 19:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, March 31, 2019 at 11:58:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 30 Mar 2019, at 07:15, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> https://thenewstack.io/which-programming-languages-use-the-least-electricity/
>>  
>> <https://thenewstack.io/which-programming-languages-use-the-least-electricity/>
>> 
>> Which language one uses makes a physical difference.
> 
> That is correct, interesting for the application, but not directly relevant 
> for the “ontological problem” and the mind-body problem.
> 
> Physics is not able to make any prediction without assuming something (what 
> exactly) capable of selecting our computation in arithmetic. Theologically, 
> it still invoke an ontology, which cannot be done when doing science.
> 
> The fact that efficient computation “survives”, and non efficient do not, 
> requires magic if the environnement does not map the finitely many accessible 
> histories at (or below) our substitution level.
> 
> A quantum computation does not require any energy, note. And both 
> observation, and mechanism seems to force the physical reality into a 
> combinatory algebra without Kestrel (Kxy = x, which eliminates the 
> information in y), nor Starling S (Sxyz = xz(yz)) nor any duplicator (no 
> Mocking Bird like M, Mx = xx). Information cannot be physically created, nor 
> eliminated, nor duplicated. 
> 
> We can still have Turing universality without eliminators. Yet we lost Turing 
> universality when we have no eliminators and no duplicators, but we can 
> regain it with adding “measurement” modal operator (internally defined, or 
> not). That is the combinatory BCI algebra, with a core physics where energy 
> is a constant, and computations use no energy, yet relative subcomputation 
> are allowed to make relative measurement, leading to apparent (indexical) 
> breaking of the core laws, and apparent elimination of “memories”. There are 
> Turing universal group and group have natural mesure theory associated with 
> them, but again, such group must be justified mathematically (and 
> theologically to get the private (first person) parts not eliminated). 
> 
> Thinking of group, I have said that physics is a symphony played by the 
> number 0, 1, e, PI, gamma, and with the number 24 has chief orchestra. To be 
> honest, my motivation comes more from physics and number theory than from 
> Metamathematics (mathematical logic, machine theology), and it makes me 
> nervous that the number theorist stumble on the right physics before the 
> theologian (leading to an arithmeticalism still capable of eliminating the 
> first person for awhile). Here is a nice video where John Baez explains well 
> why he likes 24 too, and its main role in String Theory (the Riemann 
> regularisation). I think about this when mentioning group theory, as 24 is 
> related to the Monster Group and Moonshine (where deep relation occurs 
> between fundamental physics and number theory).
> 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzjbRhYjELo 
> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzjbRhYjELo>
> 
> To be sure, my favorite reason to love 24 is more the one related to Hardy 
> Rademacher and Ramanujan exact formula for the number of partition of a 
> number. That plays also some role in fundamental chemistry and classification 
> of “orbitals” (or quantum stationary waves).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> Every programming language has physical semantics

But a term like physics has not yet understandable semantics. Carnap and Popper 
made some try in that direction, but it leads to many difficulties. It is part 
of the beauty of mechanism that it provides a semantic of the physical 
proposition, without invoking any ontological commitment (beyond the terms 
needed to have the notion of universal machine (in the 
Turing-Post-Church-Kleene sense).





> -- which depends on its material computing substrate

That seems very weird to me. If something is a programming language, it can be 
implemented in a physical realm, but it is also implemented in the arithmetical 
realm, and anything emulated in that programming language cannot see any 
difference if the original emulator is the physical one or the arithmetical 
one. That is logically impossible, even without assuming mechanism.

If you want a dependence from the substrate, you need a non computaionalist 
theory of mind, and you need to singularise matter with actual infinities, a 
bit like lowing down the substitution level up to some real numbers and oracles 
with some infinite precision.




> -- in addition to (substrate-independent) denotational and operational 
> semantics . That includes quantum programming languages, like QASM 

Re: Energy efficiency of different programming languages

2019-03-31 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 30 Mar 2019, at 07:15, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> https://thenewstack.io/which-programming-languages-use-the-least-electricity/ 
> 
> 
> Which language one uses makes a physical difference.

That is correct, interesting for the application, but not directly relevant for 
the “ontological problem” and the mind-body problem.

Physics is not able to make any prediction without assuming something (what 
exactly) capable of selecting our computation in arithmetic. Theologically, it 
still invoke an ontology, which cannot be done when doing science.

The fact that efficient computation “survives”, and non efficient do not, 
requires magic if the environnement does not map the finitely many accessible 
histories at (or below) our substitution level.

A quantum computation does not require any energy, note. And both observation, 
and mechanism seems to force the physical reality into a combinatory algebra 
without Kestrel (Kxy = x, which eliminates the information in y), nor Starling 
S (Sxyz = xz(yz)) nor any duplicator (no Mocking Bird like M, Mx = xx). 
Information cannot be physically created, nor eliminated, nor duplicated. 

We can still have Turing universality without eliminators. Yet we lost Turing 
universality when we have no eliminators and no duplicators, but we can regain 
it with adding “measurement” modal operator (internally defined, or not). That 
is the combinatory BCI algebra, with a core physics where energy is a constant, 
and computations use no energy, yet relative subcomputation are allowed to make 
relative measurement, leading to apparent (indexical) breaking of the core 
laws, and apparent elimination of “memories”. There are Turing universal group 
and group have natural mesure theory associated with them, but again, such 
group must be justified mathematically (and theologically to get the private 
(first person) parts not eliminated). 

Thinking of group, I have said that physics is a symphony played by the number 
0, 1, e, PI, gamma, and with the number 24 has chief orchestra. To be honest, 
my motivation comes more from physics and number theory than from 
Metamathematics (mathematical logic, machine theology), and it makes me nervous 
that the number theorist stumble on the right physics before the theologian 
(leading to an arithmeticalism still capable of eliminating the first person 
for awhile). Here is a nice video where John Baez explains well why he likes 24 
too, and its main role in String Theory (the Riemann regularisation). I think 
about this when mentioning group theory, as 24 is related to the Monster Group 
and Moonshine (where deep relation occurs between fundamental physics and 
number theory).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzjbRhYjELo

To be sure, my favorite reason to love 24 is more the one related to Hardy 
Rademacher and Ramanujan exact formula for the number of partition of a number. 
That plays also some role in fundamental chemistry and classification of 
“orbitals” (or quantum stationary waves).

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: Connection between Provability Logic (GL) and geometry?

2019-03-20 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 19 Mar 2019, at 19:01, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, March 19, 2019 at 9:16:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 18 Mar 2019, at 20:33, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Might have something of interest ...
>> 
>> https://mathoverflow.net/questions/325702/connection-between-provability-logic-gl-and-geometry
>>  
>> <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fmathoverflow.net%2Fquestions%2F325702%2Fconnection-between-provability-logic-gl-and-geometry=D=1=AFQjCNF4OHbDm6tYoYD1Y55XxgK8qFi0TQ>
>> 
>> ...
>> 
>> There seems to be an existing literature on topological semantics and 
>> provability logics. Thomas Icard has slides on this 
>> <http://logic.berkeley.edu/colloquium/IcardSlides.pdf>, and the Stanford 
>> Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a bit on the topic 
>> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-provability/#TopoSemaForProvLogi>. 
>> I'm not sure how related this is to the specific topological/geometric 
>> intuitions you give here, but it might be of interest more broadly. – Noah 
>> Schweber <https://mathoverflow.net/users/8133/noah-schweber> 31 mins ago 
>> <https://mathoverflow.net/questions/325702/connection-between-provability-logic-gl-and-geometry#comment813108_325702>
>> 
>> 
> 
> 
> I know the work of Leo Esakia, (and of Blok) notably his Russian paper (*) 
> and it is indeed quite interesting. It provides interesting topological 
> semantics for variants of K4 and GL (called G here). Icard has extended such 
> semantics for the logic GLP, which is a polymodal logic axiomatising the 
> provability logic on sequence of stronger and stronger theories. At each 
> level n we have a box [n] obeying to G, and with the two axioms:
> 
> [n]p -> [n+1]p
> p -> [n+1]p
> 
> for all n, Beklemishev has shown that this is complete for the arithmetical 
> interpretation extended on this succession of theories. I use this in some 
> more detailed exposition. 
> In the work of Esakia, the consistency <>p becomes a special sort of abstract 
> derivative. The idea of using topological model cale from the work of 
> McKinsey and Tarski, in the spirit of the algebraic semantics of Helena 
> Rasiowa and Roman Sikorski “The mathematics of Metamathematics” (an excellent 
> work on algebraic semantics). 
> 
> The topological space, in the semantics of Esakia, are not Hausdorff spaces, 
> and are rather peculiar from a topologist standpoint, but nevertheless, that 
> work is quite interesting. It is a good complement of the more traditional 
> Kripke or Krpke-inspired semantics (which I use much more).
> 
> Unfortunately, although this will have interesting application for the 
> general theology of “growing machine”, the topology is not related directly 
> to the quantum “geometry” of the “material” variant of G (the Z and X logics 
> I have shown to exist here). 
> 
> But thanks for this link. I missed those slides by Icard, and some references 
> therein.
> 
> Esakia died in 2010, and was responsible for the great interest in 
> provability logic in Georgia (Europa).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> (*) Esakia, L. (1981). Diagonal constructions, Löb’s formula and Cantor’s 
> scattered space (Russian). In Studies in logic and semantics, pages 128–143. 
> Metsniereba, Tbilisi.
> 
> 
>> - pt
>> 
> 
> 
> There are now three links supplied in the MathOverflow post:
> 
> (SEP article)  
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-provability/#TopoSemaForProvLogi

This is a good summary … for mathematicians. Not so good for the philosophical 
applications.


> 
> Topological Semantics for Provability Logics
> http://logic.berkeley.edu/colloquium/IcardSlides.pdf

Yes, that are the slides by Icard, which I appreciate. To be sure, it is not 
needed to understand the G* “theology”. It raised the question of formalising 
GLP* (the truth logic about the sequences of machines obeying GLP). I have some 
ideas of this, but it is very technical.


> 
> The Topological Structure of Asynchronous Computability
> http://cs.brown.edu/people/mph/HerlihyS99/p858-herlihy.pdf

That looks quite interesting, and I might read it later. It is not related to 
the provability logic, as far as I can see. 

Bruno


> 
> - pt
> 
> -- 
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Re: Connection between Provability Logic (GL) and geometry?

2019-03-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 18 Mar 2019, at 20:33, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> Might have something of interest ...
> 
> https://mathoverflow.net/questions/325702/connection-between-provability-logic-gl-and-geometry
> 
> ...
> 
> There seems to be an existing literature on topological semantics and 
> provability logics. Thomas Icard has slides on this 
> , and the Stanford 
> Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a bit on the topic 
> . 
> I'm not sure how related this is to the specific topological/geometric 
> intuitions you give here, but it might be of interest more broadly. – Noah 
> Schweber  31 mins ago 
> 
> 
> 


I know the work of Leo Esakia, (and of Blok) notably his Russian paper (*) and 
it is indeed quite interesting. It provides interesting topological semantics 
for variants of K4 and GL (called G here). Icard has extended such semantics 
for the logic GLP, which is a polymodal logic axiomatising the provability 
logic on sequence of stronger and stronger theories. At each level n we have a 
box [n] obeying to G, and with the two axioms:

[n]p -> [n+1]p
p -> [n+1]p

for all n, Beklemishev has shown that this is complete for the arithmetical 
interpretation extended on this succession of theories. I use this in some more 
detailed exposition. 
In the work of Esakia, the consistency <>p becomes a special sort of abstract 
derivative. The idea of using topological model cale from the work of McKinsey 
and Tarski, in the spirit of the algebraic semantics of Helena Rasiowa and 
Roman Sikorski “The mathematics of Metamathematics” (an excellent work on 
algebraic semantics). 

The topological space, in the semantics of Esakia, are not Hausdorff spaces, 
and are rather peculiar from a topologist standpoint, but nevertheless, that 
work is quite interesting. It is a good complement of the more traditional 
Kripke or Krpke-inspired semantics (which I use much more).

Unfortunately, although this will have interesting application for the general 
theology of “growing machine”, the topology is not related directly to the 
quantum “geometry” of the “material” variant of G (the Z and X logics I have 
shown to exist here). 

But thanks for this link. I missed those slides by Icard, and some references 
therein.

Esakia died in 2010, and was responsible for the great interest in provability 
logic in Georgia (Europa).

Bruno



(*) Esakia, L. (1981). Diagonal constructions, Löb’s formula and Cantor’s 
scattered space (Russian). In Studies in logic and semantics, pages 128–143. 
Metsniereba, Tbilisi.


> - pt
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems

2019-03-19 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi,

Grayson, Bruce, or anyone,  it is a bit for you that I answer to John Clark. If 
you agree with John, and can better explain its point, let me no. 

I recall the problem. With digital mechanism we can be be “read and cut” in 
Helsinki, and reconstituted in two cities, Washington and Moscow, 
simultaneously, where he get, in both places a cup of coffee. 
I claim that, in Helsinki the guy, who believes in Digital Mechanism  can 
predict this: 

I will with certainty drink a cup of coffee, but I am not sure if it will be 
Russian or American coffee.

The question is about the first person experience, and my justification is 
that, if we write anything else, in its prediction diary, different from “I 
will feel to be drinking a cup of coffee in W, or I will feel to be drinking a 
cup of coffee in W”. Then the prediction will be wrong, for at least one copy. 
By definition, a correct prediction on the first person experience possible, 
has to be true for all copies, so that they can all confirm it in the 
prediction diary, which has been taken in the read and cut box in Helsinki.

This later is used to say that a universal machine is unable to know which 
computations she is supported by, in the infinitely many computations executed, 
in the mathematical Church-Turing sense, in arithmetic, and that plays a key 
rôle to understand that physics will have to be reduced to a relative 
statistics on computation (a concept definable in any enough rich theory of 
arithmetic, like the theory of combinators + induction, or in Peano arithmetic.

It shows that if Everett used Mechanism, as he claims in some of its paper, and 
in his long text, then the wave itself, not just the collapse, has to be 
explained from the statistics on computations in arithmetic. 

I got this in my childhood, never met anyone taking more than 2 years to grasp. 
Usually, people grasp this in ten minutes. The only exception I know is John 
Clark. Then it took me 30 years to get the quantum logic for the logic of 
“probability one” in that mechanist and arithmetical context, so that QM 
confirms mechanism, up to now. 
You can skip the first comment, to get at this thought experience. It is the 
“step 3” of the reasoning given in the sane04 paper 
(http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html ).



> On 19 Mar 2019, at 00:35, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Mar 18, 2019 at 11:49 AM Bruno Marchal  <http://ac.be/>> wrote:
> 
> >>> the academy of Plato   
> >>  ... knew less science than one bright third grader today.
> 
> >You told me you did not have study it.
> 
> You only need to look at Plato's academy for about 25 seconds to know that 
> they didn't know where the sun went at night but a bright modern third grader 
> does. 


>From Plato came neoplatonism. From this came mathematics and physics. For a 
>scientist, it is not a problem to be wrong, on the contrary, it is a honour to 
>be refuted, and he/she is open to improvement, dialog and research.



>  
> > You invoke your god.
> 
> Apparently your a fan of transcendental meditation and  believe if you just 
> keep chanting your mantra long enough you can make it come true. You've been 
> doing it for a decade now but I guess that's not quite long enough.


Then why do you keep saying that a computation is real only when implemented in 
a primary physical reality?

You can call the objet of your ontological commitment a “physical universe”, 
this does not change that it is non valid to refute a claim by invoking a 
personal ontological commitment.

Mathematician like to homogenise concept, like making 0 and 1 into number, 
which meant numerous, at the start.

God is defined by whatever is at the origin of everything.

The god of the believer in primary Matter is a primary physical universe.
The god of the abrahamic religion is “God” (say).
Note that the statement “there is no god” is still a theological statement, but 
with no value if the notion of God is not made more precise. 

You do seem like a “strong (non agnostic) atheist”, which share the definition 
of God of the Christians, and share the belief in the “material creation”.







> 
> 
> >> A valid proof shows that a statement is grammatically correct in the 
> >> language of mathematics but it does not prove that it exists. If you prove 
> >> that every sentence in a Harry Potter book is grammatically correct in the 
> >> language of English you have not proven that dragons exist.  Dragons don't 
> >> exist but the English word "dragons" does.
> 
> 
> > 2+2 = 5 is grammatically correct in arithmetic, but that has nothing to do 
> > with ^provability or with truth.
> 
> Exactly. All true statements about things that exist made in the language of 
> mathematics are grammatically correct, but there is no reason to t

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems

2019-03-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 17 Mar 2019, at 21:37, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 2:22 PM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
> > You confess not to read the pre-dogmatic theology.
> 
> I don't even know what "pre-dogmatic theology" means in Brunospeak 


It is the science theory, before it has been stolen by the state (in occident 
this occurred in 529). In the Middle-East, this occurred (notably) in 1248, 
when Al Ghazali “won” its dispute with Averroes. In both case, this has led to 
obscurantism.



>  
> > Are you aware that after Justinian, in 529 ...
> 
> I don't give a hoot in hell what happens after Justinian, in 529.

But if you would be aware of all this, you would be able to distinguish a 
science, and what humans can do with a science when they bring the use of 
authoritative argument in there. That happened with Genetics in the ex-USSR. 



> 
> > the academy of Plato 
> 
> ... knew less science than one bright third grader today.


You told me you did not have study it. Are you just repeating stuff?





> 
> > You know you dislike both reading old text,
> 
> That's because every minute I spend reading crap by a fossilized ancient 
> Greek is a minute not spent reading a real book written by somebody who, 
> unlike the Greeks, was not scientifically illiterate.  






>
>  
> > you still assume a god
> 
> Yes I know Bruno, you've repeated that in nearly every post for at least the 
> last 5 years. I'm really curious to know if you'll ever be able to break out 
> of your infinite loop so you can invent some new insults but I can't figure 
> out if you ever will or not because the Halting Problem has no solution.


Sorry, but you are the one invoking a material reality, without evidence. Then 
you just don’t look neither at the ancient literature, nor to the contemporary 
studies, showing such commitment is incompatible with mechanism, or with the 
empirical facts.





>  
> > Primary matter, or primary physics is the idea that the fundamental reality 
> > is the physical reality.
> 
> I don't know of any physicist who claims to have found fundamental reality or 
> even something close to it, most would probably say such a thing does not 
> even exist.


But physics does not even aboard the question. Why should they?






> Richard Feynman said:
> 
> "People say to me, “Are you looking for the ultimate laws of physics?” No I 
> am not. I am just looking to find out more about the world. And if it turns 
> out there is a simple ultimate law that explains everything so be it. That 
> would be very nice discovery. If it turns out it’s like an onion with 
> millions of layers and we just sick and tired of looking at the layers then 
> that’s the way it is! But whatever way it comes out it’s nature, it’s there, 
> and she’s going to come out the way she is. And therefore when we go to 
> investigate we shouldn’t pre-decide what it is we are trying to do except to 
> find out more about it.”


Feynman just say that he does not do metaphysics. We knew.




> 
> > Even if you're right and pure mathematics can produce matter (and I can't 
> > see any way it could)
> 
> > I reassure you, nor do I.
> 
> Then you have no reason to believe mathematics is more fundamental than 
> physics.

This does not follow, given that if mathematics does not produce matter, once 
we accept Church-Turing thesis, it is a theorem of set theory that the 
arithmetic realities (the models of RA) emulates all computations.




> I can understand how physics could give birth to mathematics because physics 
> can give birth to us and we need a good language to describe the workings of 
> nature, but I don't see how it could go the other way. 
>  
> > But the sigma_1 arithmetical relation does emulate computations,
> 
> They could if  sigma_1 arithmetical relations existed, but there is no 
> evidence that they do. 

You beg again the question. You invoke your god. You see, you did it again. Can 
you give just one evidence for it? Or you confuse Matter, which exist of 
course, and primary matter, the god of Aristotle and the the Christians’ 
creation.  Sorry, but that is not my religion, and beside, when doing science, 
we cannot invoke any ontological commitment.




> A valid proof shows that a statement is grammatically correct in the language 
> of mathematics but it does not prove that it exists. If you prove that every 
> sentence in a Harry Potter book is grammatically correct in the language of 
> English you have not proven that dragons exist.  Dragons don't exist but the 
> English word "dragons" does.


2+2 = 5 is grammatically correct in arithmetic, but that has nothing to do with 
^provability or with truth.




> 

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems

2019-03-15 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 15 Mar 2019, at 13:43, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, March 15, 2019 at 5:18:43 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
>> On 14 Mar 2019, at 14:03, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, March 14, 2019 at 7:54:49 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>> On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 3:40 AM Philip Thrift gmail.com 
>> <http://gmail.com/>> wrote:
>>  
>> > We may even have robots that can sit and talk with us about current 
>> > events, know everything in Wikipedia, etc. How "creative" they will be is 
>> > an open question. 
>> 
>> I don't think it's a open question at all. I can state without reservation 
>> that regardless of how intelligent computers become they will never be 
>> creative because the word "creative" now means whatever computers aren't 
>> good at. Yet. And thus due to Moore's Law and improved programing the 
>> meaning of the word constantly changes. What was creative yesterday isn't 
>> creative today.
>> 
>> > On mathematics: Of course mathematics changes, because it is a type of 
>> > language, and languages change.
>> 
>> If mathematics is just a language (as I think it is) then it can not be used 
>> to construct things, in particular it can't, by itself without the use of 
>> matter, construct a Turing Machine as Bruno claims it can. English is also a 
>> language but an English word has no meaning without an English speaker with 
>> a physical brain to hear it.
>> 
>>  John K Clark
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> There is some AI art that sells at galleries
>> 
>>
>> https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/shortcuts/2018/oct/26/call-that-art-can-a-computer-be-a-painter
>>  
>> <https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/shortcuts/2018/oct/26/call-that-art-can-a-computer-be-a-painter>
>> 
>> but that's about it I've seen.
>> 
>> Turing machines in theoretical computing/math books are all fictional 
>> things, of course.
> 
> “Of course”?
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> All actual computers are made of matter.
> 
> No doubt that this is true, but that is not an argument that such matter are 
> not (stable) appearances.
> 
> But as I try to explain here from times to times, the arithmetical reality 
> explains where and why such stable appearances appears. If I can say.
> 
> You just seem to be a believer in a Primary Matter, but I have never seen one 
> evidence for it. Initially, “mathematician” were not believer in a 
> mathematical reality, but a skeptic toward the idea that matter is the 
> primitive reality we have to assume. But with mechanism, we don’t have to 
> assume matter, it explains matter, and unlike physicalism, it explains how 
> consciousness remains associated to the appearances of matter.
> 
> You seem to beg the question by deciding that math objects are fiction and 
> physics object is not.
> 
> No problem, but then digital mechanism is false. But there are no evidences, 
> it is just an old habit since the closure of Plato academy;
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> One could also look at it as a pragmatist.


This depends on your goal. Physics is better in prediction, than metaphysics 
and theology, except person for the first person expectation when taken 
seriously, but pragmatism is OK.




> 
> Say I want to make something. I could say "I want to make it out of 
> arithmetic (numbers).”


This would be like using string theory to prepare a pizza. 

I just let you know the logical consequence of YD + CT (indexical mechanism, 
“yes doctor” + “Church-Turing”). 

Then it is hard not to see how much contemporary physics confirms it.




> But ways to actually do that is something like to write a program where 
> "numbers" do things in a computer. But we know what is going on here is 
> electrons moving through circuits and pixels.

I have no idea what the electron are. The best I can find are books in quantum 
field theory which describes only intricate number relation, predicting rather 
well most measurable numbers related to the electron phenomenon. The physicists 
can even tell us if there is only one electron or many (cf Dirac).


> 
> It could be "running" in my brain (assuming I can imagine the program 
> executing). But that does nobody else any good.

It is the “in my brain” which might seem preposterous. 




> 
> Or I could type it up and file it away for later on a hard drive.
> 
> Electrons, circuits, pixels, brain cells, hard drives. Matter.

Or digital clock mechanism, like with Babbage machine, or just anything from 
any Turing complete reality, but if we assume m

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems

2019-03-15 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 14 Mar 2019, at 14:03, Philip Thrift  > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, March 14, 2019 at 7:54:49 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 3:40 AM Philip Thrift gmail.com 
> > wrote:
>  
> > We may even have robots that can sit and talk with us about current events, 
> > know everything in Wikipedia, etc. How "creative" they will be is an open 
> > question. 
> 
> I don't think it's a open question at all. I can state without reservation 
> that regardless of how intelligent computers become they will never be 
> creative because the word "creative" now means whatever computers aren't good 
> at. Yet. And thus due to Moore's Law and improved programing the meaning of 
> the word constantly changes. What was creative yesterday isn't creative today.
> 
> > On mathematics: Of course mathematics changes, because it is a type of 
> > language, and languages change.
> 
> If mathematics is just a language (as I think it is) then it can not be used 
> to construct things, in particular it can't, by itself without the use of 
> matter, construct a Turing Machine as Bruno claims it can. English is also a 
> language but an English word has no meaning without an English speaker with a 
> physical brain to hear it.
> 
>  John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
> There is some AI art that sells at galleries
> 
>
> https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/shortcuts/2018/oct/26/call-that-art-can-a-computer-be-a-painter
>  
> 
> 
> but that's about it I've seen.
> 
> Turing machines in theoretical computing/math books are all fictional things, 
> of course.

“Of course”?



> 
> All actual computers are made of matter.

No doubt that this is true, but that is not an argument that such matter are 
not (stable) appearances.

But as I try to explain here from times to times, the arithmetical reality 
explains where and why such stable appearances appears. If I can say.

You just seem to be a believer in a Primary Matter, but I have never seen one 
evidence for it. Initially, “mathematician” were not believer in a mathematical 
reality, but a skeptic toward the idea that matter is the primitive reality we 
have to assume. But with mechanism, we don’t have to assume matter, it explains 
matter, and unlike physicalism, it explains how consciousness remains 
associated to the appearances of matter.

You seem to beg the question by deciding that math objects are fiction and 
physics object is not.

No problem, but then digital mechanism is false. But there are no evidences, it 
is just an old habit since the closure of Plato academy;

Bruno




> 
> (Technically the fictional ones are too: Printed ink glyphs on paper.)
> 
>  -pt
> 
>  
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems

2019-03-15 Thread Bruno Marchal



> On 14 Mar 2019, at 13:54, John Clark  > wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 3:40 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>  
> > We may even have robots that can sit and talk with us about current events, 
> > know everything in Wikipedia, etc. How "creative" they will be is an open 
> > question. 
> 
> I don't think it's a open question at all. I can state without reservation 
> that regardless of how intelligent computers become they will never be 
> creative because the word "creative" now means whatever computers aren't good 
> at. Yet. And thus due to Moore's Law and improved programing the meaning of 
> the word constantly changes. What was creative yesterday isn't creative today.
> 
> > On mathematics: Of course mathematics changes, because it is a type of 
> > language, and languages change.
> 
> If mathematics is just a language (as I think it is)


Consider arithmetic. The language are the well formed expressions, using the 
logical symbols, and the no logical symboles like s, +, *, and “0”.

But a theory is concerned with proofs (syntactical) and semantics (a reality 
supposed to make the proposition true). After Gödel we know that *all* 
effective theories (effective = the proof are mechanically checkable) miss the 
arithmetical standard reality. A theory is a set of formal proposition that we 
believe true in that standard model/reality. It never captures the whole 
reality, which provably extends any theory. Even ZF is incomplete with respect 
to the arithmetical reality.





> then it can not be used to construct things, in particular it can't, by 
> itself without the use of matter, construct a Turing Machine as Bruno claims 
> it can. 

But why would that be needed. You assume some primary matter, but there are no 
evidence for this.





> English is also a language but an English word has no meaning without an 
> English speaker with a physical brain to hear it.

… and without some reality to give sense to the proposition. But the 
arithmetical reality contains, a bit like a bloc-universe, all the 
computations. Once you associated consciousness to computations, a material 
primary universe seems to add unnecessary complexity. The arithmetical reality 
cannot build matter, but contains all dreams/experience of the material. 

Bruno


> 
>  John K Clark
> 
> 
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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems

2019-03-14 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 13 Mar 2019, at 22:08, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 8:07 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
> > My computer told me that this post has not be sent. Apology if it was 
> > already sent. It is an old posts, but I think it is somehow important. 
> 
> I'm only going to comment on about 10% of your very long post because the 
> other 90% is just stuff I've heard 6.02*10^23 times before about the 
> scientifically illiterate ancient Greeks, peepee, the Universal Dance 
> Association, and how I am the most religious man who ever lived.  
> 
> >>And the scientific knowledge that existed in 529 AD was about the same as 
> >>the the scientific knowledge that existed in 529 BC, so apparently doing  
> >>metaphysics with any sort of attitude is a waste of time.
> 
> > I think the contrary. Without the progress in theology during that period 
> > [...]
> 
> Progress in theology?? What's the difference between good theology and bad 
> theology? None that I can see.


You confess not to read the pre-dogmatic theology. Are you aware that after 
Justinian, in 529, the academy of Plato has been has been closed, by order, and 
the platonist philosopher or thinker where persecuted and most of them will fly 
from Athene to Alexandria, where Hypatia will eventually taught Plotinus 
theology and Diphantius Algebra, and indeed, this will lead to the judo-Islamic 
era, full of rich merchandising and a development of science … up to 1248, 
where again, the muslim will commit the same error than the christians in 529, 
in the famous contrevery between Averroes and Al Ghazli:

Averroès: the Text must be submitted to reason.

Al Ghazali:  Reason must be submitted to Text.

Which will lead to the decline of the Muslims of the Middle-East.

The Platonician are the skeptical one; notably on Aristotle “primary 
materialism”, even more so of what some “mainstream” school of those religion 
can take, when institutionalised (the authentic “blasphemy” as well understood 
by the greeks and the taoist Chinese (but that has not prevented the Taoist to 
also fall in the “theological trap”, like harbouring any certainty in that 
subject.

Theology has progressed, but if you don’t study the non confessional theology 
of the greeks, you will not been able to appreciate it, of course.

Yet, The theology of the universal machine, the Löbian one, provides a simple 
transparent interpretation of Plotinus’ theology in arithmetic. Even in the way 
Simplicius attributes to a thinker of the first century, Moderatus, which is 
related Parmenides, and take the form of five important mode of reality:

The one,
The intellect/intelligible/believer/third-person self
The knower/soul/first-person
The intelligible matter
The sensible matter

The one, here “played”, or represented by the notion of truth, for example the 
set of sigma_1 true arithmetical sentences (that represents already the 
universal dovetailing), but for the start, and simplicity, we can use the 
“full” first order truth: the set of all true arithmetical sentences.

The intellect/intelligible is played by the Gödel “beweisbar” provability 
predicate: []p

The soul/knower/first person is placed by the formal conjunct of provability 
and truth: []p & p

The Intelligible matter, the one where God can no more control things (the 
platonician reconstruction of the Aristotle definition). It is the first person 
indeterminacy on the consistent extension, and it is motivated by the thought 
experiences, or by the Theatetus of Plato. It is played by []p & <>t. It 
assumes a reality de facto. (By the completeness theorem.

The beauty is that G* proves that all those modes describes the exact same 
extensional arithmetical reality, yet, G*, saw how much those mode-equivalence 
are not accessible to the machine, and obeys quite different logic and 
mathematics. Indeed we get classical mathematics (God, the One), intuitionist 
mathematics (the soul), quantum mathematics (intelligible matter), 
intuitionistic quantum logic (sensible matter).

You know you dislike both reading old text, and doing thought experience, or 
listening to the machine (through a bit of mathematical logic), but you seem 
also attached to your philosophical conviction that physicalism is true, or 
that there is a PRIMARY physical universe, and that only physics can explain 
consciousness. But it fails up to now, and here, we see that with Church 
thesis, it does not fail, as quantum logics and alternate consistent histories 
appears in arithmetic at the place the thought experience suggests and the math 
obliges.

You told us that consciousness is easy, and you told us that you did understand 
that consciousness is not localised, but you still assume a god, even if only a 
non personal one, an ontological commitment, if you prefer, which is not valid 
when we do science. 
You

Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems

2019-03-13 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi John,

My computer told me that this post has not be sent. Apology if it was already 
sent. It is an old posts, but I think it is somehow important. 

Lawrence, if you read those lines, it looks like one message keep not going 
through (on Gleason). I will try again. It looks like there is s server 
problem, or a Goggle account problem. Sorry.


> On 10 Dec 2018, at 23:30, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Dec 9, 2018 at 8:36 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
> > Since 529.Metaphysics has been done with the scientific attitude before. It 
> > is not easy to come back to this because in this filed, since 529 we have 
> > been brainswahedq by fairy tales, 
> 
> And the scientific knowledge that existed in 529 AD was about the same as the 
> the scientific knowledge that existed in 529 BC, so apparently doing  
> metaphysics with any sort of attitude is a waste of time.


I think the contrary. Without the progress in theology during that period, none 
of the modern mathematics, physics, computer science, would exist. You seem to 
believe that science is born at your birth. It is born in -500, and has evolved 
a lot up to 529. Then with the enlightenment period, itself due to progress in 
Islamic theology up to 1248, it has made the natural science coming back to 
reason, but spiritual and human sciences are still in the hand of the 
institutionalised charlatans.



> 
> > When we do it with the scientific method, we get experimental means to 
> > verify it.
> 
> You can't experiment with invisible factors and an experiment that produces 
> invisible results verifies nothing. 

Visibility is Aristotle’s religion. You beg the question by using 
systematically the Aristotelian materialist dogma.





> This is even true for thought experiments, a good thought experiment could in 
> theory actually be performed and only monetary or technological limitations 
> prevent you from doing so, but the thing you call a thought experiment could 
> never be performed regardless of how much money you had or your level of 
> technology because as described it is full of logical self contradictions.

? 

You asserts often negative statement like that. Yet, when we dig on this you 
find nothing, or you change the vocabulary, or use different sort of rhetorical 
distracting tricks.

Obviously, the UDA step can be done in principle. You can even replace the 
human subject by robots, the conclusion follows.



> And as a result it is a recipe for self delusion, and the easiest person to 
> fool is yourself.   

And all the scientists  who studied my work, even in my country, and many other 
people. But your own point has convinced nobody.



> 
> > conception of reality before Aristotle [...]
> 
> Why should I give a tinker's damn about the conception of reality before 
> Aristotle? 

Because you seem to believe in mechanism which is incompatible with physicalism 
or primary matter, that you invoke all the times. 

Aristotle metaphysics has been refuted. Plato was right, after all.





>  
> > You talk like if the consciousness problem was solved.
> 
> I talk like there is no point in worrying about consciousness until you've 
> first solved the problem of intelligence,

You said yourself that consciousness is easy, and intelligence is more 
difficult. In science we usually solve first the easy problem, before the more 
complex one.





> and that is something you never talk about. Why? Because coming up with a 
> intelligence theory, even a mediocre one, is incredibly hard. But coming up 
> with a consciousness theory is incredibly easy,


No. It is easier than intelligence, but it is not that easy, especially for 
people who can’t understand the most easy consequence of computationalism, like 
the first person indeterminacy. For the theory of intelligence, I use case & 
Smith, as I explained in detail in my long test “conscience et mécanisme” (in 
my URL).



> any theory will work just fine because there are no facts the theory must fit.

Of course this again shows that you don’t read the posts and the papers. 




>  
> > I am OK that consciousness is easier than intelligence to solve,
> 
> I know you are. A good theory must fit the facts. There are no known facts 
> about consciousness.

This is so false.




> Your theory fits all known facts about consciousness. Therefore your theory 
> is a good theory about consciousness, just like every other theory about 
> consciousness.

“My” theory of consciousness is the the theory of consciousness made by the 
machine, and that is 100% verifiable. Then it is also 100% testable, as that 
theory determines completely physics. It is hard to imagine anything more 
testable. You just don’t read the papers, invoking an error at step 3, and thus 
without even understanding that we don’t ne

Re: What happens to old entanglements?

2019-03-13 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 13 Mar 2019, at 07:25, Pierz  wrote:
> 
> A question for the physicists. I understand that entanglement is monogamous, 
> which is really just a way of saying that a system's correlations with other 
> systems cannot exceed +-1. Thus a maximally entangled system has no room for 
> entanglement with any other system.

Unless it is no more isolated, I would say. (I am not a physicist, and I can 
make sense only of QM without collapse)



> The question is what happens to previous entanglements when a particle 
> interacts with another particle, such that it becomes maximally entangled 
> with it.

Entanglement are just special superpositions, involving many “bodies”. Previews 
entanglement cannot disappear, but can be “traced out” and discarded FAPP.



> Are prior entanglements completely obliterated,

I don’t think that is possible (unless wave collapse is postulated).



> or are they just obliterated FAPP, meaning that maximal entanglement is also 
> only FAPP?

Yes, I would say it is local to the isolated system you are concerned with. 
Some people argue that if we are machine with a so low level of substitution 
that we need the exact quantum state of the brain, then, the whole universe 
needs to be duplicated, because a quantum Big Bang entangled all possible 
particles at the start.




> ISTM that some remote trace of entanglement - a kind of micro-entanglement - 
> must remain?

In principle, yes. I would say. In practice, we can’t recover them, it would be 
as hard as reversing the “Schroedinger equation” of the whole universe. That is 
even more difficult than resuscitating a Schroedinger cat, which is already 
technically unfeasible.


Bruno


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Re: Black holes and the information paradox

2019-03-13 Thread Bruno Marchal
Hi Grayson, Hi everybody,

Like every years, the quantity of work is growing, more or less up to June, so 
I apologise in advance for answering more slowly.


> On 12 Mar 2019, at 22:54, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, March 12, 2019 at 12:18:50 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Mar 2019, at 09:54, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, March 11, 2019 at 1:43:05 AM UTC-6, Liz R wrote:
>> I thought QM was deterministic, at least mathematically - and I guess in the 
>> MWI?
>> 
>> QM is deterministic, but only as far as reconstructing wf's as time is 
>> reversed, but it can't reconstruct individual events which are without 
>> ostensible cause. As for the MWI, I don't think it's deterministic since the 
>> different branches are never in causal contact. AG 
> 
> It has to be.
> 
> So If I am in one world of many, how can I time reverse my outcome to 
> reconstruct something from another world, the one that gave rise to the many 
> worlds? AG

By amnesia, like Belinfante showed that we can reverse the Schoredinger cat 
experience, and even statistically get the cat alive back, with a chance of 
1/4. That is sometimes used to claim that Everett theory (QM without collapse) 
is testable. 


>  
> Without wave collapse the evolution is “just” a unitary transformation. It is 
> a vector rotating in some (Hilbert) space. Only the wave collapse postulate 
> bring 3p-indterminacy. In Everett the indeterminacy is explained like in 
> arithmetic, or combinator, with the digital mechanistic hypothesis (in the 
> cognitive science, not in physics).. 
> 
> Can't we keep your theory out of this? AG 

My theory, Mechanism (in cognitive science), is the same as the one used by 
Everett, or Darwin. I have no theory of mine. I have a theorem, or proposition. 
If you are skeptical, that is the good attitude. 
Yet, without mechanism, I can hardly make sense of QM at all, nor of 
consciousness, etc. Things get to much “magical” for me.

You say also, in the next post,

> On Tuesday, March 12, 2019 at 12:18:51 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Mar 2019, at 03:16, agrays...@ <>gmail.com <http://gmail.com/> wrote:
>> 
>> They say if information is lost, determination is toast. 
> 
> That is not correct. If information is lost, reversibility is toast, but 
> determination can be conserved.
> 
> If reversibility is lost, how can determinism be preserved? It can't, and 
> this is the position Hawking took IIUC. What's your definition of 
> determinism? Doesn't it require the laws of physics to be time reversible? AG 


If reversibility is lost, you can’t recover the past from the present, but you 
might still been able to predict the future. Reversibility is a sort of 
determinism on the past, which breaks down when you loss information.

The computation of 2+2 is deterministic on all computer, but not all would be 
able to go from the result (4) to the past (2+2). But with a reversible 
computer when computing 2 + 2, you will get 4, plus some information that is 
locally discarded, but still retrievable in principle, so that you can come 
back to “2+2”.


> Typically the Kestrek bird K is irreversible, as it eliminates information 
> Kxy = x. From KSI you get S, but from S, even knowing it comes from the 
> application of K, you cannot retrieve I. Similarly with addition and 
> multiplication in arithmetic. From 18 you can’t guess it cames from 7 and 11. 
> Erasing information is common.
> 
> Some does not tolerate that, so Church works in the base {I, B, W, C}, where 
> I is [x]x, B is [x][y][z] x(yz), etc. 
> 
> That base is not combinatorial complete, but is still Turing complete, 
> illustrating that we can do computation without eliminating any information. 
> (None of I, B, C and X eliminates information)
> 
> But the quantum eliminates even the combinator W (Wxy = xyy), or the lamda 
> expression [x][y]. xyy. That is, we cannot eliminate information, but we 
> cannot duplicate it either!
> 
> Now, the problem is that the BCI combinator algebra are not Turing-complete. 
> It is the core of the physical reality, and Turing universality needs the 
> addition of modal “combinators”.
> 
> I have no idea what you're referring to. AG 

I guess you have not followed the combinator thread. It starts from zero. 
Unlike QM which asks for a serious background in mathematics, combinators can 
be understood by any kids, without any mathematical knowledge. I have very 
young students this year who asked me this introduction. The recent thread on 
the combinators comes from that experience. Just look at the first thread and 
ask question. It is very easy, and the combinators are very handy to talk about 
low level computation, including 

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-12 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 10 Mar 2019, at 21:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/10/2019 6:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 9 Mar 2019, at 01:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 3/8/2019 2:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> Why is the probability not 1.0.  Why is there any effect at all in any 
>>>>> continuation?  Why is experience dependent on physics, if it is just a 
>>>>> matter of timeless arithmetical relations.
>>>> Because to get physics you need to be able to make prediction.
>>> 
>>> But why do you need to "get physics".  You seem to be arguing backwards 
>>> from the conclusion you want.  You know you need to get physics to make a 
>>> prediction, otherwise your theory is useless.  So then you argue that 
>>> therefore substituting for brain parts is necessary because that makes 
>>> "getting physics" necessary.
>> 
>> I don’t understand. What do you mean by “substituting brain parts is 
>> necessary”. It is my working hypothesis.
> 
> But then you reach a contradiction that brain parts don't exist and are 
> irrelevant to thought.

You confuse a brain made of matter with a brain made of primary matter. That 
confusion is correct in the theology/metaphysics of Aristotle. But is invalid 
if the brain/body is Turing emulable. 



> 
>> It is the exactly same hypothesis made by Darwin, and most scientists since. 
>> That physics has to be recovered from arithmetic is shown to be a 
>> consequence of that theory. And the proofs I have given is constructive, so 
>> it explains how to recover physics from arithmetic. Most of the weirdness of 
>> quantum physics becomes indisputable arithmetic facts. In fact, the 
>> classical, or quasi classical part of physics is far more difficult to be 
>> derived, but it has still to be derivable, unless Mechanism is false (in 
>> which case we are back at the start).
>> 
>> Keep in mind that with Mechanism, physicalism is already refuted.
> 
> A tautology: With Communism, capitalism is already refuted.


?

Mechanism is only the idea that there is no magic operating in the brain. Many 
people confuse Mechanism and Materialism, and strong-atheism is used to employ 
Mechanism, in the (weakly) materialist frame to avoid dualism and to put the 
mind-body problem under the rug.

So it is an important point that when we look closer, we see that Mechanism is 
incompatible with materialism and physicalism.





> 
>> With physicalism, you need a god to select a computation, or a collection of 
>> computation, to make a prediction. But if that God exists, you cannot say 
>> that you survive a digital substitution of the brain *qua computation”. You 
>> can still say yes to a doctor, invoking the strangest magical abilities of 
>> your god or another.
>> 
>> If you doubt this, just tell me how A Nature, or a Primary Matter, or any 
>> God, select the computation which all occurs, are executed in the (sigma_1) 
>> arithmetical reality.
>> 
>> If you argue that the computation in arithmetic are not real, you again 
>> invoke your god. The word “real” has to be avoid in science, especially in 
>> theology when done with the scientific method.
> 
> But you invoke your god to justify your argument for your god: In fact, the 
> classical, or quasi classical part of physics is far more difficult to be 
> derived, but it has still to be derivable, unless Mechanism is false (in 
> which case we are back at the start).

Mechanism use  a God, which is just the sigma_1 truth, in which everybody 
believe already. Then, I prove that If Mechanism is true, physics becomes a 
branch of arithmetic “seen from inside” (using the Gödel-Kleene recursion 
theorem to define precisely that arithmetical “inside-view”.

Are you able to doubt the existence of a PRIMARY physical universe? Do you see 
what that means?

Bruno




> 
> Brent
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Re: Black holes and the information paradox

2019-03-12 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Mar 2019, at 03:16, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> They say if information is lost, determination is toast.

That is not correct. If information is lost, reversibility is toast, but 
determination can be conserved.

Typically the Kestrek bird K is irreversible, as it eliminates information Kxy 
= x. From KSI you get S, but from S, even knowing it comes from the application 
of K, you cannot retrieve I. Similarly with addition and multiplication in 
arithmetic. From 18 you can’t guess it cames from 7 and 11. Erasing information 
is common.

Some does not tolerate that, so Church works in the base {I, B, W, C}, where I 
is [x]x, B is [x][y][z] x(yz), etc. 

That base is not combinatorial complete, but is still Turing complete, 
illustrating that we can do computation without eliminating any information. 
(None of I, B, C and X eliminates information)

But the quantum eliminates even the combinator W (Wxy = xyy), or the lamda 
expression [x][y]. xyy. That is, we cannot eliminate information, but we cannot 
duplicate it either!

Now, the problem is that the BCI combinator algebra are not Turing-complete. It 
is the core of the physical reality, and Turing universality needs the addition 
of modal “combinators”.




> But doesn't QM inherently affirm information loss? I mean, although, say, the 
> SWE can be run backward in time to reconstruct any wf it describes, we can 
> never reconstruct or play backward Born's rule, in the sense of knowing what 
> original particular state gave a particular outcome. That is, there is no 
> rule in QM to predict a particular outcome, so how can we expect, that given 
> some outcome, we can know from whence it arose? AG


You can run backward by discarding information. Born rule, or the projection 
inherent in the measurement discard information, when you abandon the collapse 
postulate. That is why “fusing” histories can be done by relative amnesia, and 
also that is how Church emulate “local kestrels” capable to “apparently 
eliminate information”, but only with selected objects, like the numbers. K n m 
= n 

A quantum computer (essentially irreversible during the processing) is Turing 
complete, and so can simulate all classical computers discarding information 
all the times, but in the details, everything is locally determinist and 
reversible.

Bruno





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Re: My son the mathematician

2019-03-12 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Mar 2019, at 08:46, Liz R  wrote:
> 
> Here is his first co-authored paper (at the age of 20).
> 
> Topology and its Applications 
> 
> Volume 254 
> , 1 March 
> 2019, Pages 85-100
> 
> Extending bonding functions in generalized inverse sequences
> 
> Iztok Banič, 
>  
> SimonGoodwin and  
> MichaelLockyer
>  
>   
> 
> 
> (he's the one in the middle)


Congratulation Liz! Nice to hear from you,

Bruno




> 
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0166864118304449 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: Black holes and the information paradox

2019-03-12 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 11 Mar 2019, at 09:54, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, March 11, 2019 at 1:43:05 AM UTC-6, Liz R wrote:
> I thought QM was deterministic, at least mathematically - and I guess in the 
> MWI?
> 
> QM is deterministic, but only as far as reconstructing wf's as time is 
> reversed, but it can't reconstruct individual events which are without 
> ostensible cause. As for the MWI, I don't think it's deterministic since the 
> different branches are never in causal contact. AG 

It has to be. Without wave collapse the evolution is “just” a unitary 
transformation. It is a vector rotating in some (Hilbert) space. Only the wave 
collapse postulate bring 3p-indterminacy. In Everett the indeterminacy is 
explained like in arithmetic, or combinator, with the digital mechanistic 
hypothesis (in the cognitive science, not in physics).. 

Bruno



> 
> I mean everyone can't have forgotten quantum indeterminacy when discussing 
> the BHIP, surely?
> 
>  
> 
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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-10 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 10 Mar 2019, at 13:52, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sunday, March 10, 2019 at 7:10:40 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 8 Mar 2019, at 11:16, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, March 8, 2019 at 3:18:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 7 Mar 2019, at 12:26, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, March 7, 2019 at 5:11:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>>> On 6 Mar 2019, at 14:43, John Clark > wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 8:30 AM Bruno Marchal > wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> > You confirm my theory that strong (non agnostic) atheism is radical 
>>>> > religious fundamentalism
>>>> 
>>>> I've never heard you or anybody else criticize me that brilliantly before, 
>>>> you sure put me in my place. I am devastated!
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Lol. 
>>> 
>>> The fact remains. Anyone mocking the science theology, helps the radicals, 
>>> who have separated theology from science to mix it with (fake) politics 
>>> (and real tyranny). You are under the influence of the post 529 
>>> pseudo-christian propaganda. You defend, not intentionally I suppose, those 
>>> who want us remaining non educated. 
>>> The greek theology (not the greek mythology!) is at the origin of 
>>> mathematics, physics, and even mathematical logic more recently.
>>> 
>>> Note that the USSR, which have banned both religion and theology, did the 
>>> same thing with biology. By mixing it with the state, it becomes 
>>> obscurantist and non sensical (which led to a big famine).
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> > By theology, you know that  [...]  Plato define God by [...]
>>>> 
>>>> I'm sorry did you say something? I think I fell asleep 
>>> 
>>> Since long …
>>> Since 529, somehow, I guess. 
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Epicurus (via Lucretius) had a philosophy based on physical and psychical 
>>> atoms.
>> 
>> 
>> Intersting! (And just now you don’t provide links? I would be interested. It 
>> would show that early materialist where not eliminativist). Plotinus already 
>> complained on “eliminative materialism”, in its own term. I find this both 
>> inexact and inhuman.
>> 
>> But that leads to a non necessary dualism, which is also incompatible with 
>> Descartes Mechanism and Turing’s one.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Perhaps the writings of Epicurus and Democritus and their students should 
>>> have been preserved and the writings of Plato and Aristotle should have 
>>> been destroyed.
>>> 
>>> :)
>> 
>> Lol
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Epicurus: 
>> 
>> Psychical [soul] atoms combine with physical [body] atoms to make conscious 
>> beings.
>> 
>> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epicurus/#PsycEthi 
>> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epicurus/#PsycEthi>
>> 
>> Having established the physical basis of the world,
> 
> How?
> 
> 
> 
>> Epicurus proceeds to explain the nature of the soul (this, at least, is the 
>> order in which Lucretius sets things out). This too, of course, consists of 
>> atoms: first, there is nothing that is not made up of atoms
> 
> Assuming physicalism and atomism.
> 
> 
> 
>> and void (secondary qualities are simply accidents of the arrangement of 
>> atoms),
> 
> 
> That is the eternal confusion between first person and third person, and it 
> leads, with mechanism, to elimination of the person, or to dualisme, or 
> indeed to panpsychism, which explains absolutely nothing: neither mind nor 
> matter. 
> 
> Matter is an invention of the devil to distract us from the real thing.
> 
> Well, in neoplatonism, you define matter by where God lose control. Of course 
> it is not the christian god. The greeks neoplatonist knew already that it 
> makes not much sense to assume that God is omniscient and/or omnipotent. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> and second, an incorporeal entity could neither act on nor be moved by 
>> bodies,
> 
> 
> That is a good point. But that is the reason to not *assume* matter and 
> movement in the first place.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> as the soul is seen to do (e.g., it is conscious of what happens to the 
>> body, and it initiates phy

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-10 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 9 Mar 2019, at 01:16, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/8/2019 2:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Why is the probability not 1.0.  Why is there any effect at all in any 
>>> continuation?  Why is experience dependent on physics, if it is just a 
>>> matter of timeless arithmetical relations.
>> Because to get physics you need to be able to make prediction.
> 
> But why do you need to "get physics".  You seem to be arguing backwards from 
> the conclusion you want.  You know you need to get physics to make a 
> prediction, otherwise your theory is useless.  So then you argue that 
> therefore substituting for brain parts is necessary because that makes 
> "getting physics" necessary.

I don’t understand. What do you mean by “substituting brain parts is 
necessary”. It is my working hypothesis. It is the exactly same hypothesis made 
by Darwin, and most scientists since. That physics has to be recovered from 
arithmetic is shown to be a consequence of that theory. And the proofs I have 
given is constructive, so it explains how to recover physics from arithmetic. 
Most of the weirdness of quantum physics becomes indisputable arithmetic facts. 
In fact, the classical, or quasi classical part of physics is far more 
difficult to be derived, but it has still to be derivable, unless Mechanism is 
false (in which case we are back at the start).

Keep in mind that with Mechanism, physicalism is already refuted. With 
physicalism, you need a god to select a computation, or a collection of 
computation, to make a prediction. But if that God exists, you cannot say that 
you survive a digital substitution of the brain *qua computation”. You can 
still say yes to a doctor, invoking the strangest magical abilities of your god 
or another.

If you doubt this, just tell me how A Nature, or a Primary Matter, or any God, 
select the computation which all occurs, are executed in the (sigma_1) 
arithmetical reality.

If you argue that the computation in arithmetic are not real, you again invoke 
your god. The word “real” has to be avoid in science, especially in theology 
when done with the scientific method.

Bruno




> 
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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-10 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 8 Mar 2019, at 12:29, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, March 8, 2019 at 4:42:28 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Mar 2019, at 23:00, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, March 7, 2019 at 11:47:41 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Mar 2019, at 22:10, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 12:20:13 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> We cannot predict in advance if a machine will stop. The extensional 
>>> equality of machines, or combinators, is unsolvable. 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> There is some conceptual and practical division between mathematics and 
>>> applied mathematics
>> 
>> Yes. But note that the division we can made there are dependent of the 
>> metaphysics.
>> 
>> Then Gödel has shown that we can apply mathematics to metamathematics, and 
>> that a large part of metamathematics is in mathematics, so mathematics have 
>> application in mathematics. But that is obvious through the representation 
>> theorems, and my factors. We can say that the theory of complex analysis has 
>> found extraordinary application in the pure number theory, like Riemann 
>> discovered. 
>> 
>> Category theory is born from the discovery of abstract pattern relying many 
>> application of some branch of math to another branch of math. It helps 
>> mathematician to not reinvent the wheel all the time.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> (and there are institutionally separate Mathematics (PM, P for "Pure") and 
>>> Applied Mathematics (AM) Departments or Divisions at some universities.
>> 
>> Yes. That has been the root of my problem with some local academician. I 
>> naively stated that I decide to study mathematics because I saw application 
>> of mathematical logic (the second recursion theorem) to biology (like I have 
>> shown in my paper “Amoeba, Planaria and Dreaming machine”. But I was told 
>> that mathematical logic was taught in the section of Pure Mathematics, where 
>> it was very badly seen to apply mathematics to anything but mathematics. 
>> This illustrates it makes no sense to decide that some part of math are pure 
>> or not.
>> 
>> And this is even more true with mechanism.  There is no more an ontological 
>> physical reality, or any gods of that sort (which have never been tested, 
>> actually, except with my work, of course, where the test was negative for 
>> “Matter”). So the fundamental reality becomes mathematical. And we are pure 
>> mathematical object living in a mathematical reality. That is not entirely 
>> correct, because the internal phenomenology, for technical reason, escapes 
>> even the whole of mathematics. So, eventually, the reality is theological, 
>> to be correct. But the theology of the machines is a theory, which today, is 
>> classified in pure mathematics (the logic of provability). 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> There is a PM and an AM way of approaching what "computing" is.
>> 
>> 
>> Yes, even in arithmetic. The universal machine discover that there is a big 
>> difference between being implemented by a nameable “in principle” universal 
>> number, and being implemented by something emerging from an infinity of 
>> computations from the first person points of view. The first leads to the 
>> theory G* (the “scientific theology of the ideally sound machine”), and the 
>> others leads to quantum logic and physics, and the right one, if mechanism 
>> is correct.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> In an AM way of thinking, no computer can run forever, assuming what 
>>> scientists theorize about the future of the universe (big freeze, crunch, 
>>> etc.).
>> 
>> And assuming some physical reality. If you do serious metaphysics, it is 
>> better to invoke an ontological commitment only in last ressort. Invoking an 
>> ontological or primary physical universe is like saying “and god made it”. 
>> That does not work. It is wishful thinking, provably if Mechanism is assumed.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> AM would see computing as being nothing more than what can be done on 
>>> material computers, natural or manmade. 
>> 
>> Computation have been discovered in arithmetic, before physics.
>> 
>> Of course, the fact that we have cells and brains suggest, once we 
>> understand that a computation is an arithm

Re: What is the largest integer you can write in 5 seconds?

2019-03-10 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 8 Mar 2019, at 22:00, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 5:05 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
>  > BB(8000) is stil an infinitesimal (so to speak) compared to 
> f_epsilon_0(BB(8000)).
> 
> I don't know what "f_epsilon_0" is but if its computable then BB[BB(8000)]

Good point. But now, using epsilon_0, which is the constructive ordinal 

 omega^(omega^(omega^(omega^…, or equivalently omega tetrated to omega 
(tetration is the iteration of exponentiation, like exponentiation is the 
iteration of multiplication, and multiplication is the iteration of addition).

You can iterate the application of BB epsilon_0 times, and actually, alpha 
times for alpha any constructive ordinal.

If the problem is to name a large number, or just to point to a large number, 
in all case the winner is the one who will be able to use the constructive 
ordinal. 

Now, as you don’t ask for a name (definite description, programs to build that 
name) the question raised if you could not iterate BB on non constructive 
ordinals, but that will make the pointing even more fuzzy and not well 
definite. Continuing this process will lead to inconsistency, at to some 
undecidable threshold.

Bruno




> would be a larger number than that because BB grows faster than any 
> computable function.
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
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Re: What is the largest integer you can write in 5 seconds?

2019-03-10 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 8 Mar 2019, at 15:49, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 5:05 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
> >> Assuming you're just using 2 symbols (like 0 and 1) there are (16001)^8000 
> >>  different 8000 state Turing Machines. And that is a very large number but 
> >> a finite one. And one of those machines makes the largest number of FINITE 
> >> operations before halting. And that number of operations is BB(8000).  
> >> Even theoretically, much less practically,  you can never compute that 
> >> number but I have given a unique description of it, no other 8000 state 
> >> Turing Machine has that propertie.
>  
> > Yes, sure BB(8000) is a precise well defined finite number. But it is no 
> > what logician and philosopher call a “name”, where the number should be 
> > computable in principle. My point is just a vocabulary point,
> 
> I agree it's just a question of vocabulary but to avoid confusion if logician 
> and philosophers want to use commonly used words then their technical meaning 
> should have some relationship to their common meaning. Parents can give a 
> precise definition to their child (he's the only kid in the crib) so they can 
> "name" him even though they can't calculate him.
>  
> > and a way to remind a nice problem which I have used to illustrate some 
> > less known application of Cantor’s diagonal.
> 
> It always seemed to me that if Cantor had taken just one more small step he 
> could have proven the existence of non computable numbers more than 40 years 
> before Turing did.


Similarly, if you read Plotinus’ Ennead “On the Number”, you can see that 
Plotinus was foreseeing the Difficulty that Cantor was confronted with the 
notion of set, notably by trying to get a number of the numbers, which was a 
natural idea for a platonician, but one of those ideas which leads to 
conceptual difficulties, and theological one too, as Cantor saw by having an 
heavy correspondence with the catholic clergy. 
I think that if we would not have been obliged, by violence and terror, to 
separate science and theology, and to not have mixed it with the State(s), the 
whole “Church-Turing-Gödel” revolution could have appeared 500 hundred years 
before. I take the discovery of the Universal Machine, made by Babbage, Post, 
Church Turing is the biggest discovery made by the humans ever. It changes 
literally everything including the conception we can have on everything.

Bruno






> 
>  John K Clark
> 
> 
>  
> 
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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-10 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 8 Mar 2019, at 11:16, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, March 8, 2019 at 3:18:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 7 Mar 2019, at 12:26, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, March 7, 2019 at 5:11:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Mar 2019, at 14:43, John Clark > wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 8:30 AM Bruno Marchal > wrote:
>>> 
>>> > You confirm my theory that strong (non agnostic) atheism is radical 
>>> > religious fundamentalism
>>> 
>>> I've never heard you or anybody else criticize me that brilliantly before, 
>>> you sure put me in my place. I am devastated!
>> 
>> 
>> Lol. 
>> 
>> The fact remains. Anyone mocking the science theology, helps the radicals, 
>> who have separated theology from science to mix it with (fake) politics (and 
>> real tyranny). You are under the influence of the post 529 pseudo-christian 
>> propaganda. You defend, not intentionally I suppose, those who want us 
>> remaining non educated. 
>> The greek theology (not the greek mythology!) is at the origin of 
>> mathematics, physics, and even mathematical logic more recently.
>> 
>> Note that the USSR, which have banned both religion and theology, did the 
>> same thing with biology. By mixing it with the state, it becomes 
>> obscurantist and non sensical (which led to a big famine).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> > By theology, you know that  [...]  Plato define God by [...]
>>> 
>>> I'm sorry did you say something? I think I fell asleep 
>> 
>> Since long …
>> Since 529, somehow, I guess. 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Epicurus (via Lucretius) had a philosophy based on physical and psychical 
>> atoms.
> 
> 
> Intersting! (And just now you don’t provide links? I would be interested. It 
> would show that early materialist where not eliminativist). Plotinus already 
> complained on “eliminative materialism”, in its own term. I find this both 
> inexact and inhuman.
> 
> But that leads to a non necessary dualism, which is also incompatible with 
> Descartes Mechanism and Turing’s one.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Perhaps the writings of Epicurus and Democritus and their students should 
>> have been preserved and the writings of Plato and Aristotle should have been 
>> destroyed.
>> 
>> :)
> 
> Lol
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Epicurus: 
> 
> Psychical [soul] atoms combine with physical [body] atoms to make conscious 
> beings.
> 
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epicurus/#PsycEthi
> 
> Having established the physical basis of the world,

How?



> Epicurus proceeds to explain the nature of the soul (this, at least, is the 
> order in which Lucretius sets things out). This too, of course, consists of 
> atoms: first, there is nothing that is not made up of atoms

Assuming physicalism and atomism.



> and void (secondary qualities are simply accidents of the arrangement of 
> atoms),


That is the eternal confusion between first person and third person, and it 
leads, with mechanism, to elimination of the person, or to dualisme, or indeed 
to panpsychism, which explains absolutely nothing: neither mind nor matter. 

Matter is an invention of the devil to distract us from the real thing.

Well, in neoplatonism, you define matter by where God lose control. Of course 
it is not the christian god. The greeks neoplatonist knew already that it makes 
not much sense to assume that God is omniscient and/or omnipotent. 




> and second, an incorporeal entity could neither act on nor be moved by bodies,


That is a good point. But that is the reason to not *assume* matter and 
movement in the first place.




> as the soul is seen to do (e.g., it is conscious of what happens to the body, 
> and it initiates physical movement).

That is the shadow of Mechanism, but adding atom of souls make the brain more 
mysterious, especially that we have not find such atoms. And would they exist, 
the mind-body problem is only made more complex, if not unsolvable. At least 
Epicurus is not eliminativist, like most religious person.



> Epicurus maintains that soul atoms are particularly fine and are distributed 
> throughout the body (LH 64), and it is by means of them that we have 
> sensations (aisthêseis) and the experience of pain and pleasure, which 
> Epicurus calls pathê (a term used by Aristotle and others to signify emotions 
> instead). Body without soul atoms is unconscious and inert, and when the 
> atoms of the body are disarranged so that it can no longer support conscious 

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-08 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 7 Mar 2019, at 23:00, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, March 7, 2019 at 11:47:41 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 Mar 2019, at 22:10, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 12:20:13 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> We cannot predict in advance if a machine will stop. The extensional 
>> equality of machines, or combinators, is unsolvable. 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> There is some conceptual and practical division between mathematics and 
>> applied mathematics
> 
> Yes. But note that the division we can made there are dependent of the 
> metaphysics.
> 
> Then Gödel has shown that we can apply mathematics to metamathematics, and 
> that a large part of metamathematics is in mathematics, so mathematics have 
> application in mathematics. But that is obvious through the representation 
> theorems, and my factors. We can say that the theory of complex analysis has 
> found extraordinary application in the pure number theory, like Riemann 
> discovered. 
> 
> Category theory is born from the discovery of abstract pattern relying many 
> application of some branch of math to another branch of math. It helps 
> mathematician to not reinvent the wheel all the time.
> 
> 
> 
>> (and there are institutionally separate Mathematics (PM, P for "Pure") and 
>> Applied Mathematics (AM) Departments or Divisions at some universities.
> 
> Yes. That has been the root of my problem with some local academician. I 
> naively stated that I decide to study mathematics because I saw application 
> of mathematical logic (the second recursion theorem) to biology (like I have 
> shown in my paper “Amoeba, Planaria and Dreaming machine”. But I was told 
> that mathematical logic was taught in the section of Pure Mathematics, where 
> it was very badly seen to apply mathematics to anything but mathematics. This 
> illustrates it makes no sense to decide that some part of math are pure or 
> not.
> 
> And this is even more true with mechanism.  There is no more an ontological 
> physical reality, or any gods of that sort (which have never been tested, 
> actually, except with my work, of course, where the test was negative for 
> “Matter”). So the fundamental reality becomes mathematical. And we are pure 
> mathematical object living in a mathematical reality. That is not entirely 
> correct, because the internal phenomenology, for technical reason, escapes 
> even the whole of mathematics. So, eventually, the reality is theological, to 
> be correct. But the theology of the machines is a theory, which today, is 
> classified in pure mathematics (the logic of provability). 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> There is a PM and an AM way of approaching what "computing" is.
> 
> 
> Yes, even in arithmetic. The universal machine discover that there is a big 
> difference between being implemented by a nameable “in principle” universal 
> number, and being implemented by something emerging from an infinity of 
> computations from the first person points of view. The first leads to the 
> theory G* (the “scientific theology of the ideally sound machine”), and the 
> others leads to quantum logic and physics, and the right one, if mechanism is 
> correct.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> In an AM way of thinking, no computer can run forever, assuming what 
>> scientists theorize about the future of the universe (big freeze, crunch, 
>> etc.).
> 
> And assuming some physical reality. If you do serious metaphysics, it is 
> better to invoke an ontological commitment only in last ressort. Invoking an 
> ontological or primary physical universe is like saying “and god made it”. 
> That does not work. It is wishful thinking, provably if Mechanism is assumed.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> AM would see computing as being nothing more than what can be done on 
>> material computers, natural or manmade. 
> 
> Computation have been discovered in arithmetic, before physics.
> 
> Of course, the fact that we have cells and brains suggest, once we understand 
> that a computation is an arithmetical notion,  that the physical reality too 
> is Turing complete. But with mechanism, to solve the mind-body problem, you 
> have to derive the physical reality (and its Turing completeness) from 
> arithmetic. It is nota question of choice.
> 
> Of course you can say that in your religion, machine cannot have souls, that 
> you are not a machine, and so you can believe in the fantasy you want. That 
> is what we do since we have put theology out of science (just to make it 
> possible for some tyran to exploit people).
>

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-08 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 7 Mar 2019, at 22:20, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/7/2019 9:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 7 Mar 2019, at 05:48, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 3/6/2019 10:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> I use mechanism in the sense that if little daemon substitute each piece 
>>>> of my brain, at some resolution level,  by functional digital equivalent, 
>>>> then my consciousness would not notice the difference.
>>> According to your theory, your consciousness is instantiated by the 
>>> computational threads of the universal dovetailer, which exists within 
>>> arithmetic.  So whether a piece of your brain is present, replaced, or 
>>> removed should make no difference to you consciousness.
>> 
>> Proof?
>> 
>> Yes, at first sight, naively, the universal dovetailing predicts white 
>> rabbits, or even white noise. But this is like forgetting the definition of 
>> the subject given (the Gödel-Löbian machines), and the fact that the thread 
>> in the Universal dovetailing is entirely structured by the nuance of 
>> provability imposed by incompleteness.
>> 
>> Then the math shows that we get a quantum logic for the 3p physics, another 
>> quantum logics for the 1p physics, and even (I was wrong in my original 
>> thesis) a quantum logic for the 1p-soul. Plotinus was right on this, the 
>> soul has already a foot in matter, even if that quantum logic is an 
>> intuitionist quantum logic.
>> 
>> If I belong to a normal history, for those arithmetical quantum logic,  
>> where some people decide to remove a piece of my brain, the probability will 
>> be high that I will survive that lobotomic experience in the “continuum” of 
>> continuations which are executed in the sigma_1 arithmetic (equivalent to a 
>> universal dovetailing).
> 
> Why is the probability not 1.0.  Why is there any effect at all in any 
> continuation?  Why is experience dependent on physics, if it is just a matter 
> of timeless arithmetical relations.

Because to get physics you need to be able to make prediction. To get a logic 
of probability, incompleteness forbid to use “[]p” (true in all accessible 
continuations) because there are path to cul-de-sac at each world, so we need 
to explicitly define observation by []p & <>t. That does gives a logic of 
probability in general, and with “[]” = Gödel’s beweisbar, that gives a quantum 
probability calculus, etc.

In general relativity, people also explain the perception of time from a static 
reality. With mechanism, though, we don’t have a block-universe, but a 
block-mindscape, where the mind can be defined by the set of accessible 
computational continuation relatively to a universal machine.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> And mechanism is not my theory. Nor is the G* theology, which is just the 
>> truth theory of all classical Löbian machine, as demonstrate by the work of 
>> Gödel, Löb and Solovay. I have not invented the intensional variants. ([]p & 
>> p) has been discovered by Goldblatt and Boolos, well studied by Artemov. And 
>> yes, I point on the existence of infinitely many others, some crucial to 
>> derive “Matter” from arithmetic in the manner prescribed by Mechanism (or, 
>> actually Neoplatonism).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-03-08 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 7 Mar 2019, at 22:13, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/7/2019 8:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 6 Mar 2019, at 20:57, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 3/6/2019 5:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>> Every time I mention this you strike back at the straw man of primitive 
>>>>> matter...which I never refer to.
>>>> But then, why do you criticise the theorem? Maybe you don’t? Bt then why 
>>>> are you saying that elementary arithmetic is not a TOE? It explain the 
>>>> coupling consciousness/matter using only elementary arithmetic.
>>> 
>>> My criticism of the theory is different from my criticism of your repeated 
>>> claim that you have eliminated and matter and attributing anything to it is 
>>> "Aristotles error".   My criticism of the theory that arithmetic is a TOE 
>>> is that arithmetic proves too much.  
>> 
>> 
>> That looks like Deutsch criticism on Schmidhuber type of computationalist 
>> explanation.
>> 
>> But, this omit completely the first person indeterminacy, which not only 
>> explains (in a testable way) the origin of the physical laws, but above all 
>> makes the physics unique, and invariant for all machines.
>> 
>> The postulation of a primary universe, on the contrary, explains only the 
>> current first person prediction by using an identity thesis which is 
>> inconsistent with mechanism.
> 
> You're back to criticizing a strawman "primary" universe which I didn't 
> mention.

But then what is your point in critiszing the idea that with mechanism, we 
*must* derive physics from arithmetic, not for getting a new physics which 
would better than current theories in physics, but to solve the mind-body 
problem.




> 
>> Physics fails both for the prediction of “seeing an eclipse”, and miss the 
>> mind-body problem.
> 
> Let's see arithmetic predict an eclipse.  ISTM that you the ONLY thing your 
> theory predicts is the ineffability of consciousness.


No. It predicts/explain the existence of an apparent stable physical universe, 
which physics just assumed, and it predicts its quantum nature, which 
physicists cannot explain at all, nor even try. Then physics fails to predict 
anything without using an identity thesis which is inconsistent with Mechanism. 
It changes noting for all FAPP use of physics, and that will remain for long, 
like nobody would use quantum physics to do a pizza (although a microwave is 
based on quantum physics, but that’s not the point).

We might be at cross purpose. Keep in mind that I am working on the mind body 
problem, not on the problem to predict anything, but to more to justify why we 
can do prediction at all, and how our consciousness is related to them.



> 
>> Compared to the explanation in arithmetic, there is just no explanation 
>> given for the physical experiment and experience. It works very well 
>> locally, but only by using an inconsistent metaphysics. In fact, it does not 
>> tackle the fundamental question, and gives recipe to make prediction, 
>> without attempting to explains why we can be conscious of the prediction.
> 
> But your "mechanism" doesn't explain it either.  It simply identifies it with 
> logical inferences.

I don’t see that. Mechanism shows that the physical prediction can make sense, 
but the physics, to make sense with Mechanism (which is not proposed as a 
solution but used to reformulate an old problem mathematically), must be 
derived from arithmetic. And the derivation has given the theories S4Grz1, Z1* 
and X1*, which explains already why there is an apparent physical universe for 
all universal machine’s first person view, why it is symmetrical, but looks 
assymettrical, why its logics of observable cannot be boolean and is quantum 
like, etc. 

To pursue this, we need to solve mathematical problems. If nature refutes this, 
it will be time to search another metaphysics. But the Aristotelian has been 
shown to make no sense, or to eliminate consciousness and persons, and that is 
a position which I take as irrational deny of evidences. It is not serious with 
respect to cognitive science, which indeed is not the main interest in physics, 
even if it appears in the foundational studies.

Mechanism leads to a simple conceptual theory (indeed two small axioms), and 
explain consciousness and physical appearance, correctly up to now. Physics has 
not yet find a unifying theory, does not tackle consciousness, and use, with 
respect to mechanist cognitive science, an inconsistent metaphysics. 

Bruno 





> 
> Bre

Re: What is the largest integer you can write in 5 seconds?

2019-03-08 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 7 Mar 2019, at 15:04, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Mar 7, 2019 at 8:18 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
> > Usually, when asked to name a big number, we mean to provide a number that 
> > e can compute in a finite time (no matter how long). BB(8000) will be 
> > rejected, because it is not a definite description, or name, because BB is 
> > not computable.
> 
> Assuming you're just using 2 symbols (like 0 and 1) there are (16001)^8000  
> different 8000 state Turing Machines. And that is a very large number but a 
> finite one. And one of those machines makes the largest number of FINITE 
> operations before halting. And that number of operations is BB(8000).  Even 
> theoretically, much less practically,  you can never compute that number but 
> I have given a unique description of it, no other 8000 state Turing Machine 
> has that propertie.


Yes, sure BB(8000) is a precise well defined finite number. But it is no what 
logician and philosopher call a “name”, where the number should be computable 
in principle. My point is just a vocabulary point, and a way to remind a nice 
problem which I have used to illustrate some less known application of Cantor’s 
diagonal. A constructive one, in this case. Then even using BB, you should 
still use the diagonalization, as BB(8000) is stil an infinitesimal (so to 
speak) compared to f_epsilon_0(BB(8000)).

Bruno





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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-08 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 7 Mar 2019, at 12:26, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, March 7, 2019 at 5:11:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 6 Mar 2019, at 14:43, John Clark > wrote:
>> 
>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 8:30 AM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> 
>> > You confirm my theory that strong (non agnostic) atheism is radical 
>> > religious fundamentalism
>> 
>> I've never heard you or anybody else criticize me that brilliantly before, 
>> you sure put me in my place. I am devastated!
> 
> 
> Lol. 
> 
> The fact remains. Anyone mocking the science theology, helps the radicals, 
> who have separated theology from science to mix it with (fake) politics (and 
> real tyranny). You are under the influence of the post 529 pseudo-christian 
> propaganda. You defend, not intentionally I suppose, those who want us 
> remaining non educated. 
> The greek theology (not the greek mythology!) is at the origin of 
> mathematics, physics, and even mathematical logic more recently.
> 
> Note that the USSR, which have banned both religion and theology, did the 
> same thing with biology. By mixing it with the state, it becomes obscurantist 
> and non sensical (which led to a big famine).
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> > By theology, you know that  [...]  Plato define God by [...]
>> 
>> I'm sorry did you say something? I think I fell asleep 
> 
> Since long …
> Since 529, somehow, I guess. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> Epicurus (via Lucretius) had a philosophy based on physical and psychical 
> atoms.


Intersting! (And just now you don’t provide links? I would be interested. It 
would show that early materialist where not eliminativist). Plotinus already 
complained on “eliminative materialism”, in its own term. I find this both 
inexact and inhuman.

But that leads to a non necessary dualism, which is also incompatible with 
Descartes Mechanism and Turing’s one.



> 
> Perhaps the writings of Epicurus and Democritus and their students should 
> have been preserved and the writings of Plato and Aristotle should have been 
> destroyed.
> 
> :)

Lol

Bruno




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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-07 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 6 Mar 2019, at 22:10, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 12:20:13 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> We cannot predict in advance if a machine will stop. The extensional equality 
> of machines, or combinators, is unsolvable. 
> 
> 
> 
> There is some conceptual and practical division between mathematics and 
> applied mathematics

Yes. But note that the division we can made there are dependent of the 
metaphysics.

Then Gödel has shown that we can apply mathematics to metamathematics, and that 
a large part of metamathematics is in mathematics, so mathematics have 
application in mathematics. But that is obvious through the representation 
theorems, and my factors. We can say that the theory of complex analysis has 
found extraordinary application in the pure number theory, like Riemann 
discovered. 

Category theory is born from the discovery of abstract pattern relying many 
application of some branch of math to another branch of math. It helps 
mathematician to not reinvent the wheel all the time.



> (and there are institutionally separate Mathematics (PM, P for "Pure") and 
> Applied Mathematics (AM) Departments or Divisions at some universities.

Yes. That has been the root of my problem with some local academician. I 
naively stated that I decide to study mathematics because I saw application of 
mathematical logic (the second recursion theorem) to biology (like I have shown 
in my paper “Amoeba, Planaria and Dreaming machine”. But I was told that 
mathematical logic was taught in the section of Pure Mathematics, where it was 
very badly seen to apply mathematics to anything but mathematics. This 
illustrates it makes no sense to decide that some part of math are pure or not.

And this is even more true with mechanism.  There is no more an ontological 
physical reality, or any gods of that sort (which have never been tested, 
actually, except with my work, of course, where the test was negative for 
“Matter”). So the fundamental reality becomes mathematical. And we are pure 
mathematical object living in a mathematical reality. That is not entirely 
correct, because the internal phenomenology, for technical reason, escapes even 
the whole of mathematics. So, eventually, the reality is theological, to be 
correct. But the theology of the machines is a theory, which today, is 
classified in pure mathematics (the logic of provability). 






> There is a PM and an AM way of approaching what "computing" is.


Yes, even in arithmetic. The universal machine discover that there is a big 
difference between being implemented by a nameable “in principle” universal 
number, and being implemented by something emerging from an infinity of 
computations from the first person points of view. The first leads to the 
theory G* (the “scientific theology of the ideally sound machine”), and the 
others leads to quantum logic and physics, and the right one, if mechanism is 
correct.





> 
> In an AM way of thinking, no computer can run forever, assuming what 
> scientists theorize about the future of the universe (big freeze, crunch, 
> etc.).

And assuming some physical reality. If you do serious metaphysics, it is better 
to invoke an ontological commitment only in last ressort. Invoking an 
ontological or primary physical universe is like saying “and god made it”. That 
does not work. It is wishful thinking, provably if Mechanism is assumed.




> 
> AM would see computing as being nothing more than what can be done on 
> material computers, natural or manmade. 

Computation have been discovered in arithmetic, before physics.

Of course, the fact that we have cells and brains suggest, once we understand 
that a computation is an arithmetical notion,  that the physical reality too is 
Turing complete. But with mechanism, to solve the mind-body problem, you have 
to derive the physical reality (and its Turing completeness) from arithmetic. 
It is nota question of choice.

Of course you can say that in your religion, machine cannot have souls, that 
you are not a machine, and so you can believe in the fantasy you want. That is 
what we do since we have put theology out of science (just to make it possible 
for some tyran to exploit people).

Or you can try to build a precise non computationalist theory of mind, and how 
to test it, in which case the computationalist theory will gives many hint. 
Indeed, if some logics the universal machine gives for matter is contradicted 
by nature, we do have a precise hint how to transform the machine theory to get 
a correct non mechanist theory.
Today, such theory does not exist, Nature follows perfectly well Mechanism,and 
the theory of apparent matter given by all classical universal machine,  thanks 
to QM.  

There is no evidence for your metaphysical ontological commitment. Given that 
it makes the mind-body problem unsolvable since a 

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 7 Mar 2019, at 05:48, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/6/2019 10:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> I use mechanism in the sense that if little daemon substitute each piece of 
>> my brain, at some resolution level,  by functional digital equivalent, then 
>> my consciousness would not notice the difference.
> 
> According to your theory, your consciousness is instantiated by the 
> computational threads of the universal dovetailer, which exists within 
> arithmetic.  So whether a piece of your brain is present, replaced, or 
> removed should make no difference to you consciousness.


Proof?

Yes, at first sight, naively, the universal dovetailing predicts white rabbits, 
or even white noise. But this is like forgetting the definition of the subject 
given (the Gödel-Löbian machines), and the fact that the thread in the 
Universal dovetailing is entirely structured by the nuance of provability 
imposed by incompleteness.

Then the math shows that we get a quantum logic for the 3p physics, another 
quantum logics for the 1p physics, and even (I was wrong in my original thesis) 
a quantum logic for the 1p-soul. Plotinus was right on this, the soul has 
already a foot in matter, even if that quantum logic is an intuitionist quantum 
logic.

If I belong to a normal history, for those arithmetical quantum logic,  where 
some people decide to remove a piece of my brain, the probability will be high 
that I will survive that lobotomic experience in the “continuum” of 
continuations which are executed in the sigma_1 arithmetic (equivalent to a 
universal dovetailing). 

And mechanism is not my theory. Nor is the G* theology, which is just the truth 
theory of all classical Löbian machine, as demonstrate by the work of Gödel, 
Löb and Solovay. I have not invented the intensional variants. ([]p & p) has 
been discovered by Goldblatt and Boolos, well studied by Artemov. And yes, I 
point on the existence of infinitely many others, some crucial to derive 
“Matter” from arithmetic in the manner prescribed by Mechanism (or, actually 
Neoplatonism).

Bruno



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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-03-07 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 6 Mar 2019, at 20:57, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/6/2019 5:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Every time I mention this you strike back at the straw man of primitive 
>>> matter...which I never refer to.
>> But then, why do you criticise the theorem? Maybe you don’t? Bt then why are 
>> you saying that elementary arithmetic is not a TOE? It explain the coupling 
>> consciousness/matter using only elementary arithmetic.
> 
> My criticism of the theory is different from my criticism of your repeated 
> claim that you have eliminated and matter and attributing anything to it is 
> "Aristotles error".   My criticism of the theory that arithmetic is a TOE is 
> that arithmetic proves too much.  


That looks like Deutsch criticism on Schmidhuber type of computationalist 
explanation.

But, this omit completely the first person indeterminacy, which not only 
explains (in a testable way) the origin of the physical laws, but above all 
makes the physics unique, and invariant for all machines.

The postulation of a primary universe, on the contrary, explains only the 
current first person prediction by using an identity thesis which is 
inconsistent with mechanism. Physics fails both for the prediction of “seeing 
an eclipse”, and miss the mind-body problem. Compared to the explanation in 
arithmetic, there is just no explanation given for the physical experiment and 
experience. It works very well locally, but only by using an inconsistent 
metaphysics. In fact, it does not tackle the fundamental question, and gives 
recipe to make prediction, without attempting to explains why we can be 
conscious of the prediction.

With mechanism we get the whole fundamental science, already axiomatised 
completely (thanks to Solovay- at the propositional level. I don’t see it 
explains too much. You might confuse Mechanism and digital physics. Digital 
physics just assume that there is some u such that phi_u is the physical 
universe. That reduce physics to arithmetic, but that explains too much, or 
nothing. And is wrong. With mechanism, even if some u plays some more special 
role, that choice of u and that role have to be explained, given the 
differentiation of conscious on all relative computational computations.

Bruno




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Re: What is the largest integer you can write in 5 seconds?

2019-03-07 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 5 Mar 2019, at 19:05, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> It's easy to prove that the Busy Beaver Function grows faster than ANY 
> computable function because if there were such a faster growing function you 
> could use it to solve the Halting Problem. So if you're ever in a contest to 
> see who can name the largest integer in less than 5 seconds just write 
> BB(9000) and you'll probably win.





Usually, when asked to name a big number, we mean to provide a number that e 
can compute in a finite time (no matter how long). BB(8000) will be rejected, 
because it is not a definite description, or name, because BB is not computable.

How to name a big number? You can start with a sequence of growing function, 
like addition, multiplication, expoenntation, iteration, quintation, hexaxion, 
etc. (each one is just the iteration of the preceding one).

Then, calling those functions F_0, F_1, F_2, … F_i, … you can get a “limit” by 
diagonalising them, which gives a growing total function, as all F_i are total, 
and it grow more quickly:

G_0(n) = F_n(n) + 1,

And then a full new sequence G_0, G_1, G_2, …

And you can diagonalise on that sequence too, and again and again. This will 
work on the whole range of the constructive (aka recursive) ordinals.

So, if you need to write the description of a big number, the usual method will 
be to name a big constructive infinite ordinal, like epsilon_zer, for example, 
although there are much bigger one … and write:

F_epsilon-0 (999).

See my old post on this published here a (long) time ago, for a more detailed 
account, going far above epsilon_zero.

It is a cute problem we can ask six years old children. Usually some write 
9+9+9+9+… +9, on the whole paper. Some write 9*9*9*9*9¨… *9. Later they get 
better ideas, and can discuss this all along their secondary school. To get the 
transfinite constructive original, you need the second recursion theorem of 
Kleene, which is con course much more advanced.

O course, if a non computable number number is asked, and still want to win, 
you can do the same statring from BB(8000), like 

F_epsilon-0(BB(8000)). But again, that is usually not accepted, because the 
“name” is not constructive, and usually a name must be a constructive definite 
description.

Bruno





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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-07 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 6 Mar 2019, at 14:43, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 8:30 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
> > You confirm my theory that strong (non agnostic) atheism is radical 
> > religious fundamentalism
> 
> I've never heard you or anybody else criticize me that brilliantly before, 
> you sure put me in my place. I am devastated!


Lol. 

The fact remains. Anyone mocking the science theology, helps the radicals, who 
have separated theology from science to mix it with (fake) politics (and real 
tyranny). You are under the influence of the post 529 pseudo-christian 
propaganda. You defend, not intentionally I suppose, those who want us 
remaining non educated. 
The greek theology (not the greek mythology!) is at the origin of mathematics, 
physics, and even mathematical logic more recently.

Note that the USSR, which have banned both religion and theology, did the same 
thing with biology. By mixing it with the state, it becomes obscurantist and 
non sensical (which led to a big famine).



> 
> > By theology, you know that  [...]  Plato define God by [...]
> 
> I'm sorry did you say something? I think I fell asleep 

Since long …
Since 529, somehow, I guess. 

Bruno



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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-06 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 6 Mar 2019, at 11:47, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Monday, March 4, 2019 at 6:24:35 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 3 Mar 2019, at 20:49, Lawrence Crowell > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 7:58:01 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 7:32:00 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>> 
>> Bringing Gödel into physics is treading on a mine field as it is. Believe 
>> me, most physicists react in horror at the mere suggestion of this. I have 
>> this suspicion however that quantum measurement is a a sort of Gödel 
>> self-reference with quantum information or qubits. This may, at least within 
>> how we describe quantum mechanics if it should turn out to be not how the 
>> quantum world actually is, be one reason why we have this growing pantheon 
>> of quantum interpretations and no apparent way to decide which is 
>> definitively correct. 
>>  
>> 
>>  
>> I still think it's Darwin, not Gödel,  that has anything to do with  
>> "quantum measurement".
>> 
>> But physicists recoil in horror from that.
>> 
>> - pt
>> 
>> Darwinian logic did put down the Aristotelian-Cartesian hierarchical 
>> structure with respect to biology.
> 
> OK. Darwin use both mechanism (quasi-explicitly), and is understood usually 
> in the materialist frame, but Darwin just do not address that question.
> 
> 
> 
>> Aristotle and Plato are the two most known Hellenic philosophers because 
>> their systems of thought were wrapped into the New Testament Bible. Plato 
>> had this idea of there being a hierarchy of being, which was taken up by St 
>> Paul, carried further by Augustine, Aquinas and eventually encoded by 
>> Descartes. Descartes had this hierarchy of structure over function, design 
>> over material form etc, which was carried into science during the 17th and 
>> 18th century. In some ways Newtonian mechanics was seen as a confirmation of 
>> Descartes' metaphysics.
> 
> That is true. Today we know that Newtonian Mechanics is highly not 
> computable. But Newton saw that, and indeed, distrusted his Mechanics, and 
> saw it as an approximation. 
> 
> 
> 
> I would say classical mechanics is NP computable.


In classical mechanics, the three body problem is Turing universal, I think. No 
doubt for for the many body problem as the billiard board computer illustrates.

Any theorem complete for arbitrary finite Newtonian mechanical system will be 
Turing complete, and thus essentially undecidable (in the sense of Tarski: it 
means that all its effective consistent extensions are undecidable as well). 
Turing universal = partial computable (not total computable).



> The problems of chaos are similar to to NP problems in that for a Turing 
> machine that computes P these problems are exponential in space and time. 
> Chaos is of that nature, but it is convergent. One can compute for some 
> finite time the evolution of complex systems.


?

We cannot predict in advance if a machine will stop. The extensionnal equality 
of machines, or combinators, is unsolvable. 

P NP are complexity classes included in the total computable. Once Turing 
universal, the behaviour can be non computable, not even in exponential or 
super-exponential time. In no time at all. 




>  
> 
>> Darwin struck a fatal blow to this with respect to biology.
> 
> He struck the wrong view on Descartes and Mechanism, but his own Mechanism is 
> a foreseen of digital mechanism, and its confirmation by molecular genetics, 
> and the genetical code.
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Darwin did away with Aristotle and Descartes with biology. Gödel had an 
>> impact on Plato, though it is not clear to me how. Gödel saw himself as a 
>> Platonist and that his incompleteness theorem demonstrated how mathematical 
>> truth is independent of knowing it. I tend to see this in terms of Turing 
>> machines, which would say that certain problems are not computable and as 
>> such no information can be derived.
> 
> … can be derived mechanically. But the truth can be guessed and experience by 
> non algorithmic, mechanical, means, even by a machine. Gödel’s theorem is 
> already proved by machine, which can even prove their own Gödel’s theorem, 
> and enforces them to be mystical, that is, to believe that there is something 
> more than their own consciousness.
> 
> 
> 
> Gödel’s theorem is proven in a computable manner, and so is an algorithm of 
> sorts.


Like all theorems in mathematics and physics. A theorem has to be easy to 
check. That is not possible in full second order logic (Analysis), but Analysis 
can be done in effective p

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-06 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 5 Mar 2019, at 19:27, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, March 5, 2019 at 6:23:42 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 5 Mar 2019, at 00:43, Brent Meeker > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 3/4/2019 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>>> On 3 Mar 2019, at 20:43, Brent Meeker > 
>>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 3/3/2019 4:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Here's an example David Wallace presents (as an "outlandish" 
>>>>> possibility): Suppose in pi (which is computable, so has a program (a 
>>>>> spigot one, in fact) that produces its digits. Suppose somewhere in that 
>>>>> stream of digits is the Standard Model Equation
>>>>> 
>>>>> (say written in LaTeX/Math but rendered here)
>>>>>  
>>>>> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png
>>>>>  
>>>>> <https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png>
>>>>> 
>>>>> So what could this mean? (He sort of leaves it hanging.)
>>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Nothing.  Given a suitable mapping the SM Lagrangian can be found in any 
>>>> sequence of symbols.  It's just a special case of the rock that computes 
>>>> everything.
>>> 
>>> Even if rock would exist in some primitive sense, which I doubt, they do 
>>> not compute anything, except in a trivial sense the quantum state of the 
>>> rock. A rock is not even a definable digital object.
>> 
>> It's an ostensively definable object...which is much better.
> 
> Ostension is dream-able. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>>> If someone want to convince me that a rock can compute everything, I will 
>>> ask them to write a complier of the combinators, say, in the rock. I will 
>>> ask an algorithm generating the phi_i associated to the rock.
>> 
>> There is no particular phi_i associated to the rock.  That's the point.  The 
>> rock goes thru various states so there exists a mapping from that sequence 
>> of states to any computation with a similar number of states.
> 
> It is a mapping of states. It is like a bijection. You need something like a 
> morphism preserving the computability structure, which do not exist in the 
> rock. A computation is not just a sequence of states, it is a sequence of 
> states defined by the universal machine which brought those states. 
> 
> There are bijections between N and Z, but only Z is a group, because those 
> bijections does not preserve the algebraic structure. Similarly, there is a 
> bijection between a computation and a movie of that computation, but it does 
> not preserve the causal/logical relation between the states, which is a 
> universal machine for the computation, and just a linear order for the 
> sequence, without structure, of the states.
> 
> 
> 
>>   Of course one may object that the actual computation is in the 
>> mapping...but that's because of our prejudice for increasing entropy.
> 
> OK.Now, a bijection between a physical computation and an arithmetical 
> computation do preserve the computability structure, that is why we can say 
> that the arithmetical reality/model implements genuinely the computations.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The bijection
> 
>material [physical] computation ↔ arithmetical computation 
> 
> is like (New Testament) Paul's thesis: There's earthly bodies and spiritual 
> bodies.

Hmm… You could say that, as a reductio ad absurd of the idea that there are 
*primitive* material bodies.

But my point was that a bijection is not enough, you need a fiathftull, 
consciousness preserving transformation, then this can help to derive 
constructively physics from arithmetic, and the physical reality is recvovred 
as a part of the machine theology (G*).



> 
> "Not all flesh is the same: People have one kind of flesh, animals have 
> another, birds another and fish another.

That reminds me of the argument by the catholic that “obviously” Indian have no 
souls. 

I am not sure by what you mean “have different flesh”. We are all using the sae 
DNA, quite similar protein and enzyme, and the difference are as contingent as 
the fact that you and me are different person, in our relative current 
incarnation/implementation.




> There are also heavenly bodies and there are earthly bodies; but the splendor 
> of the heavenly bodies is one kind, and the splendor of the earthly bodies is 
> another. ... I

Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-03-06 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 5 Mar 2019, at 20:01, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/5/2019 4:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> RNA, proteins, krebs cycle, and proton pumps are all necessary for that.
>> 
>> That is carbon chauvinism, with all my respect. I am a lover of Krebs cycle, 
>> and even more Calvin cycle (in photosynthesis). My initial inspiration of 
>> Mechanism came from Molecular biology. But nothing there has been shown to 
>> be non-Turing emulable. Your artificial brain, when you say “yes” to the 
>> doctor, might not involve any of these cycles, but use a simple battery 
>> instead (or you are just telling me that you doubt Digital Mechanism, which 
>> is my basic working hypothesis to solve the Mind-Body problem.
> 
> That you can emulate those processes is beside the point.  The point is that 
> you would have to emulate them in order to support your contention that 
> bacteria are Turing complete. 

? I do’nt undersatnd. When Turing showed that his Turing machine are able to 
emulate lambda calculus, and that lambda calculus can emulate the Turing 
machine, nobody ask them to emulate them. Turing also showed that elementary 
arithmetic emulates them “already”.

You argument is equivalent to saying that we have to enumerate the primes 
number to make sense of Riemann hypothesis. That looks like extreme 
physicalism, akin to ultra-finitism.




> That's has been my "doubt" of your theory all along.  It is not a TOE in 
> which consciousness appears without matter.  It is a theory in which 
> consciousness and matter must appear together. 

Yes, but from numbers only (or from combinators only, …), which is the point, 
and that makes elementary arithmetic into the only TOE available. If you can 
found a discrepancy with nature, you will show that we cannot be machine (if 
your proofs is understandable by humans).



> Every time I mention this you strike back at the straw man of primitive 
> matter...which I never refer to.


But then, why do you criticise the theorem? Maybe you don’t? Bt then why are 
you saying that elementary arithmetic is not a TOE? It explain the coupling 
consciousness/matter using only elementary arithmetic. No need of Mechanism, 
which can be used only for the motivation for the Theatetus definition, for 
those who have not read Plato.

I am just trying to understand your point.

Bruno 



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-06 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 5 Mar 2019, at 19:13, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 9:57 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
> > But in the “theology of the machine” [...]
> 
> Given the fact that I don't have an infinite amount of time to read things my 
> rule of thumb is to stop reading whenever I encounter the T word.


Not using the T word, in this case, consists in encouraging people to continue 
to belief in fairy tale, and to accept the invalid argument of the materialist 
in the field.

You confirm my theory that strong (non agnostic) atheism is radical religious 
fundamentalism. I sincerely thought this was just an European latin disease, 
but since 20 years, that fundamentalism seems to develop even, in the west.

By theology, you know that I mean the study of G*, and its intensional variant. 
God, is just the (sigma_1) truth. Plato define God by the truth, because he 
intuited that Truth is not definable. The word is only a pointer to what we 
search. The greeks knew that using God as an explanation is necessarily a 
fraud. 

The only reason why theology has been taken out of science was to mix state and 
religion, to steal people, simply. The only way to separate state and church is 
to let theology, the science, to come back in science, where it is born (and 
where it gives rise to physics and mathematics, and even mathematical logic, 
etc.).

Also, I have avoided the T word for long. But in my life, I ahem been asked to 
avoid many words, like consciousness, person soul, quantum (sic), even 
“machine”.

But if you study the work, you will see that I can use any words, without 
changing the prediction. So, that problems with word is just a pretext to avoid 
thinking. 

I prefer to think that religion is the only goal, and science is the only mean. 
To separate religion from science, makes exact science inexact and human 
science inhuman, as we can se when reading the news each morning.

Bruno







> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-06 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 5 Mar 2019, at 15:53, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 8:03 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
> > The expression "Non computable numbers” appears only in intuitionist logic,
> 
> If so then just by reading the title of Turing's famous 1936 paper where he 
> first described a device that we now call a Turing Machine you'd have to 
> conclude that Turing was a intuitionist,


Not at all. He was talking about REAL numbers, not natural numbers.



> it was called "On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the 
> Entscheidungsproblem”.


But I told you that everybody agrees, Turing the first, that its definition of 
“computable  (real) numbers” was misleading, and has been abandoned since.

I predicted that you would confuse soon or later something like f(x) and 
[x]f(x) in the context of that paper by Turing, and you did it when using 
“computable number” for a natural number. At, least Turing made clear he was 
talking on real numbers. 

All natural numbers, rational numbers, integers are “trivially” computable. 

Real numbers are better seen as higher order construct, having the nature of 
functions and operators.

Turing’s paper is a very important work. It convinced Gödel of the Church’s 
thesis? But it is full of errors (from typo, to pedagogical simplification 
which eventually mislead people. The two main one is the use of computable for 
real numbers, the second is the idea that a universal machine needs an infinite 
tape, and so would be an infinite object, when it is capital for the whole 
recursion theory to understand that a universal machine is a finite object.

Bruno





> 
>  John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> 
> 
>> On 4 Mar 2019, at 23:31, John Clark > <mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 11:04 AM Bruno Marchal > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
>> 
>> >> I don't follow you. If the 8000th BB number is unknowable then it is 
>> >> certainly uncomputable
>> 
>> > That is not true. All natural number n are computable. The program is 
>> > “output n”.
>> 
>> I think you're being silly. You're saying if you already know that the 
>> answer to a problem is n then you can write a program that will "compute" 
>> the answer with just a "print n" command. But that's not computing that's 
>> just printing.
> 
> I am even more silly. I claim that I need only to know that there is an 
> answer to say that BB(n), unlike [n]BB(n), is computable, trivially and non 
> interestingly, perhaps, but that follows from the classical definition of 
> Turing, Church, Markov, Hebrand-Gödel, etc.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Incidentally very recently Stefan O’Rear has reduced Aaronson' s 7918 number 
>> so now we know that BB(1919) is not computable.
> 
> Nice!!!
> 
> Of course, we know only that BB(1919) = k, for k any enough big number is 
> undeciadbale in ZF.
> 
> Perhaps tomorrow, we will know that BB(1919) = k is decidable in ZFC + kappa. 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> So we know that:
>> • BB(1)=1
>> • BB(2)=6
>> • BB(3)=21 
>> • BB(4)=107
>> 
>> and that's all we know for sure, but we do know some lower bounds:
>> 
>> • BB(5) ≥ 47,176,870 
>> • BB(6) ≥ 7.4 *10^36534 
>> • BB(7) >10^((10^10)^(10^10)^7)
>> 
>> > BB(n) is not computable means that there is no algorithm, which given n, 
>> > will give BB(n).
>> 
>> Yes, so what are we arguing about?
> 
> 
> That we should not confuse the many possible notions of computable functions 
> from R to R, for which there is no standard definition on which everyone 
> would agree, and no corresponding Church-Turing notion, with the notion of 
> computable function from N to N (or any set of finitely describable objects, 
> always trivially computable).
> 
> Mechanism use the Church-Turing notion. A digital brain has no real numbers 
> as input; nor real numbers as output.
> 
> In the classical theory of computability, a real number is seen as an 
> infinite objects, and is modelled by total computable functions; or by 
> recursive operator, not by the usual partial recursive functions (phi_i).
> 
> 
> 
> 
>>   
>> > what Aaronson has shown, is that above 7918, we loss any hope to find it 
>> > by using the theory ZF. But may be someone will find it by using ZF + 
>> > kappa, which is much more powerful that ZF,
>> 
>> It's easy to find a system of axioms more powerful than ZF, the problem is 
>> it may be so powerful it can even prove things that aren't true.
> 
> That is always the ri

Re: A Program to Compute Gödel-Löb Fixpoints

2019-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 2 Mar 2019, at 14:19, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> I guess I am not sure what a Gödel-Löb fixed point is. Is this somehow 
> analogous to a Brouwer fixed points in maps or diffeomorphisms of spaces?


There are some analogies, some of which can be made technically precise, but 
that requires sophisticated semantics for the variant of probability.

The fixed point theorem in provability logic is that self-reference have fixed 
point, like with the diagonalisation lemma.

By the diagonalisation lemma, you can find sentence asserting anything 
computable about them, and you can eliminate the self-reference. For example, 
you can find p such that PA proves p <-> []p, that gives the Löbian fixed point 
t, and PA will prove it, PA will prove p <-> t. 
Similarly PA can prove, for some p, that p <-> ~[]p, that gives the famous 
Gödel sentences, and PA will prove that p is equivalent, in this case, to <>t 
(= ~[]f = consistency).
There are many others, and even if they involved other sentences, it is always 
possible to eliminate the self-reference.
Three different proofs are given in Boolos 1993. It is a very important result 
in the provability logic, aka machine theology (to be sure the theology is G*, 
the true extension of the provability logic G, coming from Solovay second 
completeness theorem, which generalises a lot the incompleteness theorem. 
Indeed all the true propositional modal truth are axiomatised by G*, also known 
as GLS (Gödel-Löb-Solovay) in the literature.



> 
> I read Rucker's Infinity and the Mind last spring, after having read it many 
> years ago. I could tell he had a penchant for various mystical ideas. This 
> tends blog entry of his suggests he has ideas similar to what Gödel thought, 
> and which I think were a part of leading  him into paranoid delusions. When I 
> clicked on this for some reason I thought this was about monoids, and was a 
> bit disappointed to see it is more philosophical. However, I think the Kant 
> noumena is not really directly knowable, and I think from quantum mechanics 
> we can't know this as either purely epistemic or ontic. I am not sure how 
> ideas of mind fit into this.

With mechanism, it fits remarkably. Indeed it makes physics a branch of 
machine’s theology. See my papers for all details, or my posts here. Physics 
can be sued to refute that theology, but we get only confirmation up to now. 
The physicalist theory of mind requires endowing matter with some magics, for 
which no evidence exist.

Bruno



> 
> LC
> 
> On Saturday, March 2, 2019 at 3:26:18 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> A Program to Compute Gödel-Löb Fixpoints
> Melvin Fitting [ http://melvinfitting.org/  ]
> 
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285841645_A_program_to_compute_Godel-Lob_fixpoints
>  
> 
> 
> 
> A loose motivation for much of Melvin Fitting's work can be formulated 
> succinctly as follows. There are many logics. Our principles of reasoning 
> vary with context and subject matter. Multiplicity is one of the glories of 
> modern formal logic. The common thread tying logics together is a concern for 
> what can be said (syntax), what that means (semantics), and relationships 
> between the two. A philosophical position that can be embodied in a formal 
> logic has been shown to be coherent, not correct. Logic is a tool, not a 
> master, but it is an enjoyable tool to use.
> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melvin_Fitting 
>  ]
> 
> 
> also (a bit offbeat):
> 
> “Simply Gödel,” Phenomenology, and Monads
> Rudy Rucker
> http://www.rudyrucker.com/blog/2017/03/17/godel-phenomonology-and-monads/ 
> 
> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 2 Mar 2019, at 08:22, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 6:25:05 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 1 Mar 2019, at 09:28, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 2:05:03 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 5:15:17 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 2/28/2019 3:00 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 4:34:54 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 2/28/2019 2:14 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 3:48:04 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 2/28/2019 1:17 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> The best current philosopher of (and writer about) consciousness is Galen 
>>>>> Strawson.
>>>>> 
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson 
>>>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson>
>>>>> https://sites.google.com/site/galenstrawson/ 
>>>>> <https://sites.google.com/site/galenstrawson/>
>>>>> https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/philosophy/faculty/profile.php?id=gs24429 
>>>>> <https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/philosophy/faculty/profile.php?id=gs24429>
>>>>> 
>>>>> There is a lot of his material (PDFs, articles, videos, etc.) freely 
>>>>> available online.
>>>>> 
>>>>> The main word that is synonymous with consciousness is experience.
>>>> 
>>>> Which is something bacteria and plants and my thermostat have...and 
>>>> ability to detect and react to the environment based on internal states.
>>>> 
>>>> Brent
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Galen is a (type of) micropsychist.
>>> 
>>> But the point is we don't need a philosopher to explain that level of 
>>> consciousness to us.  It's already at the level of engineering.  If 
>>> Strawson is going to provide any useful explanations of consciousness he 
>>> should study machine learning...it's getting close to engineering 
>>> consciousness at the next higher level.
>>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
>>> It won't be accomplished via certain types of engineering, like 
>>> "information network" approaches (IIT [ 
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory 
>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory> ]) but 
>>> potentially could with a "synthetic" approach that combines networks with 
>>> synthetic biology. Something along these lines is the "fusion" idea 
>>> proposed by
>> 
>> I don't know why IIT is even discussed.  Aaronson pretty well shot it down.
>> 
>> My son may get a chance to work on the Deepmind team.  What kind of brain 
>> cells would you suggest he sprinkle on the CPUs?
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> 
>> Like The Graduate's "plastics", today, "polymers".
>> 
>> 
>> Biomaterials for the central nervous system
>> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2475552/ 
>> <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2475552/>
>> 
>> Scientists Have Built Artificial Neurons That Fully Mimic Human Brain Cells
>> https://www.sciencealert.com/scientists-build-an-artificial-neuron-that-fully-mimics-a-human-brain-cell
>>  
>> <https://www.sciencealert.com/scientists-build-an-artificial-neuron-that-fully-mimics-a-human-brain-cell>
>> 
>> Scientists develop promising new type of polymer
>> https://phys.org/news/2019-01-scientists-polymers.html 
>> <https://phys.org/news/2019-01-scientists-polymers.html>
>> 
>> Synthetic Glycopolymers for Highly Efficient Differentiation of Embryonic 
>> Stem Cells into Neurons: Lipo- or Not?
>> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28287262 
>> <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28287262>
>> 
>> Elastic materials for tissue engineering applications: Natural, synthetic, 
>> and hybrid polymers
>> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S174270611830494X 
>> <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S174270611830494X>
>> 
>> Biomaterials for Scaffolds: Synthetic Polymers
>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286340849_Biomaterials_for_Scaffolds_Synthetic_Polymers
>> 

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 1 Mar 2019, at 20:42, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 8:49:54 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 1 Mar 2019, at 01:42, Lawrence Crowell > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 9:42:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 25 Feb 2019, at 12:39, Lawrence Crowell > 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 2:44:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>>> On 24 Feb 2019, at 15:24, Lawrence Crowell > 
>>>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 3:18:01 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> On 2/22/2019 11:39 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>>>> This sounds almost tautological. I have not read Masanes' paper, but he 
>>>>> seems to be saying the Born rule is a matter of pure logic. In some ways 
>>>>> that is what Born said.
>>>>> 
>>>>> The Born rule is not hard to understand. If you have a state space with 
>>>>> vectors |u_i> then a quantum state can be written as sum_ic_i|u_i>. For 
>>>>> an observable O with eigenvectors o_i the expectation values for that 
>>>>> observable is
>>>>> 
>>>>>  sum_{ij} = sum_{ij} = sum_ip_io_i.
>>>>> 
>>>>> So the expectations of each eigenvalue is multiple of the probability for 
>>>>> the system to be found in that state. It is not hard to understand, but 
>>>>> the problem is there is no general theorem and proof that the eigenvalues 
>>>>> of an operator or observable are diagonal in the probabilities.
>>> 
>>> I am not sure I understand this.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>>> In fact this has some subtle issues with degeneracies.
>>>> 
>>>> Doesn't Gleason's theorem show that there is no other consistent way to 
>>>> assign probabilities to subspaces of a Hilbert space?
>>>> 
>>>> Brent
>>>> 
>>>> It is close. Gleason's theorem tells us that probabilities are a 
>>>> consequence of certain measurements. So for a basis Q = {q_n} then in a 
>>>> span in Q = P{q_n}, for P a projection operator that a measure μ(Q} is 
>>>> given by a trace over projection operators. This is close, but it does not 
>>>> address the issue of eigenvalues of an operator or observable. Gleason 
>>>> tried to make this work for operators, but was ultimately not able to.
>>> 
>>> It should work for the projection operator, that this is the 
>>> yes-no-experiment, but that extends to the other measurement, by reducing 
>>> (as usual) the question “what is the value of A” into the (many) question 
>>> “does A measurement belong to this interval” … Gleason’s theorem assures 
>>> that the measure is unique (on the subspaces of H with dim bigger or equal 
>>> to 3), so the Born rule should be determined, at least in non degenerate 
>>> case (but also in the degenerate case when the degeneracy is due to tracing 
>>> out a subsystem from a bigger system. I will verify later as my mind 
>>> belongs more to the combinator and applicative algebra that QM for now.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Many years ago I had an idea that since the trace of a density matrix may 
>>>> be thought of as constructed from projection operators with tr(ρ_n) = 
>>>> sum_n |c_n|^2P_n, that observables that commute with the density matrix 
>>>> might have a derived Born rule following Gleason. Further, maybe operators 
>>>> that do not commute then have some dual property that still upholds Born 
>>>> rule. I was not able to make this work.
>>> 
>>> I will think about this. Normally the measure is determine by the “right" 
>>> quantum logic, and the right quantum logic is determined by the any 
>>> “provability” box accompanied by consistency condition (like []p & p, []p & 
>>> <>t, …).  The main difference to be expected, is that eventually we get a 
>>> “quantum credibility measure”, not really a probability. It is like 
>>> probability, except that credibility is between 0 and infinity (not 0 and 
>>> 1).
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I think I ran into the issue of why Gleason's theorem does not capture the 
>>> Born rule. Not all operators are commutative with the density matrix. So if

Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 1 Mar 2019, at 19:45, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 9:08:43 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 28 Feb 2019, at 22:47, Brent Meeker > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 2/28/2019 1:17 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The best current philosopher of (and writer about) consciousness is Galen 
>>> Strawson.
>>> 
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson 
>>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson>
>>> https://sites.google.com/site/galenstrawson/ 
>>> <https://sites.google.com/site/galenstrawson/>
>>> https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/philosophy/faculty/profile.php?id=gs24429 
>>> <https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/philosophy/faculty/profile.php?id=gs24429>
>>> 
>>> There is a lot of his material (PDFs, articles, videos, etc.) freely 
>>> available online.
>>> 
>>> The main word that is synonymous with consciousness is experience.
>> 
>> Which is something bacteria and plants and my thermostat have...and ability 
>> to detect and react to the environment based on internal states.
> 
> What the thermostat lacks, that the bacteria and plants do not lack, is 
> Turing universality. That gives the mind, and even the free-will. 
> 
> I think free-will is just universality, and we lost it when we impose 
> “security”. What makes a universal machine universal is the ability to search 
> for a number which do not exist, making them able to “not stop”, and that is 
> what a thermostat cannot do.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
> 
> 
> Galen Strawson has an argument that makes 'free-will' something of a 
> 'non-thing'. It's based on his concept of 'self'. A conscious entity (me) is 
> a self in the sense that 'I am me’.

I guess this fits with the first person self, given by the “truth” variant of 
provability ([]p & p) of Theatetus when translated in the arithmetical language.




> I can't really have free will since I can't choose not to be me.

We have partial control. Free-will is just the ability to decide when knowing 
we lack information. It is related only to the logical self-indetermination 
(not the first person indeterminacy, which gives randomness, which limits 
free-will.




> 
> We have 'autonomous will' but not 'free will’.

It depends on the definition that we accept for free-will. Some makes it just 
absurd, like a possibility to violate physical or mathematical laws. I am not 
sure that makes any sense.

Bruno



> Whenever someone talks about 'free will' not I just think of the Protestant 
> denomination Free Will Baptist [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_Will_Baptist] and nothing more beyond that.
> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 5 Mar 2019, at 15:40, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 7:40 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
> > (And what is proof anyway?)

I did not wrote that.


>  
> A proof is a construction made from a finite set of axioms using a finite set 
> of rules.

Yes. That is a formal proof. But in math, proof are never formalised. Only in 
logic, for the reason that the proofs are the object of study. The proofs on 
that are also informal.



> If the axioms and the rules are sound

With respect to some semantics. No problem for arithmetic, as there is an 
acceptable notion of “standard model”. But soundness is always defined with 
respect to some informal reality, be it the standard model of numbers, or a 
physical reality, etc.



> then the proof will tell you something about the nature of reality,

About reality? Reality is the model itself. It escapes all theories. But a 
proof in the theory of numbers or machines, will say something about numbers 
and machine. To talk about the nature of reality, you need to add some 
metaphysical axioms, like Mechanism, for example. To illustrate, with 
mechanism, we can say that the nature of reality is mathematical.




> if they are not sound you will be no wiser after you've completed the proof 
> than you'd be after you completed a crossword puzzle. That's why it's so 
> important to be super conservative when picking your axioms and rules.

Absolutely. But no theories at all can prove it is sound, nor even that it has 
a model(reality). We never know that we are sound (probably assuming Indexical 
Digital Mechanism (Yes-Doctor + Church's Thesis). Some logicians, like Nelson, 
think that PA is already not sound, nor consistent. Few people believe him, but 
each time he comes up with a proof that PA is inconsistent, the community does 
its job, and usually find the mistake, that Nelson recognises quickly, but then 
he continues to such the contradiction, because he is clearly convinced that PA 
is already not sound. And recently, I have got that with Mechanism, PA is 
unsound if taken as an ontology. We can only taken RA, that is, PA without the 
induction axioms, which are already too much powerful. For the same reason, we 
cannot add the axiom of infinity to RA or PA. In that case, the measure on the 
computation would need the non standard computations, existing in the 
non-standard model, but that has to be excluded with Mechanism, as addition and 
multiplication are not computable in the non-standard models. They become 
computable in a non standard sense, violating directly the Church Turing 
thesis, which is normal, as the non standard natural numbers are typically 
infinite objects.

Bruno




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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 5 Mar 2019, at 15:20, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 12:55 AM Russell Standish  > wrote:
> 
> > The usual meaning of computable integer is that there exists a program that 
> > outputs it.
> 
> There is no point in arguing over the meaning of a word, but if that is what 
> you mean then there is a particular form of "computation" that is as dull as 
> dishwater and of no mathematical scientific or philosophical importance, in 
> other words if that's what you mean then you're not wrong but you are rather 
> silly. 


No. It concentrates the real difficulty on the functions, and take the 
primitive has trivially computable.

If that is silly, then the Church-Turing thesis is silly, the classical theory 
of computability is silly, etc.

You need a good knowledge of this classical theory of computability to study 
the more advanced notion of computability on the real numbers. There are many, 
and there is no Church-Turing corresponding thesis.

A function (from N to N, that is what I always mean by a function) is 
computable if there is a code which compute it.

What you are using here is some notion of constructively computability (we 
might ask you which one). You are saying that a function is computable if we 
can exhibit an algorithm for it. That means, if not only the algorithm exists, 
but we can find it in a finite time, and prove it does what is requires. But 
then you will lost many fundamental theorem in computer science, which 
sometimes use the existence of programs which existence can be proved to be 
necessarily not constructive. Some ask more: they want the concept to be 
decidable, in which case we lost almost all partial recursive function. It 
makes sense for security concerns, when working in a bank, but is nonsensical 
in the fundamental matter where we are confronted to non stopping machine, 
without us knowing if they stop or not.

If you are interested in constructive or intuitionist notion of computability, 
you might read the book by Beeson, which is excellent. A good help is Dummett’s 
book on intuitionism. But in the “theology of the machine”, this consists in 
studying only the ([]p & p) modes of self-reference (the mathematical notion of 
first person, the soul in Plotinus, the owner of consciousness, …) which 
natural arithmetical interpretation is intuitionist/solipsist.

Bruno




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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 5 Mar 2019, at 00:42, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 10:25 AM Russell Standish  <mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au>> wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 05:31:00PM -0500, John Clark wrote:
> > On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 11:04 AM Bruno Marchal  > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > >> I don't follow you. If the 8000th BB number is unknowable then 
> > it is
> > certainly uncomputable
> > 
> > 
> > > That is not true. All natural number n are computable. The program is
> > “output n”.
> > 
> > 
> > I think you're being silly. You're saying if you already know that the 
> > answer
> > to a problem is n then you can write a program that will "compute" the 
> > answer
> > with just a "print n" command. But that's not computing that's just 
> > printing.
> 
> OK, so what about the program "print X+1", where X is the expansion of
> the number BB(8000)-1?
> 
> If that's not computing something, then I'm sure I can cook up
> something more complicated to compute.
> 
> I think the trouble with that, or with variations of that idea, is that they 
> render the notion of 'computability' vacuous. In order to write such a 
> program, or concoct such an algorithm, you need to know the answer in 
> advance. That is fine, if you just want a program to compute the number 'n', 
> 'n' being given in advance. But that is no help in computing a number that 
> can be defined, but is not known in advance.
> 
> So what people are really looking for here is a constructive notion of 
> computability -- anything else has a tendency to render the notion of 
> 'computability' trivial.

Then the whole recursion theory (computability theory) should be trivial, when 
on the contrary it is a mine of surprising counter-intuitive results.

There is not yet clear notions of “non computable” for the constructive notion 
of computability, which are dependent of the subjectivity of the 
mathematicians. We got them in the talk of the “… & p” modes of self-reference. 
The first person mental space is intuitionist. Indeed, it says even “no” to the 
doctor, a priori. 

The function defined by

If the twin conjecture is true output 0, else output 1. 

Is a well defined function and it is computable, although not constructively. 
It is computable, because it can be proved (easily) that its code is in the set 
{K0  K1} (the two constant function [x]0 and  [x]1.

The function defined by

if phi_x(x) converges output 1, else output 0

is provably NOT computable. That illustrates that the Turing-Church’s notion of 
computability is not trivial.

Bruno




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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 4 Mar 2019, at 23:31, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 11:04 AM Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
> >> I don't follow you. If the 8000th BB number is unknowable then it is 
> >> certainly uncomputable
> 
> > That is not true. All natural number n are computable. The program is 
> > “output n”.
> 
> I think you're being silly. You're saying if you already know that the answer 
> to a problem is n then you can write a program that will "compute" the answer 
> with just a "print n" command. But that's not computing that's just printing.

I am even more silly. I claim that I need only to know that there is an answer 
to say that BB(n), unlike [n]BB(n), is computable, trivially and non 
interestingly, perhaps, but that follows from the classical definition of 
Turing, Church, Markov, Hebrand-Gödel, etc.




> 
> Incidentally very recently Stefan O’Rear has reduced Aaronson' s 7918 number 
> so now we know that BB(1919) is not computable.

Nice!!!

Of course, we know only that BB(1919) = k, for k any enough big number is 
undeciadbale in ZF.

Perhaps tomorrow, we will know that BB(1919) = k is decidable in ZFC + kappa. 



> 
> So we know that:
> • BB(1)=1
> • BB(2)=6
> • BB(3)=21 
> • BB(4)=107
> 
> and that's all we know for sure, but we do know some lower bounds:
> 
> • BB(5) ≥ 47,176,870 
> • BB(6) ≥ 7.4 *10^36534 
> • BB(7) >10^((10^10)^(10^10)^7)
> 
> > BB(n) is not computable means that there is no algorithm, which given n, 
> > will give BB(n).
> 
> Yes, so what are we arguing about?


That we should not confuse the many possible notions of computable functions 
from R to R, for which there is no standard definition on which everyone would 
agree, and no corresponding Church-Turing notion, with the notion of computable 
function from N to N (or any set of finitely describable objects, always 
trivially computable).

Mechanism use the Church-Turing notion. A digital brain has no real numbers as 
input; nor real numbers as output.

In the classical theory of computability, a real number is seen as an infinite 
objects, and is modelled by total computable functions; or by recursive 
operator, not by the usual partial recursive functions (phi_i).




>   
> > what Aaronson has shown, is that above 7918, we loss any hope to find it by 
> > using the theory ZF. But may be someone will find it by using ZF + kappa, 
> > which is much more powerful that ZF,
> 
> It's easy to find a system of axioms more powerful than ZF, the problem is it 
> may be so powerful it can even prove things that aren't true.

That is always the risk. It cannot been avoided. Provability is a relative 
notion. No provers can prove its own consistency. 



> Would you really trust a system that claimed to be able to solve the Halting 
> Problem? I certainly wouldn't! And if you can't solve the Halting Problem 
> then there is absolutely no way to calculate BB(7918) or BB(1919) and I 
> wouldn't be surprised if even BB(5) is out of reach.


You are right on this. The BB function computability is equivalent with 
computability with the halting oracle.
With an oracle for BB, you can solve the halting problem and vice versa.

You can’t solve the totality/partiality problem though (named TOT). Even with 
the BB oracle (or the halting oracle) you need to do an infinite task to solve 
the TOT problem. There is a transfinite set of set of numbers which are more 
and more unsolvable in that sense. 




> 
> > There are only 2 possibilities, a program will halt after a finite number 
> > of steps or it won’t.
> 
> > Yes. But the program which computes BB(n) always stop.
> 
> if it stops then it is successful but if n is 1919 then it never stops so 
> BB(1919) is never computed.  

AAronson’s paper is not on the computability of BB, but of the undecidability 
of equation of the type BB(n) = k, in ZF. It is not about us, but about the 
particular Löbian machine ZF.


> 
> 
> >>I would maintain that you haven't solved a problem if you can't give the 
> >>right answer more often than random guessing would.
> 
> > You are restricting computability to a string notion of intutionistic 
> > computability.
> 
> What grade would you give a student who couldn't answer your questions better 
> than you'd expect from random guessing?

Random guessing has nothing to so with what we are talking about.

My point is just that the notion of computability used is the classical one, 
and in that case, despite [n]BBn is not a computable function, each BB(n) is 
trivially, and non interestingly computable. That is why we use natural 
numbers: to have a set of trivially computable primitive elements. To compute 
any natural numbers, you need only to app

Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 4 Mar 2019, at 21:34, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, March 4, 2019 at 12:00:05 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
> 
> 
> And proof is not truth.
> ... 
>  
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Of course truth == proof in the land of radical intuitionists-constructivists.

And John does not defend such radical intuitionism. Notably by claiming that 
truth is not proof. 



> 
> (And what is proof anyway?)


Here John did identify “computable” with some constructive notion. But that has 
nothing to do with the sense of computable used in the Church-Turing thesis. It 
is a different notion, and when translated in classical mathematics, you get 
interesting structure, but with very restricted class of functions. Indeed, In 
Brouwer’s intuitionism, or in the Topos of Hyland, it is very simple: all 
functions from N to N are computable, and all functions from R to R are 
continuous. That has been used by Scott to get classical set theoretical models 
of Church lambda calculus (aka combinators).

Bruno



> 
> 
> From: Doren Zeilberger
> To: Scott Aaronson
> [ http://sites.math.rutgers.edu/~zeilberg/Opinion155.html ]
> 
> ...
> 
> As I have said before, there is a quick dictionary to turn all this 
> undecidability babble and the obsession with related problems, like the "busy 
> beaver", into purely meaningful, albeit uninteresting, statements. Every 
> statement that involves quantifies over "infinite" sets, even such a 
> "trivial" statement like
> 
> n+1=1+n , for EVERY natural number n   ,
> 
> (tacitly assuming that you have an "infinite" supply of them) is a priori 
> meaningless, but many of them (including the above, and the statement that 
> "for all" integers x,y,z > 0 and n > 2 , xn+ yn -zn < > 0) can be made a 
> posteriori meaningful, by proving them for symbolic n (and x,y,z). So the 
> right dictionary (for statements that involve quantifies over "infinite" sets)
> 
> Provable : a priori meaningless (taken literally), but a posteriori 
> meaningful, when interpreted correctly (for symbolic n)
> 
> Undecidable: not even a posteriori meaningful, impossible to make sense of it 
> symbolically
> So, like the proof that the square-root of two is irrational, Gödel and 
> Turing did prove something seminal, but it was a negative result, that they 
> (and you, and unfortunately so many, otherwise smart, people), in their naive 
> platonism, interpret in a wrong way. So the initial "paradox" was very 
> interesting, but all the subsequent "busy beaver" bells and whistles, is just 
> a meaningless game.
> 
> I am not saying that you are not brilliant, you sure are (and you are also a 
> brilliant speaker, as I found out from your stimulating and engaging talk at 
> AviFest last week), but you are wasting your talent on uninteresting 
> research. Perhaps even worse than "undecidability" is your main research area 
> on "quantum computing", that once again is a challenging intellectual 
> mathematical game, but with empty content. The history of science and 
> mathematics is full of people who had superstitious beliefs: Kepler believed 
> in Astrology, Newton in Alchemy, but they did many other things besides. The 
> great debunker, Gil Kalai, (who debunked the Bible Code, along with 
> co-debunkers Dror Bar-Natan and Brendan McKay), has recently pointed out 
> (unfortunately in his understated, gentle, way) the shortcomings of research 
> in "quantum computing", and my impression is that he is right. It is indeed 
> amazing how in our current "enlightened" age, that (allegedly) abhors 
> superstition, such superstitious people as you (and many other, e.g. MIT 
> cosmologist, Max Tegmark, another admittedly brilliant, but nevertheless 
> superstitious, scientist) can be full professors at MIT.
> 
> But then again, it supplies some comic relief, and some of us still enjoy 
> Mythology and Theology, but it is not nice to be dismissive of people who do 
> not share your superstitions.
> 
> 
> - pt
> 
> 
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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 5 Mar 2019, at 00:43, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/4/2019 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 3 Mar 2019, at 20:43, Brent Meeker >> <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 3/3/2019 4:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Here's an example David Wallace presents (as an "outlandish" possibility): 
>>>> Suppose in pi (which is computable, so has a program (a spigot one, in 
>>>> fact) that produces its digits. Suppose somewhere in that stream of digits 
>>>> is the Standard Model Equation
>>>> 
>>>> (say written in LaTeX/Math but rendered here)
>>>>  
>>>> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png
>>>>  
>>>> <https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png>
>>>> 
>>>> So what could this mean? (He sort of leaves it hanging.)
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> Nothing.  Given a suitable mapping the SM Lagrangian can be found in any 
>>> sequence of symbols.  It's just a special case of the rock that computes 
>>> everything.
>> 
>> Even if rock would exist in some primitive sense, which I doubt, they do not 
>> compute anything, except in a trivial sense the quantum state of the rock. A 
>> rock is not even a definable digital object.
> 
> It's an ostensively definable object...which is much better.

Ostension is dream-able. 




> 
>> If someone want to convince me that a rock can compute everything, I will 
>> ask them to write a complier of the combinators, say, in the rock. I will 
>> ask an algorithm generating the phi_i associated to the rock.
> 
> There is no particular phi_i associated to the rock.  That's the point.  The 
> rock goes thru various states so there exists a mapping from that sequence of 
> states to any computation with a similar number of states.

It is a mapping of states. It is like a bijection. You need something like a 
morphism preserving the computability structure, which do not exist in the 
rock. A computation is not just a sequence of states, it is a sequence of 
states defined by the universal machine which brought those states. 

There are bijections between N and Z, but only Z is a group, because those 
bijections does not preserve the algebraic structure. Similarly, there is a 
bijection between a computation and a movie of that computation, but it does 
not preserve the causal/logical relation between the states, which is a 
universal machine for the computation, and just a linear order for the 
sequence, without structure, of the states.



>   Of course one may object that the actual computation is in the 
> mapping...but that's because of our prejudice for increasing entropy.

OK.Now, a bijection between a physical computation and an arithmetical 
computation do preserve the computability structure, that is why we can say 
that the arithmetical reality/model implements genuinely the computations.

Bruno



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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 4 Mar 2019, at 19:48, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/4/2019 3:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>  Unconsciousness is an illusion of consciousness … It should be obvious that 
>> “being unconscious” cannot be a first person experience, for logical reason. 
>> To die is not a personal event. That happens only to the others.
> I agree.  Except I don't suppose that all events are personal.


I don’t like this much, but physics is first person plural. Is is not purely 
personal, we share the histories, thanks to entanglement, which is just the 
sharing of realities in the duplication/multiplication of the observers.

Bruno 


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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 4 Mar 2019, at 19:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/4/2019 3:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>   I have had two relatives die of Alzheimers and they lost their identity 
>>> gradually as they lost memory. 
>> They lost they memory. Not their identity, but the apprehension of their 
>> identity. If not, when you ask where they are in the hospital, the nurse 
>> would say “what are you talking about”. Even a corpse has an identity. 
> At last you recognize the importance of the material.

Matter and physics are even more important, and more reasonable, with 
Mechanism. The fact that matter becomes derivable from number makes matter 
theories more well founded than any extrapolation we could do from a finite 
number of observation. The material becomes unavoidable for *all* universal 
machine, but its existence is phenomenological.
The quantum weirdness was to be expected, when we look at ourselves closely 
around our substitution level. (Indeed exactly below that level in case we 
assume us to be classically computed, it is more complicated if we have a 
quantum brain, which I doubt, but that would mean our brains exploits the 
massive parallelism intrinsic to the arithmetical reality.

Bruno 



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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-03-05 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 4 Mar 2019, at 19:46, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 3/4/2019 3:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> Snip
>>>>> 
>>>>> A bacterium doesn't have Turing universiality, only bacteria in the 
>>>>> abstract of a potentially infinite set of evolving bacteria interacting 
>>>>> with their environment.  But if a consider a potentially infinite set of 
>>>>> thermostats interacting with their environment of furnaces and rooms, it 
>>>>> will be Turing universal too.  Turing universality is cheap.
>>>> 
>>>> Yes, it is cheap, like consistency, and plausibly consciousness.
>>>> 
>>>> But it is more cheap you might think, because even one bacteria is fully 
>>>> Turing universal. The genome of Escherichia Coli can be “programmed” to 
>>>> run a Turing universal set of quadruplet. Of course, the bacteria’s “tape” 
>>>> is quite limited, and they can exploit their universality only by 
>>>> cooperation in the long run, and so no individual bacteria can be 
>>>> self-conscious or Löbian.
>>> 
>>> I think that's what I said.  Except I also noted that all this requires an 
>>> environment within which the bacteria can metabolize. 
>> 
>> That is contingent with respect of the bacteria “mental life”. All programs 
>> needs a code, and an environment which run it, but it can be arithmetic. 
>> Then a physical reality emerges as a means on all accessible 
>> computations-continuations.
>> 
>> Mentioning the environment can be misleading. If a material environment is 
>> needed, matter would play some role, and there is no more reason to say 
>> accept a digital, even if physical, brain.
> 
> I didn't say anything about the environment being "material".But your 
> objection seems to reduce to, "But that's contrary to my theory.”

The context indicates that I was using “material” for “primitively material”. 
My objection is not “that’s contrary to my theory”, but to my theorem. I am 
just saying that you cannot have both “primitive matter” (or just physicalism) 
and Mechanism together. Even without that theorem, the 
simple-buta-pparently-not-so simple *fact* that elementary arithmetical truth 
is Turing complete should make us doubt, at the least, about physicalism.




>   It's no good saying your theory is testable when you only test it within 
> the assumptions you used to derive it.

Where do I do that?




> 
>> In a dream, we create more clearly the environment by ourself, and that is 
>> enough for being conscious, or even self-conscious, like in a lucid dream, 
>> or a sophisticated virtual environment.
> 
> The dream is realized by the brain and it is about elements of our real 
> environment.

The human dreams are realised by the human brain, and is about element of our 
human environment. To invoke “real” or “reality” or “truth” is not admissible 
in science. Doubly so in metaphysics, as it begs the main question, which is 
indeed about what could be real, and what could not be real.






> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> So to say bacteria have Turing universality is like saying water is 
>>> lemonade...if you add lemons and sugar.
>> 
>> It means that with the 4 letters, you can program any partial recursive 
>> function. Of course you need the decoding apparatus, but that is entirely in 
>> the bacteria. It means that you can simulate any other computer, with a 
>> basic set of DNA-enzyme molecular interaction. A universal machine is just a 
>> number u such that for all x and y phi_u(x, y) = phi_x(y) *in principle. You 
>> can implement all control structure. The operon illustrates a 
>> “if-then-else”, and the regulation apparatus is enough to get universality. 
>> René Thomas, in Brussels, has succeeded to make a loop, with a plasmid 
>> (little circular gene) entering in the bacterium, and then going out, 
>> repetitively. It is even a “fuzzy computer”. Some product are regulated in a 
>> continuum, depending on the concentration of the metabolites. When I was 
>> young, I have made e project for a massively parallel computers which was a 
>> solution of bacteria (E. coli) and bacteriophage. One drop of it could 
>> process billions of instructions in a second. But the read and write was 
>> demanding highly sophisticated molecular biology. I think that such ideas 
>> have more success today. After all, molecular biology studies “natural 
>> nanotechnology”.
> 
> You're wrong.  The environment is essential.  The fact that DNA can encode 
> functions m

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 4 Mar 2019, at 15:13, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, March 4, 2019 at 5:54:24 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 3 Mar 2019, at 20:43, Brent Meeker > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On 3/3/2019 4:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Here's an example David Wallace presents (as an "outlandish" possibility): 
>>> Suppose in pi (which is computable, so has a program (a spigot one, in 
>>> fact) that produces its digits. Suppose somewhere in that stream of digits 
>>> is the Standard Model Equation
>>> 
>>> (say written in LaTeX/Math but rendered here)
>>>  
>>> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png
>>>  
>>> <https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png>
>>> 
>>> So what could this mean? (He sort of leaves it hanging.)
>>> 
>> 
>> Nothing.  Given a suitable mapping the SM Lagrangian can be found in any 
>> sequence of symbols.  It's just a special case of the rock that computes 
>> everything.
> 
> Even if rock would exist in some primitive sense, which I doubt, they do not 
> compute anything, except in a trivial sense the quantum state of the rock. A 
> rock is not even a definable digital object. If someone want to convince me 
> that a rock can compute everything, I will ask them to write a complier of 
> the combinators, say, in the rock. I will ask an algorithm generating the 
> phi_i associated to the rock.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> There are "smart" rocks that do signal processing.
> 
> http://science.sciencemag.org/content/350/6258/289.4
> 

Pebbles have a very small of natural computational power, in that sense. They 
memorise events, like photon memorise his encounter with an election, by some 
change of direction. Then, if you add that pebbles interact with water, and can 
cooperates, yes, in that sense rocks can be “smart”.

In that sense, I have already demonstrate that pebbles are very intelligent, 
and wise. They never asserts stupidities, and nobody has heard a pebble lying 
for its personal benefits, nor do they hung their fellows. So much more 
intelligent than the humans. But pebbles do not compute in those simple task, 
except what I mentioned, they can bounce, and remember in that way, which makes 
a lot of pebbles capable of accomplishing some task. 

Here with have the problem to delineate the computability of the environment, 
which eventually emulates the pebble, and the computability of the pebble. When 
I say that a rock does not compute, it is a reference to Putnam’s suggestion 
that all the movement of the rocks part (the electron in the atoms) can be 
combined to obtained all computations. But that makes no sense, because the 
computation is in the logical relations, incarnate in a very special way, so 
that the computational state are related by some relation (the arithmetical 
one, and the physical one if the computation is entangled to you). That is true 
in a trivial sense, because with quantum mechanics, even the vacuum is already 
Turing universal. This is predicted by Mechanism, the closer you look at the 
possible environment, the closer you look to a universal dovetailing, or to 
*all* computations, even "the aberrant one” (those inconsistent relatively to 
your normal histories). Mechanism predict the “many-world appearance” but also 
that there is a lot of things at the bottom, virtual things of course, but 
everything is virtual with Mechanism.

It is like the question, can apes solve trigonometrical equation? You can say 
no. But some will show you that the brain of the visual cortex of the apes do 
solve trigonometrical equation. But of course, the apes is not its brain. With 
such a confusion, I could say that I have solved the protein enfolding problem, 
indeed about a billions times everyday, after they emerges from my ribosome. I 
do that /// naturally! Lol.

When talking about subject and object, there is always some ambiguity possible, 
and caution to take.

Bruno





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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-04 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 4 Mar 2019, at 14:24, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 6:38 PM Russell Standish  > wrote:
> 
> > ISTM that the 8000th BB number is unknowable, rather than uncomputable.
> 
> I don't follow you. If the 8000th BB number is unknowable then it is 
> certainly uncomputable


That is not true. All natural number n are computable. The program is “output 
n”.

4 is computable, by the program "output 4”.

45643900765502223 is computable, by the program “output 45643900765502223”.

Even “990801733966657343489 … 678907”, with “…” for a row of 10^(10^100) 
digits, is still computable, by the program “output “990801733966657343489 … 
678907”.

BB(n) is not computable means that there is no algorithm, which given n, will 
give BB(n).

The number BB(n), unlike the function  [n] BB(n), is computable, despite we 
cannot find constructively, mechanically, its programs.

We might say that you are using “computable” in the intuitionist sense. The 
program computing BB(n) is just a constant number, and it belongs somewhere in 
the phi_i. We cannot find it, and what Aaronson has shown, is that above 7918, 
we loss any hope to find it by using the theory ZF. But may be someone will 
find it by using ZF + kappa, which is much more powerful that ZF, and might be 
able to solve much more halting question, so that the correspond limit for ZF + 
kappa would be something like 6758918. It is sure that it will be bigger than 
7918. 
For PA, the limit can be expected to be much smaller than 7918. 



> but if it's uncomputable then it's only *probably* unknowable because you 
> could get lucky and correctly guess the truth.

BB(n), the number, is computable, because there is a problem which computes it, 
independently of me guessing it or not. The program exists, if you accept 
classical logic. Even if you will never guess it correctly, or even if you 
guess an incorrect number. That will not change the fact that the number exists 
and can, like all natural number, be computed.

That is the reason, except for Turing fundamental paper, all the theory of 
computability is based on the natural numbers, or any precise finite entities. 
It makes the primitive objects all trivially computable, and the non 
computability is only in the functions and relations.

When using the real numbers, a confusion is forced to occur, notably between 
intuitionist real numbers and classical real numbers. Then, also, a real 
numbers can be seen as a total computable function (on N, in N). But then, the 
set of such computable numbers is no more recursively enumerable, and we miss 
the partial computable functions, which are capital for the whole theory, or 
worst, we need to add a notion of real numbers having some undefined digits.

Today, we have progressed, and there are very nice notions of computable real 
numbers. Some do take them as primitive (like with an implicit oracle). That 
gives the Blum, Small and Shub theory of computable real numbers (and functions 
on them). Other just take the classical theory of real numbers, restricted to 
intuitionist mathematics, and here, some use Browuer’s intuitionism (all 
functions are computable, simply) or any of the many variant of intuitionism. 
There is no Church-Turing thesis for them, and are treated in recursion theory 
by using the analytical hierarchy, where second order logic is used (variable 
represents both number and functions).
In all reasonable theory of the reals, the computable reals are not 
mechanically enumerable, like the total functions from N to N, and so cannot be 
used for a general theory of computations. That was just not clear at Turing’s 
time, even if Turing is the guy who will benefits a lot to the development of 
computability theory. 




> So unknowable covers more ground than uncomputable
>  
> > As Bruno said, there is a program that outputs the 8000th BB number, but we 
> > can never know that this program is the correct one.
> 
> There are only 2 possibilities, a program will halt after a finite number of 
> steps or it won’t.

Yes. But the program which computes BB(n) always stop. It is a program like 

“output “990801733966657343489 … 678907”. 

Now, you cannot recognise that is the correct program. But that is frequent. By 
Rice theorem, you cannot recognise if an arbitrary program computes the 
factorial function or not. Most attributes of program are non computable, and 
most relations between programs are undecidable, in all effective theories. (A 
theory is effective if we can test mechanically the proofs). Usually theories 
are effective, but logicians have enlarged very much the notion of theory, and 
they admit non effective theory. They consider for example the set of true 
sentences of arithmetic to be a theory, but that does not concern us).



> So can you solve the halting problem by just flipping a coin?

Certainly not.


> I would maintain that you haven't solved a problem if you can't give the 

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