Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-17 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, April 17, 2019 at 11:11:31 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> > On 17 Apr 2019, at 01:29, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > On 4/16/2019 6:42 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
> >> In the experientialist (Strawson-Goff-etc. "panpsychist" view): 
> experiential qualia (EQ) exist in matter at some level on their own -- and 
> EQ cannot be reduced to information (numbers). 
> >> 
> >> So real "selfness" cannot be achieved in any "Gödel-Löb-etc." theorem 
> prover running on the so-called conventional computer. 
> >> 
> >> Now some future biological computers -- made via synthetic biology -- 
> open new possibilities. 
> > 
> > What makes them "biological"?  Do they have to be made of amino acids? 
>  nuclei acids?  do they have to be powered by a phosphate cycle?  What 
> makes one bunch of biological molecules conscious and another very similar 
> bunch dead, or anesthesized? 
> > 
> > The only coherent answer is that consciousness is realized by certain 
> information processing...independent of the molecules instantiating the 
> process. 
>
> Good point, and this is what will lead, when assuming the process are 
> digital, to associate a mind to all “enough similar” digital process 
> realised, in the precise sense of Church and Turing, in arithmetic. It is 
> the same information which os processed, at the “right” level, which exist 
> by the assumption of digital mechanism. 
>
> Bruno 
>
>
>
Information may be sufficient to compose consciousness, but I am skeptical. 
Wheeler said "it from bit" (or "qbit"), but I say "xbit".


φbits = 2bits+qbits(physical bits: information)
ψbits = xbits   (psychical bits: experience)


https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/02/08/2bits-qbits-xbits-a-cosmos/

- pt 

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-17 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, April 17, 2019 at 1:42:14 AM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> 1) Oh, I'm clearly not making that mistake. When I talk about emergence, I 
> talk about ontological emergence, not the hand-waving epistemic kind that 
> people usually talk about. The emergence that I'm talking about is the 
> emergence of new qualia on top of previously existing qualia. This is what 
> my book is about. So it's the real deal. Alternatively, have a look at my 
> presentation from the Science & Nonduality conference where I talk about 
> The Emergent Structure of Consciousness, where I talk about ontological 
> emergence and I specifically mention to the audience that the epistemic 
> emergence is false: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jMAy6ft-ZQ 
> And what realizes the ontological emergence is self-reference through its 
> property of looking-back-at-itself, with looking-back becoming more than 
> itself, like in the cover of the book.
>
> 2) Consciousness is not mysterious. And this is exactly what my book is 
> doing: demystifying consciousness. If you decide to read my book, you will 
> gain at the end of it a clarity of thinking through these issues that all 
> people should have such that they will stop making the confusions that 
> robots are alive.
>
> 3) No, they are not extraordinarily claims. They are quite trivial. And 
> they start from the trivial realization that the brain does not exist. The 
> "brain" is just an idea in consciousness.
>
>
>>

 
The panpsychist says

   *Matter is all there is, but matter has experientiality.*

The proposed alternative is

*Experientiality is all there is, while matter is illusion. *


As science has proceeded so far as the study of matter, I'm not sure how 
the alternative (vs. panpsychism) helps in the science of consciousness.

- pt





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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-16 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:29:24 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 4/16/2019 6:42 AM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
> > In the experientialist (Strawson-Goff-etc. "panpsychist" view): 
> > experiential qualia (EQ) exist in matter at some level on their own -- 
> > and EQ cannot be reduced to information (numbers). 
> > 
> > So real "selfness" cannot be achieved in any "Gödel-Löb-etc." theorem 
> > prover running on the so-called conventional computer. 
> > 
> > Now some future biological computers -- made via synthetic biology -- 
> > open new possibilities. 
>
> What makes them "biological"?  Do they have to be made of amino acids?  
> nuclei acids?  do they have to be powered by a phosphate cycle?  What 
> makes one bunch of biological molecules conscious and another very 
> similar bunch dead, or anesthesized? 
>
> The only coherent answer is that consciousness is realized by certain 
> information processing...independent of the molecules instantiating the 
> process. 
>
> Brent 
>



We don't know enough about matter to say. Look at all the quirky stuff 
coming out of materials science news. And biomatter is quirkier still. 

- pt

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-16 Thread Philip Thrift


In the experientialist (Strawson-Goff-etc. "panpsychist" view): 
experiential qualia (EQ) exist in matter at some level on their own -- and 
EQ cannot be reduced to information (numbers).

So real "selfness" cannot be achieved in any "Gödel-Löb-etc." theorem 
prover running on the so-called conventional computer.

Now some future biological computers -- made via synthetic biology -- open 
new possibilities.

- pt

On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 3:28:14 AM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> Yes, no need to apply. They are using the concept of self-reference in a 
> misleading way. The true meaning of self-reference is an entity that refers 
> to itself. There are several problems with the way in which they are using 
> the concept. First problem is that "machine" is not an entity. "Machine" is 
> just an idea in consciousness, it doesn't have an independent existence, it 
> doesn't have any ontological status, it doesn't exist as an entity. And 
> since it doesn't exist, it cannot refer to itself, or for that matter it 
> cannot do anything. Only consciousness (and its forms of manifestation: 
> qualia) has ontological status.
>
> The second issue is that the way self-reference refers to itself is to 
> incorporate itself in the very act of referring. Basically, the observer, 
> the observed, and the act of observation are all one and the same thing. 
> I'm pretty much you cannot think of a machine in these terms. So a 
> "self-referential machine" is just words-play. It doesn't have anything in 
> common whatsoever with the true characteristics of the true self-reference.
>
> On Tuesday, 16 April 2019 09:24:46 UTC+3, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>> So, no need to apply? :)
>>
>>
>> *Seeking Research Fellows in Type Theory and Machine Self-Reference*
>>
>>

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Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-16 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics
>
> *The physics of Game of Thrones*
>
> https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/
>
>
>
> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.
>
> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. That 
> is not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if that is 
> the case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = phi_u’ 
> extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if mechanism is 
> correct. 
>
> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our 
> substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would 
> be the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and 
> physics would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would 
> make Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for 
> Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.
>
>
>
>
>
> in another number?
>
> Or: Is there a a GoT reality?
>
>
> Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining 
> (every)thing.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
Assume "our physics" is the Standard Model.

 Here it is in a few hundred characters (Lagrangian_{SM}):
 
 
https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like

How does one "derive" this Lagrangian_{SM} from the logic of elementary 
arithmetic (Logic_{EA}) -- even given the translation of the language of 
Lagrangians into the language of Logic_{EA}. Why should our SM be the one, 
and not an alternative SM? If every SM equation is possible (not just the 
one equation above), what is "explained"?

It makes more sense that Lagrangian_{SM} and Logic_{EA} are completely 
contingent hypotheses written in languages created by us humans to model 
reality.

- pt

 

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-16 Thread Philip Thrift
So, no need to apply? :)



*Seeking Research Fellows in Type Theory and Machine Self-Reference*

https://intelligence.org/2016/03/18/seeking-research-fellows-in-type-theory-and-machine-self-reference/

The Machine Intelligence Research Institute (MIRI) is accepting 
applications for a full-time research fellow* to develop theorem provers 
with self-referential capabilities*, beginning by implementing a strongly 
typed language within that very language. The goal of this research project 
will be to help us understand autonomous systems that can prove theorems 
about systems with similar deductive capabilities. Applicants should have 
experience programming in functional programming languages, with a 
preference for languages with dependent types, such as Agda, Coq, or Lean.

MIRI is a mathematics and computer science research institute specializing 
in long-term AI safety and robustness work. Our offices are in Berkeley, 
California, near the UC Berkeley campus.


Type Theory in Type Theory

Our goal with this project is to build tools for better modeling reflective 
reasoning in software systems, as with our project modeling the HOL4 proof 
assistant within itself. There are Gödelian reasons to think that 
self-referential reasoning is not possible in full generality. However, 
many real-world tasks that cannot be solved in full generality admit of 
effective mostly-general or heuristic approaches. Humans, for example, 
certainly succeed in trusting their own reasoning in many contexts.

There are a number of tools missing in modern-day theorem provers that 
would be helpful for studying self-referential reasoning. First among these 
is theorem provers that can construct proofs about software systems that 
make use of a very similar theorem prover. To build these tools in a 
strongly typed programming language, we need to start by writing programs 
and proofs that can make reference to the type of programs and proofs in 
the same language.

Type theory in type theory has recently received a fair amount of 
attention. James Chapman’s work is pushing in a similar direction to what 
we want, as is Matt Brown and Jens Palsberg’s, but these projects don’t yet 
give us the tools we need. (F-omega is too weak a logic for our purposes, 
and methods like Chapman’s don’t get us self-representations.)

This is intended to be an independent research project, though some 
collaborations with other researchers may occur. Our expectation is that 
this will be a multi-year project, but it is difficult to predict exactly 
how difficult this task is in advance. It may be easier than it looks, or 
substantially more difficult.

Depending on how the project goes, researchers interested in continuing to 
work with us after this project’s completion may be able to collaborate on 
other parts of our research agenda or propose their own additions to our 
program.


- pt


On Monday, April 15, 2019 at 1:28:22 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> Hmm... the thing is that what I'm arguing for in the book is that 
> self-reference is unformalizable, so there can be no mathematics of 
> self-reference. More than this, self-reference is not some concept in a 
> theory, but it is us, each and everyone of us is a form of manifestation of 
> self-reference. Self-reference is an eternal logical structure that 
> eternally looks-back-at-itself. And this looking-back-at-itself 
> automatically generates a subjective ontology, an "I am". In other words, 
> the very definition of the concept of "existence" is the 
> looking-back-at-itself of self-reference. So, existence can only be 
> subjective, so all that can exists is consciousness. I talk in the book how 
> the looking-back-at-itself implies 3 properties: identity (self-reference 
> is itself, x=x), inclusion (self-reference is included in itself, x transcendence (self-reference is more than itself, x>x). And all these 
> apparently contradictory properties are happening all at the same time. So, 
> x=x, xx all at the same time. But there is no actual contradiction 
> here, because self-reference is unformalizable. The reason why I get to 
> such weird conclusions is explored throughout the book where a 
> phenomenological analysis of consciousness is done and it is shown how it 
> is structured on an emergent holarchy of levels, a holarchy meaning that a 
> higher level includes the lower levels, and I conclude that this can only 
> happen if there is an entity called "self-reference" which has the above 
> mentioned properties. So as you can see, there pretty much cannot be a 
> mathematics of self-reference.
>
> I will also present about self-reference at The Science of Consciousness 
> conference this year at Interlaken, Switzerland, so if you are there we can 
> talk more about these issues.
>
> On Thursday, 11 April 2019 02:55:55 UTC+3, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Hi Cosmin,
>>
>> It seems your conclusion fits well with the conclusion already given by 
>> the universal machine (the 

Re: How does one make a topic UNREAD?

2019-04-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, April 15, 2019 at 1:39:34 PM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> I only see an option to make all topics READ. TIA. AG
>

Post a new reply. :)

- pt 

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-15 Thread Philip Thrift


Philip Goff is the primary author of the SEP article on the general subject

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/

while he (@Philip_Goff on Twitter, links to his web site and videos there) 
has written on* micropsychism* (also reviewed above)

*Cosmopsychism, Micropsychism and the Grounding Relation*
https://philarchive.org/archive/GOFCMA 

His book (likely mostly what he has been presenting on his Twitter feed in 
the last year) will be called 

 *Galileo's Error*
 *Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness*
 https://www.penguinrandomhouseaudio.com/book/599229/galileos-error/

Goff is in the same "camp" mostly with Galen Strawson

 *Consciousness Isn't a Mystery. It's Matter.*

 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/16/opinion/consciousness-isnt-a-mystery-its-matter.html
 
Experience is a first-class property of matter. But at what levels and 
configurations of matter is the question.

This is pretty much the opposite of the "emergence" view:

*Panpsychism vs. Emergentism*
https://www.iep.utm.edu/panpsych/#H4


- pt


On Monday, April 15, 2019 at 1:16:12 PM UTC-5, Cosmin Visan wrote:
>
> Where can I find Philip Goff's ideas ? Maybe you can summarize them here 
> so we can discuss. But to answer your question, my book deals specifically 
> with the emergent structure of consciousness and the nature of 
> self-reference, so it is a rather specialized book. It is not your everyday 
> "materialism vs idealism" endless debate. In my book I actually do 
> something in moving the science of consciousness further, by doing real 
> science of consciousness. So I guess my book cannot compare too much with 
> other books out there that are wasting energy in endless debates instead of 
> actually doing something.
>
> Btw, I also have a presentation at the Science & Nonduality conference 
> from last year, where I present about The Emergent Structure of 
> Consciousness:
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6jMAy6ft-ZQ
>
> On Tuesday, 9 April 2019 08:30:52 UTC+3, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> Although his book isn't out yet, how do you think your approach compares 
>> to Philip Goff's:
>>
>

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Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-15 Thread Philip Thrift

If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics

*The physics of Game of Thrones*
https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/

in another number?

Or: Is there a a GoT reality?

- pt

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Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

2019-04-12 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, April 11, 2019 at 11:56:08 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 4/11/2019 9:33 PM, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, April 11, 2019 at 7:12:17 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 4/11/2019 4:53 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, April 11, 2019 at 4:37:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 4/11/2019 1:58 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>
 He might have been referring to a transformation to a tangent space 
 where the metric tensor is diagonalized and its derivative at that point 
 in 
 spacetime is zero. Does this make any sense? 


 Sort of.  

>>>
>>>
>>> Yeah, that's what he's doing. He's assuming a given coordinate system 
>>> and some arbitrary point in a non-empty spacetime. So spacetime has a non 
>>> zero curvature and the derivative of the metric tensor is generally 
>>> non-zero at that arbitrary point, however small we assume the region around 
>>> that point. But applying the EEP, we can transform to the tangent space at 
>>> that point to diagonalize the metric tensor and have its derivative as zero 
>>> at that point. Does THIS make sense? AG
>>>
>>>
>>> Yep.  That's pretty much the defining characteristic of a Riemannian 
>>> space.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> But isn't it weird that changing labels on spacetime points by 
>> transforming coordinates has the result of putting the test particle in 
>> local free fall, when it wasn't prior to the transformation? AG 
>>
>> It doesn't put it in free-fall.  If the particle has EM forces on it, it 
>> will deviate from the geodesic in the tangent space coordinates.  The 
>> transformation is just adapting the coordinates to the local free-fall 
>> which removes gravity as a force...but not other forces.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> In both cases, with and without non-gravitational forces acting on test 
> particle, I assume the trajectory appears identical to an external 
> observer, before and after coordinate transformation to the tangent plane 
> at some point; all that's changed are the labels of spacetime points. If 
> this is true, it's still hard to see why changing labels can remove the 
> gravitational forces. And what does this buy us? AG
>
>
> You're looking at it the wrong way around.  There never were any 
> gravitational forces, just your choice of coordinate system made fictitious 
> forces appear; just like when you use a merry-go-round as your reference 
> frame you get coriolis forces.  What is gets you is it enforces and 
> explains the equivalence principle.  And of course Einstein's theory also 
> correctly predicted the bending of light, gravitational waves, time 
> dilation and the precession of the perhelion of Mercury.
>
> Brent
>



One would think (has anyone ever used it?) the Einstein Toolkit - 
https://einsteintoolkit.org/ - (the one platform I've heard about) takes 
care of all the coordinate management.

https://einsteintoolkit.org/thornguide/CactusBase/CoordBase/documentation.html
 

- pt

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Re: First Picture If A Black Hole

2019-04-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, April 10, 2019 at 6:55:55 PM UTC-5, Tomasz Rola wrote:
>
> On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 09:32:32AM -0400, John Clark wrote: 
> > https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/science/black-hole-picture.html 
> > 
>
> Also, here: 
>
> https://www.eso.org/public/news/eso1907/ 
>
> -- 
> Regards, 
> Tomasz Rola 
>
> -- 
> ** A C programmer asked whether computer had Buddha's nature.  ** 
> ** As the answer, master did "rm -rif" on the programmer's home** 
> ** directory. And then the C programmer became enlightened...  ** 
> ** ** 
> ** Tomasz Rola  mailto:tomas...@bigfoot.com  
> ** 
>




(About the foot note, not the black hole.)


Unix indeed has the Buddha nature. 

Microsoft has made available Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL).
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Windows_Subsystem_for_Linux

Now even Windows 10 can have the Buddha nature.

- pt

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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon

2019-04-08 Thread Philip Thrift

Although his book isn't out yet, how do you think your approach compares to 
Philip Goff's:

  
https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781473563353.html

He has written a lot about it via @Philip_Goff.

Goff is sort the "next generation" Galen Strawson:

   
http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s0/Realistic-Monism---Why-Physicalism-Entails-Panpsychism-Galen-Strawson.pdf

(If you read the above article by Strawson replace "physical..." with 
"material..."everywhere  it reads OK.)

- pt

On Sunday, April 7, 2019 at 6:10:28 PM UTC-5, za_w...@yahoo.com wrote:
>
> My book "I Am" has been published on amazon. It deals with my ideas about 
> the emergent structure of consciousness and the nature of self-reference 
> which gives birth to the emergent structure, which as far as I know, are 
> new ideas, so they might prove useful in opening new paths in the attempt 
> of obtaining a theory of consciousness.
>
> Kindle version: https://www.amazon.com/dp/B07Q4LZVFH
> Paperback version: https://www.amazon.com/dp/1092284397
>
> (also available for the other amazon national websites)
>

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Re: Energy efficiency of different programming languages

2019-04-02 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, April 2, 2019 at 12:03:06 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 4/2/2019 2:35 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
> "Analogical rendering" is a perfectly good programming paradigm.
>
> *Engineers Develop Analog Computing Compiler *
>
> https://www.engineering.com/DesignerEdge/DesignerEdgeArticles/ArticleID/13340/Engineers-Develop-Analog-Computing-Compiler-for-Biological-Simulations-More.aspx
>
> "The high-level language of the compiler makes use of differential 
> equations, which are frequently used to describe biological systems."
>
> "Researchers from MIT have presented a new compiler designed for analog 
> computers. The compiler, called Arco, takes sets of differential equations 
> as its input and translates them into circuits in programmable analog 
> devices."
>
>
> Sounds like old news.  Fifty years ago the Navy built real-time 
> simulations in which air-launched missiles were tested.  They were run on 
> analog computers programed by wiring on big plug boards.  Thirty years ago 
> these were replaced by analog computers which were programmed by digital 
> computers.  
>
> Brent
>



We are bioanalog computers.

*Stanford creates biological transistors, the final step towards computers 
inside living cells*
https://www.extremetech.com/extreme/152074-stanford-creates-biological-transistors-the-final-step-towards-computers-inside-living-cells

*DNA Circuits for Analog Computing*
https://users.cs.duke.edu/~reif/courses/molcomplectures/DNAanalog/DNAanalog(Tianqi)/DNAanalog(Tianqi).pdf
https://users.cs.duke.edu/~reif/courses/molcomplectures/DNAanalog/DNAanalog(Tianqi)/DNAanalog(Tianqi).pdf
 


One day people will be outputs of compilers.

- pt

 

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Re: Energy efficiency of different programming languages

2019-04-02 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, April 2, 2019 at 3:19:36 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 1 Apr 2019, at 20:08, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, April 1, 2019 at 11:46:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 31 Mar 2019, at 19:50, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, March 31, 2019 at 11:58:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 30 Mar 2019, at 07:15, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> https://thenewstack.io/which-programming-languages-use-the-least-electricity/
>>>
>>> Which language one uses makes a physical difference.
>>>
>>>
>>> That is correct, interesting for the application, but not directly 
>>> relevant for the “ontological problem” and the mind-body problem.
>>>
>>> Physics is not able to make any prediction without assuming something 
>>> (what exactly) capable of selecting our computation in arithmetic. 
>>> Theologically, it still invoke an ontology, which cannot be done when doing 
>>> science.
>>>
>>> The fact that efficient computation “survives”, and non efficient do 
>>> not, requires magic if the environnement does not map the finitely many 
>>> accessible histories at (or below) our substitution level.
>>>
>>> A quantum computation does not require any energy, note. And both 
>>> observation, and mechanism seems to force the physical reality into a 
>>> combinatory algebra without Kestrel (Kxy = x, which eliminates the 
>>> information in y), nor Starling S (Sxyz = xz(yz)) nor any duplicator (no 
>>> Mocking Bird like M, Mx = xx). Information cannot be physically created, 
>>> nor eliminated, nor duplicated. 
>>>
>>> We can still have Turing universality without eliminators. Yet we lost 
>>> Turing universality when we have no eliminators and no duplicators, but we 
>>> can regain it with adding “measurement” modal operator (internally defined, 
>>> or not). That is the combinatory BCI algebra, with a core physics where 
>>> energy is a constant, and computations use no energy, yet relative 
>>> subcomputation are allowed to make relative measurement, leading to 
>>> apparent (indexical) breaking of the core laws, and apparent elimination of 
>>> “memories”. There are Turing universal group and group have natural mesure 
>>> theory associated with them, but again, such group must be justified 
>>> mathematically (and theologically to get the private (first person) parts 
>>> not eliminated). 
>>>
>>> Thinking of group, I have said that physics is a symphony played by the 
>>> number 0, 1, e, PI, gamma, and with the number 24 has chief orchestra. To 
>>> be honest, my motivation comes more from physics and number theory than 
>>> from Metamathematics (mathematical logic, machine theology), and it makes 
>>> me nervous that the number theorist stumble on the right physics before the 
>>> theologian (leading to an arithmeticalism still capable of eliminating the 
>>> first person for awhile). Here is a nice video where John Baez explains 
>>> well why he likes 24 too, and its main role in String Theory (the Riemann 
>>> regularisation). I think about this when mentioning group theory, as 24 is 
>>> related to the Monster Group and Moonshine (where deep relation occurs 
>>> between fundamental physics and number theory).
>>>
>>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzjbRhYjELo
>>>
>>> To be sure, my favorite reason to love 24 is more the one related to 
>>> Hardy Rademacher and Ramanujan exact formula for the number of partition of 
>>> a number. That plays also some role in fundamental chemistry and 
>>> classification of “orbitals” (or quantum stationary waves).
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> Every programming language has physical semantics 
>>
>>
>> But a term like physics has not yet understandable semantics. Carnap and 
>> Popper made some try in that direction, but it leads to many difficulties. 
>> It is part of the beauty of mechanism that it provides a semantic of the 
>> physical proposition, without invoking any ontological commitment (beyond 
>> the terms needed to have the notion of universal machine (in the 
>> Turing-Post-Church-Kleene sense).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -- which depends on its material computing substrate
>>
>>
>> That seems very weird to me. If something is a programming lan

Re: Energy efficiency of different programming languages

2019-04-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, April 1, 2019 at 11:46:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 31 Mar 2019, at 19:50, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, March 31, 2019 at 11:58:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 30 Mar 2019, at 07:15, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> https://thenewstack.io/which-programming-languages-use-the-least-electricity/
>>
>> Which language one uses makes a physical difference.
>>
>>
>> That is correct, interesting for the application, but not directly 
>> relevant for the “ontological problem” and the mind-body problem.
>>
>> Physics is not able to make any prediction without assuming something 
>> (what exactly) capable of selecting our computation in arithmetic. 
>> Theologically, it still invoke an ontology, which cannot be done when doing 
>> science.
>>
>> The fact that efficient computation “survives”, and non efficient do not, 
>> requires magic if the environnement does not map the finitely many 
>> accessible histories at (or below) our substitution level.
>>
>> A quantum computation does not require any energy, note. And both 
>> observation, and mechanism seems to force the physical reality into a 
>> combinatory algebra without Kestrel (Kxy = x, which eliminates the 
>> information in y), nor Starling S (Sxyz = xz(yz)) nor any duplicator (no 
>> Mocking Bird like M, Mx = xx). Information cannot be physically created, 
>> nor eliminated, nor duplicated. 
>>
>> We can still have Turing universality without eliminators. Yet we lost 
>> Turing universality when we have no eliminators and no duplicators, but we 
>> can regain it with adding “measurement” modal operator (internally defined, 
>> or not). That is the combinatory BCI algebra, with a core physics where 
>> energy is a constant, and computations use no energy, yet relative 
>> subcomputation are allowed to make relative measurement, leading to 
>> apparent (indexical) breaking of the core laws, and apparent elimination of 
>> “memories”. There are Turing universal group and group have natural mesure 
>> theory associated with them, but again, such group must be justified 
>> mathematically (and theologically to get the private (first person) parts 
>> not eliminated). 
>>
>> Thinking of group, I have said that physics is a symphony played by the 
>> number 0, 1, e, PI, gamma, and with the number 24 has chief orchestra. To 
>> be honest, my motivation comes more from physics and number theory than 
>> from Metamathematics (mathematical logic, machine theology), and it makes 
>> me nervous that the number theorist stumble on the right physics before the 
>> theologian (leading to an arithmeticalism still capable of eliminating the 
>> first person for awhile). Here is a nice video where John Baez explains 
>> well why he likes 24 too, and its main role in String Theory (the Riemann 
>> regularisation). I think about this when mentioning group theory, as 24 is 
>> related to the Monster Group and Moonshine (where deep relation occurs 
>> between fundamental physics and number theory).
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzjbRhYjELo
>>
>> To be sure, my favorite reason to love 24 is more the one related to 
>> Hardy Rademacher and Ramanujan exact formula for the number of partition of 
>> a number. That plays also some role in fundamental chemistry and 
>> classification of “orbitals” (or quantum stationary waves).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> Every programming language has physical semantics 
>
>
> But a term like physics has not yet understandable semantics. Carnap and 
> Popper made some try in that direction, but it leads to many difficulties. 
> It is part of the beauty of mechanism that it provides a semantic of the 
> physical proposition, without invoking any ontological commitment (beyond 
> the terms needed to have the notion of universal machine (in the 
> Turing-Post-Church-Kleene sense).
>
>
>
>
>
> -- which depends on its material computing substrate
>
>
> That seems very weird to me. If something is a programming language, it 
> can be implemented in a physical realm, but it is also implemented in the 
> arithmetical realm, and anything emulated in that programming language 
> cannot see any difference if the original emulator is the physical one or 
> the arithmetical one. That is logically impossible, even without assuming 
> mechanism.
>
> If you want a dependence from the substrate, you need a non 
> computaionalist theory of mind, and you need to singularise matter with 
> actual infinities,

Re: Energy efficiency of different programming languages

2019-03-31 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, March 31, 2019 at 11:58:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 30 Mar 2019, at 07:15, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
>
> https://thenewstack.io/which-programming-languages-use-the-least-electricity/
>
> Which language one uses makes a physical difference.
>
>
> That is correct, interesting for the application, but not directly 
> relevant for the “ontological problem” and the mind-body problem.
>
> Physics is not able to make any prediction without assuming something 
> (what exactly) capable of selecting our computation in arithmetic. 
> Theologically, it still invoke an ontology, which cannot be done when doing 
> science.
>
> The fact that efficient computation “survives”, and non efficient do not, 
> requires magic if the environnement does not map the finitely many 
> accessible histories at (or below) our substitution level.
>
> A quantum computation does not require any energy, note. And both 
> observation, and mechanism seems to force the physical reality into a 
> combinatory algebra without Kestrel (Kxy = x, which eliminates the 
> information in y), nor Starling S (Sxyz = xz(yz)) nor any duplicator (no 
> Mocking Bird like M, Mx = xx). Information cannot be physically created, 
> nor eliminated, nor duplicated. 
>
> We can still have Turing universality without eliminators. Yet we lost 
> Turing universality when we have no eliminators and no duplicators, but we 
> can regain it with adding “measurement” modal operator (internally defined, 
> or not). That is the combinatory BCI algebra, with a core physics where 
> energy is a constant, and computations use no energy, yet relative 
> subcomputation are allowed to make relative measurement, leading to 
> apparent (indexical) breaking of the core laws, and apparent elimination of 
> “memories”. There are Turing universal group and group have natural mesure 
> theory associated with them, but again, such group must be justified 
> mathematically (and theologically to get the private (first person) parts 
> not eliminated). 
>
> Thinking of group, I have said that physics is a symphony played by the 
> number 0, 1, e, PI, gamma, and with the number 24 has chief orchestra. To 
> be honest, my motivation comes more from physics and number theory than 
> from Metamathematics (mathematical logic, machine theology), and it makes 
> me nervous that the number theorist stumble on the right physics before the 
> theologian (leading to an arithmeticalism still capable of eliminating the 
> first person for awhile). Here is a nice video where John Baez explains 
> well why he likes 24 too, and its main role in String Theory (the Riemann 
> regularisation). I think about this when mentioning group theory, as 24 is 
> related to the Monster Group and Moonshine (where deep relation occurs 
> between fundamental physics and number theory).
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vzjbRhYjELo
>
> To be sure, my favorite reason to love 24 is more the one related to Hardy 
> Rademacher and Ramanujan exact formula for the number of partition of a 
> number. That plays also some role in fundamental chemistry and 
> classification of “orbitals” (or quantum stationary waves).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
Every programming language has physical semantics -- which depends on its 
material computing substrate -- in addition to (substrate-independent) 
denotational and operational semantics . That includes quantum programming 
languages, like QASM [ https://arxiv.org/abs/1707.03429 ] (for IBM's Q 
computer).

 - pt

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Energy efficiency of different programming languages

2019-03-30 Thread Philip Thrift


https://thenewstack.io/which-programming-languages-use-the-least-electricity/

Which language one uses makes a physical difference.

- pt

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Re: The grandfather paradox, redux

2019-03-24 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, March 24, 2019 at 3:48:30 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grandfather_paradox
>
>
> In the usual EPR-type experiment, a particle A is sent westward and 
> "correlated" particle B is sent eastward. (A could travel 5 miles and B 
> could travel just 5 feet, for example.) But their detection outputs show 
> that A and B are "entangled" so that apparently the detection setups at 
> both ends influences the "final" states of A and B.
>
>
> In another EPR-type experiment, an emitter sends one particle A "skyward" 
> into space, and simultaneously a twin particle B to a detector nearby. 
> Depending on what the B detector measures, an unlucky grandfather is killed 
> or not. The A particle bends around a massive object (its path bent by 
> general relativity - it could also be more than one massive object involved 
> in its travel)  light years away and returns to Earth 30 years later when 
> that grandfather's grandchild has set up a detector for A whose measurement 
> results in the grandfather's death.
>
>
> - pt
>
>
I should add that the difference in the above example from the typical one

A-detector   <-   Source -> B-detector
A   B

is that in the typical example the time of travel A and the time of travel 
of B are fairly equal (though both very short), but in the above example 
the time of travel of A is decades, while B stays the same.

- pt

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The grandfather paradox, redux

2019-03-24 Thread Philip Thrift


cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grandfather_paradox


In the usual EPR-type experiment, a particle A is sent westward and 
"correlated" particle B is sent eastward. (A could travel 5 miles and B 
could travel just 5 feet, for example.) But their detection outputs show 
that A and B are "entangled" so that apparently the detection setups at 
both ends influences the "final" states of A and B.


In another EPR-type experiment, an emitter sends one particle A "skyward" 
into space, and simultaneously a twin particle B to a detector nearby. 
Depending on what the B detector measures, an unlucky grandfather is killed 
or not. The A particle bends around a massive object (its path bent by 
general relativity - it could also be more than one massive object involved 
in its travel)  light years away and returns to Earth 30 years later when 
that grandfather's grandchild has set up a detector for A whose measurement 
results in the grandfather's death.


- pt

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ASSC 23 (Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness)

2019-03-23 Thread Philip Thrift

https://theassc.org/assc-23/

ASSC 23
(Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness)
June 25th - 28th 2019
University of Western Ontario, Canada

abstract submissions due April 1, 2019
(no joke)

- pt

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Re: Connection between Provability Logic (GL) and geometry?

2019-03-19 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, March 19, 2019 at 9:16:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Mar 2019, at 20:33, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> Might have something of interest ...
>
>
> https://mathoverflow.net/questions/325702/connection-between-provability-logic-gl-and-geometry
>  
> <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fmathoverflow.net%2Fquestions%2F325702%2Fconnection-between-provability-logic-gl-and-geometry=D=1=AFQjCNF4OHbDm6tYoYD1Y55XxgK8qFi0TQ>
>
> ...
>
> There seems to be an existing literature on topological semantics and 
> provability logics. Thomas Icard has slides on this 
> <http://logic.berkeley.edu/colloquium/IcardSlides.pdf>, and the Stanford 
> Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a bit on the topic 
> <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-provability/#TopoSemaForProvLogi>. 
> I'm not sure how related this is to the specific topological/geometric 
> intuitions you give here, but it might be of interest more broadly. – Noah 
> Schweber <https://mathoverflow.net/users/8133/noah-schweber> 31 mins ago 
> <https://mathoverflow.net/questions/325702/connection-between-provability-logic-gl-and-geometry#comment813108_325702>
>
>
>
>
> I know the work of Leo Esakia, (and of Blok) notably his Russian paper (*) 
> and it is indeed quite interesting. It provides interesting topological 
> semantics for variants of K4 and GL (called G here). Icard has extended 
> such semantics for the logic GLP, which is a polymodal logic axiomatising 
> the provability logic on sequence of stronger and stronger theories. At 
> each level n we have a box [n] obeying to G, and with the two axioms:
>
> [n]p -> [n+1]p
> p -> [n+1]p
>
> for all n, Beklemishev has shown that this is complete for the 
> arithmetical interpretation extended on this succession of theories. I use 
> this in some more detailed exposition. 
> In the work of Esakia, the consistency <>p becomes a special sort of 
> abstract derivative. The idea of using topological model cale from the work 
> of McKinsey and Tarski, in the spirit of the algebraic semantics of Helena 
> Rasiowa and Roman Sikorski “The mathematics of Metamathematics” (an 
> excellent work on algebraic semantics). 
>
> The topological space, in the semantics of Esakia, are not Hausdorff 
> spaces, and are rather peculiar from a topologist standpoint, but 
> nevertheless, that work is quite interesting. It is a good complement of 
> the more traditional Kripke or Krpke-inspired semantics (which I use much 
> more).
>
> Unfortunately, although this will have interesting application for the 
> general theology of “growing machine”, the topology is not related directly 
> to the quantum “geometry” of the “material” variant of G (the Z and X 
> logics I have shown to exist here). 
>
> But thanks for this link. I missed those slides by Icard, and some 
> references therein.
>
> Esakia died in 2010, and was responsible for the great interest in 
> provability logic in Georgia (Europa).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> (*) Esakia, L. (1981). Diagonal constructions, Löb’s formula and Cantor’s 
> scattered space (Russian). In Studies in logic and semantics, pages 
> 128–143. Metsniereba, Tbilisi.
>
>
> - pt
>
>
There are now three links supplied in the MathOverflow post:

(SEP article)  
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-provability/#TopoSemaForProvLogi

*Topological Semantics for Provability Logics*
http://logic.berkeley.edu/colloquium/IcardSlides.pdf

*The Topological Structure of Asynchronous Computability*
http://cs.brown.edu/people/mph/HerlihyS99/p858-herlihy.pdf

- pt

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Classical geometries emerging from quantum spacetime

2019-03-19 Thread Philip Thrift


This line of research is that of Daniele Pranzetti [  
https://www.perimeterinstitute.ca/people/daniele-pranzetti ].

"The idea at the basis of our study is that *homogenous classical 
geometries emerge from a condensate of quanta of space introduced in LQG in 
order to describe quantum geometries*," explains [Daniele] Pranzetti. 
"Thus, we obtained a description of black hole quantum states, suitable 
also to describe 'continuum' physics—that is, the physics of space-time as 
we know it."

*Loop quantum gravity theory offers glimpse beyond the event horizon*
https://phys.org/news/2016-05-loop-quantum-gravity-theory-glimpse.html

*Horizon entropy from quantum gravity condensates*
Daniele Oriti, Daniele Pranzetti, Lorenzo Sindoni
(Submitted on 23 Oct 2015 (v1), last revised 26 May 2016 (this version, v3))
https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.06991

*Black Holes as Quantum Gravity Condensates*
Daniele Oriti, Daniele Pranzetti, Lorenzo Sindoni
(Submitted on 4 Jan 2018)
https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.01479

- pt

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Connection between Provability Logic (GL) and geometry?

2019-03-18 Thread Philip Thrift

Might have something of interest ...

https://mathoverflow.net/questions/325702/connection-between-provability-logic-gl-and-geometry

...

There seems to be an existing literature on topological semantics and 
provability logics. Thomas Icard has slides on this 
, and the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a bit on the topic 
. 
I'm not sure how related this is to the specific topological/geometric 
intuitions you give here, but it might be of interest more broadly. – Noah 
Schweber  31 mins ago 



- pt

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems

2019-03-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, March 15, 2019 at 5:18:43 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> On 14 Mar 2019, at 14:03, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, March 14, 2019 at 7:54:49 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 3:40 AM Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>  
>>
>>> *> We may even have robots that can sit and talk with us about current 
>>> events, know everything in Wikipedia, etc. How "creative" they will be is 
>>> an open question. *
>>>
>>
>> I don't think it's a open question at all. I can state without 
>> reservation that regardless of how intelligent computers become they will 
>> *never* be creative because the word "creative" now means whatever 
>> computers aren't good at. Yet. And thus due to Moore's Law and improved 
>> programing the meaning of the word constantly changes. What was creative 
>> yesterday isn't creative today.
>>
>> *> On mathematics: Of course mathematics changes, because it is a type of 
>>> language, and languages change.*
>>>
>>
>> If mathematics is just a language (as I think it is) then it can not be 
>> used to construct things, in particular it can't, by itself without the use 
>> of matter, construct a Turing Machine as Bruno claims it can. English is 
>> also a language but an English word has no meaning without an English 
>> speaker with a physical brain to hear it.
>>
>>  John K Clark
>>
>
>
>
> There is some AI art that sells at galleries
>
>
> https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/shortcuts/2018/oct/26/call-that-art-can-a-computer-be-a-painter
>
> but that's about it I've seen.
>
> Turing machines in theoretical computing/math books are all fictional 
> things, of course.
>
>
> “Of course”?
>
>
>
>
> All actual computers are made of matter.
>
>
> No doubt that this is true, but that is not an argument that such matter 
> are not (stable) appearances.
>
> But as I try to explain here from times to times, the arithmetical reality 
> explains where and why such stable appearances appears. If I can say.
>
> You just seem to be a believer in a Primary Matter, but I have never seen 
> one evidence for it. Initially, “mathematician” were not believer in a 
> mathematical reality, but a skeptic toward the idea that matter is the 
> primitive reality we have to assume. But with mechanism, we don’t have to 
> assume matter, it explains matter, and unlike physicalism, it explains how 
> consciousness remains associated to the appearances of matter.
>
> You seem to beg the question by deciding that math objects are fiction and 
> physics object is not.
>
> No problem, but then digital mechanism is false. But there are no 
> evidences, it is just an old habit since the closure of Plato academy;
>
> Bruno
>
>
>

One could also look at it as a pragmatist.

Say I want to *make something*. I could say "I want to make it out of 
arithmetic (numbers)." But ways to actually do that is something like to 
write a program where "numbers" do things in a computer. But we know what 
is going on here is electrons moving through circuits and pixels.

It could be "running" in my brain (assuming I can imagine the program 
executing). But that does nobody else any good.

Or I could type it up and file it away for later on a hard drive.

Electrons, circuits, pixels, brain cells, hard drives. Matter.

On whether some ultimate Löb-Gödel theorem prover can "explain" self-aware 
experiences: I still think that there are non-numerical first-class 
experiential entities that are needed to completely "flesh out" true 
experience. (And those can only come from matter.)


- pt 

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems

2019-03-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, March 14, 2019 at 7:54:49 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 3:40 AM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>  
>
>> *> We may even have robots that can sit and talk with us about current 
>> events, know everything in Wikipedia, etc. How "creative" they will be is 
>> an open question. *
>>
>
> I don't think it's a open question at all. I can state without 
> reservation that regardless of how intelligent computers become they will 
> *never* be creative because the word "creative" now means whatever 
> computers aren't good at. Yet. And thus due to Moore's Law and improved 
> programing the meaning of the word constantly changes. What was creative 
> yesterday isn't creative today.
>
> *> On mathematics: Of course mathematics changes, because it is a type of 
>> language, and languages change.*
>>
>
> If mathematics is just a language (as I think it is) then it can not be 
> used to construct things, in particular it can't, by itself without the use 
> of matter, construct a Turing Machine as Bruno claims it can. English is 
> also a language but an English word has no meaning without an English 
> speaker with a physical brain to hear it.
>
>  John K Clark
>



There is some AI art that sells at galleries

  
 
https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/shortcuts/2018/oct/26/call-that-art-can-a-computer-be-a-painter

but that's about it I've seen.

Turing machines in theoretical computing/math books are all fictional 
things, of course.

All actual computers are made of matter.

(Technically the fictional ones are too: Printed ink glyphs on paper.)

 -pt

 

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Re: Towards Conscious AI Systems

2019-03-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, March 13, 2019 at 4:09:24 PM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 8:07 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>
> *> My computer told me that this post has not be sent. Apology if it was 
>> already sent. It is an old posts, but I think it is somehow important. *
>
>
> I'm only going to comment on about 10% of your very long post because the 
> other 90% is just stuff I've heard 6.02*10^23 times before about the 
> scientifically illiterate ancient Greeks, peepee, the Universal Dance 
> Association, and how I am the most religious man who ever lived.  
>
> >>And the scientific knowledge that existed in 529 AD was about the same 
>>> as the the scientific knowledge that existed in 529 BC, so apparently 
>>> doing  metaphysics with any sort of attitude is a waste of time.
>>
>>
>> *> I think the contrary. Without the progress in theology during that 
>> period* [...]
>>
>
> Progress in theology?? What's the difference between good theology and 
> bad theology? None that I can see.
>  
>
>> > *none of the modern mathematics, physics, computer science, would 
>> exist. You seem to believe that science is born at your birth. It is born 
>> in -500, and has evolved a lot up to 529.*
>>
>
> There was almost no progress in science or mathematics between 100 and 529 
> AD, especially in Christian Europe, the big jump had to wait for another 
> 900 years or so.
>
> > You can't experiment with invisible factors and an experiment that 
>>> produces invisible results verifies nothing. 
>>
>>
>> *> Visibility is Aristotle’s religion.*
>>
>
> Meaning needs contrast and Brunospeak is not my native language so please 
> name something that is *NOT* a religion. I've asked you to do this before 
> but you never did.
>
> >> there is no point in worrying about consciousness until you've first 
>>> solved the problem of intelligence,
>>
>>
>> *> You said yourself that consciousness is easy,*
>>
>
> It's far TOO easy, it's so easy ANY consciousness theory will work because 
> there are no facts they must satisfy, and that's why every Tom Dick and 
> Harry on the internet is peddling their own consciousness theory. But 
> there are vastly fewer intelligence theoreticians on the net because that's 
> hard and unlike consciousness theories they can be tested.
>
> > Literalism is bad in religion
>>
>
>  Everything is bad in religion because religion is just bad. As Christopher 
> Hitchens said "religion ruins everything".
>
> >> If time and space are not made use of in your mystical invisible 
>>> timeless Turing Machine how do you go from step N to step N+1, what is the 
>>> relationship between the 2 steps?
>>
>>
>> *> The transition table of the Turing machine,*
>>
>
> A transition table never changes, thus it can't *DO* anything
>
>  *> or The reduction in the combinators,*
>
>  Mathematics never changes, thus it can't *DO* anything
>  
>
>> *> or A clock in the von Neumann mathematical computer*
>>
>
> A software clock can't change without the help of physical hardware, and a 
> clock that can't change is not a clock.
>
>  >> explain how a non-material Turing machine that has nothing to do with 
>>> time or space can be so important when time and space are so critical to 
>>> our intelligence and consciousness. 
>>
>>
>> > *Yes, but no primary matter needs to be invoke for this. *You point 
>> makes sense, but is not valid to refute the immaterialist consequence of 
>> mechanism.
>>
>  
> Could you please make clear your distinction between matter and primary 
> matter and why this distinction is important. Even if you're right and pure 
> mathematics can produce matter (and I can't see any way it could) it would 
> still be necessary for mathematics to first produce matter before 
> intelligence or consciousness could emerge.
>
> >> I can know your proof is incorrect by just asking a few very simple 
>>> questions about the thought experiment it is based on; such as " after 
>>> the experiment has been concluded what did the correct answer turn out to 
>>> be, Moscow or Washington?”
>>
>>
>> *> As the answer must be confirmed by both copies, *
>>
>
> Confirmed? What with your massive confusion with personal pronouns causes 
> be the existence of a personal pronoun duplicating machine you can't even 
> clearly state what the question is much less confirm that that the answer 
> was correct. 
>  
>
>> *> the correct prediction was “W v M”,*
>>
>
> You predict that the result of my coin flip experiment will turn out to be 
> heads or tails. I then flip the coin and it turns out to be tails. So tell 
> me, what have we learned from this experiment?  
> Absolutely positively nothing. 
>
> > neither the Washington Man nor  the Moscow man existed yesterday back 
>>> in Helsinki 
>>
>>
>> *> Then the H-guy died. *
>>
>
> Yes the H-guy does not exist today, but only if you define the H-guy as 
> the man who was in Helsinki yesterday because today is not yesterday so 
> today there is no way a man can be a man in 

Re: Black holes and the information paradox

2019-03-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, March 10, 2019 at 9:16:12 PM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> They say if information is lost, determination is toast. But doesn't QM 
> inherently affirm information loss? I mean, although, say, the SWE can be 
> run backward in time to reconstruct any wf it describes, we can never 
> reconstruct or play backward Born's rule, in the sense of knowing what 
> original particular state gave a particular outcome. That is, there is no 
> rule in QM to predict a particular outcome, so how can we expect, that 
> given some outcome, we can know from whence it arose? AG
>



We basically know that general relativity (GR) is wrong at the small scale, 
and that quantum mechanics (QM) is "gravity challenged".

The "information" paradox is likely just a confusion caused by not having a 
good theory yet to replace GR or update QM, or both.


Here are two items worth considering to possibly be used to resolve this

*Spacetime could be simultaneously continuous and discrete, in the same way 
that information can be*
New Journal of Physics 12 (2010)
Achim Kempf
Departments of Applied Mathematics and Physics, University of Waterloo
https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1367-2630/12/11/115001/meta


*Beyond Einstein*
https://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2018-12/lsu-be122018.php

Theoretical physicists have been questioning if singularities really exist 
through complex mathematical equations over the past several decades with 
little success until now. LSU Department of Physics & Astronomy Associate 
Professor Parampreet Singh and collaborators LSU Postdoctoral Researcher 
Javier Olmedo and Abhay Ashtekar, the Eberly Professor of Physics at Penn 
State developed new mathematical equations that go beyond Einstein's theory 
of general relativity overcoming its key limitation--the central 
singularity of black holes. 

Theoretical physicists developed a theory called loop quantum gravity in 
the 1990s that marries the laws of microscopic physics, or quantum 
mechanics, with gravity, which explains the dynamics of space and time. 
Ashtekar, Olmedos and Singh's new equations describe black holes in loop 
quantum gravity and showed that black hole singularity does not exist.

"In Einstein's theory, space-time is a fabric that can be divided as small 
as we want. This is essentially the cause of the singularity where the 
gravitational field becomes infinite. In loop quantum gravity, the fabric 
of space-time has a tile-like structure, which cannot be divided beyond the 
smallest tile. My colleagues and I have shown that this is the case inside 
black holes and therefore *there is no singularity*," Singh said.

Instead of singularity, loop quantum gravity predicts a funnel to another 
branch of the space-time.

"These tile-like units of geometry--called 'quantum excitations'-- which 
resolve the singularity problem are orders of magnitude smaller than we can 
detect with today's technology, but we have precise mathematical equations 
that predict their behavior," said Ashtekar, who is one of the founding 
fathers of loop quantum gravity.

"At LSU, we have been developing state-of-the-art computational techniques 
to extract physical consequences of these physical equations using 
supercomputers, bringing us closer to reliably test quantum gravity," Singh 
said.

Einstein's theory fails not only at the center of the black holes but also 
to explain how the universe was created from the Big Bang singularity. 
Therefore, a decade ago, Ashtekar, Singh and collaborators began to extend 
physics beyond the Big Bang and make new predictions using loop quantum 
gravity. Using the mathematical equations and computational techniques of 
loop quantum gravity, they showed that the Big Bang is replaced by the "Big 
Bounce." But, the problem of overcoming black hole singularity is 
exceptionally complex.

"The fate of black holes in a quantum theory of gravity is, in my view, the 
most important problem in theoretical physics," said Jorge Pullin, the 
Horace Hearne professor of theoretical physics at LSU, who was not part of 
this study.


- pt 

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Re: My son the mathematician

2019-03-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, March 11, 2019 at 2:46:50 AM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:
>
> Here is his first co-authored paper (at the age of 20).
>
> Topology and its Applications 
> 
> Volume 254 
> , 1 
> March 2019, Pages 85-100
>
> Extending bonding functions in generalized inverse sequences
> Iztok Banič, 
>  
> SimonGoodwin and 
> 
> MichaelLockyer 
> 
>  
> 
>
> (he's the one in the middle)
>
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0166864118304449
>


Cool.

He should a cut of the proceeds ($39.95)  the publisher wants for this 
paper. :)

- pt

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Re: Is Google groups shutting down?

2019-03-11 Thread Philip Thrift
On Monday, March 11, 2019 at 2:33:58 AM UTC-5, Liz R wrote:

> If so is the EL going somewhere else?
>


Google Groups as a whole

https://groups.google.com/

e.g. this one

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/everything-list

apparently will remain as is with nothing changing.

- pt
 

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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-10 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, March 10, 2019 at 7:10:40 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 8 Mar 2019, at 11:16, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, March 8, 2019 at 3:18:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 7 Mar 2019, at 12:26, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, March 7, 2019 at 5:11:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6 Mar 2019, at 14:43, John Clark  wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 8:30 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>> *> You confirm my theory that strong (non agnostic) atheism is radical 
>>>> religious fundamentalism*
>>>
>>>
>>> I've never heard you or anybody else criticize me that brilliantly 
>>> before, you sure put me in my place. I am devastated!
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Lol. 
>>>
>>> The fact remains. Anyone mocking the science theology, helps the 
>>> radicals, who have separated theology from science to mix it with (fake) 
>>> politics (and real tyranny). You are under the influence of the post 529 
>>> pseudo-christian propaganda. You defend, not intentionally I suppose, those 
>>> who want us remaining non educated. 
>>> The greek theology (not the greek mythology!) is at the origin of 
>>> mathematics, physics, and even mathematical logic more recently.
>>>
>>> Note that the USSR, which have banned both religion and theology, did 
>>> the same thing with biology. By mixing it with the state, it becomes 
>>> obscurantist and non sensical (which led to a big famine).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> > By theology, you know that  [...]  *Plato define God by* [...]
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm sorry did you say something? I think I fell asleep 
>>>
>>>
>>> Since long …
>>> Since 529, somehow, I guess. 
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Epicurus (via Lucretius) had a philosophy based on physical and 
>> psychical atoms.
>>
>>
>>
>> Intersting! (And just now you don’t provide links? I would be interested. 
>> It would show that early materialist where not eliminativist). Plotinus 
>> already complained on “eliminative materialism”, in its own term. I find 
>> this both inexact and inhuman.
>>
>> But that leads to a non necessary dualism, which is also incompatible 
>> with Descartes Mechanism and Turing’s one.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Perhaps the writings of Epicurus and Democritus and their students should 
>> have been preserved and the writings of Plato and Aristotle should have 
>> been destroyed.
>>
>> :)
>>
>>
>> Lol
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> Epicurus: 
>
> Psychical [soul] atoms combine with physical [body] atoms to make 
> conscious beings.
>
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epicurus/#PsycEthi
>
> *Having established the physical basis of the world, *
>
>
> How?
>
>
>
> *Epicurus proceeds to explain the nature of the soul (this, at least, is 
> the order in which Lucretius sets things out). This too, of course, 
> consists of atoms: first, there is nothing that is not made up of atoms*
>
>
> Assuming physicalism and atomism.
>
>
>
> * and void (secondary qualities are simply accidents of the arrangement of 
> atoms),*
>
>
>
> That is the eternal confusion between first person and third person, and 
> it leads, with mechanism, to elimination of the person, or to dualisme, or 
> indeed to panpsychism, which explains absolutely nothing: neither mind nor 
> matter. 
>
> Matter is an invention of the devil to distract us from the real thing.
>
> Well, in neoplatonism, you define matter by where God lose control. Of 
> course it is not the christian god. The greeks neoplatonist knew already 
> that it makes not much sense to assume that God is omniscient and/or 
> omnipotent. 
>
>
>
>
> * and second, an incorporeal entity could neither act on nor be moved by 
> bodies,*
>
>
>
> That is a good point. But that is the reason to not *assume* matter and 
> movement in the first place.
>
>
>
>
> * as the soul is seen to do (e.g., it is conscious of what happens to the 
> body, and it initiates physical movement). *
>
>
> That is the shadow of Mechanism, but adding atom of souls make the brain 
> more mysterious, especially that we have not find such atoms. And would 
> they exist, the mind-body problem is only made more complex, if not 
> unsolvable. At leas

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-08 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, March 8, 2019 at 4:42:28 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Mar 2019, at 23:00, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, March 7, 2019 at 11:47:41 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 Mar 2019, at 22:10, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 12:20:13 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> We cannot predict in advance if a machine will stop. The extensional 
>>> equality of machines, or combinators, is unsolvable. 
>>>
>>>
>>
>> There is some conceptual and practical division between mathematics and 
>> applied mathematics
>>
>>
>> Yes. But note that the division we can made there are dependent of the 
>> metaphysics.
>>
>> Then Gödel has shown that we can apply mathematics to metamathematics, 
>> and that a large part of metamathematics is in mathematics, so mathematics 
>> have application in mathematics. But that is obvious through the 
>> representation theorems, and my factors. We can say that the theory of 
>> complex analysis has found extraordinary application in the pure number 
>> theory, like Riemann discovered. 
>>
>> Category theory is born from the discovery of abstract pattern relying 
>> many application of some branch of math to another branch of math. It helps 
>> mathematician to not reinvent the wheel all the time.
>>
>>
>>
>> (and there are institutionally separate Mathematics (PM, P for "Pure") 
>> and Applied Mathematics (AM) Departments or Divisions at *some* 
>> universities.
>>
>>
>> Yes. That has been the root of my problem with some local academician. I 
>> naively stated that I decide to study mathematics because I saw application 
>> of mathematical logic (the second recursion theorem) to biology (like I 
>> have shown in my paper “Amoeba, Planaria and Dreaming machine”. But I was 
>> told that mathematical logic was taught in the section of Pure Mathematics, 
>> where it was very badly seen to apply mathematics to anything but 
>> mathematics. This illustrates it makes no sense to decide that some part of 
>> math are pure or not.
>>
>> And this is even more true with mechanism.  There is no more an 
>> ontological physical reality, or any gods of that sort (which have never 
>> been tested, actually, except with my work, of course, where the test was 
>> negative for “Matter”). So the fundamental reality becomes mathematical. 
>> And we are pure mathematical object living in a mathematical reality. That 
>> is not entirely correct, because the internal phenomenology, for technical 
>> reason, escapes even the whole of mathematics. So, eventually, the reality 
>> is theological, to be correct. But the theology of the machines is a 
>> theory, which today, is classified in pure mathematics (the logic of 
>> provability). 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> There is a PM and an AM way of approaching what "computing" is.
>>
>>
>>
>> Yes, even in arithmetic. The universal machine discover that there is a 
>> big difference between being implemented by a nameable “in principle” 
>> universal number, and being implemented by something emerging from an 
>> infinity of computations from the first person points of view. The first 
>> leads to the theory G* (the “scientific theology of the ideally sound 
>> machine”), and the others leads to quantum logic and physics, and the right 
>> one, if mechanism is correct.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> In an AM way of thinking, no computer can run forever, assuming what 
>> scientists theorize about the future of the universe (big freeze, crunch, 
>> etc.).
>>
>>
>> And assuming some physical reality. If you do serious metaphysics, it is 
>> better to invoke an ontological commitment only in last ressort. Invoking 
>> an ontological or primary physical universe is like saying “and god made 
>> it”. That does not work. It is wishful thinking, provably if Mechanism is 
>> assumed.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> AM would see computing as being nothing more than what can be done on 
>> material computers, natural or manmade. 
>>
>>
>> Computation have been discovered in arithmetic, before physics.
>>
>> Of course, the fact that we have cells and brains suggest, once we 
>> understand that a computation is an arithmetical notion,  that the physical 
>> reality too is Turing complete. But with mechanism, to solve the m

Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-08 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, March 8, 2019 at 3:18:39 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 7 Mar 2019, at 12:26, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, March 7, 2019 at 5:11:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 6 Mar 2019, at 14:43, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 8:30 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>> *> You confirm my theory that strong (non agnostic) atheism is radical 
>>> religious fundamentalism*
>>
>>
>> I've never heard you or anybody else criticize me that brilliantly 
>> before, you sure put me in my place. I am devastated!
>>
>>
>>
>> Lol. 
>>
>> The fact remains. Anyone mocking the science theology, helps the 
>> radicals, who have separated theology from science to mix it with (fake) 
>> politics (and real tyranny). You are under the influence of the post 529 
>> pseudo-christian propaganda. You defend, not intentionally I suppose, those 
>> who want us remaining non educated. 
>> The greek theology (not the greek mythology!) is at the origin of 
>> mathematics, physics, and even mathematical logic more recently.
>>
>> Note that the USSR, which have banned both religion and theology, did the 
>> same thing with biology. By mixing it with the state, it becomes 
>> obscurantist and non sensical (which led to a big famine).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> > By theology, you know that  [...]  *Plato define God by* [...]
>>
>>
>> I'm sorry did you say something? I think I fell asleep 
>>
>>
>> Since long …
>> Since 529, somehow, I guess. 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> Epicurus (via Lucretius) had a philosophy based on physical and psychical 
> atoms.
>
>
>
> Intersting! (And just now you don’t provide links? I would be interested. 
> It would show that early materialist where not eliminativist). Plotinus 
> already complained on “eliminative materialism”, in its own term. I find 
> this both inexact and inhuman.
>
> But that leads to a non necessary dualism, which is also incompatible with 
> Descartes Mechanism and Turing’s one.
>
>
>
>
> Perhaps the writings of Epicurus and Democritus and their students should 
> have been preserved and the writings of Plato and Aristotle should have 
> been destroyed.
>
> :)
>
>
> Lol
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>

Epicurus: 

Psychical [soul] atoms combine with physical [body] atoms to make conscious 
beings.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epicurus/#PsycEthi

*Having established the physical basis of the world, Epicurus proceeds to 
explain the nature of the soul (this, at least, is the order in which 
Lucretius sets things out). This too, of course, consists of atoms: first, 
there is nothing that is not made up of atoms and void (secondary qualities 
are simply accidents of the arrangement of atoms), and second, an 
incorporeal entity could neither act on nor be moved by bodies, as the soul 
is seen to do (e.g., it is conscious of what happens to the body, and it 
initiates physical movement). Epicurus maintains that soul atoms are 
particularly fine and are distributed throughout the body (LH 64), and it 
is by means of them that we have sensations (aisthêseis) and the experience 
of pain and pleasure, which Epicurus calls pathê (a term used by Aristotle 
and others to signify emotions instead). Body without soul atoms is 
unconscious and inert, and when the atoms of the body are disarranged so 
that it can no longer support conscious life, the soul atoms are scattered 
and no longer retain the capacity for sensation (LH 65). There is also a 
part of the human soul that is concentrated in the chest, and is the seat 
of the higher intellectual functions. The distinction is important, because 
it is in the rational part that error of judgment enters in. Sensation, 
like pain and pleasure, is incorrigible just because it is a function of 
the non-rational part, which does not modify a perception — that is, the 
reception of lamina emitted from macroscopic bodies — by the addition of 
opinion or belief.*


is an ancient precursor to

Realistic Monism (Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism)
Galen Strawson
http://www.sjsu.edu/people/anand.vaidya/courses/c2/s0/Realistic-Monism---Why-Physicalism-Entails-Panpsychism-Galen-Strawson.pdf

Physicalist panpsychism (Blackwell Companion to Consciousness) 
Galen Strawson
https://www.academia.edu/25420435/Physicalist_panpsychism_2017_draft


Note: Strawson uses "physicalism" to mean "materialism" since he thinks 
physics - what counts as its subject matter (pun intended) - will change in 
the future.

- pt

 

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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-07 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, March 7, 2019 at 11:47:41 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 6 Mar 2019, at 22:10, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 12:20:13 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> We cannot predict in advance if a machine will stop. The extensional 
>> equality of machines, or combinators, is unsolvable. 
>>
>>
>
> There is some conceptual and practical division between mathematics and 
> applied mathematics
>
>
> Yes. But note that the division we can made there are dependent of the 
> metaphysics.
>
> Then Gödel has shown that we can apply mathematics to metamathematics, and 
> that a large part of metamathematics is in mathematics, so mathematics have 
> application in mathematics. But that is obvious through the representation 
> theorems, and my factors. We can say that the theory of complex analysis 
> has found extraordinary application in the pure number theory, like Riemann 
> discovered. 
>
> Category theory is born from the discovery of abstract pattern relying 
> many application of some branch of math to another branch of math. It helps 
> mathematician to not reinvent the wheel all the time.
>
>
>
> (and there are institutionally separate Mathematics (PM, P for "Pure") and 
> Applied Mathematics (AM) Departments or Divisions at *some* universities.
>
>
> Yes. That has been the root of my problem with some local academician. I 
> naively stated that I decide to study mathematics because I saw application 
> of mathematical logic (the second recursion theorem) to biology (like I 
> have shown in my paper “Amoeba, Planaria and Dreaming machine”. But I was 
> told that mathematical logic was taught in the section of Pure Mathematics, 
> where it was very badly seen to apply mathematics to anything but 
> mathematics. This illustrates it makes no sense to decide that some part of 
> math are pure or not.
>
> And this is even more true with mechanism.  There is no more an 
> ontological physical reality, or any gods of that sort (which have never 
> been tested, actually, except with my work, of course, where the test was 
> negative for “Matter”). So the fundamental reality becomes mathematical. 
> And we are pure mathematical object living in a mathematical reality. That 
> is not entirely correct, because the internal phenomenology, for technical 
> reason, escapes even the whole of mathematics. So, eventually, the reality 
> is theological, to be correct. But the theology of the machines is a 
> theory, which today, is classified in pure mathematics (the logic of 
> provability). 
>
>
>
>
>
>
> There is a PM and an AM way of approaching what "computing" is.
>
>
>
> Yes, even in arithmetic. The universal machine discover that there is a 
> big difference between being implemented by a nameable “in principle” 
> universal number, and being implemented by something emerging from an 
> infinity of computations from the first person points of view. The first 
> leads to the theory G* (the “scientific theology of the ideally sound 
> machine”), and the others leads to quantum logic and physics, and the right 
> one, if mechanism is correct.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> In an AM way of thinking, no computer can run forever, assuming what 
> scientists theorize about the future of the universe (big freeze, crunch, 
> etc.).
>
>
> And assuming some physical reality. If you do serious metaphysics, it is 
> better to invoke an ontological commitment only in last ressort. Invoking 
> an ontological or primary physical universe is like saying “and god made 
> it”. That does not work. It is wishful thinking, provably if Mechanism is 
> assumed.
>
>
>
>
>
> AM would see computing as being nothing more than what can be done on 
> material computers, natural or manmade. 
>
>
> Computation have been discovered in arithmetic, before physics.
>
> Of course, the fact that we have cells and brains suggest, once we 
> understand that a computation is an arithmetical notion,  that the physical 
> reality too is Turing complete. But with mechanism, to solve the mind-body 
> problem, you have to derive the physical reality (and its Turing 
> completeness) from arithmetic. It is nota question of choice.
>
> Of course you can say that in your religion, machine cannot have souls, 
> that you are not a machine, and so you can believe in the fantasy you want. 
> That is what we do since we have put theology out of science (just to make 
> it possible for some tyran to exploit people).
>
> Or you can try to build a precise non computationalist theory of mind, and 
> how to test it, in which case the computatio

Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-07 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, March 7, 2019 at 5:11:57 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 6 Mar 2019, at 14:43, John Clark > 
> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Mar 6, 2019 at 8:30 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>
> *> You confirm my theory that strong (non agnostic) atheism is radical 
>> religious fundamentalism*
>
>
> I've never heard you or anybody else criticize me that brilliantly before, 
> you sure put me in my place. I am devastated!
>
>
>
> Lol. 
>
> The fact remains. Anyone mocking the science theology, helps the radicals, 
> who have separated theology from science to mix it with (fake) politics 
> (and real tyranny). You are under the influence of the post 529 
> pseudo-christian propaganda. You defend, not intentionally I suppose, those 
> who want us remaining non educated. 
> The greek theology (not the greek mythology!) is at the origin of 
> mathematics, physics, and even mathematical logic more recently.
>
> Note that the USSR, which have banned both religion and theology, did the 
> same thing with biology. By mixing it with the state, it becomes 
> obscurantist and non sensical (which led to a big famine).
>
>
>
>
> > By theology, you know that  [...]  *Plato define God by* [...]
>
>
> I'm sorry did you say something? I think I fell asleep 
>
>
> Since long …
> Since 529, somehow, I guess. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> Epicurus (via Lucretius) had a philosophy based on physical and psychical 
atoms.

Perhaps the writings of Epicurus and Democritus and their students should 
have been preserved and the writings of Plato and Aristotle should have 
been destroyed.

:)

- pt

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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-06 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 12:20:13 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> We cannot predict in advance if a machine will stop. The extensional 
> equality of machines, or combinators, is unsolvable. 
>
>

There is some conceptual and practical division between mathematics and 
applied mathematics (and there are institutionally separate Mathematics 
(PM, P for "Pure") and Applied Mathematics (AM) Departments or Divisions at 
*some* universities. There is a PM and an AM way of approaching what 
"computing" is.

In an AM way of thinking, no computer can run forever, assuming what 
scientists theorize about the future of the universe (big freeze, crunch, 
etc.).

AM would see computing as being nothing more than what can be done on 
material computers, natural or manmade. 

- pt

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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-06 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, March 6, 2019 at 7:59:04 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 5 Mar 2019, at 19:27, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, March 5, 2019 at 6:23:42 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 5 Mar 2019, at 00:43, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 3/4/2019 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 3 Mar 2019, at 20:43, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 3/3/2019 4:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>>
>> Here's an example David Wallace presents (as an "outlandish" 
>> possibility): Suppose in *pi *(which is computable, so has a *program* 
>> (a spigot one, in fact) that produces its digits. Suppose somewhere in that 
>> stream of digits is the Standard Model Equation
>>
>> (say written in LaTeX/Math but rendered here)
>>  
>> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png
>>
>> So what could this mean? (He sort of leaves it hanging.)
>>
>>
>> Nothing.  Given a suitable mapping the SM Lagrangian can be found in any 
>> sequence of symbols.  It's just a special case of the rock that computes 
>> everything.
>>
>>
>> Even if rock would exist in some primitive sense, which I doubt, they do 
>> not compute anything, except in a trivial sense the quantum state of the 
>> rock. A rock is not even a definable digital object. 
>>
>>
>> It's an ostensively definable object...which is much better.
>>
>>
>> Ostension is dream-able. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> If someone want to convince me that a rock can compute everything, I will 
>> ask them to write a complier of the combinators, say, in the rock. I will 
>> ask an algorithm generating the phi_i associated to the rock.
>>
>>
>> There is no particular phi_i associated to the rock.  That's the point.  
>> The rock goes thru various states so there exists a mapping from that 
>> sequence of states to any computation with a similar number of states.
>>
>>
>> It is a mapping of states. It is like a bijection. You need something 
>> like a morphism preserving the computability structure, which do not exist 
>> in the rock. A computation is not just a sequence of states, it is a 
>> sequence of states defined by the universal machine which brought those 
>> states. 
>>
>> There are bijections between N and Z, but only Z is a group, because 
>> those bijections does not preserve the algebraic structure. Similarly, 
>> there is a bijection between a computation and a movie of that computation, 
>> but it does not preserve the causal/logical relation between the states, 
>> which is a universal machine for the computation, and just a linear order 
>> for the sequence, without structure, of the states.
>>
>>
>>
>>   Of course one may object that the actual computation is in the 
>> mapping...but that's because of our prejudice for increasing entropy.
>>
>>
>> OK.Now, a bijection between a physical computation and an arithmetical 
>> computation do preserve the computability structure, that is why we can say 
>> that the arithmetical reality/model implements genuinely the computations.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>
> The bijection
>
>material [physical] computation ↔ arithmetical computation 
>
> is like (New Testament) Paul's thesis: There's earthly bodies and 
> spiritual bodies.
>
>
> Hmm… You could say that, as a reductio ad absurd of the idea that there 
> are *primitive* material bodies.
>
> But my point was that a bijection is not enough, you need a fiathftull, 
> consciousness preserving transformation, then this can help to derive 
> constructively physics from arithmetic, and the physical reality is 
> recvovred as a part of the machine theology (G*).
>
>
>
>
> "Not all flesh is the same: People have one kind of flesh, animals have 
> another, birds another and fish another. 
>
>
> That reminds me of the argument by the catholic that “obviously” Indian 
> have no souls. 
>
> I am not sure by what you mean “have different flesh”. We are all using 
> the sae DNA, quite similar protein and enzyme, and the difference are as 
> contingent as the fact that you and me are different person, in our 
> relative current incarnation/implementation.
>
>
>
>
> There are also heavenly bodies and there are earthly bodies; but the 
> splendor of the heavenly bodies is one kind, and the splendor of the 
> earthly bodies is another. ... If there is a natural body, there 

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-05 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, March 5, 2019 at 6:23:42 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 5 Mar 2019, at 00:43, Brent Meeker > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 3/4/2019 3:54 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 3 Mar 2019, at 20:43, Brent Meeker > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 3/3/2019 4:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>>
> Here's an example David Wallace presents (as an "outlandish" possibility): 
> Suppose in *pi *(which is computable, so has a *program* (a spigot one, 
> in fact) that produces its digits. Suppose somewhere in that stream of 
> digits is the Standard Model Equation
>
> (say written in LaTeX/Math but rendered here)
>  
> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png
>
> So what could this mean? (He sort of leaves it hanging.)
>
>
> Nothing.  Given a suitable mapping the SM Lagrangian can be found in any 
> sequence of symbols.  It's just a special case of the rock that computes 
> everything.
>
>
> Even if rock would exist in some primitive sense, which I doubt, they do 
> not compute anything, except in a trivial sense the quantum state of the 
> rock. A rock is not even a definable digital object. 
>
>
> It's an ostensively definable object...which is much better.
>
>
> Ostension is dream-able. 
>
>
>
>
>
> If someone want to convince me that a rock can compute everything, I will 
> ask them to write a complier of the combinators, say, in the rock. I will 
> ask an algorithm generating the phi_i associated to the rock.
>
>
> There is no particular phi_i associated to the rock.  That's the point.  
> The rock goes thru various states so there exists a mapping from that 
> sequence of states to any computation with a similar number of states.
>
>
> It is a mapping of states. It is like a bijection. You need something like 
> a morphism preserving the computability structure, which do not exist in 
> the rock. A computation is not just a sequence of states, it is a sequence 
> of states defined by the universal machine which brought those states. 
>
> There are bijections between N and Z, but only Z is a group, because those 
> bijections does not preserve the algebraic structure. Similarly, there is a 
> bijection between a computation and a movie of that computation, but it 
> does not preserve the causal/logical relation between the states, which is 
> a universal machine for the computation, and just a linear order for the 
> sequence, without structure, of the states.
>
>
>
>   Of course one may object that the actual computation is in the 
> mapping...but that's because of our prejudice for increasing entropy.
>
>
> OK.Now, a bijection between a physical computation and an arithmetical 
> computation do preserve the computability structure, that is why we can say 
> that the arithmetical reality/model implements genuinely the computations.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>

The bijection

   material [physical] computation ↔ arithmetical computation 

is like (New Testament) Paul's thesis: There's earthly bodies and spiritual 
bodies.

"Not all flesh is the same: People have one kind of flesh, animals have 
another, birds another and fish another. There are also heavenly bodies and 
there are earthly bodies; but the splendor of the heavenly bodies is one 
kind, and the splendor of the earthly bodies is another. ... If there is a 
natural body, there is also a spiritual body."

Spiritual or heavenly fictionalism is like arithmetical fictionalism: 
spirits (like numbers) do not exist.

- pt




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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-04 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, March 5, 2019 at 12:23:28 AM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 4:55 PM Russell Standish  > wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 02:22:05PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> > On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 2:03 PM Russell Standish > > wrote:
>> > 
>> > You cannot represent n as a finite string for an arbitrary real 
>> number
>> > n. But you can for an arbitrary integer n.
>> > 
>> > 
>> > Sure. But that was not part of your definition of a 'computation'. The
>> > algorithm f(x): (r-1)+1 works for all reals r as well as for finite 
>> strings n.
>> > 
>> > Bruce
>>
>> I don't think it's 'my definition'. The usual meaning of computable
>> integer is that there exists a program that outputs it. For real
>> numbers, this is changed to a program exists that outputs a sequence
>> of numbers that converges to the real number in question. One could
>> also consider "spigot" programs for this purpose too - a program that
>> outputs the decimal (or binary say) expansion of the real number. It
>> is clear that this more relaxed definition is equivalent to the former
>> in the integer case.
>>
>
> It seems that you are relying on the idea of 'computable' as capable of 
> being calculated in a finite number of steps on a finite Turing machine. 
> That is fine; it then rules out functions such as (r-1)+1 for reals, since 
> these are not representable on a finite Turing machine. But it also renders 
> the concept of a computable number completely trivial, and all you are left 
> with for the Church-Turing thesis is the concept of computable functions 
> which are non-trivial in the sense that the function cannot depend ab 
> initio on the output number.
>
> Bruce
>


*What is computable *has its traditional computability theory 
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computability_theory ] answers, but outside 
of this, the more empirical, open-ended approaches.

First, there is the use of *futures and promises *[ 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Futures_and_promises 
].

Another, *persistent Turing machines* 
[ 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/225181994_Persistent_Turing_Machines_as_a_Model_of_Interactive_Computation
 
].

Those are the two that come to mind right now.

- pt

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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-04 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, March 4, 2019 at 12:00:05 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
> And proof is not truth.
>
... 

>  
>
John K Clark
>
>
>
>>
Of course *truth == proof *in the land of radical 
intuitionists-constructivists.

(And what is proof anyway?)


From: Doren Zeilberger
To: Scott Aaronson
[ http://sites.math.rutgers.edu/~zeilberg/Opinion155.html ]

...

As I have said before, there is a quick dictionary to turn all this 
undecidability babble and the obsession with related problems, like the *"busy 
beaver"*, into purely meaningful, albeit uninteresting, statements. Every 
statement that involves quantifies over "infinite" sets, even such a 
"trivial" statement like

n+1=1+n , for EVERY natural number n   ,

(tacitly assuming that you have an "infinite" supply of them) is a priori 
meaningless, but many of them (including the above, and the statement that 
"for all" integers x,y,z > 0 and n > 2 , xn+ yn -zn < > 0) can be made a 
posteriori meaningful, by proving them for symbolic n (and x,y,z). So the 
right dictionary (for statements that involve quantifies over "infinite" 
sets)

Provable : a priori meaningless (taken literally), but a posteriori 
meaningful, when interpreted correctly (for symbolic n)

Undecidable: not even a posteriori meaningful, impossible to make sense of 
it symbolically
So, like the proof that the square-root of two is irrational, Gödel and 
Turing did prove something seminal, but it was a negative result, that they 
(and you, and unfortunately so many, otherwise smart, people), in their 
naive platonism, interpret in a wrong way. So the initial "paradox" was 
very interesting, but all the subsequent "busy beaver" bells and whistles, 
is just a meaningless game.

I am not saying that you are not brilliant, you sure are (and you are also 
a brilliant speaker, as I found out from your stimulating and engaging talk 
at AviFest last week), but you are wasting your talent on uninteresting 
research. Perhaps even worse than "undecidability" is your main research 
area on "quantum computing", that once again is a challenging intellectual 
mathematical game, but with empty content. The history of science and 
mathematics is full of people who had superstitious beliefs: Kepler 
believed in Astrology, Newton in Alchemy, but they did many other things 
besides. The great debunker, Gil Kalai, (who debunked the Bible Code, along 
with co-debunkers Dror Bar-Natan and Brendan McKay), has recently pointed 
out (unfortunately in his understated, gentle, way) the shortcomings of 
research in "quantum computing", and my impression is that he is right. It 
is indeed amazing how in our current "enlightened" age, that (allegedly) 
abhors superstition, such superstitious people as you (and many other, e.g. 
MIT cosmologist, Max Tegmark, another admittedly brilliant, but 
nevertheless superstitious, scientist) can be full professors at MIT.

But then again, it supplies some comic relief, and some of us still enjoy 
Mythology and Theology, but it is not nice to be dismissive of people who 
do not share your superstitions.


- pt

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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-04 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, March 4, 2019 at 5:54:24 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 3 Mar 2019, at 20:43, Brent Meeker > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 3/3/2019 4:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>>
> Here's an example David Wallace presents (as an "outlandish" possibility): 
> Suppose in *pi *(which is computable, so has a *program* (a spigot one, 
> in fact) that produces its digits. Suppose somewhere in that stream of 
> digits is the Standard Model Equation
>
> (say written in LaTeX/Math but rendered here)
>  
> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png
>
> So what could this mean? (He sort of leaves it hanging.)
>
>
> Nothing.  Given a suitable mapping the SM Lagrangian can be found in any 
> sequence of symbols.  It's just a special case of the rock that computes 
> everything.
>
>
> Even if rock would exist in some primitive sense, which I doubt, they do 
> not compute anything, except in a trivial sense the quantum state of the 
> rock. A rock is not even a definable digital object. If someone want to 
> convince me that a rock can compute everything, I will ask them to write a 
> complier of the combinators, say, in the rock. I will ask an algorithm 
> generating the phi_i associated to the rock.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
There are "smart" rocks that do signal processing.

http://science.sciencemag.org/content/350/6258/289.4

- pt 

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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-03 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 3:38:18 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 2:52 PM Philip Thrift  > wrote:
>
> *> If a program "represents" a real number (e.g. in the spigot sense), 
>> then that could be said to "define" it.*
>
>
> But for most Real Numbers there is no such program. 
>
> * > But what does it mean for a real number to be "defined"?*
>
>
> If you can point to a property that a Real Number has that no other Real 
> number does then it is defined; a number like PI can be defined and you can 
> approximated it with a calculation, a Busy Beaver Number can be defined but 
> not approximated, most Real Numbers can not be defined or approximated 
> and thus most Real Numbers can not be named.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>  
>

I'm just reading the last notes at the very end of


http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Must-every-number-be-definable_-Norwich-Feb-2019.pdf

?  :)

- pt 

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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-03 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 1:43:58 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 3/3/2019 4:52 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>>
> Here's an example David Wallace presents (as an "outlandish" possibility): 
> Suppose in *pi *(which is computable, so has a *program* (a spigot one, 
> in fact) that produces its digits. Suppose somewhere in that stream of 
> digits is the Standard Model Equation
>
> (say written in LaTeX/Math but rendered here)
>  
> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png 
> <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.sciencealert.com%2Fimages%2FScreen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png=D=1=AFQjCNHE8XfpeGQ3w37URpIkaZkiJ2Jqug>
>
> So what could this mean? (He sort of leaves it hanging.)
>
>
> Nothing.  Given a suitable mapping the SM Lagrangian can be found in any 
> sequence of symbols.  It's just a special case of the rock that computes 
> everything.
>
> Brent
>


I guess the point is there is no point to a "law of nature" (e.g. the  SM 
equation above consisting of on the order of 1000 unicode characters in 
source form). It just happens that it works in a narrow domain and that's 
all there is to it.

- pt

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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-03 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 11:29:32 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 9:26 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>
>>
>> >> The 8000th Busy Beaver Number can be named but not calculated even 
>>> theoretically,
>>
>>
>> *> The busy beaver function is not computable, but on each individual n, 
>> it is computable theoretically, *
>>
>
> No it is not, not if n= 7918, to compute that the program would have to 
> solve the Halting Problem. The first 4 Busy beaver numbers have been 
> computed and Scott Aaronson proved that the 7918th Busy Beaver Number is 
> not computable, most people think n=5 is not computable either but that has 
> not been proved.
>
> The 7918th Busy Beaver Number 
> 
>
> *> The 8000h BB number is well defined, *
>>
>
> Yes.
>  
>
>> *> so it is a (finite) number, *
>>
>
> Yes,
>
> *> and so you there exist a finite program computing it*
>>
>
> No. The 8000th Busy Beaver Number is the largest number of FINITE 
> operations a 8000 state Turing Machine will make before it halts. Some 
> programs we can observe halting and with others it's easy to prove will 
> never halt, that's why we know the first 4 Busy Beaver Numbers, but Turing 
> Proved you can't do that in general and  Aaronson proved you can't do that 
> for the 7918th; and you probably can't even do it for the 5th.
>
> It is entirely possible that the 5th Busy Beaver number is  47,176,870 
> because a 5 state Turing Machine has been found that halts after 47,176,870 
> operations,  the problem is there are still 5 different 5 state turing 
> machines that are well past 47,176,870 and they have not halted. If none of 
> those 5 machines ever halts then 47,176,870 really and truly is the 5th 
> Busy Beaver Number, but if that is the case we will never know that is 
> the case because we'll never know that none of those 5 machines ever halts. 
>
> John K Clark
>



The original issue is what real numbers can be *described* or *defined.*

  https://twitter.com/JDHamkins/status/1100090709527408640 


Must there be numbers we cannot describe or define? Definability in 
mathematics and the Math Tea argument 



If a program "represents" a real number (e.g. in the spigot sense), then 
that could be said to "define" it.

But what noes it mean for a real number to be "defined"?

- pt



 

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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-03 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 8:54:42 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 3 Mar 2019, at 15:32, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 6:52:41 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 5:58:17 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 1 Mar 2019, at 19:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Reading all the above in the context of 
>>>>
>>>> *Naturalness and Emergence*
>>>> David Wallace
>>>> February 20, 2019
>>>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15757/1/naturalness_emergence.pdf
>>>>
>>>> leads to the conclusion that *our current language(s) of physics 
>>>> is(are) most likely wrong.*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> A proposition can be wrong. I am not sure what you or Wallace would 
>>>> mean by a language being wrong. Perhaps Wallace meant that our metaphysics 
>>>> (most of the time the materialist one) is wrong, which makes more sense. 
>>>> Perhaps he does not dare to say so. It is not well seen in some circles.
>>>>
>>>> Bruno
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> By 'language' in the above paper he means 'mathematical language' and he 
>>> means precisely the language in which QFT an GR are actually written in 
>>> (seen when you look at them on paper or on a screen): Sentences are made of 
>>> mathematical symbols and variables, but the basics begin with a selection 
>>> of sentences (axioms) from which a theory is made. 
>>>
>>>
>>> OK. Thanks. That makes more sense.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So he is really saying the axioms are likely wrong, and even new 
>>> primitives (mathematical symbols) may have to be invented.
>>>
>>>
>>> Of course, I don’t think so. It is phenomenologically true, but for the 
>>> ontology, i.e. the minimal amount of things which needs to be assumed, s, 
>>> 0, + and x are enough (added to logic). In fact, S and K, with “(“ and “)”, 
>>> plus “=“ are enough, even without logic. (I always assume Mechanism, by 
>>> default, to be sure).
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> Here's an example David Wallace presents (as an "outlandish" 
>> possibility): Suppose in *pi *(which is computable, so has a *program* 
>> (a spigot one, in fact) that produces its digits. Suppose somewhere in that 
>> stream of digits is the Standard Model Equation
>>
>> (say written in LaTeX/Math [ Unicode ] but rendered here)
>>  
>> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png
>>
>> So what could this mean? (He sort of leaves it hanging.)
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
>
> Apropos Dilbert cartoon:
>
> https://dilbert.com/strip/2019-03-03
>
>
>
> Poor Dilbert will have an infinite task to fail its simulated creature. He 
> will have to revise its limit an infinity of times. If the simulation is 
> “physically correct”, there is no sense to localise the mind of the 
> creature in the simulation, as its supervene on infinity of computations. 
> If the simulation is physically incorrect, the creature will see it, by 
> comparing the arithmetic physics with their observation, unless Dilbert 
> intervenes each time to make them dumb.
>
> We can experimentally test if the empirical world is fundamental or not, 
> and the results obtained today is that it is very plausibly only a symptom 
> of a deeper, and simpler, non material reality. That’s why we have to come 
> back to Plato, and take distance from Aristotle, at least if we are willing 
> to bet the brain is a (material/natural) digitalizable machine.
>
> Bruno 
>
>


Paralleling the Donald Rumsfeld quote:

You go to do science [ or engineering ] with the matter you have, not the 
matter you might want to have. 

- pt

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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-03 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 6:52:41 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 5:58:17 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 1 Mar 2019, at 19:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Reading all the above in the context of 
>>>
>>> *Naturalness and Emergence*
>>> David Wallace
>>> February 20, 2019
>>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15757/1/naturalness_emergence.pdf
>>>
>>> leads to the conclusion that *our current language(s) of physics 
>>> is(are) most likely wrong.*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> A proposition can be wrong. I am not sure what you or Wallace would mean 
>>> by a language being wrong. Perhaps Wallace meant that our metaphysics (most 
>>> of the time the materialist one) is wrong, which makes more sense. Perhaps 
>>> he does not dare to say so. It is not well seen in some circles.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> By 'language' in the above paper he means 'mathematical language' and he 
>> means precisely the language in which QFT an GR are actually written in 
>> (seen when you look at them on paper or on a screen): Sentences are made of 
>> mathematical symbols and variables, but the basics begin with a selection 
>> of sentences (axioms) from which a theory is made. 
>>
>>
>> OK. Thanks. That makes more sense.
>>
>>
>>
>> So he is really saying the axioms are likely wrong, and even new 
>> primitives (mathematical symbols) may have to be invented.
>>
>>
>> Of course, I don’t think so. It is phenomenologically true, but for the 
>> ontology, i.e. the minimal amount of things which needs to be assumed, s, 
>> 0, + and x are enough (added to logic). In fact, S and K, with “(“ and “)”, 
>> plus “=“ are enough, even without logic. (I always assume Mechanism, by 
>> default, to be sure).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
> Here's an example David Wallace presents (as an "outlandish" possibility): 
> Suppose in *pi *(which is computable, so has a *program* (a spigot one, 
> in fact) that produces its digits. Suppose somewhere in that stream of 
> digits is the Standard Model Equation
>
> (say written in LaTeX/Math [ Unicode ] but rendered here)
>  
> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png
>
> So what could this mean? (He sort of leaves it hanging.)
>
> - pt
>


Apropos Dilbert cartoon:

https://dilbert.com/strip/2019-03-03

- pt

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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-03 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 7:32:00 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

Bringing Gödel into physics is treading on a mine field as it is. Believe 
> me, most physicists react in horror at the mere suggestion of this. I have 
> this suspicion however that quantum measurement is a a sort of Gödel 
> self-reference with quantum information or qubits. This may, at least 
> within how we describe quantum mechanics if it should turn out to be not 
> how the quantum world actually is, be one reason why we have this growing 
> pantheon of quantum interpretations and no apparent way to decide which is 
> definitively correct. 
>  
>

 
I still think it's Darwin, not Gödel,  that has anything to do with  
"quantum measurement".

But physicists recoil in horror from that.

- pt

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Re: HoTT: The programing language of space

2019-03-03 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 6:32:50 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 1 Mar 2019, at 22:57, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 3:19:21 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 3:09:23 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>>
>>> The question is whether HoTT is also the language of entanglement.
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>>  
>>
>> All "entanglement" is is a path integral [ 
>> https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/path+integral ] so it should.
>>
>>
>> - pt
>>
>
>
> Also entanglement can be defined by the σCP (Stochastic Concurrent Prolog) 
> language.
>
>
> But that is not the quantum entanglement, or you could program Prolog to 
> get faster than light apparent action, which I doubt. You can get them with 
> prolog, but only for the internal creature that you would emulate.
>
> Bruno
>
>
 σCP is a programming language.

  
 https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/04/08/cp-stochastic-concurrent-prolog/

But σCP programs could be compiled to run on the appropriate hardware 
substrate - a quantum or Wheeler-Feynman computer - whenever this kind of 
computer is made available to compile programs to.

- pt

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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-03 Thread Philip Thrift


On Sunday, March 3, 2019 at 5:58:17 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 1 Mar 2019, at 19:32, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> Reading all the above in the context of 
>>
>> *Naturalness and Emergence*
>> David Wallace
>> February 20, 2019
>> http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/15757/1/naturalness_emergence.pdf
>>
>> leads to the conclusion that *our current language(s) of physics is(are) 
>> most likely wrong.*
>>
>>
>>
>> A proposition can be wrong. I am not sure what you or Wallace would mean 
>> by a language being wrong. Perhaps Wallace meant that our metaphysics (most 
>> of the time the materialist one) is wrong, which makes more sense. Perhaps 
>> he does not dare to say so. It is not well seen in some circles.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> By 'language' in the above paper he means 'mathematical language' and he 
> means precisely the language in which QFT an GR are actually written in 
> (seen when you look at them on paper or on a screen): Sentences are made of 
> mathematical symbols and variables, but the basics begin with a selection 
> of sentences (axioms) from which a theory is made. 
>
>
> OK. Thanks. That makes more sense.
>
>
>
> So he is really saying the axioms are likely wrong, and even new 
> primitives (mathematical symbols) may have to be invented.
>
>
> Of course, I don’t think so. It is phenomenologically true, but for the 
> ontology, i.e. the minimal amount of things which needs to be assumed, s, 
> 0, + and x are enough (added to logic). In fact, S and K, with “(“ and “)”, 
> plus “=“ are enough, even without logic. (I always assume Mechanism, by 
> default, to be sure).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
Here's an example David Wallace presents (as an "outlandish" possibility): 
Suppose in *pi *(which is computable, so has a *program* (a spigot one, in 
fact) that produces its digits. Suppose somewhere in that stream of digits 
is the Standard Model Equation

(say written in LaTeX/Math but rendered here)

 https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png

So what could this mean? (He sort of leaves it hanging.)

- pt

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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-03 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, March 2, 2019 at 8:28:01 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 1, 2019 at 4:23 PM Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> > There are numbers that have no description in a practical sense. The 
>> numbers 10^{10^{10^{10}}} and 10^{10^{10^{10^{10 have a vast number of 
>> numbers that have no description with any information theoretic sense.
>>
>
> The 8000th Busy Beaver Number can be named but not calculated even 
> theoretically, but most Real Numbers can't even be uniquely named with 
> ASCII characters, not even with an infinite number of them.   
>
> John K Clark
>



The "computable" real numbers are "described" by programs (each program is 
a finite list of characters). For example, a "spigot" program for pi.

spigot program: pumps out digits one at a time and does not use the digits 
after they are computed

*A Spigot Algorithm for the Digits of Pi*
http://www.cs.williams.edu/~heeringa/classes/cs135/s15/readings/spigot.pdf

The problem is *what about the uncomputable real numbers?*

- pt



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Re: A Program to Compute Gödel-Löb Fixpoints

2019-03-02 Thread Philip Thrift


"Fixed point" here is a term in the subject of provability logic (PL):

   https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-provability/#FixePoinTheo

How this relates to a Brouwer fixed point  - * how does provability logic 
relate to topology*  - is a subject that is interesting but is outside what 
I know about.

Fixed points, monads, monoids, all arise in PL and PLT. So what do they 
have to do with qualia of experience?  TBD.

- pt


On Saturday, March 2, 2019 at 7:19:01 AM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> I guess I am not sure what a Gödel-Löb fixed point is. Is this somehow 
> analogous to a Brouwer fixed points in maps or diffeomorphisms of spaces?
>
> I read Rucker's *Infinity and the Mind* last spring, after having read it 
> many years ago. I could tell he had a penchant for various mystical ideas. 
> This tends blog entry of his suggests he has ideas similar to what Gödel 
> thought, and which I think were a part of leading  him into paranoid 
> delusions. When I clicked on this for some reason I thought this was about 
> monoids, and was a bit disappointed to see it is more philosophical. 
> However, I think the Kant noumena is not really directly knowable, and I 
> think from quantum mechanics we can't know this as either purely epistemic 
> or ontic. I am not sure how ideas of mind fit into this.
>
> LC
>
> On Saturday, March 2, 2019 at 3:26:18 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> *A Program to Compute Gödel-Löb Fixpoints*
>> Melvin Fitting [ http://melvinfitting.org/ ]
>>
>>
>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285841645_A_program_to_compute_Godel-Lob_fixpoints
>>  
>> <https://www.google.com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.researchgate.net%2Fpublication%2F285841645_A_program_to_compute_Godel-Lob_fixpoints=D=1=AFQjCNFQ4ORDwOhT81xzkzLgV9unsTybRg>
>>
>>
>> *A loose motivation for much of Melvin Fitting's work can be formulated 
>> succinctly as follows. There are many logics. Our principles of reasoning 
>> vary with context and subject matter. Multiplicity is one of the glories of 
>> modern formal logic. The common thread tying logics together is a concern 
>> for what can be said (syntax), what that means (semantics), and 
>> relationships between the two. A philosophical position that can be 
>> embodied in a formal logic has been shown to be coherent, not correct. 
>> Logic is a tool, not a master, but it is an enjoyable tool to use.*
>> [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melvin_Fitting ]
>>
>>
>> also (a bit offbeat):
>>
>> “Simply Gödel,” Phenomenology, and Monads
>> Rudy Rucker
>> http://www.rudyrucker.com/blog/2017/03/17/godel-phenomonology-and-monads/
>>
>> - pt
>>
>

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A Program to Compute Gödel-Löb Fixpoints

2019-03-02 Thread Philip Thrift


*A Program to Compute Gödel-Löb Fixpoints*
Melvin Fitting [ http://melvinfitting.org/ ]

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/285841645_A_program_to_compute_Godel-Lob_fixpoints


*A loose motivation for much of Melvin Fitting's work can be formulated 
succinctly as follows. There are many logics. Our principles of reasoning 
vary with context and subject matter. Multiplicity is one of the glories of 
modern formal logic. The common thread tying logics together is a concern 
for what can be said (syntax), what that means (semantics), and 
relationships between the two. A philosophical position that can be 
embodied in a formal logic has been shown to be coherent, not correct. 
Logic is a tool, not a master, but it is an enjoyable tool to use.*
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Melvin_Fitting ]


also (a bit offbeat):

“Simply Gödel,” Phenomenology, and Monads
Rudy Rucker
http://www.rudyrucker.com/blog/2017/03/17/godel-phenomonology-and-monads/

- pt

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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 7:02:20 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 4:13:00 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 3/1/2019 1:44 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> I think the interesting question is what does the function on natural 
>> numbers 
>>
>>   n → shortestDescriptionOf(n)/n
>>
>> look like.
>>
>>
>> That's not even a function since ShortestDescriptionOf (n) depends on the 
>> notation for the description and different notations can produce the same 
>> value.  Theorems about Kolmogorov complexity always depend on behavior in 
>> the limit of large n, so that the fixed preamble can be be ignored.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Not only that this amounts to trying to find the most efficient data 
> compression algorithm for arithmetic. This is not possible in a manner 
> similar to the Turing halting problem. 
>
> LC 
>


There is a recent paper on 'descriptions' by Graham Priest

   https://ojs.victoria.ac.nz/ajl/article/view/4972/4634

but the discussion between Priest, Hartry Field, and Ross Brady continue. 

- pt

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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-03-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 6:25:05 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 1 Mar 2019, at 09:28, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 2:05:03 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 5:15:17 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2/28/2019 3:00 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 4:34:54 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 2/28/2019 2:14 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 3:48:04 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 2/28/2019 1:17 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The best current philosopher of (and writer about) consciousness is 
>>>>> *Galen 
>>>>> Strawson*. 
>>>>>
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson
>>>>> https://sites.google.com/site/galenstrawson/
>>>>>
>>>>> https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/philosophy/faculty/profile.php?id=gs24429
>>>>>
>>>>> There is a lot of his material (PDFs, articles, videos, etc.) freely 
>>>>> available online.
>>>>>
>>>>> The main word that is synonymous with *consciousness *is *experience*.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Which is something bacteria and plants and my thermostat have...and 
>>>>> ability to detect and react to the environment based on internal states.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Brent
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Galen is a (type of) micropsychist.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> But the point is we don't need a philosopher to explain that level of 
>>>> consciousness to us.  It's already at the level of engineering.  If 
>>>> Strawson is going to provide any useful explanations of consciousness he 
>>>> should study machine learning...it's getting close to engineering 
>>>> consciousness at the next higher level.
>>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
>>>
>>> It won't be accomplished via certain types of engineering, like 
>>> "information network" approaches (IIT [ 
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory ]) but 
>>> potentially could with a "synthetic" approach that *combines networks 
>>> with synthetic biology*. Something along these lines is the "fusion" 
>>> idea proposed by
>>>
>>>
>>> I don't know why IIT is even discussed.  Aaronson pretty well shot it 
>>> down.
>>>
>>> My son may get a chance to work on the Deepmind team.  What kind of 
>>> brain cells would you suggest he sprinkle on the CPUs?
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>> Like The Graduate's "plastics", today, "polymers".
>>
>>
>> Biomaterials for the central nervous system
>> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2475552/
>>
>> Scientists Have Built Artificial Neurons That Fully Mimic Human Brain 
>> Cells
>>
>> https://www.sciencealert.com/scientists-build-an-artificial-neuron-that-fully-mimics-a-human-brain-cell
>>
>> Scientists develop promising new type of polymer
>> https://phys.org/news/2019-01-scientists-polymers.html
>>
>> Synthetic Glycopolymers for Highly Efficient Differentiation of Embryonic 
>> Stem Cells into Neurons: Lipo- or Not?
>> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28287262
>>
>> Elastic materials for tissue engineering applications: Natural, 
>> synthetic, and hybrid polymers
>> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S174270611830494X
>>
>> Biomaterials for Scaffolds: Synthetic Polymers
>>
>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286340849_Biomaterials_for_Scaffolds_Synthetic_Polymers
>>  
>>
>>
> Biosynthetic Polymers as Functional Materials
> https://pubs.acs.org/doi/full/10.1021/acs.macromol.6b00439
>
>
>
> You might be interested by this quite remarkable news: a 8 letters 
> synthetic DNA, which seems to work well.
> If that is true, it really suggests that we all come from one bacteria, I 
> think. It is amazing that all life use only the same 4 letters coding (A, 
> T, G, C).
>
> https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-00650-8
>
> Bruno
>


As this sort of stuff progresses, and bioengineers make conscious 'robots' 
out of alternative materials, phenomenologists will wonder how their 
experiences differ from ours.

(But now Dan Dennett says *Don't make conscious robots in the first place*.)

- pt

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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-03-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 6:25:05 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 1 Mar 2019, at 00:15, Brent Meeker > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/28/2019 3:00 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 4:34:54 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/28/2019 2:14 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 3:48:04 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2/28/2019 1:17 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The best current philosopher of (and writer about) consciousness is *Galen 
>>> Strawson*. 
>>>
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson
>>> https://sites.google.com/site/galenstrawson/
>>> https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/philosophy/faculty/profile.php?id=gs24429
>>>
>>> There is a lot of his material (PDFs, articles, videos, etc.) freely 
>>> available online.
>>>
>>> The main word that is synonymous with *consciousness *is *experience*.
>>>
>>>
>>> Which is something bacteria and plants and my thermostat have...and 
>>> ability to detect and react to the environment based on internal states.
>>>
>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Galen is a (type of) micropsychist.
>>
>>
>> But the point is we don't need a philosopher to explain that level of 
>> consciousness to us.  It's already at the level of engineering.  If 
>> Strawson is going to provide any useful explanations of consciousness he 
>> should study machine learning...it's getting close to engineering 
>> consciousness at the next higher level.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> It won't be accomplished via certain types of engineering, like 
> "information network" approaches (IIT [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory ]) but 
> potentially could with a "synthetic" approach that *combines networks 
> with synthetic biology*. Something along these lines is the "fusion" idea 
> proposed by
>
>
> I don't know why IIT is even discussed.  Aaronson pretty well shot it down.
>
> My son may get a chance to work on the Deepmind team.  What kind of brain 
> cells would you suggest he sprinkle on the CPUs?
>
>
>
> Good question!
>
> Once we relate consciousness to matter, there is no reason to evacuate any 
> cells. May be consciousness is produced by our bones and by our hair. Some 
> people have believed that if they cut too much of their hairs, they lose 
> their soul!
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
This is related of course to *the combination problem*:

https://philarchive.org/archive/GOFTPB
cf.: https://heddahasselmorch.wordpress.com/

 - pt

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Re: HoTT: The programing language of space

2019-03-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 3:19:21 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 3:09:23 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> The question is whether HoTT is also the language of entanglement.
>>
>> LC
>>
>
>  
>
> All "entanglement" is is a path integral [ 
> https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/path+integral ] so it should.
>
>
> - pt
>


Also entanglement can be defined by the σCP (Stochastic Concurrent Prolog) 
language.

- pt
 

>
>
>>
>> On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 3:15:34 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> HoTT (Homotopy Type Theory) is re-expressed here as a programming 
>>> language to encode mathematics.
>>>
>>>
>>> [ 
>>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326645835_HoTT_The_Language_of_Space
>>>  
>>> ] 
>>>
>>> [ https://github.com/groupoid/cafe) github.com/groupoid/cafe ]
>>>
>>>
>>> Abstract
>>> Homotopy Type Theory (HoTT) is the most advanced programming language in 
>>> the domain of intersection of several theories: algebraic topology, 
>>> homological algebra, higher category theory, mathematical logic, and 
>>> theoretical computer science. That is why it can be considered as a 
>>> language of space, as it can encode any existent mathematics.
>>>
>>> Speaker: Maxim Sokhatsky is an author of Privat24 deposits, 20 years of 
>>> working experience as a programmer, one of the 30 top-commiters in Ukraine 
>>> in Open Source, author of N2O, the best Erlang Web Framework, CEO of Synrc 
>>> Research Center, author of several embedded operating system runtimes and 
>>> production programming languages. Maxim is familiar with any programming 
>>> language on the planet and had seen sources of all operating systems.
>>>
>>> Now Maxim is doing his Ph.D. research (the second year of education) in 
>>> HoTT, trying to encode as much mathematics in the programming language as 
>>> possible along the way.
>>>
>>> During this lecture, Maxim will try to smoothly guide you from the 
>>> programming perspective to the pure space of mathematics and will show the 
>>> evolution of mathematical provers from AUTOMATH to the family of Cubical 
>>> Type Checkers. Also, this lecture is considered as a general introduction 
>>> to HoTT course Maxim is preparing for his friends.
>>>
>>> cf. [ http://groupoid.space) groupoid.space ]
>>>
>>> - pt
>>>
>>>

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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-03-01 Thread Philip Thrift


I think the interesting question is what does the function on natural 
numbers

  n → shortestDescriptionOf(n)/n

look like.

- pt

On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 3:22:59 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> There are numbers that have no description in a practical sense. The 
> numbers 10^{10^{10^{10}}} and 10^{10^{10^{10^{10 have a vast number of 
> numbers that have no description with any information theoretic sense. This 
> is even if all the particles in the some 10^{500}cosmologies in the 
> multiverse or with 12-dimensions some 10^{10100} cosmos's were employed as 
> information bits. It is also not hard to construct a Berry paradox for a 
> vast number of numbers here. 
>
> LC
>
> On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 1:35:49 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>> via
>> https://twitter.com/JDHamkins/status/1100090709527408640
>>
>> Joel David Hamkins   @JDHamkins
>>
>> *Must there be numbers we cannot describe or define? Definability in 
>> mathematics and the Math Tea argument*
>> Pure Mathematics Research Seminar at the University of East Anglia in 
>> Norwich on Monday, 25 February, 2019.
>>
>>
>> Abstract:
>>
>> *An old argument, heard perhaps at a good math tea, proceeds: “there must 
>> be some real numbers that we can neither describe nor define, since there 
>> are uncountably many real numbers, but only countably many definitions.” 
>> Does it withstand scrutiny? In this talk, I will discuss the phenomenon of 
>> pointwise definable structures in mathematics, structures in which every 
>> object has a property that only it exhibits. A mathematical structure is 
>> Leibnizian, in contrast, if any pair of distinct objects in it exhibit 
>> different properties. Is there a Leibnizian structure with no definable 
>> elements? Must indiscernible elements in a mathematical structure be 
>> automorphic images of one another? We shall discuss many elementary yet 
>> interesting examples, eventually working up to the proof that every 
>> countable model of set theory has a pointwise definable extension, in which 
>> every mathematical object is definable.*
>>
>>
>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/must-there-be-number-we-cannot-define-norwich-february-2019/
>>
>> Lecture notes:
>>
>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Must-every-number-be-definable_-Norwich-Feb-2019.pdf
>>
>>
>> - pt
>>
>

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Re: HoTT: The programing language of space

2019-03-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 3:09:23 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> The question is whether HoTT is also the language of entanglement.
>
> LC
>

 

All "entanglement" is is a path integral 
[ https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/path+integral ] so it should.


- pt


>
> On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 3:15:34 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>> HoTT (Homotopy Type Theory) is re-expressed here as a programming 
>> language to encode mathematics.
>>
>>
>> [ 
>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326645835_HoTT_The_Language_of_Space
>>  
>> ] 
>>
>> [ https://github.com/groupoid/cafe) github.com/groupoid/cafe ]
>>
>>
>> Abstract
>> Homotopy Type Theory (HoTT) is the most advanced programming language in 
>> the domain of intersection of several theories: algebraic topology, 
>> homological algebra, higher category theory, mathematical logic, and 
>> theoretical computer science. That is why it can be considered as a 
>> language of space, as it can encode any existent mathematics.
>>
>> Speaker: Maxim Sokhatsky is an author of Privat24 deposits, 20 years of 
>> working experience as a programmer, one of the 30 top-commiters in Ukraine 
>> in Open Source, author of N2O, the best Erlang Web Framework, CEO of Synrc 
>> Research Center, author of several embedded operating system runtimes and 
>> production programming languages. Maxim is familiar with any programming 
>> language on the planet and had seen sources of all operating systems.
>>
>> Now Maxim is doing his Ph.D. research (the second year of education) in 
>> HoTT, trying to encode as much mathematics in the programming language as 
>> possible along the way.
>>
>> During this lecture, Maxim will try to smoothly guide you from the 
>> programming perspective to the pure space of mathematics and will show the 
>> evolution of mathematical provers from AUTOMATH to the family of Cubical 
>> Type Checkers. Also, this lecture is considered as a general introduction 
>> to HoTT course Maxim is preparing for his friends.
>>
>> cf. [ http://groupoid.space) groupoid.space ]
>>
>> - pt
>>
>>

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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-03-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 2:36:06 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 3/1/2019 7:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Feb 2019, at 22:47, Brent Meeker > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/28/2019 1:17 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> The best current philosopher of (and writer about) consciousness is *Galen 
> Strawson*. 
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson
> https://sites.google.com/site/galenstrawson/
> https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/philosophy/faculty/profile.php?id=gs24429
>
> There is a lot of his material (PDFs, articles, videos, etc.) freely 
> available online.
>
> The main word that is synonymous with *consciousness *is *experience*.
>
>
> Which is something bacteria and plants and my thermostat have...and 
> ability to detect and react to the environment based on internal states.
>
>
> What the thermostat lacks, that the bacteria and plants do not lack, is 
> Turing universality. That gives the mind, and even the free-will. 
>
>
> A bacterium doesn't have Turing universiality, only bacteria in the 
> abstract of a potentially infinite set of evolving bacteria interacting 
> with their environment.  But if a consider a potentially infinite set of 
> thermostats interacting with their environment of furnaces and rooms, it 
> will be Turing universal too.  Turing universality is cheap.
>
> Brent
>
>

Programming the bacterium


*The development of genetic parts to precisely program the human commensal 
gut bacterium Bacteroides thetaiotaomicron lays the foundation for 
microbiome engineering.*

https://www.cell.com/cell-systems/pdfExtended/S2405-4712(15)6-X

- pt
 

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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 8:49:54 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 1 Mar 2019, at 01:42, Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 9:42:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 25 Feb 2019, at 12:39, Lawrence Crowell  
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 2:44:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Feb 2019, at 15:24, Lawrence Crowell  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 3:18:01 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



 On 2/22/2019 11:39 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

 This sounds almost tautological. I have not read Masanes' paper, but he 
 seems to be saying the Born rule is a matter of pure logic. In some ways 
 that is what Born said.

 The Born rule is not hard to understand. If you have a state space with 
 vectors |u_i> then a quantum state can be written as sum_ic_i|u_i>. For an 
 observable O with eigenvectors o_i the expectation values for that 
 observable is

  sum_{ij} = sum_{ij} = sum_ip_io_i.

 So the expectations of each eigenvalue is multiple of the probability 
 for the system to be found in that state. It is not hard to understand, 
 but 
 the problem is there is no general theorem and proof that the eigenvalues 
 of an operator or observable are diagonal in the probabilities. 


>>> I am not sure I understand this.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In fact this has some subtle issues with degeneracies.


 Doesn't Gleason's theorem show that there is no other consistent way to 
 assign probabilities to subspaces of a Hilbert space?

 Brent

>>>
>>> It is close. Gleason's theorem tells us that probabilities are a 
>>> consequence of certain measurements. So for a basis Q = {q_n} then in a 
>>> span in Q = P{q_n}, for P a projection operator that a measure μ(Q} is 
>>> given by a trace over projection operators. This is close, but it does not 
>>> address the issue of eigenvalues of an operator or observable. Gleason 
>>> tried to make this work for operators, but was ultimately not able to.
>>>
>>>
>>> It should work for the projection operator, that this is the 
>>> yes-no-experiment, but that extends to the other measurement, by reducing 
>>> (as usual) the question “what is the value of A” into the (many) question 
>>> “does A measurement belong to this interval” … Gleason’s theorem assures 
>>> that the measure is unique (on the subspaces of H with dim bigger or equal 
>>> to 3), so the Born rule should be determined, at least in non degenerate 
>>> case (but also in the degenerate case when the degeneracy is due to tracing 
>>> out a subsystem from a bigger system. I will verify later as my mind 
>>> belongs more to the combinator and applicative algebra that QM for now.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Many years ago I had an idea that since the trace of a density matrix 
>>> may be thought of as constructed from projection operators with tr(ρ_n) = 
>>> sum_n |c_n|^2P_n, that observables that commute with the density matrix 
>>> might have a derived Born rule following Gleason. Further, maybe operators 
>>> that do not commute then have some dual property that still upholds Born 
>>> rule. I was not able to make this work.
>>>
>>>
>>> I will think about this. Normally the measure is determine by the 
>>> “right" quantum logic, and the right quantum logic is determined by the any 
>>> “provability” box accompanied by consistency condition (like []p & p, []p & 
>>> <>t, …).  The main difference to be expected, is that eventually we get a 
>>> “quantum credibility measure”, not really a probability. It is like 
>>> probability, except that credibility is between 0 and infinity (not 0 and 
>>> 1).
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>> I think I ran into the issue of why Gleason's theorem does not capture 
>> the Born rule. Not all operators are commutative with the density matrix. 
>> So if you construct the diagonal of the density matrix, or its trace 
>> elements, with projector operators and off diagonal elements with left and 
>> right acting projectors (left acting hit bra vectors and right acting hit 
>> ket vectors) the problem is many operators are non-commutative. In 
>> particular the usual situation is for the Hamiltonian to have nontrivial 
>> commutation with the density matrix.
>>
>>
>>
>> It seems to me that Gleason theorem takes this into account. It only 
>> means that the probabilities does not make the same partition of the 
>> multiverse, but that is not a problem for someone who use physics to see if 
>> it confirms or refute the “observable” available to the universal 
>> numbers/machines in arithmetic.
>>
>
> Gleason's theorem applies for just one set of commuting operators, 
>
>
>
> I am astonished by this. Are you sure you refer Gleason’s original work? I 
> have seen many “simplified” proof, which sometimes add simplifying 
> hypothesis. 
>
> I’m afraid you will have to wait that I find the time to revise my proof 
> 

Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-03-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 9:08:43 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Feb 2019, at 22:47, Brent Meeker > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/28/2019 1:17 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> The best current philosopher of (and writer about) consciousness is *Galen 
> Strawson*. 
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson
> https://sites.google.com/site/galenstrawson/
> https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/philosophy/faculty/profile.php?id=gs24429
>
> There is a lot of his material (PDFs, articles, videos, etc.) freely 
> available online.
>
> The main word that is synonymous with *consciousness *is *experience*.
>
>
> Which is something bacteria and plants and my thermostat have...and 
> ability to detect and react to the environment based on internal states.
>
>
> What the thermostat lacks, that the bacteria and plants do not lack, is 
> Turing universality. That gives the mind, and even the free-will. 
>
> I think free-will is just universality, and we lost it when we impose 
> “security”. What makes a universal machine universal is the ability to 
> search for a number which do not exist, making them able to “not stop”, and 
> that is what a thermostat cannot do.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Brent
>
>
Galen Strawson has an argument that makes 'free-will' something of a 
'non-thing'. It's based on his concept of 'self'. A conscious entity (me) 
is a self in the sense that 'I am me'. I can't really have free will since 
I can't choose not to be me.

We have 'autonomous will' but not 'free will'. Whenever someone talks about 
'free will' not I just think of the Protestant denomination Free Will 
Baptist [ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_Will_Baptist] and nothing more 
beyond that.

- pt


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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 8:53:00 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 1 Mar 2019, at 09:20, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 6:42:07 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 9:42:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 25 Feb 2019, at 12:39, Lawrence Crowell  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 2:44:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 24 Feb 2019, at 15:24, Lawrence Crowell  
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 3:18:01 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> On 2/22/2019 11:39 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> This sounds almost tautological. I have not read Masanes' paper, but 
>>>>> he seems to be saying the Born rule is a matter of pure logic. In some 
>>>>> ways 
>>>>> that is what Born said.
>>>>>
>>>>> The Born rule is not hard to understand. If you have a state space 
>>>>> with vectors |u_i> then a quantum state can be written as sum_ic_i|u_i>. 
>>>>> For an observable O with eigenvectors o_i the expectation values for that 
>>>>> observable is
>>>>>
>>>>>  sum_{ij} = sum_{ij} = sum_ip_io_i.
>>>>>
>>>>> So the expectations of each eigenvalue is multiple of the probability 
>>>>> for the system to be found in that state. It is not hard to understand, 
>>>>> but 
>>>>> the problem is there is no general theorem and proof that the eigenvalues 
>>>>> of an operator or observable are diagonal in the probabilities. 
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> I am not sure I understand this.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> In fact this has some subtle issues with degeneracies.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Doesn't Gleason's theorem show that there is no other consistent way 
>>>>> to assign probabilities to subspaces of a Hilbert space?
>>>>>
>>>>> Brent
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It is close. Gleason's theorem tells us that probabilities are a 
>>>> consequence of certain measurements. So for a basis Q = {q_n} then in a 
>>>> span in Q = P{q_n}, for P a projection operator that a measure μ(Q} is 
>>>> given by a trace over projection operators. This is close, but it does not 
>>>> address the issue of eigenvalues of an operator or observable. Gleason 
>>>> tried to make this work for operators, but was ultimately not able to.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It should work for the projection operator, that this is the 
>>>> yes-no-experiment, but that extends to the other measurement, by reducing 
>>>> (as usual) the question “what is the value of A” into the (many) question 
>>>> “does A measurement belong to this interval” … Gleason’s theorem assures 
>>>> that the measure is unique (on the subspaces of H with dim bigger or equal 
>>>> to 3), so the Born rule should be determined, at least in non degenerate 
>>>> case (but also in the degenerate case when the degeneracy is due to 
>>>> tracing 
>>>> out a subsystem from a bigger system. I will verify later as my mind 
>>>> belongs more to the combinator and applicative algebra that QM for now.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Many years ago I had an idea that since the trace of a density matrix 
>>>> may be thought of as constructed from projection operators with tr(ρ_n) = 
>>>> sum_n |c_n|^2P_n, that observables that commute with the density matrix 
>>>> might have a derived Born rule following Gleason. Further, maybe operators 
>>>> that do not commute then have some dual property that still upholds Born 
>>>> rule. I was not able to make this work.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I will think about this. Normally the measure is determine by the 
>>>> “right" quantum logic, and the right quantum logic is determined by the 
>>>> any 
>>>> “provability” box accompanied by consistency condition (like []p & p, []p 
>>>> & 
>>>> <>t, …).  The main difference to be expected, is that eventually we get a 
>>>> “quantum credibility

Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-03-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, March 1, 2019 at 2:05:03 AM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 5:15:17 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/28/2019 3:00 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 4:34:54 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2/28/2019 2:14 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 3:48:04 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 2/28/2019 1:17 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The best current philosopher of (and writer about) consciousness is *Galen 
>>>> Strawson*. 
>>>>
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson
>>>> https://sites.google.com/site/galenstrawson/
>>>> https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/philosophy/faculty/profile.php?id=gs24429
>>>>
>>>> There is a lot of his material (PDFs, articles, videos, etc.) freely 
>>>> available online.
>>>>
>>>> The main word that is synonymous with *consciousness *is *experience*.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Which is something bacteria and plants and my thermostat have...and 
>>>> ability to detect and react to the environment based on internal states.
>>>>
>>>
>>>> Brent
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Galen is a (type of) micropsychist.
>>>
>>>
>>> But the point is we don't need a philosopher to explain that level of 
>>> consciousness to us.  It's already at the level of engineering.  If 
>>> Strawson is going to provide any useful explanations of consciousness he 
>>> should study machine learning...it's getting close to engineering 
>>> consciousness at the next higher level.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> It won't be accomplished via certain types of engineering, like 
>> "information network" approaches (IIT [ 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory ]) but 
>> potentially could with a "synthetic" approach that *combines networks 
>> with synthetic biology*. Something along these lines is the "fusion" 
>> idea proposed by
>>
>>
>> I don't know why IIT is even discussed.  Aaronson pretty well shot it 
>> down.
>>
>> My son may get a chance to work on the Deepmind team.  What kind of brain 
>> cells would you suggest he sprinkle on the CPUs?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
> Like The Graduate's "plastics", today, "polymers".
>
>
> Biomaterials for the central nervous system
> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2475552/
>
> Scientists Have Built Artificial Neurons That Fully Mimic Human Brain Cells
>
> https://www.sciencealert.com/scientists-build-an-artificial-neuron-that-fully-mimics-a-human-brain-cell
>
> Scientists develop promising new type of polymer
> https://phys.org/news/2019-01-scientists-polymers.html
>
> Synthetic Glycopolymers for Highly Efficient Differentiation of Embryonic 
> Stem Cells into Neurons: Lipo- or Not?
> https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28287262
>
> Elastic materials for tissue engineering applications: Natural, synthetic, 
> and hybrid polymers
> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S174270611830494X
>
> Biomaterials for Scaffolds: Synthetic Polymers
>
> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286340849_Biomaterials_for_Scaffolds_Synthetic_Polymers
>  
>
>
Biosynthetic Polymers as Functional Materials
https://pubs.acs.org/doi/full/10.1021/acs.macromol.6b00439

- pt

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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-03-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 6:42:07 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 9:42:01 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 25 Feb 2019, at 12:39, Lawrence Crowell  
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 2:44:14 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 24 Feb 2019, at 15:24, Lawrence Crowell  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 3:18:01 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



 On 2/22/2019 11:39 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

 This sounds almost tautological. I have not read Masanes' paper, but he 
 seems to be saying the Born rule is a matter of pure logic. In some ways 
 that is what Born said.

 The Born rule is not hard to understand. If you have a state space with 
 vectors |u_i> then a quantum state can be written as sum_ic_i|u_i>. For an 
 observable O with eigenvectors o_i the expectation values for that 
 observable is

  sum_{ij} = sum_{ij} = sum_ip_io_i.

 So the expectations of each eigenvalue is multiple of the probability 
 for the system to be found in that state. It is not hard to understand, 
 but 
 the problem is there is no general theorem and proof that the eigenvalues 
 of an operator or observable are diagonal in the probabilities. 


>>> I am not sure I understand this.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In fact this has some subtle issues with degeneracies.


 Doesn't Gleason's theorem show that there is no other consistent way to 
 assign probabilities to subspaces of a Hilbert space?

 Brent

>>>
>>> It is close. Gleason's theorem tells us that probabilities are a 
>>> consequence of certain measurements. So for a basis Q = {q_n} then in a 
>>> span in Q = P{q_n}, for P a projection operator that a measure μ(Q} is 
>>> given by a trace over projection operators. This is close, but it does not 
>>> address the issue of eigenvalues of an operator or observable. Gleason 
>>> tried to make this work for operators, but was ultimately not able to.
>>>
>>>
>>> It should work for the projection operator, that this is the 
>>> yes-no-experiment, but that extends to the other measurement, by reducing 
>>> (as usual) the question “what is the value of A” into the (many) question 
>>> “does A measurement belong to this interval” … Gleason’s theorem assures 
>>> that the measure is unique (on the subspaces of H with dim bigger or equal 
>>> to 3), so the Born rule should be determined, at least in non degenerate 
>>> case (but also in the degenerate case when the degeneracy is due to tracing 
>>> out a subsystem from a bigger system. I will verify later as my mind 
>>> belongs more to the combinator and applicative algebra that QM for now.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Many years ago I had an idea that since the trace of a density matrix 
>>> may be thought of as constructed from projection operators with tr(ρ_n) = 
>>> sum_n |c_n|^2P_n, that observables that commute with the density matrix 
>>> might have a derived Born rule following Gleason. Further, maybe operators 
>>> that do not commute then have some dual property that still upholds Born 
>>> rule. I was not able to make this work.
>>>
>>>
>>> I will think about this. Normally the measure is determine by the 
>>> “right" quantum logic, and the right quantum logic is determined by the any 
>>> “provability” box accompanied by consistency condition (like []p & p, []p & 
>>> <>t, …).  The main difference to be expected, is that eventually we get a 
>>> “quantum credibility measure”, not really a probability. It is like 
>>> probability, except that credibility is between 0 and infinity (not 0 and 
>>> 1).
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>> I think I ran into the issue of why Gleason's theorem does not capture 
>> the Born rule. Not all operators are commutative with the density matrix. 
>> So if you construct the diagonal of the density matrix, or its trace 
>> elements, with projector operators and off diagonal elements with left and 
>> right acting projectors (left acting hit bra vectors and right acting hit 
>> ket vectors) the problem is many operators are non-commutative. In 
>> particular the usual situation is for the Hamiltonian to have nontrivial 
>> commutation with the density matrix.
>>
>>
>>
>> It seems to me that Gleason theorem takes this into account. It only 
>> means that the probabilities does not make the same partition of the 
>> multiverse, but that is not a problem for someone who use physics to see if 
>> it confirms or refute the “observable” available to the universal 
>> numbers/machines in arithmetic.
>>
>
> Gleason's theorem applies for just one set of commuting operators, and in 
> particular those that commute with the density matrix. The Born rule holds 
> for all operators, and especially the Hamiltonian that does not commute 
> with the density matrix.
>  
>
>>
>> I am not completely sure. You raise a doubt, and I’m afraid it will take 
>> some time I come back 

Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-03-01 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 5:15:17 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/28/2019 3:00 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 4:34:54 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/28/2019 2:14 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 3:48:04 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 2/28/2019 1:17 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> The best current philosopher of (and writer about) consciousness is *Galen 
>>> Strawson*. 
>>>
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson
>>> https://sites.google.com/site/galenstrawson/
>>> https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/philosophy/faculty/profile.php?id=gs24429
>>>
>>> There is a lot of his material (PDFs, articles, videos, etc.) freely 
>>> available online.
>>>
>>> The main word that is synonymous with *consciousness *is *experience*.
>>>
>>>
>>> Which is something bacteria and plants and my thermostat have...and 
>>> ability to detect and react to the environment based on internal states.
>>>
>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Galen is a (type of) micropsychist.
>>
>>
>> But the point is we don't need a philosopher to explain that level of 
>> consciousness to us.  It's already at the level of engineering.  If 
>> Strawson is going to provide any useful explanations of consciousness he 
>> should study machine learning...it's getting close to engineering 
>> consciousness at the next higher level.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> It won't be accomplished via certain types of engineering, like 
> "information network" approaches (IIT [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory ]) but 
> potentially could with a "synthetic" approach that *combines networks 
> with synthetic biology*. Something along these lines is the "fusion" idea 
> proposed by
>
>
> I don't know why IIT is even discussed.  Aaronson pretty well shot it down.
>
> My son may get a chance to work on the Deepmind team.  What kind of brain 
> cells would you suggest he sprinkle on the CPUs?
>
> Brent
>


Like The Graduate's "plastics", today, "polymers".


Biomaterials for the central nervous system
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2475552/

Scientists Have Built Artificial Neurons That Fully Mimic Human Brain Cells
https://www.sciencealert.com/scientists-build-an-artificial-neuron-that-fully-mimics-a-human-brain-cell

Scientists develop promising new type of polymer
https://phys.org/news/2019-01-scientists-polymers.html

Synthetic Glycopolymers for Highly Efficient Differentiation of Embryonic 
Stem Cells into Neurons: Lipo- or Not?
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28287262

Elastic materials for tissue engineering applications: Natural, synthetic, 
and hybrid polymers
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S174270611830494X

Biomaterials for Scaffolds: Synthetic Polymers
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286340849_Biomaterials_for_Scaffolds_Synthetic_Polymers
 

...

- pt

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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-02-28 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 4:34:54 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/28/2019 2:14 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 3:48:04 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/28/2019 1:17 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> The best current philosopher of (and writer about) consciousness is *Galen 
>> Strawson*. 
>>
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson
>> https://sites.google.com/site/galenstrawson/
>> https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/philosophy/faculty/profile.php?id=gs24429
>>
>> There is a lot of his material (PDFs, articles, videos, etc.) freely 
>> available online.
>>
>> The main word that is synonymous with *consciousness *is *experience*.
>>
>>
>> Which is something bacteria and plants and my thermostat have...and 
>> ability to detect and react to the environment based on internal states.
>>
>
>> Brent
>>
>
>
>
> Galen is a (type of) micropsychist.
>
>
> But the point is we don't need a philosopher to explain that level of 
> consciousness to us.  It's already at the level of engineering.  If 
> Strawson is going to provide any useful explanations of consciousness he 
> should study machine learning...it's getting close to engineering 
> consciousness at the next higher level.
>
> Brent
>

It won't be accomplished via certain types of engineering, like 
"information network" approaches (IIT 
[ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_information_theory ]) but 
potentially could with a "synthetic" approach that *combines networks with 
synthetic biology*. Something along these lines is the "fusion" idea 
proposed by

- Hedda Hassel Mørch
@heddamorch
<https://twitter.com/heddamorch>
https://twitter.com/heddamorch/status/1090899016064356352

https://philpapers.org/rec/MRCICI


- pt

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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-02-28 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 3:48:04 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/28/2019 1:17 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> The best current philosopher of (and writer about) consciousness is *Galen 
> Strawson*. 
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson
> https://sites.google.com/site/galenstrawson/
> https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/philosophy/faculty/profile.php?id=gs24429
>
> There is a lot of his material (PDFs, articles, videos, etc.) freely 
> available online.
>
> The main word that is synonymous with *consciousness *is *experience*.
>
>
> Which is something bacteria and plants and my thermostat have...and 
> ability to detect and react to the environment based on internal states.
>

> Brent
>



Galen is a (type of) micropsychist.

- pt
 

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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-02-28 Thread Philip Thrift


The best current philosopher of (and writer about) consciousness is *Galen 
Strawson*.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galen_Strawson
https://sites.google.com/site/galenstrawson/
https://liberalarts.utexas.edu/philosophy/faculty/profile.php?id=gs24429

There is a lot of his material (PDFs, articles, videos, etc.) freely 
available online.

The main word that is synonymous with *consciousness *is *experience*.


- pt


On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 2:14:58 PM UTC-6, Azutmai wrote:
>
> Brent . . . it might be helpful to equate the word ‘consciousness’ and 
> ‘awareness.’ If we are conscious or aware of something . . . then it 
> pertains to our viewpoint and lifestyle. Memory is a secondary feature to 
> allow the individual to retain over time . . . otherwise we would have to 
> learn the same thing over and over and over again . . . which we still 
> somewhat do anyway. Observe someone’s interests, passions, habits, etc . . 
> . and one can get a very good idea of their general level or state of 
> consciousness. It is consciousness where we all differ . . . one from the 
> other. We might all be the same . . . we might all be One . . . but 
> individual consciousness differentiates each of us from the other . . . no 
> matter how great or minute the differences are. 
>
> On Sunday, February 10, 2019 at 4:24:45 PM UTC-8, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/10/2019 3:34 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > Two recent books: 
>> > 
>> > The First Minds: Caterpillars, Karyotes, and Consciousness 
>> > Arthur S. Reber 
>> > 
>> https://books.google.com/books/about/The_First_Minds.html?id=RBLEugEACAAJ 
>> > 
>> > Brain-Mind: From Neurons to Consciousness and Creativity 
>> > Paul Thagard 
>> > https://books.google.com/books/about/Brain_Mind.html?id=jJjHvAEACAAJ 
>> > 
>> > via 
>> > When Did Consciousness Begin? 
>> > Paul Thagard 
>> > 
>> https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/hot-thought/201901/when-did-consciousness-begin
>>  
>> > 
>> > Thagard's 10 hypotheses: 
>> > 
>> > 1. Consciousness has always existed, because God is conscious and 
>> eternal. 
>> > 
>> > 2. Consciousness began when the universe formed, around 13.7 billion 
>> > years ago. 
>> > 
>> > 3. Consciousness began with single-celled life, around 3.7 billion 
>> > years ago (Reber). 
>> > 
>> > 4. Consciousness began with multicellular plants, around 850 million 
>> > years ago. 
>> > 
>> > 5. Consciousness began when animals such as jellyfish got thousands of 
>> > neurons, around 580 million years ago. 
>> > 
>> > 6. Consciousness began when insects and fish developed larger brains 
>> > with about a million neurons (honeybees) or 10 million neurons 
>> > (zebrafish) around 560 million years ago. 
>> > 
>> > 7. Consciousness began when animals such as birds and mammals 
>> > developed much larger brains with hundreds of millions neurons, around 
>> > 200 million years ago. [Thagard] 
>> > 
>> > 8. Consciousness began with humans, homo sapiens, around 200,000 years 
>> > ago. 
>> > 
>> > 9. Consciousness began when human culture became advanced, around 3000 
>> > years ago (Julian Jaynes). 
>> > 
>> > 10. Consciousness does not exist, as it is just a scientific mistake 
>> > (behaviorism} or a “user illusion” (Daniel Dennett). 
>>
>> A good exposition, but I wish he had taken some time to consider what is 
>> consciousness.  I think he recognizes that there are different kinds and 
>> levels of consciousness, but he doesn't make it clear what they are; how 
>> are they related to memory and communication and planning.  It seems 
>> clear to me that different kinds and levels of consciousness appeared at 
>> different times. 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>

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Re: The halting problem

2019-02-28 Thread Philip Thrift


A program may not halt, but it could rot.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software_rot

- pt



On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 12:53:23 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>

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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-02-28 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 10:54:28 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 27 Feb 2019, at 19:18, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, February 27, 2019 at 11:25:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 26 Feb 2019, at 19:41, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> There is another approach vs. the JD Hamkins / set theory & mathematical 
>> logic (math dept.) approach. the one of Martin Escardo / type & programming 
>> language theory (computer science dept.).
>>
>> Martin Escardo
>> http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/
>>
>> *higher-type computation = *
>>
>> *sets that can be exhaustively searched by an algorithm, in the sense of 
>> Turing, in finite time, as those that are topologically compact*
>>
>>
>> ?
>>
>> If it is an algorithm in the sense of Turing, and if the search is 
>> required to be finite, then the set is finite.
>>
>
>
>
> In any case, there is programming he has written
>
> M.H. Escardo. *Infinite sets that admit fast exhaustive search*. 
>
>
> In that sense, there is no problem. The universal dovetailer exhaust all 
> computations with all oracles in that sense.
>
>
>
>
> In LICS'2007, IEEE, pages 443-452, Poland, Wroclaw, July.
>
> pdf <https://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/exhaustive.pdf> (paper), hs 
> <https://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/exhaustive.hs> (companion Haskell 
> program extracted from the paper
>
> from   https://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/papers/
>
>
> One could say: *There is nothing outside the code.*
>
> (The program stands on its own.)
>
>
>
>
> Programs can’t do that when becoming inputs to universal programs. You 
> can’t escape truth so easily, even if you can’t define it. All Gödel-Löbian 
> machines know that. There is definitely something outside the code, if 
> there is a code. And that is the many universal codes which gives the 
> behaviour and the experience to the person attached to their infinitely 
> many codes in arithmetic. But the laws of physics must be derived from 
> this, and by using the self-reference logics of Gödel-Löb-Solovay (G*), we 
> get the qualia as supplementary gifts, in the form of immediate “volume” 
> type of truth that we cannot prove, nor define, yet indubitably known.
>
> Bruno
>


We have only scratched the surface of the subject of *Semantic*s (of code) 
in PLT.

*PLT: A path to enlightenment in Programming Language Theory*
https://steshaw.org/plt/

- pt 


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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-02-28 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, February 28, 2019 at 11:13:07 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Feb 2019, at 02:01, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, February 13, 2019 at 9:40:32 PM UTC-7, cdemorsella wrote:
>>
>> Two fascinating (and very different) approaches are presented to derive 
>> Quantim Mechanics main practical tool (e.g. Born's rule). Wonder what some 
>> of the physicists on here think about this research?
>>
>> I find the argument that no laws is the fundamental law... and that the 
>> universe and its laws are emergent guided by subtle mathematical 
>> statistical phenomena, at the same time both alluring and annoying it 
>> is somehow unsatisfactory like being served a quite empty plate with 
>> nice garnish for dinner.
>>
>> One example of emergence from chaotic conditions is how traffic jams (aka 
>> density waves) can emerge from chaotic initial conditions, becoming self 
>> re-enforcing within local domains of influence... for those unlucky to be 
>> stuck in them. Density wave emergence is seen across scale, for example the 
>> spiral arms of galaxies can be explained as giant gravitational pile ups 
>> with some fundamentally similar parallels to say a rush hour traffic jam, 
>> except on vastly different scales of course and due to other different 
>> factors, in the galactic case the emergent effects of a vast number of 
>> gravitational inter-actions as stars migrate through these arms on their 
>> grand voyages around the galactic core.
>>
>> This paired with the corollary argument that any attempt to discover a 
>> fundamental law seems doomed to the infinite regression of then needing to 
>> explain what this foundation itself rests upon leading to the "it's 
>> turtles all the way down" hall of mirrors carnival house... head-banger. 
>>
>> Perhaps, as Wheeler argued, the world is a self-synthesizing system, and 
>> the seeming order we observe, is emergent... a law without law.
>>
>> Here is the link to the article:
>>
>>
>>
>> The Born Rule Has Been Derived From Simple Physical Principles | Quanta 
>> Magazine 
>> 
>> The Born Rule Has Been Derived From Simple Physical Principles | Quanta 
>> Magazine
>>
>> The new work promises to give researchers a better grip on the core 
>> mystery of quantum mechanics.
>>
>> 
>>  
>>
>>  
>
>> *Is there consensus that Born's rule can be, and has been derived from 
>> physical principles, and/or the other postulates of QM? TIA, AG*
>>
>
>
> I would say no. Just many interesting hints though. Then with mechanism, 
> you need to derive the wave/matrix as well, and the symmetries, from any 
> universal machinery phi_i. All the rest is given by Gauge invariance and 
> our breaking of the symmetries.
>
> I am (re)reading what Weinberg says about all this, but his conclusion is 
> that quantum mechanics could be simply wrong, and just a symptom of a 
> deeper theory, which it should with Indexical Digital Mechanism.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
As for the beginning with the *Feynman postulates* (listed here):

 http://muchomas.lassp.cornell.edu/8.04/Lecs/lec_FeynmanDiagrams/node3.html

it seems thatsome form of the Born rule should be derivable, but I don't 
know.

- pt

 

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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-02-27 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, February 27, 2019 at 11:25:06 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 26 Feb 2019, at 19:41, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 5:07:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 25 Feb 2019, at 20:35, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> via
>> https://twitter.com/JDHamkins/status/1100090709527408640
>>
>> Joel David Hamkins   @JDHamkins
>>
>> *Must there be numbers we cannot describe or define? Definability in 
>> mathematics and the Math Tea argument*
>> Pure Mathematics Research Seminar at the University of East Anglia in 
>> Norwich on Monday, 25 February, 2019.
>>
>>
>> Abstract:
>>
>> *An old argument, heard perhaps at a good math tea, proceeds: “there must 
>> be some real numbers that we can neither describe nor define, since there 
>> are uncountably many real numbers, but only countably many definitions.*
>>
>>
>>
>> But that argument is rather weak, as the notion of cardinality is a 
>> relative notion, depending of the model (not the theory) that we might use. 
>> There are countable models of Cantor’s theory of set and the transfinite 
>> (cf the paradox of Skolem). If you agree o identify a real number with a 
>> total computable function (from N to N), as Turing did originally, then you 
>> can prove the existence of specific non definable real number, in any rich 
>> enough extension of any essentially undecidable theory.
>>
>> It is very simple, any theory reich enough to define a universal 
>> machine/number, is automatically essentially undecidable. It is a generator 
>> of infinitely many surprises for *any* machines and super-marching, etc. We 
>> know now that we know basically nothing, with such “rich” theories. 
>> Elementary arithmetic is already essentially undecidable.
>>
>> You can change the logic, and will get quite different view on the real 
>> numbers. In brouwer’s intuitionistic logic, and in the effective topos 
>> (which generalises Kleene’s realisability notion, and is based on the 
>> category of partial combinatory algebra): we have that all real number are 
>> computable, and all functions are continuous. I am not sure if we get that 
>> all real numbers will be definable, though. They might be not-not-definable 
>> ...
>>
>>
>>
>> *” Does it withstand scrutiny? In this talk, I will discuss the 
>> phenomenon of pointwise definable structures in mathematics, structures in 
>> which every object has a property that only it exhibits. A mathematical 
>> structure is Leibnizian, in contrast, if any pair of distinct objects in it 
>> exhibit different properties. *
>>
>>
>> x ≠ y ->. Ax ≠ Ay, that is Ax = Ay ->. x = y. That is the axiom of 
>> extensionality (in Combinators, lama calculus, set theories).
>>
>> I have used it in the elimination of variables in the combinations. It is 
>> a god’s gift, as it leads to simple efficacious combinators. It is, with 
>> the combinators, equivalent to [x](Ax) = A, when A has no free occurence of 
>> x. Not to be confuse with ([x]A)x = A (which is always true, and just 
>> defines what elimination of x means). 
>>
>>
>>
>> *Is there a Leibnizian structure with no definable elements? *
>>
>>
>> Yes. The classical reals, or the classical set of total computable 
>> functions.
>>
>>
>>
>> *Must indiscernible elements in a mathematical structure be automorphic 
>> images of one another? *
>>
>>
>> No. If we cannot discern them, we cannot build a morphism between them. I 
>> would say.
>>
>>
>> *We shall discuss many elementary yet interesting examples, eventually 
>> working up to the proof that every countable model of set theory has a 
>> pointwise definable extension, in which every mathematical object is 
>> definable.*
>>
>>
>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/must-there-be-number-we-cannot-define-norwich-february-2019/
>>
>> Lecture notes:
>>
>> http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Must-every-number-be-definable_-Norwich-Feb-2019.pdf
>>
>>
>> I will take a look, but that does not make much sense, unless the logic 
>> is weakemed in some way. In some intuitionist set theory with choice, it 
>> might make sense.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> There is another approach vs. the JD Hamkins / set theory & mathematical 
> logic (math dept.) approach. the one of Martin Escardo / type & programming 
> language theory (computer science dept

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-26 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 4:39:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/26/2019 2:02 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 2:51:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things. 
>>>
>>> Brent 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> For those from the type theory, programming language theory, constructive 
>> mathematics (whatever that clumping of schools is called):
>>
>> Truth and existence are the same things.
>>
>>
>> So do those infer the existence of 2 and 4 from truth of 2+2=4?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Formulate arithmetic as a logic program and enter the query:
>
>∃(X,Y):(X+X=Y)
>
> Then via backtracking it prints out:
>
> (X,Y) =
>
> (0,0)
> (1,2)
> (2,4)
> ...
>
>
> Formulate theology as a logic program and enter the query:
>
>   E(x)[If P is a prefection, then Px]
>
> Then it prints out:
>
> x = Anslem's God.
>
> That's the great thing about logic. You can prove anything if you just the 
> right axioms and rules of inference.
>
> Brent
>



*Automating Godel’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence with Higher-order 
Automated Theorem Provers*
http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf

- pt
 

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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-26 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 2:51:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things. 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>>
>>
> For those from the type theory, programming language theory, constructive 
> mathematics (whatever that clumping of schools is called):
>
> Truth and existence are the same things.
>
>
> So do those infer the existence of 2 and 4 from truth of 2+2=4?
>
> Brent
>

Formulate arithmetic as a logic program and enter the query:

   ∃(X,Y):(X+X=Y)

Then via backtracking it prints out:

(X,Y) =

(0,0)
(1,2)
(2,4)
...

 - pt

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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-26 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things. 
>
> Brent 
>
>
>
For those from the type theory, programming language theory, constructive 
mathematics (whatever that clumping of schools is called):

Truth and existence are the same things.

- pt

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Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-02-26 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 5:07:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Feb 2019, at 20:35, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
> via
> https://twitter.com/JDHamkins/status/1100090709527408640
>
> Joel David Hamkins   @JDHamkins
>
> *Must there be numbers we cannot describe or define? Definability in 
> mathematics and the Math Tea argument*
> Pure Mathematics Research Seminar at the University of East Anglia in 
> Norwich on Monday, 25 February, 2019.
>
>
> Abstract:
>
> *An old argument, heard perhaps at a good math tea, proceeds: “there must 
> be some real numbers that we can neither describe nor define, since there 
> are uncountably many real numbers, but only countably many definitions.*
>
>
>
> But that argument is rather weak, as the notion of cardinality is a 
> relative notion, depending of the model (not the theory) that we might use. 
> There are countable models of Cantor’s theory of set and the transfinite 
> (cf the paradox of Skolem). If you agree o identify a real number with a 
> total computable function (from N to N), as Turing did originally, then you 
> can prove the existence of specific non definable real number, in any rich 
> enough extension of any essentially undecidable theory.
>
> It is very simple, any theory reich enough to define a universal 
> machine/number, is automatically essentially undecidable. It is a generator 
> of infinitely many surprises for *any* machines and super-marching, etc. We 
> know now that we know basically nothing, with such “rich” theories. 
> Elementary arithmetic is already essentially undecidable.
>
> You can change the logic, and will get quite different view on the real 
> numbers. In brouwer’s intuitionistic logic, and in the effective topos 
> (which generalises Kleene’s realisability notion, and is based on the 
> category of partial combinatory algebra): we have that all real number are 
> computable, and all functions are continuous. I am not sure if we get that 
> all real numbers will be definable, though. They might be not-not-definable 
> ...
>
>
>
> *” Does it withstand scrutiny? In this talk, I will discuss the phenomenon 
> of pointwise definable structures in mathematics, structures in which every 
> object has a property that only it exhibits. A mathematical structure is 
> Leibnizian, in contrast, if any pair of distinct objects in it exhibit 
> different properties. *
>
>
> x ≠ y ->. Ax ≠ Ay, that is Ax = Ay ->. x = y. That is the axiom of 
> extensionality (in Combinators, lama calculus, set theories).
>
> I have used it in the elimination of variables in the combinations. It is 
> a god’s gift, as it leads to simple efficacious combinators. It is, with 
> the combinators, equivalent to [x](Ax) = A, when A has no free occurence of 
> x. Not to be confuse with ([x]A)x = A (which is always true, and just 
> defines what elimination of x means). 
>
>
>
> *Is there a Leibnizian structure with no definable elements? *
>
>
> Yes. The classical reals, or the classical set of total computable 
> functions.
>
>
>
> *Must indiscernible elements in a mathematical structure be automorphic 
> images of one another? *
>
>
> No. If we cannot discern them, we cannot build a morphism between them. I 
> would say.
>
>
> *We shall discuss many elementary yet interesting examples, eventually 
> working up to the proof that every countable model of set theory has a 
> pointwise definable extension, in which every mathematical object is 
> definable.*
>
>
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/must-there-be-number-we-cannot-define-norwich-february-2019/
>
> Lecture notes:
>
> http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Must-every-number-be-definable_-Norwich-Feb-2019.pdf
>
>
> I will take a look, but that does not make much sense, unless the logic is 
> weakemed in some way. In some intuitionist set theory with choice, it might 
> make sense.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
There is another approach vs. the JD Hamkins / set theory & mathematical 
logic (math dept.) approach. the one of Martin Escardo / type & programming 
language theory (computer science dept.).

Martin Escardo
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mhe/

*higher-type computation = *

*sets that can be exhaustively searched by an algorithm, in the sense of 
Turing, in finite time, as those that are topologically compact*

*constructive mathematics, which I see as a generalization, rather than as 
a restriction, of classical mathematics. In constructive mathematics, in 
the way I conceive it, computation is a side-effect, rather than its 
foundation.*

*What distinguishes classical and constructive mathematics is that the 
latter is better equipped to explicitly indicate the amou

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-25 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 6:04:28 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/25/2019 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to 
> > physics, but to the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the 
> > fundamental reality. The theology of the universal machine is a priori 
> > quite non Aristotelian: there is no Creator, and there is no Creation. 
> > Just a universal dreamer which lost itself in an infinitely surprising 
> > structure and wake up from time to time, or from numbers to numbers. 
>
> There is according to St Anselm, who also thought that definitions bring 
> things into existence. 
>
> Brent 
>


Anselm would work for DC Films or Marvel Studios today.

- pt


> > 
> > I need no more than a partial applicative algebra, and each choice of 
> > the phi_i makes N into one, simply by defining an operation “*” in N 
> > such that n * m = phi_n(m). There exist numbers k and s such that 
> > 
> > ((k * n) * m) = n 
> > (((s * n) * m) * r) = (n * r) * (m * r), 
> > 
> > for all m, n, r in N. 
> > 
> > And, the key point, the operation “*” can be defined in the 
> > arithmetical language, and those statements are, for each n, m, r, 
> > provable in RA. I have shown that the converse is true. It is a very 
> > elegant Turing complete theory. With Indexical Digital Mechanism, it 
> > is absolutely undecidable if the Universe is bigger than the sigma_1 
> > reality. (But here I do a blasphemy: that can only be entirely 
> > justified by G* *only*!, It is where I have to insist that this is 
> > presented as a consequence of YD + CT (“yes doctor” + Church-Turing 
> > thesis). 
> > 
> > Such theories are essentially undecidable. It means that not only they 
> > are arithmetically incomplete, but all their effective consistent 
> > extensions are too. They are creative, you cannot capture the semantic 
> > in the way it could become complete, even in some imaginary domain 
> > concevable by the machine/theory/number. The universal machine are 
> > never entirely satisfied and a computation is always an escape 
> > forward, but their self-reflection create a mess, and illusions. 
> > 
> > The sigma_1 arithmetical reality, as seen by the universal numbers 
> > which lives there, in the first person undetermined sense, is 
> > something *very big*. It generates infinitely many surprises. There 
> > are consistent histories. 
> > 
>
>

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Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?

2019-02-25 Thread Philip Thrift
via
https://twitter.com/JDHamkins/status/1100090709527408640

Joel David Hamkins   @JDHamkins

*Must there be numbers we cannot describe or define? Definability in 
mathematics and the Math Tea argument*
Pure Mathematics Research Seminar at the University of East Anglia in 
Norwich on Monday, 25 February, 2019.


Abstract:

*An old argument, heard perhaps at a good math tea, proceeds: “there must 
be some real numbers that we can neither describe nor define, since there 
are uncountably many real numbers, but only countably many definitions.” 
Does it withstand scrutiny? In this talk, I will discuss the phenomenon of 
pointwise definable structures in mathematics, structures in which every 
object has a property that only it exhibits. A mathematical structure is 
Leibnizian, in contrast, if any pair of distinct objects in it exhibit 
different properties. Is there a Leibnizian structure with no definable 
elements? Must indiscernible elements in a mathematical structure be 
automorphic images of one another? We shall discuss many elementary yet 
interesting examples, eventually working up to the proof that every 
countable model of set theory has a pointwise definable extension, in which 
every mathematical object is definable.*

http://jdh.hamkins.org/must-there-be-number-we-cannot-define-norwich-february-2019/

Lecture notes:
http://jdh.hamkins.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Must-every-number-be-definable_-Norwich-Feb-2019.pdf


- pt

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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-25 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 3:34:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Feb 2019, at 18:44, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> Some accept the possibility that there can be something that is immaterial.
>
>
> Yes. We call them “mathematician”.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
This recent thesis I came across

*Application and ontology in mathematics: a defence [defense] of 
fictionalism*
http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/18636/

leads to

pure mathematicians may be immaterialists,
but applied mathematicians are materialists.



Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to defend fictionalism as a response to the 
mathematical placement problem. As we will see, against the backdrop of 
philosophical naturalism, it is difficult to see how to fit mathematical 
objects into our best total scientific theory. On the other hand, the 
indispensability argument seems to suggest that science itself mandates 
ontological commitment to mathematical entities. My goal is to undermine 
the indispensability argument by presenting an account of applied 
mathematics as a kind of revolutionary prop-oriented make-believe, the 
content of which is given by a mapping account of mathematical 
applications. This kind of fictionalism faces a number of challenges from 
various quarters. To begin with, we will have to face the challenge of a 
different kind of indispensability argument, one that draws ontological 
conclusions from the role of mathematical objects in scientific 
explanations. We will then examine one recent theory of mathematical 
scientific representation, and discover that the resulting position is 
Platonistic. At this point we will introduce our fictionalist account, and 
see that it defuses the Platonist consequences of mathematical 
representation. The closing chapters of the thesis then take a 
metaphilosophical turn. The legitmacy of a fictionalist response to the 
mathematical placement problem is open to challenge from a 
metaphilosophical perspective in two different ways: on the one hand, some 
modern pragmatists have argued that this kind of metaphysics relies on 
questionable assumptions about how langauge works. On the other, some 
modern philosophers have developed forms of metaontological anti-realism 
that they believe undermine the legitimacy of philosophical work in 
metaphysics. In the final two chapters I defend the fictionalist account 
developed here against these sceptical claims. I conclude that the 
fictionalist account of applied mathematics offered here is our best hope 
for coping with the mathematical placement problem. 


- pt

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Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

2019-02-24 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, February 23, 2019 at 6:04:15 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, February 23, 2019 at 6:53:09 AM UTC-7, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, February 23, 2019 at 7:25:21 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 11:08 PM  wrote:
>>>
>>> > *In GR, the paths are determined by geometry in the absence of 
>>>> forces, not by mediating particles.*
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, that's because General Relativity is a classical theory that is not 
>>> quantized, it has so far passed every experimental test posed to it with 
>>> flying colors but we know it can't be entirely correct because when we ask 
>>> it what happens when things become very small and very massive, such as in 
>>> the center of Black Holes, it gives the absurd answer of infinity. Neither 
>>> Quantum Mechanics or General Relativity works when things get massive and 
>>> small, perhaps quantizing General Relativity will fix this or maybe there 
>>> is some other way to do so. Nobody knows.
>>>
>>>  > *I could be mistaken, but I see gravitons as being part of a 
>>>> distinct theory of gravity, which might give the same results as GR,*
>>>
>>>  
>>> Nobody has ever experimentally detected a graviton and it's extremely 
>>> unlikely anybody ever will, so if they make the same predictions as 
>>> standard General Relativity there would be no point in introducing the 
>>> idea. 
>>>
>>>  John K Clark
>>>
>>>
>>
>> If all experiments proposed to determine if gravity is quantized* fail*
>>
>>  Such measurements, they say, could enable them to uncover the quantum 
>> nature of gravity and determine whether or not gravity is quantized.
>>
>>
>>
>> https://physics.aps.org/synopsis-for/10.1103/PhysRevLett.122.071101
>>
>>
>> that is: the search for a quantized gravity is a wild goose chase
>>
>> what do theorists do then?
>>
>> (I asked Hossenfelder. No answer.)
>>
>> - pt 
>>
>
> *The article you cite indicates increasing hypothetical sensitivity for 
> measuring gravity for tiny effects. If gravity can be quantized, what 
> exactly would be quantized? Bruce says that gravity waves would involve 
> gravitons under a quantized theory. Is that all? AG *
>




I suppose it needs to defined *what an experiment would be* that would 
determine that gravity is quantized in a measurable way.

Theories disconnected from experiments are mere math games.

- pt

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Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

2019-02-23 Thread Philip Thrift


On Saturday, February 23, 2019 at 7:25:21 AM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Fri, Feb 22, 2019 at 11:08 PM > 
> wrote:
>
> > *In GR, the paths are determined by geometry in the absence of forces, 
>> not by mediating particles.*
>
>
> Yes, that's because General Relativity is a classical theory that is not 
> quantized, it has so far passed every experimental test posed to it with 
> flying colors but we know it can't be entirely correct because when we ask 
> it what happens when things become very small and very massive, such as in 
> the center of Black Holes, it gives the absurd answer of infinity. Neither 
> Quantum Mechanics or General Relativity works when things get massive and 
> small, perhaps quantizing General Relativity will fix this or maybe there 
> is some other way to do so. Nobody knows.
>
>  > *I could be mistaken, but I see gravitons as being part of a distinct 
>> theory of gravity, which might give the same results as GR,*
>
>  
> Nobody has ever experimentally detected a graviton and it's extremely 
> unlikely anybody ever will, so if they make the same predictions as 
> standard General Relativity there would be no point in introducing the 
> idea. 
>
>  John K Clark
>
>

If all experiments proposed to determine if gravity is quantized* fail*

 Such measurements, they say, could enable them to uncover the quantum 
nature of gravity and determine whether or not gravity is quantized.



https://physics.aps.org/synopsis-for/10.1103/PhysRevLett.122.071101


that is: the search for a quantized gravity is a wild goose chase

what do theorists do then?

(I asked Hossenfelder. No answer.)

- pt 

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Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

2019-02-22 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 11:28:50 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 9:12:02 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Feb 23, 2019 at 3:08 PM  wrote:
>>
>>> On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 8:13:21 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:

 On 2/22/2019 6:04 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

 On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 4:55:41 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote: 
>
>
>
> On 2/22/2019 2:40 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
> Gravitons, as quanta of the metric field, are already relativistic 
>> particles and covariant.
>>
>
> *I thought it's the equations of motion for the particular force, not 
> the mediating particles, that must be covariant. On a related topic for 
> this thread, where does GR depart from Mach's principle? That is, what 
> did 
> Einstein implicitly (or explicitly) deny about Mach's principle? TIA, AG *
>
>
> Einstein thought he would develop a theory that satisfied Mach's 
> principle, but as it turned out GR doesn't. For example the metric of 
> spacetime is a dynamic field and transmit momentum and energy, as shown 
> by 
> LIGO.  Mach's idea of spacetime as purely a relation between material 
> events couldn't do that.
>
> Brent
>

 *Were you inferring covariance simply because the mediating particle 
 for gravity, the graviton, travels at the SoL? *


 GR is a covariant theory.  So it's quanta, gravitons, are covariant.

>>>
>>> *I could be mistaken, but I see gravitons as being part of a distinct 
>>> theory of gravity, which might give the same results as GR. In GR, the 
>>> paths are determined by geometry in the absence of forces, not by mediating 
>>> particles. AG *
>>>
>>
>> GR, as a theory, implies the existence of gravity waves. Wave, when 
>> quantised, give particles: these are the gravitons of the theory. Exchange 
>> of such gravitons does not necessarily have anything to do with the forces 
>> in the theory, or the formation of geodesics.
>>
>> Bruce 
>>
>
> *Very clarifying. Then, since gravitational waves have been detected, it 
> must be that gravitons exist, but too low in energy to be detected. AG *
>


That is news for sure!

- pt 

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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-22 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 3:57:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Feb 2019, at 20:26, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 8:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 Feb 2019, at 20:18, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> > 
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/0SIiavzPI84/jUkaOlUdAwAJ
>> This is the link to the reply in the topic "When Did Consciousness 
>> Begin?" As I have said before, the modal logic and numerical semantics 
>> written there is one way to approach the science of experience. But I think 
>> ultimately this is a logical semantics (not a material semantics), but of 
>> course belief in an actual numerical reality makes a difference.
>>
>> Here is something more along those lines:
>>
>> On modal logic and consciousness:
>>
>> *A Modal Logic for Gödelian Intuition*
>> Hasen Khudairi
>> https://philarchive.org/archive/KHUAML
>>
>> *Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness*
>> Jim Cunningham [ https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/ ]
>> https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/Cunningham.pdf
>>
>>
>> However I think that there is ultimately a material semantics.
>>
>>
>> I can imagine a semantic for some theory of matter, but matter itself 
>> cannot be semantical. What would that mean? Even without mechanism, I have 
>> no idea what that could mean.
>>
>>
>>
>>
> I define material semantics here:
>
> *Material Semantics for Unconventional Programming*
>
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>
>
>  
>
>material semantics =
>
>  physical (*incl.* chemical+biological)
>  +
>  psychical (or experiential) semantics
>
>
> That does not assume the existence of an ontological matter. 
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> As for the ancient Greeks, forget Aristotle and look to Epicurus.
>>
>>
>> I assume mechanism, and I just listen to the universal machine, with 
>> machine taken in the sense of Church and Turing. The notion of matter is 
>> not assumed in such definition, and we know, basically since Gödel, that 
>> they exist in arithmetic (semantically, of course).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Some "offbeat" materialism I just came across that my be of interest:
>>
>> Terry Eagleton 
>> *Materialism*, Yale University Press
>> excerpt 1: https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=PErJDQAAQBAJ
>> excerpt 2: 
>> http://blog.yalebooks.com/2017/02/09/material-theology-and-christian-religion/
>>
>>
>> Very nice. I would not have dare to suggest that christianism is so much 
>> materialist. I am not sure this was true during the five first hundreds 
>> years, but it is dogmatically so after 529 (closure of Plato’s academy).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *Matter is an aggregation of cuisines whose recipes arise and combine to 
>> form the cookbook of nature.*
>>
>>
>> No problem with this, on the contrary. A recipe is another name for an 
>> algorithm, which is typically not made of matter, but exist in arithmetic. 
>>
>> And for the cooking, there is no need distinguish primary matter, which 
>> cannot exist with Mechanism, and matter, which obviously exist 
>> phenomenologically. 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>
>
> Of course all algorithms (technically) are made of matter:
>
>
> I disagree. An algorithm is an immaterial recipe to compute a function, or 
> to implement a process, and you can do that in any universal machinery, 
> implemented in the physical reality or not. The physical reality itself is 
> not produced by an algorithm, but emerges from the first person 
> indeterminacy on all consistent computational histories, structure by the 
> observable mode. That explains quanta and qualia, in a testable (and 
> tested) way.
>

(I'don't know what this test is.)



Some accept the possibility that there can be something that is immaterial.


In philosophy, *antimaterialism* can mean one of several metaphysical or 
religious beliefs that are specifically opposed to materialism 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Materialism>, the notion that *only matter 
exists*. These beliefs include:

   - • Immaterialism <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immaterialism>, a 
   philosophy branching from George Berkeley of which 

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-21 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 8:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Feb 2019, at 20:18, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
> On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/0SIiavzPI84/jUkaOlUdAwAJ
> This is the link to the reply in the topic "When Did Consciousness Begin?" 
> As I have said before, the modal logic and numerical semantics written 
> there is one way to approach the science of experience. But I think 
> ultimately this is a logical semantics (not a material semantics), but of 
> course belief in an actual numerical reality makes a difference.
>
> Here is something more along those lines:
>
> On modal logic and consciousness:
>
> *A Modal Logic for Gödelian Intuition*
> Hasen Khudairi
> https://philarchive.org/archive/KHUAML
>
> *Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness*
> Jim Cunningham [ https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/ ]
> https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/Cunningham.pdf
>
>
> However I think that there is ultimately a material semantics.
>
>
> I can imagine a semantic for some theory of matter, but matter itself 
> cannot be semantical. What would that mean? Even without mechanism, I have 
> no idea what that could mean.
>
>
>
>
I define material semantics here:

*Material Semantics for Unconventional Programming*
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/


 

   material semantics =

 physical (*incl.* chemical+biological)
 +
 psychical (or experiential) semantics

 

>
>
>
> As for the ancient Greeks, forget Aristotle and look to Epicurus.
>
>
> I assume mechanism, and I just listen to the universal machine, with 
> machine taken in the sense of Church and Turing. The notion of matter is 
> not assumed in such definition, and we know, basically since Gödel, that 
> they exist in arithmetic (semantically, of course).
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Some "offbeat" materialism I just came across that my be of interest:
>
> Terry Eagleton 
> *Materialism*, Yale University Press
> excerpt 1: https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=PErJDQAAQBAJ
> excerpt 2: 
> http://blog.yalebooks.com/2017/02/09/material-theology-and-christian-religion/
>
>
> Very nice. I would not have dare to suggest that christianism is so much 
> materialist. I am not sure this was true during the five first hundreds 
> years, but it is dogmatically so after 529 (closure of Plato’s academy).
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Matter is an aggregation of cuisines whose recipes arise and combine to 
> form the cookbook of nature.*
>
>
> No problem with this, on the contrary. A recipe is another name for an 
> algorithm, which is typically not made of matter, but exist in arithmetic. 
>
> And for the cooking, there is no need distinguish primary matter, which 
> cannot exist with Mechanism, and matter, which obviously exist 
> phenomenologically. 
>
> Bruno
>
>


Of course all algorithms (technically) are made of matter:

They are arrangements of glyphs of ink on paper  (like in a book), or are 
electronic dots on a screen (like you are looking at right now) or are 
magnetic polarities stored on a hard drive, etc.

That matter "has" recipes (or algorithms) is the dialectics of Codicalism.

- pt

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Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

2019-02-21 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 7:27:27 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
> *Other than gravity, the remaining known forces are moderated, or shall we 
> say "caused by" particles. Doesn't GR remain an exception; that is, 
> wouldn't it preclude the existence of a graviton? TIA, AG*
>

Just my opinion: There are at least two possibilities for gravity people 
are considering.

1. Gravity is "mediated" by particles: *gravitons*.  Here, all particles 
(including gravitons) "move" in a conventional spacetime background.
2. Space (or spacetime) *itself* is composed in some way as a collection of 
"particles" ("cells", "tiles", ...). This is the approach of LQG and CDT. 
There is no background "space" that things move in anymore in the 
conventional sense: just a bunch of *spacicles* and particles interacting.


There could be others of course (e.g. HOPE - Histories of Phenomenally 
Everything, ...).

- pt




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HoTT: The programing language of space

2019-02-21 Thread Philip Thrift

HoTT (Homotopy Type Theory) is re-expressed here as a programming language 
to encode mathematics.


[ 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/326645835_HoTT_The_Language_of_Space 
] 

[ https://github.com/groupoid/cafe) github.com/groupoid/cafe ]


Abstract
Homotopy Type Theory (HoTT) is the most advanced programming language in 
the domain of intersection of several theories: algebraic topology, 
homological algebra, higher category theory, mathematical logic, and 
theoretical computer science. That is why it can be considered as a 
language of space, as it can encode any existent mathematics.

Speaker: Maxim Sokhatsky is an author of Privat24 deposits, 20 years of 
working experience as a programmer, one of the 30 top-commiters in Ukraine 
in Open Source, author of N2O, the best Erlang Web Framework, CEO of Synrc 
Research Center, author of several embedded operating system runtimes and 
production programming languages. Maxim is familiar with any programming 
language on the planet and had seen sources of all operating systems.

Now Maxim is doing his Ph.D. research (the second year of education) in 
HoTT, trying to encode as much mathematics in the programming language as 
possible along the way.

During this lecture, Maxim will try to smoothly guide you from the 
programming perspective to the pure space of mathematics and will show the 
evolution of mathematical provers from AUTOMATH to the family of Cubical 
Type Checkers. Also, this lecture is considered as a general introduction 
to HoTT course Maxim is preparing for his friends.

cf. [ http://groupoid.space) groupoid.space ]

- pt

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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-02-20 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, February 20, 2019 at 9:14:35 AM UTC-6, PGC wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 19, 2019 at 11:39:21 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 15 Feb 2019, at 20:43, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, February 15, 2019 at 12:01:26 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 15 Feb 2019, at 16:12, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, February 15, 2019 at 5:35:02 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On 15 Feb 2019, at 08:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On Wednesday, February 13, 2019 at 10:40:32 PM UTC-6, cdemorsella wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Two fascinating (and very different) approaches are presented to 
>>>>> derive Quantim Mechanics main practical tool (e.g. Born's rule). Wonder 
>>>>> what some of the physicists on here think about this research?
>>>>>
>>>>> I find the argument that no laws is the fundamental law... and that 
>>>>> the universe and its laws are emergent guided by subtle mathematical 
>>>>> statistical phenomena, at the same time both alluring and annoying it 
>>>>> is somehow unsatisfactory like being served a quite empty plate with 
>>>>> nice garnish for dinner.
>>>>>
>>>>> One example of emergence from chaotic conditions is how traffic jams 
>>>>> (aka density waves) can emerge from chaotic initial conditions, becoming 
>>>>> self re-enforcing within local domains of influence... for those unlucky 
>>>>> to 
>>>>> be stuck in them. Density wave emergence is seen across scale, for 
>>>>> example 
>>>>> the spiral arms of galaxies can be explained as giant gravitational pile 
>>>>> ups with some fundamentally similar parallels to say a rush hour traffic 
>>>>> jam, except on vastly different scales of course and due to other 
>>>>> different 
>>>>> factors, in the galactic case the emergent effects of a vast number of 
>>>>> gravitational inter-actions as stars migrate through these arms on their 
>>>>> grand voyages around the galactic core.
>>>>>
>>>>> This paired with the corollary argument that any attempt to discover a 
>>>>> fundamental law seems doomed to the infinite regression of then needing 
>>>>> to 
>>>>> explain what this foundation itself rests upon leading to the "it's 
>>>>> turtles all the way down" hall of mirrors carnival house... head-banger. 
>>>>>
>>>>> Perhaps, as Wheeler argued, the world is a self-synthesizing system, 
>>>>> and the seeming order we observe, is emergent... a law without law.
>>>>>
>>>>> Here is the link to the article:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-born-rule-has-been-derived-from-simple-physical-principles-20190213/
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>  
>>>> One can (sort of) write all "physics" in a couple of equations: the 
>>>> Einstein Field Equation (EFE) and the Standard Model Equation (SME):
>>>>
>>>> EFE: 
>>>> https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/45/EinsteinLeiden4.jpg/620px-EinsteinLeiden4.jpg
>>>> +
>>>> SME: 
>>>> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png
>>>>
>>>> What caused *this particular arrangement* of expressions in these to 
>>>> be the "law" of our universe I suppose can be "explained" by it's being 
>>>> one 
>>>> of any number of possible arrangements.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The tiny (sigma_1) arithmetical reality contains all “combinations” of 
>>>> all programs, and your explanation is a bit like digital physics, where 
>>>> the 
>>>> physical universe would be one special universal number, say U. That is 
>>>> possible, but this can explain the origin of the physical laws, in a 
>>>> coherent way with respect to the mind-body problem (the hard problem of 
>>>> consciousness) only in presence of an explanation of why that program U is 
>>>> winning, that is how such U can “multiply” you so much in the relative way 
>>>> that the laws of physics get stabilised. Arithmetical self-reference 
>>>

Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR

2019-02-19 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, February 20, 2019 at 1:06:25 AM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 19, 2019 at 8:16:51 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/19/2019 5:10 PM, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>> *What you wrote makes no sense. It fails to explain why motion occurs in 
>> the absence of force. AG *
>>
>>
>> So did Newton: "A body in motion will remain in motion."
>>
>
> *Right, but Newton "explained" why a body at "rest" can start moving, via 
> the application of "force".  What does "rest" mean in GR and what causes 
> "motion" from that pov? Incidentally, when I posed the question of why 
> space and time must be fused in relativity. I didn't know the answer. I 
> came to a partial explanation by posing the question. AG*
>
>>
>>

Physics doesn't really explain anything. It only creates expressions in 
different mathematical dialects that we interpret.

https://www.newyorker.com/science/elements/a-different-kind-of-theory-of-everything
 


In 1964, during a lecture at Cornell University, the physicist Richard 
Feynman articulated a profound mystery about the physical world. He told 
his listeners to imagine two objects, each gravitationally attracted to the 
other. How, he asked, should we predict their movements? Feynman identified 
three approaches, each invoking a different belief about the world. The 
first approach used Newton’s law of gravity, according to which the objects 
exert a pull on each other. The second imagined a gravitational field 
extending through space, which the objects distort. The third applied the 
principle of least action, which holds that each object moves by following 
the path that takes the least energy in the least time. All three 
approaches produced the same, correct prediction. They were three equally 
useful descriptions of how gravity works.

“One of the amazing characteristics of nature is this variety of 
interpretational schemes,” Feynman said. ... “If you modify the laws much, 
you find you can only write them in fewer ways,” Feynman said. “I always 
found that mysterious, and I do not know the reason why it is that the 
correct laws of physics are expressible in such a tremendous variety of 
ways. They seem to be able to get through several wickets at the same time.”

...

- pt

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Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-18 Thread Philip Thrift
On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/0SIiavzPI84/jUkaOlUdAwAJ
This is the link to the reply in the topic "When Did Consciousness Begin?" 
As I have said before, the modal logic and numerical semantics written 
there is one way to approach the science of experience. But I think 
ultimately this is a logical semantics (not a material semantics), but of 
course belief in an actual numerical reality makes a difference.

Here is something more along those lines:

On modal logic and consciousness:

*A Modal Logic for Gödelian Intuition*
Hasen Khudairi
https://philarchive.org/archive/KHUAML

*Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness*
Jim Cunningham [ https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/ ]
https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/Cunningham.pdf


However I think that there is ultimately a material semantics.

As for the ancient Greeks, forget Aristotle and look to Epicurus.



Some "offbeat" materialism I just came across that my be of interest:

Terry Eagleton 
*Materialism*, Yale University Press
excerpt 1: https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=PErJDQAAQBAJ
excerpt 2: 
http://blog.yalebooks.com/2017/02/09/material-theology-and-christian-religion/



*Matter is an aggregation of cuisines whose recipes arise and combine to 
form the cookbook of nature.*

- pt

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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-02-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, February 15, 2019 at 1:37:54 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 1:15 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>
> > I will do a personal confession: I have never believe in matter, 
>
>
> Matter doesn't care if you believe in it or not, it will just continue 
> doing what it does.
>
> > *because I have never seen any evidence for it. *
>
>
> That's OK, I don't think matter has ever seen any evidence for you either.
>
> > *Matter is like God, *
>
>
> Matter is nothing like God, one is amenable to the scientific method and 
> one is not, that is to say one is bullshit and one is not.
>
> > *in the sense of the greeks*
>
>
> Yes in the sense of the ancient Greeks, in other words in the sense of 
> people with less scientific literacy than a bright fourth grader. Why oh 
> why do you keep talking about those ignoramuses? 
>
> > which means that it is something that we have to explain,
>
>
> And then we have to explain the explanation and then explain the 
> explanation of the explanation and then...
>
>  John K Clark
>
>
>

Aristotle  (384–322 B.C.E.):
  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle/
Epicurus (341–270 B.C.E.): 
  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epicurus/

Aristotle was a dunce compared to Epicurus. :)

- pt 

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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-02-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, February 15, 2019 at 12:15:52 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 14 Feb 2019, at 09:43, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wednesday, February 13, 2019 at 10:17:57 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Feb 2019, at 19:31, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, February 11, 2019 at 9:24:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11 Feb 2019, at 00:34, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Two recent books:
>>>
>>> The First Minds: Caterpillars, Karyotes, and Consciousness
>>> Arthur S. Reber
>>> https://books.google.com/books/about/The_First_Minds.html?id=RBLEugEACAAJ
>>>
>>> Brain-Mind: From Neurons to Consciousness and Creativity
>>> Paul Thagard
>>> https://books.google.com/books/about/Brain_Mind.html?id=jJjHvAEACAAJ
>>>
>>> via
>>> When Did Consciousness Begin?
>>> Paul Thagard
>>>
>>> https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/hot-thought/201901/when-did-consciousness-begin
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I compare with the theology of the computationalist Universal Turing 
>>> machine’s theology.
>>>
>>> (So I do the blasphemy some times, and it is important that keep in mind 
>>> the necessary interrogation point). I have not look at the answer of 
>>> others, to test this later …).
>>>
>>> Consciousness is just the “instinctive” or “automated” 
>>> belief/anticipation concerning a possible reality.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thagard's 10 hypotheses:
>>>
>>> 1. Consciousness has always existed, because God is conscious and 
>>> eternal.
>>>
>>>
>>> Consciousness has always existed, because all universal machine/number 
>>> are conscious and “eternal” (out of time).
>>>
>>> Is God conscious? Open problem.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 2. Consciousness began when the universe formed, around 13.7 billion 
>>> years ago. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> This cannot be. But the event “13 billion years ago” and many variants 
>>> occurs "all the time” (or all the number-of-step of all universal 
>>> dovetailing) in the arithmetical reality.
>>>
>>> Those are important events in our history, but the consciousness which 
>>> does the history selection was there “before”.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 3. Consciousness began with single-celled life, around 3.7 billion years 
>>> ago (Reber). 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Not really, but the consciousness of the universal machine get a 
>>> physical stable implementations, apparently relatively to us. We get many 
>>> universal entities capable of interacting with a solid notion of resources. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 4. Consciousness began with multicellular plants, around 850 million 
>>> years ago. 
>>>
>>>
>>> In our histories, which “tautologically” are those semantical statifying 
>>> the logic of the material modes of self-reference, which seems the case 
>>> thanks to the quantum and Gödel (which enforces the distinction between []p 
>>> and []p & <>t in the provable part of the machine in arithmetic.
>>>
>>> Again, important events in our history, but consciousness was “there 
>>> before”.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 5. Consciousness began when animals such as jellyfish got thousands of 
>>> neurons, around 580 million years ago. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That’s about the time the soul of the machine falls, and they begin to 
>>> hallucinate and believe in what they were conscious of, and thus get 
>>> partially deluded. The universal machine get Löbian. Soon, they will even 
>>> begin to believe in the axiom of infinity, and calculus, if not Lagrangian 
>>> (grin).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> 6. Consciousness began when insects and fish developed larger brains 
>>> with about a million neurons (honeybees) or 10 million neurons (zebrafish) 
>>> around 560 million years ago. 
>>>
>>>
>>> It has been discovered that bees adds and multiplies little numbers, 
>>> when they need, to get pollen from mathematical human teacher! But I still 
>>&g

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-02-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, February 15, 2019 at 12:01:26 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 Feb 2019, at 16:12, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, February 15, 2019 at 5:35:02 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 15 Feb 2019, at 08:25, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, February 13, 2019 at 10:40:32 PM UTC-6, cdemorsella wrote:
>>
>>> Two fascinating (and very different) approaches are presented to derive 
>>> Quantim Mechanics main practical tool (e.g. Born's rule). Wonder what some 
>>> of the physicists on here think about this research?
>>>
>>> I find the argument that no laws is the fundamental law... and that the 
>>> universe and its laws are emergent guided by subtle mathematical 
>>> statistical phenomena, at the same time both alluring and annoying it 
>>> is somehow unsatisfactory like being served a quite empty plate with 
>>> nice garnish for dinner.
>>>
>>> One example of emergence from chaotic conditions is how traffic jams 
>>> (aka density waves) can emerge from chaotic initial conditions, becoming 
>>> self re-enforcing within local domains of influence... for those unlucky to 
>>> be stuck in them. Density wave emergence is seen across scale, for example 
>>> the spiral arms of galaxies can be explained as giant gravitational pile 
>>> ups with some fundamentally similar parallels to say a rush hour traffic 
>>> jam, except on vastly different scales of course and due to other different 
>>> factors, in the galactic case the emergent effects of a vast number of 
>>> gravitational inter-actions as stars migrate through these arms on their 
>>> grand voyages around the galactic core.
>>>
>>> This paired with the corollary argument that any attempt to discover a 
>>> fundamental law seems doomed to the infinite regression of then needing to 
>>> explain what this foundation itself rests upon leading to the "it's 
>>> turtles all the way down" hall of mirrors carnival house... head-banger. 
>>>
>>> Perhaps, as Wheeler argued, the world is a self-synthesizing system, and 
>>> the seeming order we observe, is emergent... a law without law.
>>>
>>> Here is the link to the article:
>>>
>>>
>>> https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-born-rule-has-been-derived-from-simple-physical-principles-20190213/
>>>
>>>
>>  
>> One can (sort of) write all "physics" in a couple of equations: the 
>> Einstein Field Equation (EFE) and the Standard Model Equation (SME):
>>
>> EFE: 
>> https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/45/EinsteinLeiden4.jpg/620px-EinsteinLeiden4.jpg
>> +
>> SME: 
>> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png
>>
>> What caused *this particular arrangement* of expressions in these to be 
>> the "law" of our universe I suppose can be "explained" by it's being one of 
>> any number of possible arrangements.
>>
>>
>>
>> The tiny (sigma_1) arithmetical reality contains all “combinations” of 
>> all programs, and your explanation is a bit like digital physics, where the 
>> physical universe would be one special universal number, say U. That is 
>> possible, but this can explain the origin of the physical laws, in a 
>> coherent way with respect to the mind-body problem (the hard problem of 
>> consciousness) only in presence of an explanation of why that program U is 
>> winning, that is how such U can “multiply” you so much in the relative way 
>> that the laws of physics get stabilised. Arithmetical self-reference 
>> explains consciousness “easily”, but at the price of forcing us to derive 
>> the physical laws from any universal machinery.
>> The physical reality is not a mathematical reality among others, it is 
>> the projective border of the universal mind, which is just the mind of the 
>> universal machine. It is a complex many-dreams structure, and its quantum 
>> aspects explain why negative amplitude of probability can play a role in 
>> making the aberrant histories relatively rare, despite them being also in 
>> that sigma_1 arithmetic.
>>
>> With mechanism, the idea that there is anything more than the sigma_1 
>> arithmetical truth is absolutely undecidable. The sigma_1 truth emulates 
>> the sigma_n believers for all n, and beyond. If the physics which is in the 
>> head of the universal numbers departs too much from what we see, it will be 
>> time to suspect that th

Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-02-15 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, February 15, 2019 at 5:35:02 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 Feb 2019, at 08:25, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, February 13, 2019 at 10:40:32 PM UTC-6, cdemorsella wrote:
>
>> Two fascinating (and very different) approaches are presented to derive 
>> Quantim Mechanics main practical tool (e.g. Born's rule). Wonder what some 
>> of the physicists on here think about this research?
>>
>> I find the argument that no laws is the fundamental law... and that the 
>> universe and its laws are emergent guided by subtle mathematical 
>> statistical phenomena, at the same time both alluring and annoying it 
>> is somehow unsatisfactory like being served a quite empty plate with 
>> nice garnish for dinner.
>>
>> One example of emergence from chaotic conditions is how traffic jams (aka 
>> density waves) can emerge from chaotic initial conditions, becoming self 
>> re-enforcing within local domains of influence... for those unlucky to be 
>> stuck in them. Density wave emergence is seen across scale, for example the 
>> spiral arms of galaxies can be explained as giant gravitational pile ups 
>> with some fundamentally similar parallels to say a rush hour traffic jam, 
>> except on vastly different scales of course and due to other different 
>> factors, in the galactic case the emergent effects of a vast number of 
>> gravitational inter-actions as stars migrate through these arms on their 
>> grand voyages around the galactic core.
>>
>> This paired with the corollary argument that any attempt to discover a 
>> fundamental law seems doomed to the infinite regression of then needing to 
>> explain what this foundation itself rests upon leading to the "it's 
>> turtles all the way down" hall of mirrors carnival house... head-banger. 
>>
>> Perhaps, as Wheeler argued, the world is a self-synthesizing system, and 
>> the seeming order we observe, is emergent... a law without law.
>>
>> Here is the link to the article:
>>
>>
>> https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-born-rule-has-been-derived-from-simple-physical-principles-20190213/
>>
>>
>  
> One can (sort of) write all "physics" in a couple of equations: the 
> Einstein Field Equation (EFE) and the Standard Model Equation (SME):
>
> EFE: 
> https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/45/EinsteinLeiden4.jpg/620px-EinsteinLeiden4.jpg
> +
> SME: 
> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png
>
> What caused *this particular arrangement* of expressions in these to be 
> the "law" of our universe I suppose can be "explained" by it's being one of 
> any number of possible arrangements.
>
>
>
> The tiny (sigma_1) arithmetical reality contains all “combinations” of all 
> programs, and your explanation is a bit like digital physics, where the 
> physical universe would be one special universal number, say U. That is 
> possible, but this can explain the origin of the physical laws, in a 
> coherent way with respect to the mind-body problem (the hard problem of 
> consciousness) only in presence of an explanation of why that program U is 
> winning, that is how such U can “multiply” you so much in the relative way 
> that the laws of physics get stabilised. Arithmetical self-reference 
> explains consciousness “easily”, but at the price of forcing us to derive 
> the physical laws from any universal machinery.
> The physical reality is not a mathematical reality among others, it is the 
> projective border of the universal mind, which is just the mind of the 
> universal machine. It is a complex many-dreams structure, and its quantum 
> aspects explain why negative amplitude of probability can play a role in 
> making the aberrant histories relatively rare, despite them being also in 
> that sigma_1 arithmetic.
>
> With mechanism, the idea that there is anything more than the sigma_1 
> arithmetical truth is absolutely undecidable. The sigma_1 truth emulates 
> the sigma_n believers for all n, and beyond. If the physics which is in the 
> head of the universal numbers departs too much from what we see, it will be 
> time to suspect that there is indeed something more. But not only there are 
> no evidence for that, but there are strong evidence for the completeness of 
> the sigma_1 truth with respect to the metaphysical questions.
>
> Bruno 
>
>
>
>
Whatever brand of scientist - physicist, chemist, biologist, even 
psychologist - it seems that they see any theory of whatever is within 
their domain is to be composed of a finite number of sentences (e.g. 
equations, for physicis

modal µ-calculus and Gödel-Löb logic

2019-02-15 Thread Philip Thrift


(connecting a programming semantics with a provability logic)

On Modal µ-Calculus and Gödel-Löb Logic
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00353743/document

μ-calculus: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_%CE%BC-calculus

- pt

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Re: Recommend this article, Even just for the Wheeler quote near the end

2019-02-14 Thread Philip Thrift
On Wednesday, February 13, 2019 at 10:40:32 PM UTC-6, cdemorsella wrote:

> Two fascinating (and very different) approaches are presented to derive 
> Quantim Mechanics main practical tool (e.g. Born's rule). Wonder what some 
> of the physicists on here think about this research?
>
> I find the argument that no laws is the fundamental law... and that the 
> universe and its laws are emergent guided by subtle mathematical 
> statistical phenomena, at the same time both alluring and annoying it 
> is somehow unsatisfactory like being served a quite empty plate with 
> nice garnish for dinner.
>
> One example of emergence from chaotic conditions is how traffic jams (aka 
> density waves) can emerge from chaotic initial conditions, becoming self 
> re-enforcing within local domains of influence... for those unlucky to be 
> stuck in them. Density wave emergence is seen across scale, for example the 
> spiral arms of galaxies can be explained as giant gravitational pile ups 
> with some fundamentally similar parallels to say a rush hour traffic jam, 
> except on vastly different scales of course and due to other different 
> factors, in the galactic case the emergent effects of a vast number of 
> gravitational inter-actions as stars migrate through these arms on their 
> grand voyages around the galactic core.
>
> This paired with the corollary argument that any attempt to discover a 
> fundamental law seems doomed to the infinite regression of then needing to 
> explain what this foundation itself rests upon leading to the "it's 
> turtles all the way down" hall of mirrors carnival house... head-banger. 
>
> Perhaps, as Wheeler argued, the world is a self-synthesizing system, and 
> the seeming order we observe, is emergent... a law without law.
>
> Here is the link to the article:
>
>
> https://www.quantamagazine.org/the-born-rule-has-been-derived-from-simple-physical-principles-20190213/
>
>
 
One can (sort of) write all "physics" in a couple of equations: the 
Einstein Field Equation (EFE) and the Standard Model Equation (SME):

EFE: 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/4/45/EinsteinLeiden4.jpg/620px-EinsteinLeiden4.jpg
+
SME: 
https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png

What caused *this particular arrangement* of expressions in these to be the 
"law" of our universe I suppose can be "explained" by it's being one of any 
number of possible arrangements.


- pt 

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Re: Planck Length

2019-02-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, February 13, 2019 at 10:17:57 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Feb 2019, at 10:22, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, February 8, 2019 at 5:53:01 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 4 Feb 2019, at 19:09, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> As I have said, I am language-oriented. What this means is that I say 
>> that science (from that perspective) is a collection of domain-specific 
>> languages - general relativity, particle physics, chemistry, microbiology, 
>> cellular biology, neurobiology, psychology, sociology,  ,… 
>>
>>
>> They all use English. The theories differ but sometimes can be related, 
>> like chemistry is in principle reducible to quantum mechanics, with 
>> electron playing a preponderant role. Yet, high level chemistry will 
>> develop higher level tools not always easily reducible to quantum physics. 
>> For the mind body problem, with mechanism, we have the choice of choosing 
>> any language, and any Turing complete theory. The machine theology (G*), 
>> which should include physics, is theory independent. The physical reality 
>> is phi_i independent.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
> There is English. But there is also also a collection of mathematical 
> language "dialects", like "Lagrangian":
>
> *This Is What The Standard Model of Physics Actually Looks Like*
>
> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like
>
> "The Lagrangian is a fancy way of writing an equation to determine the 
> state of a changing system and explain the maximum possible energy the 
> system can maintain ... Despite appearances, the Lagrangian is one of the 
> easiest and most compact ways of presenting the theory.”
>
>
> That is technical language. It is just natural language with some 
> technical terms added to it. Yes, a Lagrangian contains a lot of 
> information, but it is open if the setting is classical or quantum, which 
> changes a lot the interpretation problem.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Suppose there is a conference *Languages for the Mind-Body Problem*, 
> including
>
> G*
> EMPL⁺ 
>
>
>
> G* is a theory, not a language. G* is the same whatever classical 
> ontological (Turing-complete) theory you take. (Even if you add infinity 
> axioms, or super-Turing elements).
>
>
>
>
> The irony to me is that there are people talking about those languages 
> which could refer to themselves at a conference presenting those languages.
>
> ⁺ *Experiential Modalities Programing Language* 
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/10/14/experience-processing/
>
>
> With mechanism, experiential modalities are given by the variant of 
> provability using “ & p” in the definition, like []p & p, or []p & <>t & p. 
> That “& p” makes them qualitative and undefinable by the machine concerned, 
> but a rich consistent machine can study the complete theology (at the 
> propositional level) of a simpler machine that she knows/believes to be 
> sound (or just consistent).
>
>
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> - however one wants to carve them up (they are all human inventions 
>> anyway). 
>>
>>
>>
>> “Brain” is an invention of the human, but the brain itself is more an 
>> invention of nature. With mechanism, eventually nature is a result of 
>> “consciousness selection or projection”. A result of sharable first person 
>> indterminacies, from all “relative computational states existing in the 
>> sigma_1 arithmetic"
>>
>>
>>
>> The terms 'reduction', 'emergence' are really about how expressions (aka 
>> theories) in one domain language relate to (can compile to, translate to, 
>> can be defined in terms of) another domain language, rather than some 
>> teleological, causal relation.
>>
>>
>> Non problem with this. But the representation have to be faithful, and 
>> proved to be so when used. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But languages have semantics, including the "what" they are about.
>>
>>
>> Yes. Languages and theories have semantics. That is what mathematical 
>> logic is all about. Proof theory, Model theory, and the relation between 
>> proofs and model, where a model is usually a mathematical structure 
>> verifying the statements of the theory.
>>
>>
>>
>>
> Even though the terms "model", "interpretation", "domain of discourse" 
> etc. are used  in mathematical logic [ 
> https://en.wikipe

Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-02-14 Thread Philip Thrift


On Wednesday, February 13, 2019 at 10:17:57 PM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Feb 2019, at 19:31, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, February 11, 2019 at 9:24:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 11 Feb 2019, at 00:34, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Two recent books:
>>
>> The First Minds: Caterpillars, Karyotes, and Consciousness
>> Arthur S. Reber
>> https://books.google.com/books/about/The_First_Minds.html?id=RBLEugEACAAJ
>>
>> Brain-Mind: From Neurons to Consciousness and Creativity
>> Paul Thagard
>> https://books.google.com/books/about/Brain_Mind.html?id=jJjHvAEACAAJ
>>
>> via
>> When Did Consciousness Begin?
>> Paul Thagard
>>
>> https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/hot-thought/201901/when-did-consciousness-begin
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I compare with the theology of the computationalist Universal Turing 
>> machine’s theology.
>>
>> (So I do the blasphemy some times, and it is important that keep in mind 
>> the necessary interrogation point). I have not look at the answer of 
>> others, to test this later …).
>>
>> Consciousness is just the “instinctive” or “automated” 
>> belief/anticipation concerning a possible reality.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Thagard's 10 hypotheses:
>>
>> 1. Consciousness has always existed, because God is conscious and eternal.
>>
>>
>> Consciousness has always existed, because all universal machine/number 
>> are conscious and “eternal” (out of time).
>>
>> Is God conscious? Open problem.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2. Consciousness began when the universe formed, around 13.7 billion 
>> years ago. 
>>
>>
>>
>> This cannot be. But the event “13 billion years ago” and many variants 
>> occurs "all the time” (or all the number-of-step of all universal 
>> dovetailing) in the arithmetical reality.
>>
>> Those are important events in our history, but the consciousness which 
>> does the history selection was there “before”.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 3. Consciousness began with single-celled life, around 3.7 billion years 
>> ago (Reber). 
>>
>>
>>
>> Not really, but the consciousness of the universal machine get a physical 
>> stable implementations, apparently relatively to us. We get many universal 
>> entities capable of interacting with a solid notion of resources. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 4. Consciousness began with multicellular plants, around 850 million 
>> years ago. 
>>
>>
>> In our histories, which “tautologically” are those semantical statifying 
>> the logic of the material modes of self-reference, which seems the case 
>> thanks to the quantum and Gödel (which enforces the distinction between []p 
>> and []p & <>t in the provable part of the machine in arithmetic.
>>
>> Again, important events in our history, but consciousness was “there 
>> before”.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 5. Consciousness began when animals such as jellyfish got thousands of 
>> neurons, around 580 million years ago. 
>>
>>
>>
>> That’s about the time the soul of the machine falls, and they begin to 
>> hallucinate and believe in what they were conscious of, and thus get 
>> partially deluded. The universal machine get Löbian. Soon, they will even 
>> begin to believe in the axiom of infinity, and calculus, if not Lagrangian 
>> (grin).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 6. Consciousness began when insects and fish developed larger brains with 
>> about a million neurons (honeybees) or 10 million neurons (zebrafish) 
>> around 560 million years ago. 
>>
>>
>> It has been discovered that bees adds and multiplies little numbers, when 
>> they need, to get pollen from mathematical human teacher! But I still think 
>> that spider, especially the hunters, go much farer in their conception of 
>> reality as a video illustrates well here. At 0.44 she explores and get a 
>> surprise when “not seeing a spider where expected”, that occurs two times, 
>> and the second times she run away!
>>
>> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ij4pdf49bxw
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> 7. Consciousness began when animals such as birds and mammals developed 
>> much larger brains with hundreds of millions neurons, around 200 million 
>> years ago. [Thagard]
>>
>>
>> Much larger brain enlarges the number of stupidity you 

Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-02-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, February 11, 2019 at 9:56:12 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Feb 2019, at 01:42, Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> I do not hold to the idea of panpsychism
>
>
> Nor do I.
>
>
>
Panpsychism 

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/panpsychism/
https://www.iep.utm.edu/panpsych/

is a spectrum going from *micropsychism* to *cosmopsychism*.

Sometimes people say they are not panpsychist, and then when you* read what 
they write* you see they write like they are some type of panpsychist.

- pt

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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-02-11 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, February 11, 2019 at 9:24:18 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Feb 2019, at 00:34, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> Two recent books:
>
> The First Minds: Caterpillars, Karyotes, and Consciousness
> Arthur S. Reber
> https://books.google.com/books/about/The_First_Minds.html?id=RBLEugEACAAJ
>
> Brain-Mind: From Neurons to Consciousness and Creativity
> Paul Thagard
> https://books.google.com/books/about/Brain_Mind.html?id=jJjHvAEACAAJ
>
> via
> When Did Consciousness Begin?
> Paul Thagard
>
> https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/hot-thought/201901/when-did-consciousness-begin
>
>
>
>
> I compare with the theology of the computationalist Universal Turing 
> machine’s theology.
>
> (So I do the blasphemy some times, and it is important that keep in mind 
> the necessary interrogation point). I have not look at the answer of 
> others, to test this later …).
>
> Consciousness is just the “instinctive” or “automated” belief/anticipation 
> concerning a possible reality.
>
>
>
>
> Thagard's 10 hypotheses:
>
> 1. Consciousness has always existed, because God is conscious and eternal.
>
>
> Consciousness has always existed, because all universal machine/number are 
> conscious and “eternal” (out of time).
>
> Is God conscious? Open problem.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> 2. Consciousness began when the universe formed, around 13.7 billion years 
> ago. 
>
>
>
> This cannot be. But the event “13 billion years ago” and many variants 
> occurs "all the time” (or all the number-of-step of all universal 
> dovetailing) in the arithmetical reality.
>
> Those are important events in our history, but the consciousness which 
> does the history selection was there “before”.
>
>
>
>
>
> 3. Consciousness began with single-celled life, around 3.7 billion years 
> ago (Reber). 
>
>
>
> Not really, but the consciousness of the universal machine get a physical 
> stable implementations, apparently relatively to us. We get many universal 
> entities capable of interacting with a solid notion of resources. 
>
>
>
>
>
> 4. Consciousness began with multicellular plants, around 850 million years 
> ago. 
>
>
> In our histories, which “tautologically” are those semantical statifying 
> the logic of the material modes of self-reference, which seems the case 
> thanks to the quantum and Gödel (which enforces the distinction between []p 
> and []p & <>t in the provable part of the machine in arithmetic.
>
> Again, important events in our history, but consciousness was “there 
> before”.
>
>
>
>
>
> 5. Consciousness began when animals such as jellyfish got thousands of 
> neurons, around 580 million years ago. 
>
>
>
> That’s about the time the soul of the machine falls, and they begin to 
> hallucinate and believe in what they were conscious of, and thus get 
> partially deluded. The universal machine get Löbian. Soon, they will even 
> begin to believe in the axiom of infinity, and calculus, if not Lagrangian 
> (grin).
>
>
>
>
> 6. Consciousness began when insects and fish developed larger brains with 
> about a million neurons (honeybees) or 10 million neurons (zebrafish) 
> around 560 million years ago. 
>
>
> It has been discovered that bees adds and multiplies little numbers, when 
> they need, to get pollen from mathematical human teacher! But I still think 
> that spider, especially the hunters, go much farer in their conception of 
> reality as a video illustrates well here. At 0.44 she explores and get a 
> surprise when “not seeing a spider where expected”, that occurs two times, 
> and the second times she run away!
>
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ij4pdf49bxw
>
>
>
>
> 7. Consciousness began when animals such as birds and mammals developed 
> much larger brains with hundreds of millions neurons, around 200 million 
> years ago. [Thagard]
>
>
> Much larger brain enlarges the number of stupidity you can asserts, but of 
> course, the catastrophes are limited until … the universal (natural) 
> languages develops … 
>
>
>
>
> 8. Consciousness began with humans, homo sapiens, around 200,000 years ago.
>
>
> “Homo sapiens” cannot be asserted by the homo if he is really sapiens … 
>
> Let us say that the peculiar human Intelligence, accompanied by human 
> stupidity, begin to develop.
>
> Intelligence and stupidity are two big friends, they never separate each 
> other.
>
>
>
>
>
> 9. Consciousness began when human culture became advanced, around 3000 
> years ago (Julian Jaynes).  
>
>
> Birth of the little ego. Birth

Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-02-11 Thread Philip Thrift


As I've mentioned before, I think there is some relation between 
(proto)consciousness and (proto)language.

Spoken-language ability (hominid) could have appeared perhaps 60,000 years 
ago.
But written-language ability appears perhaps 6,000 years ago.

Writing (beyond speaking) ability is significant, I think.

- pt

On Monday, February 11, 2019 at 12:46:18 AM UTC-6, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Sun, Feb 10, 2019 at 04:24:40PM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote: 
> > 
> > 
> > On 2/10/2019 3:34 PM, Philip Thrift wrote: 
> > > 9. Consciousness began when human culture became advanced, around 3000 
> > > years ago (Julian Jaynes). 
>
> The date more usually given is 40,000 years bp. There was an explosion 
> of advanced culture that occurred at that time. Steven Pinker promotes 
> this idea ("the brain's big bang") IIRC. 
>
>
> -- 
>
>  
>
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) 
> Principal, High Performance Coders 
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpc...@hpcoders.com.au 
>  
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au 
>  
>
>

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Re: When Did Consciousness Begin?

2019-02-11 Thread Philip Thrift


Interest in the psychical (experience, consciousness) aspect in all 
biological levels has sort of taken off recently, it seems.

cf.

Cosmopsychism, Micropsychism, and the Grounding Relation 
<https://philpapers.org/go.pl?id=GOFCMA==https%3A%2F%2Fphilpapers.org%2Farchive%2FGOFCMA.pdf>
Philip Goff <https://philpapers.org/s/Philip%20Goff>



Language is not experience/consciousness of course, but I think there is 
some sort of connection between the existence of protolanguages (of lower 
level animals) and protoconsciousnesses.


- pt



On Sunday, February 10, 2019 at 6:42:20 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> I do not hold to the idea of panpsychism and the existence of God is 
> something that can be dismissed with no loss of understanding of reality. 
> It is harder to know about consciousness in living things. I hesitate in 
> some ways to think that prokaryotes are conscious in the way we are, just 
> greatly diminished. My dogs are conscious beings I am pretty convinced, but 
> I think their mental landscape is smaller than that of a human. So 
> somewhere in that spectrum consciousness may emerge. Plants may have some 
> form of consciousness, and they do signal and appear to have some level of 
> awareness of their surroundings. 
>
> Consciousness is in a way a sort of bootstrap process where a being 
> generates an internal representation of themselves and themselves in this 
> world. It is then a sort of virtual process, and one where there being 
> encodes a representation of themselves within themselves. I think it has 
> some form of truncated self-reference such as Gödel's theorem. It might 
> serve to give an estimate on say Chaitin's halting probability so the being 
> is able to take a risk. This may be extended in part to all sort of complex 
> self-adaptive systems, in particular biological organisms. 
>
> LC
>
> On Sunday, February 10, 2019 at 5:34:01 PM UTC-6, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Two recent books:
>>
>> The First Minds: Caterpillars, Karyotes, and Consciousness
>> Arthur S. Reber
>> https://books.google.com/books/about/The_First_Minds.html?id=RBLEugEACAAJ
>>
>> Brain-Mind: From Neurons to Consciousness and Creativity
>> Paul Thagard
>> https://books.google.com/books/about/Brain_Mind.html?id=jJjHvAEACAAJ
>>
>> via
>> When Did Consciousness Begin?
>> Paul Thagard
>>
>> https://www.psychologytoday.com/intl/blog/hot-thought/201901/when-did-consciousness-begin
>>
>> Thagard's 10 hypotheses:
>>
>> 1. Consciousness has always existed, because God is conscious and eternal.
>>
>> 2. Consciousness began when the universe formed, around 13.7 billion 
>> years ago. 
>>
>> 3. Consciousness began with single-celled life, around 3.7 billion years 
>> ago (Reber). 
>>
>> 4. Consciousness began with multicellular plants, around 850 million 
>> years ago. 
>>
>> 5. Consciousness began when animals such as jellyfish got thousands of 
>> neurons, around 580 million years ago. 
>>
>> 6. Consciousness began when insects and fish developed larger brains with 
>> about a million neurons (honeybees) or 10 million neurons (zebrafish) 
>> around 560 million years ago. 
>>
>> 7. Consciousness began when animals such as birds and mammals developed 
>> much larger brains with hundreds of millions neurons, around 200 million 
>> years ago. [Thagard]
>>
>> 8. Consciousness began with humans, homo sapiens, around 200,000 years 
>> ago.
>>
>> 9. Consciousness began when human culture became advanced, around 3000 
>> years ago (Julian Jaynes).  
>>
>> 10. Consciousness does not exist, as it is just a scientific mistake 
>> (behaviorism} or a “user illusion” (Daniel Dennett). 
>>
>> - pt
>>
>>

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