Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 26 Feb 2019, at 23:45, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 4:39:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
> 
> 
> On 2/26/2019 2:02 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 2:51:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things. 
>>> 
>>> Brent 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> For those from the type theory, programming language theory, constructive 
>>> mathematics (whatever that clumping of schools is called):
>>> 
>>> Truth and existence are the same things.
>> 
>> So do those infer the existence of 2 and 4 from truth of 2+2=4?
>> 
>> Brent
>> 
>> Formulate arithmetic as a logic program and enter the query:
>> 
>>∃(X,Y):(X+X=Y)
>> 
>> Then via backtracking it prints out:
>> 
>> (X,Y) =
>> 
>> (0,0)
>> (1,2)
>> (2,4)
>> ...
>> 
>> 
> Formulate theology as a logic program and enter the query:
> 
>   E(x)[If P is a prefection, then Px]
> 
> Then it prints out:
> 
> x = Anslem's God.
> 
> That's the great thing about logic. You can prove anything if you just the 
> right axioms and rules of inference.
> 
> Brent
> 
> 
> 
> Automating Godel’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence with Higher-order 
> Automated Theorem Provers
> http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf

This illustrates only that we can “brainwash” machine, even machine which 
reason in a valid way, by using absurd definitions or premise. That will not 
convince Brent, I’m afraid. It is logically interesting though, and not 
completely trivial, but hardly convincing as an argument of metaphysics. You 
could as well say that infinity exists because ZF say so. It is not valid 
argument. It is an argument per-authority, unless you make clear that you 
assume the axioms of ZF.

Bruno


> 
> - pt
>  
> 
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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-27 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 26 Feb 2019, at 19:43, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 2/26/2019 2:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 26 Feb 2019, at 01:04, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 2/25/2019 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to physics, 
 but to the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the fundamental 
 reality. The theology of the universal machine is a priori quite non 
 Aristotelian: there is no Creator, and there is no Creation. Just a 
 universal dreamer which lost itself in an infinitely surprising structure 
 and wake up from time to time, or from numbers to numbers.
>>> There is according to St Anselm, who also thought that definitions bring 
>>> things into existence.
>> 
>> Yes, but God is defined by being perfect, and existence is considered as 
>> being good, and better than non existence. So, of course, God has to exists. 
>> Then Gödel made St-Anselmes more rigorous, by making that proof in the modal 
>> logic S5, which unfortunately presuppose a metaphysics incompatible with 
>> Mechanism.
>> Such notions of God are quite away from Plato, and makes sense with 
>> physicalism, and not much sense with Mechanism, where the notion of 
>> “fundamental truth" is the closer notion to the God of Plato. There is an 
>> understanding that such a notion of “fundamental truth”, at the origin of 
>> all types of truth, is transcendant, and this fits very well with the 
>> theology (G*) of the sound machines.
> 
> Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things.


Absolutely. And there are many sort of existence, even if we postulate only one 
“universal truth”.

With mechanism, it is absolutely undecidable if there is anything more than the 
sigma_1 truth (which gives already the universal dovetailing on all 
computations, and thus of all dreaming digital machines.

Then many sort of phenomenological existence are imposed by incompleteness. The 
absolute existence can be defined by the absolute truth of existential (not 
necessarily sigma_1) formula, like Ex(x is a prime number), or Ex(x is a 
halting computation), etc.

Most interesting notion of existence, like the psychological existence (or pain 
and suffering for example), or the material existence are explained in therm of 
the modal nuances enforced by incompleteness. Physical existence becomes 
something like []<>(Ex([]<>P(x)), with the box [] being the one of Z1*, X1*, or 
S4Grz1*.

It is the advantage of the Digital Mechanist hypothesis. It might be wrong, but 
it is mathematically precise, and physically testable.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> Only strong-atheists believe in the God of the (Roman) Christians. Educated 
>> christians usually does not, although they fake it since 529 (due to 
>> violence and authoritative argument only).
>> 
>> Of course, no argument at all can prove any existence, but all experiences 
>> makes some existence true, although not in a rationally justified way.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Brent
>>> 
 I need no more than a partial applicative algebra, and each choice of the 
 phi_i makes N into one, simply by defining an operation “*” in N such that 
 n * m = phi_n(m). There exist numbers k and s such that
 
 ((k * n) * m) = n
 (((s * n) * m) * r) = (n * r) * (m * r),
 
 for all m, n, r in N.
 
 And, the key point, the operation “*” can be defined in the arithmetical 
 language, and those statements are, for each n, m, r, provable in RA. I 
 have shown that the converse is true. It is a very elegant Turing complete 
 theory. With Indexical Digital Mechanism, it is absolutely undecidable if 
 the Universe is bigger than the sigma_1 reality. (But here I do a 
 blasphemy: that can only be entirely justified by G* *only*!, It is where 
 I have to insist that this is presented as a consequence of YD + CT (“yes 
 doctor” + Church-Turing thesis).
 
 Such theories are essentially undecidable. It means that not only they are 
 arithmetically incomplete, but all their effective consistent extensions 
 are too. They are creative, you cannot capture the semantic in the way it 
 could become complete, even in some imaginary domain concevable by the 
 machine/theory/number. The universal machine are never entirely satisfied 
 and a computation is always an escape forward, but their self-reflection 
 create a mess, and illusions.
 
 The sigma_1 arithmetical reality, as seen by the universal numbers which 
 lives there, in the first person undetermined sense, is something *very 
 big*. It generates infinitely many surprises. There are consistent 
 histories.
 
>>> -- 
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>>> "Everything List" group.
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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-26 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 4:39:25 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/26/2019 2:02 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 2:51:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things. 
>>>
>>> Brent 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> For those from the type theory, programming language theory, constructive 
>> mathematics (whatever that clumping of schools is called):
>>
>> Truth and existence are the same things.
>>
>>
>> So do those infer the existence of 2 and 4 from truth of 2+2=4?
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> Formulate arithmetic as a logic program and enter the query:
>
>∃(X,Y):(X+X=Y)
>
> Then via backtracking it prints out:
>
> (X,Y) =
>
> (0,0)
> (1,2)
> (2,4)
> ...
>
>
> Formulate theology as a logic program and enter the query:
>
>   E(x)[If P is a prefection, then Px]
>
> Then it prints out:
>
> x = Anslem's God.
>
> That's the great thing about logic. You can prove anything if you just the 
> right axioms and rules of inference.
>
> Brent
>



*Automating Godel’s Ontological Proof of God’s Existence with Higher-order 
Automated Theorem Provers*
http://page.mi.fu-berlin.de/cbenzmueller/papers/C40.pdf

- pt
 

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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-26 Thread Brent Meeker



On 2/26/2019 2:02 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 2:51:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things.

Brent



For those from the type theory, programming language theory,
constructive mathematics (whatever that clumping of schools is
called):

Truth and existence are the same things.


So do those infer the existence of 2 and 4 from truth of 2+2=4?

Brent


Formulate arithmetic as a logic program and enter the query:

∃(X,Y):(X+X=Y)

Then via backtracking it prints out:

(X,Y) =

(0,0)
(1,2)
(2,4)
...



Formulate theology as a logic program and enter the query:

  E(x)[If P is a prefection, then Px]

Then it prints out:

x = Anslem's God.

That's the great thing about logic. You can prove anything if you just 
the right axioms and rules of inference.


Brent

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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-26 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 2:51:39 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things. 
>>
>> Brent 
>>
>>
>>
> For those from the type theory, programming language theory, constructive 
> mathematics (whatever that clumping of schools is called):
>
> Truth and existence are the same things.
>
>
> So do those infer the existence of 2 and 4 from truth of 2+2=4?
>
> Brent
>

Formulate arithmetic as a logic program and enter the query:

   ∃(X,Y):(X+X=Y)

Then via backtracking it prints out:

(X,Y) =

(0,0)
(1,2)
(2,4)
...

 - pt

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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-26 Thread Brent Meeker



On 2/26/2019 11:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things.

Brent



For those from the type theory, programming language theory, 
constructive mathematics (whatever that clumping of schools is called):


Truth and existence are the same things.


So do those infer the existence of 2 and 4 from truth of 2+2=4?

Brent

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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-26 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, February 26, 2019 at 12:43:49 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things. 
>
> Brent 
>
>
>
For those from the type theory, programming language theory, constructive 
mathematics (whatever that clumping of schools is called):

Truth and existence are the same things.

- pt

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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-26 Thread Brent Meeker




On 2/26/2019 2:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Feb 2019, at 01:04, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 2/25/2019 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to physics, but to 
the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the fundamental reality. The 
theology of the universal machine is a priori quite non Aristotelian: there is 
no Creator, and there is no Creation. Just a universal dreamer which lost 
itself in an infinitely surprising structure and wake up from time to time, or 
from numbers to numbers.

There is according to St Anselm, who also thought that definitions bring things 
into existence.


Yes, but God is defined by being perfect, and existence is considered as being 
good, and better than non existence. So, of course, God has to exists. Then 
Gödel made St-Anselmes more rigorous, by making that proof in the modal logic 
S5, which unfortunately presuppose a metaphysics incompatible with Mechanism.
Such notions of God are quite away from Plato, and makes sense with physicalism, and 
not much sense with Mechanism, where the notion of “fundamental truth" is the 
closer notion to the God of Plato. There is an understanding that such a notion of 
“fundamental truth”, at the origin of all types of truth, is transcendant, and this 
fits very well with the theology (G*) of the sound machines.


Right.  Truth and existence are quite different things.

Brent



Only strong-atheists believe in the God of the (Roman) Christians. Educated 
christians usually does not, although they fake it since 529 (due to violence 
and authoritative argument only).

Of course, no argument at all can prove any existence, but all experiences 
makes some existence true, although not in a rationally justified way.

Bruno





Brent


I need no more than a partial applicative algebra, and each choice of the phi_i 
makes N into one, simply by defining an operation “*” in N such that n * m = 
phi_n(m). There exist numbers k and s such that

((k * n) * m) = n
(((s * n) * m) * r) = (n * r) * (m * r),

for all m, n, r in N.

And, the key point, the operation “*” can be defined in the arithmetical 
language, and those statements are, for each n, m, r, provable in RA. I have 
shown that the converse is true. It is a very elegant Turing complete theory. 
With Indexical Digital Mechanism, it is absolutely undecidable if the Universe 
is bigger than the sigma_1 reality. (But here I do a blasphemy: that can only 
be entirely justified by G* *only*!, It is where I have to insist that this is 
presented as a consequence of YD + CT (“yes doctor” + Church-Turing thesis).

Such theories are essentially undecidable. It means that not only they are 
arithmetically incomplete, but all their effective consistent extensions are 
too. They are creative, you cannot capture the semantic in the way it could 
become complete, even in some imaginary domain concevable by the 
machine/theory/number. The universal machine are never entirely satisfied and a 
computation is always an escape forward, but their self-reflection create a 
mess, and illusions.

The sigma_1 arithmetical reality, as seen by the universal numbers which lives 
there, in the first person undetermined sense, is something *very big*. It 
generates infinitely many surprises. There are consistent histories.


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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-26 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 26 Feb 2019, at 01:04, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 2/25/2019 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to physics, but 
>> to the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the fundamental reality. 
>> The theology of the universal machine is a priori quite non Aristotelian: 
>> there is no Creator, and there is no Creation. Just a universal dreamer 
>> which lost itself in an infinitely surprising structure and wake up from 
>> time to time, or from numbers to numbers.
> 
> There is according to St Anselm, who also thought that definitions bring 
> things into existence.


Yes, but God is defined by being perfect, and existence is considered as being 
good, and better than non existence. So, of course, God has to exists. Then 
Gödel made St-Anselmes more rigorous, by making that proof in the modal logic 
S5, which unfortunately presuppose a metaphysics incompatible with Mechanism. 
Such notions of God are quite away from Plato, and makes sense with 
physicalism, and not much sense with Mechanism, where the notion of 
“fundamental truth" is the closer notion to the God of Plato. There is an 
understanding that such a notion of “fundamental truth”, at the origin of all 
types of truth, is transcendant, and this fits very well with the theology (G*) 
of the sound machines.

Only strong-atheists believe in the God of the (Roman) Christians. Educated 
christians usually does not, although they fake it since 529 (due to violence 
and authoritative argument only).

Of course, no argument at all can prove any existence, but all experiences 
makes some existence true, although not in a rationally justified way.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> I need no more than a partial applicative algebra, and each choice of the 
>> phi_i makes N into one, simply by defining an operation “*” in N such that n 
>> * m = phi_n(m). There exist numbers k and s such that
>> 
>> ((k * n) * m) = n
>> (((s * n) * m) * r) = (n * r) * (m * r),
>> 
>> for all m, n, r in N.
>> 
>> And, the key point, the operation “*” can be defined in the arithmetical 
>> language, and those statements are, for each n, m, r, provable in RA. I have 
>> shown that the converse is true. It is a very elegant Turing complete 
>> theory. With Indexical Digital Mechanism, it is absolutely undecidable if 
>> the Universe is bigger than the sigma_1 reality. (But here I do a blasphemy: 
>> that can only be entirely justified by G* *only*!, It is where I have to 
>> insist that this is presented as a consequence of YD + CT (“yes doctor” + 
>> Church-Turing thesis).
>> 
>> Such theories are essentially undecidable. It means that not only they are 
>> arithmetically incomplete, but all their effective consistent extensions are 
>> too. They are creative, you cannot capture the semantic in the way it could 
>> become complete, even in some imaginary domain concevable by the 
>> machine/theory/number. The universal machine are never entirely satisfied 
>> and a computation is always an escape forward, but their self-reflection 
>> create a mess, and illusions.
>> 
>> The sigma_1 arithmetical reality, as seen by the universal numbers which 
>> lives there, in the first person undetermined sense, is something *very 
>> big*. It generates infinitely many surprises. There are consistent histories.
>> 
> 
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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-25 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 6:04:28 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 2/25/2019 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to 
> > physics, but to the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the 
> > fundamental reality. The theology of the universal machine is a priori 
> > quite non Aristotelian: there is no Creator, and there is no Creation. 
> > Just a universal dreamer which lost itself in an infinitely surprising 
> > structure and wake up from time to time, or from numbers to numbers. 
>
> There is according to St Anselm, who also thought that definitions bring 
> things into existence. 
>
> Brent 
>


Anselm would work for DC Films or Marvel Studios today.

- pt


> > 
> > I need no more than a partial applicative algebra, and each choice of 
> > the phi_i makes N into one, simply by defining an operation “*” in N 
> > such that n * m = phi_n(m). There exist numbers k and s such that 
> > 
> > ((k * n) * m) = n 
> > (((s * n) * m) * r) = (n * r) * (m * r), 
> > 
> > for all m, n, r in N. 
> > 
> > And, the key point, the operation “*” can be defined in the 
> > arithmetical language, and those statements are, for each n, m, r, 
> > provable in RA. I have shown that the converse is true. It is a very 
> > elegant Turing complete theory. With Indexical Digital Mechanism, it 
> > is absolutely undecidable if the Universe is bigger than the sigma_1 
> > reality. (But here I do a blasphemy: that can only be entirely 
> > justified by G* *only*!, It is where I have to insist that this is 
> > presented as a consequence of YD + CT (“yes doctor” + Church-Turing 
> > thesis). 
> > 
> > Such theories are essentially undecidable. It means that not only they 
> > are arithmetically incomplete, but all their effective consistent 
> > extensions are too. They are creative, you cannot capture the semantic 
> > in the way it could become complete, even in some imaginary domain 
> > concevable by the machine/theory/number. The universal machine are 
> > never entirely satisfied and a computation is always an escape 
> > forward, but their self-reflection create a mess, and illusions. 
> > 
> > The sigma_1 arithmetical reality, as seen by the universal numbers 
> > which lives there, in the first person undetermined sense, is 
> > something *very big*. It generates infinitely many surprises. There 
> > are consistent histories. 
> > 
>
>

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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-25 Thread Brent Meeker




On 2/25/2019 8:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to 
physics, but to the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the 
fundamental reality. The theology of the universal machine is a priori 
quite non Aristotelian: there is no Creator, and there is no Creation. 
Just a universal dreamer which lost itself in an infinitely surprising 
structure and wake up from time to time, or from numbers to numbers.


There is according to St Anselm, who also thought that definitions bring 
things into existence.


Brent



I need no more than a partial applicative algebra, and each choice of 
the phi_i makes N into one, simply by defining an operation “*” in N 
such that n * m = phi_n(m). There exist numbers k and s such that


((k * n) * m) = n
(((s * n) * m) * r) = (n * r) * (m * r),

for all m, n, r in N.

And, the key point, the operation “*” can be defined in the 
arithmetical language, and those statements are, for each n, m, r, 
provable in RA. I have shown that the converse is true. It is a very 
elegant Turing complete theory. With Indexical Digital Mechanism, it 
is absolutely undecidable if the Universe is bigger than the sigma_1 
reality. (But here I do a blasphemy: that can only be entirely 
justified by G* *only*!, It is where I have to insist that this is 
presented as a consequence of YD + CT (“yes doctor” + Church-Turing 
thesis).


Such theories are essentially undecidable. It means that not only they 
are arithmetically incomplete, but all their effective consistent 
extensions are too. They are creative, you cannot capture the semantic 
in the way it could become complete, even in some imaginary domain 
concevable by the machine/theory/number. The universal machine are 
never entirely satisfied and a computation is always an escape 
forward, but their self-reflection create a mess, and illusions.


The sigma_1 arithmetical reality, as seen by the universal numbers 
which lives there, in the first person undetermined sense, is 
something *very big*. It generates infinitely many surprises. There 
are consistent histories.




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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-25 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 25 Feb 2019, at 11:52, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 3:34:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 22 Feb 2019, at 18:44, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Some accept the possibility that there can be something that is immaterial.
> 
> Yes. We call them “mathematician”.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> This recent thesis I came across
> 
> Application and ontology in mathematics: a defence [defense] of fictionalism
> http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/18636/
> 
> leads to
> 
> pure mathematicians may be immaterialists,
> but applied mathematicians are materialists.
> 
> 
> 
> Abstract
> 
> The aim of this thesis is to defend fictionalism as a response to the 
> mathematical placement problem. As we will see, against the backdrop of 
> philosophical naturalism, it is difficult to see how to fit mathematical 
> objects into our best total scientific theory.
> 
Which “best total scientific theory”? Theology is still taboo, and there is no 
coherent physical theory of the universe, nor clear argument why that would 
exist.

Assuming mechanism, assuming more than the natural numbers, or than the 
combinators, or the programs, is just speculation on undecidable metaphysical 
ontologies. No doubt is put on physics as an art to put relevant order on the 
observable and predictable, but it can’t be the fundamental science. It has to 
be derived from the theology, that is from G* (actually from qZ1*, the 
observable-mode of self-reference, motivated through thought experience and/or 
Theaetetus/Parmenides/Moderatus/Plotinus. (It is an old alternative viewing of 
reality).



> On the other hand, the indispensability argument seems to suggest that 
> science itself mandates ontological commitment to mathematical entities.
> 

Not really. It needs we agree on some basic starting simple relation.

As I have demonstrate recently here, the relation 

Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)

Are enough. But classical logic + Robinson arithmetic is enough.

No need of ontological commitment other that not denying what we found almost 
obvious in primary school. You can remain formal, but it is simpler to do a bit 
of math and get the intuition that indeed it kick back and, well, 2+2 is not 
equal to 5.


> My goal is to undermine the indispensability argument by presenting an 
> account of applied mathematics as a kind of revolutionary prop-oriented 
> make-believe, the content of which is given by a mapping account of 
> mathematical applications. This kind of fictionalism faces a number of 
> challenges from various quarters. To begin with, we will have to face the 
> challenge of a different kind of indispensability argument, one that draws 
> ontological conclusions from the role of mathematical objects in scientific 
> explanations. We will then examine one recent theory of mathematical 
> scientific representation, and discover that the resulting position is 
> Platonistic. At this point we will introduce our fictionalist account, and 
> see that it defuses the Platonist consequences of mathematical 
> representation. The closing chapters of the thesis then take a 
> metaphilosophical turn. The legitmacy of a fictionalist response to the 
> mathematical placement problem is open to challenge from a metaphilosophical 
> perspective in two different ways: on the one hand, some modern pragmatists 
> have argued that this kind of metaphysics relies on questionable assumptions 
> about how langauge works. On the other, some modern philosophers have 
> developed forms of metaontological anti-realism that they believe undermine 
> the legitimacy of philosophical work in metaphysics. In the final two 
> chapters I defend the fictionalist account developed here against these 
> sceptical claims. I conclude that the fictionalist account of applied 
> mathematics offered here is our best hope for coping with the mathematical 
> placement problem. 
> 
> 


It illustrates the kind of difficulties you can meet when you take for granted 
the idea that the fundamental reality is physical. 

There is only a placement problem for mathematics because people commit 
themselves into some *place* which does not seem to be an hypothesis making 
thing simpler.

Fictionalism does not apply to the arithmetical reality, nor to physics, but to 
the naïve idea of a “physical universe” as being the fundamental reality. The 
theology of the universal machine is a priori quite non Aristotelian: there is 
no Creator, and there is no Creation. Just a universal dreamer which lost 
itself in an infinitely surprising structure and wake up from time to time, or 
from numbers to numbers.

I need no more than a partial applicative algebra, and each choice of the phi_i 
makes N into one, simply by defining an operation “*” in N such that n * m = 
phi_n(m). There exist numbers k and s such that

((k * n) * m) = n
(((s * n) * m) * r) = (n * r) * (m * r),

for all m, n, r in N.

And, the key point, the operation “*” can be defined in the 

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-25 Thread Philip Thrift


On Monday, February 25, 2019 at 3:34:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Feb 2019, at 18:44, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> Some accept the possibility that there can be something that is immaterial.
>
>
> Yes. We call them “mathematician”.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
This recent thesis I came across

*Application and ontology in mathematics: a defence [defense] of 
fictionalism*
http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/18636/

leads to

pure mathematicians may be immaterialists,
but applied mathematicians are materialists.



Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to defend fictionalism as a response to the 
mathematical placement problem. As we will see, against the backdrop of 
philosophical naturalism, it is difficult to see how to fit mathematical 
objects into our best total scientific theory. On the other hand, the 
indispensability argument seems to suggest that science itself mandates 
ontological commitment to mathematical entities. My goal is to undermine 
the indispensability argument by presenting an account of applied 
mathematics as a kind of revolutionary prop-oriented make-believe, the 
content of which is given by a mapping account of mathematical 
applications. This kind of fictionalism faces a number of challenges from 
various quarters. To begin with, we will have to face the challenge of a 
different kind of indispensability argument, one that draws ontological 
conclusions from the role of mathematical objects in scientific 
explanations. We will then examine one recent theory of mathematical 
scientific representation, and discover that the resulting position is 
Platonistic. At this point we will introduce our fictionalist account, and 
see that it defuses the Platonist consequences of mathematical 
representation. The closing chapters of the thesis then take a 
metaphilosophical turn. The legitmacy of a fictionalist response to the 
mathematical placement problem is open to challenge from a 
metaphilosophical perspective in two different ways: on the one hand, some 
modern pragmatists have argued that this kind of metaphysics relies on 
questionable assumptions about how langauge works. On the other, some 
modern philosophers have developed forms of metaontological anti-realism 
that they believe undermine the legitimacy of philosophical work in 
metaphysics. In the final two chapters I defend the fictionalist account 
developed here against these sceptical claims. I conclude that the 
fictionalist account of applied mathematics offered here is our best hope 
for coping with the mathematical placement problem. 


- pt

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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-25 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 22 Feb 2019, at 18:44, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 3:57:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 21 Feb 2019, at 20:26, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 8:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 18 Feb 2019, at 20:18, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
>>> > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/0SIiavzPI84/jUkaOlUdAwAJ 
>>> > 
>>> This is the link to the reply in the topic "When Did Consciousness Begin?" 
>>> As I have said before, the modal logic and numerical semantics written 
>>> there is one way to approach the science of experience. But I think 
>>> ultimately this is a logical semantics (not a material semantics), but of 
>>> course belief in an actual numerical reality makes a difference.
>>> 
>>> Here is something more along those lines:
>>> 
>>> On modal logic and consciousness:
>>> 
>>> A Modal Logic for Gödelian Intuition
>>> Hasen Khudairi
>>> https://philarchive.org/archive/KHUAML 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness
>>> Jim Cunningham [ https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/ 
>>>  ]
>>> https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/Cunningham.pdf 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> However I think that there is ultimately a material semantics.
>> 
>> I can imagine a semantic for some theory of matter, but matter itself cannot 
>> be semantical. What would that mean? Even without mechanism, I have no idea 
>> what that could mean.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I define material semantics here:
>> 
>> Material Semantics for Unconventional Programming
>> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>  
>>material semantics =
>> 
>>  physical (incl. chemical+biological)
>>  +
>>  psychical (or experiential) semantics
>> 
>> 
> 
> That does not assume the existence of an ontological matter. 
> 
> 
> 
>>  
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> As for the ancient Greeks, forget Aristotle and look to Epicurus.
>> 
>> I assume mechanism, and I just listen to the universal machine, with machine 
>> taken in the sense of Church and Turing. The notion of matter is not assumed 
>> in such definition, and we know, basically since Gödel, that they exist in 
>> arithmetic (semantically, of course).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Some "offbeat" materialism I just came across that my be of interest:
>>> 
>>> Terry Eagleton 
>>> Materialism, Yale University Press
>>> excerpt 1: https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=PErJDQAAQBAJ 
>>> 
>>> excerpt 2: 
>>> http://blog.yalebooks.com/2017/02/09/material-theology-and-christian-religion/
>>>  
>>> 
>> Very nice. I would not have dare to suggest that christianism is so much 
>> materialist. I am not sure this was true during the five first hundreds 
>> years, but it is dogmatically so after 529 (closure of Plato’s academy).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Matter is an aggregation of cuisines whose recipes arise and combine to 
>>> form the cookbook of nature.
>> 
>> No problem with this, on the contrary. A recipe is another name for an 
>> algorithm, which is typically not made of matter, but exist in arithmetic. 
>> 
>> And for the cooking, there is no need distinguish primary matter, which 
>> cannot exist with Mechanism, and matter, which obviously exist 
>> phenomenologically. 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Of course all algorithms (technically) are made of matter:
> 
> I disagree. An algorithm is an immaterial recipe to compute a function, or to 
> implement a process, and you can do that in any universal machinery, 
> implemented in the physical reality or not. The physical reality itself is 
> not produced by an algorithm, but emerges from the first person indeterminacy 
> on all consistent computational histories, structure by the observable mode. 
> That explains quanta and qualia, in a testable (and tested) way.
> 
> (I'don't know what this test is.)


It consists, roughly, in comparing the quantum logic extrapolated from 
observation, with the quantum logics "in the head of the machine”.  We get 
three quantum logics “in the head of the machine”: the one given (all the time 
with p for a sigma_1 (computable) sentences by []p & p, []p & <>t, and []p & 
<>t & p.
([]p is an abbreviation of Gödel’s beweisbar, <>p is ~[]~p).

Each modal nuance (with “ & <>p”, or “& p” and p sigma_1) give modal logics 
mimicking quantum logic (like S4Grz gives logics mimicking 

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-22 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, February 22, 2019 at 3:57:49 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Feb 2019, at 20:26, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 8:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 Feb 2019, at 20:18, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>> On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> > 
>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/0SIiavzPI84/jUkaOlUdAwAJ
>> This is the link to the reply in the topic "When Did Consciousness 
>> Begin?" As I have said before, the modal logic and numerical semantics 
>> written there is one way to approach the science of experience. But I think 
>> ultimately this is a logical semantics (not a material semantics), but of 
>> course belief in an actual numerical reality makes a difference.
>>
>> Here is something more along those lines:
>>
>> On modal logic and consciousness:
>>
>> *A Modal Logic for Gödelian Intuition*
>> Hasen Khudairi
>> https://philarchive.org/archive/KHUAML
>>
>> *Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness*
>> Jim Cunningham [ https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/ ]
>> https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/Cunningham.pdf
>>
>>
>> However I think that there is ultimately a material semantics.
>>
>>
>> I can imagine a semantic for some theory of matter, but matter itself 
>> cannot be semantical. What would that mean? Even without mechanism, I have 
>> no idea what that could mean.
>>
>>
>>
>>
> I define material semantics here:
>
> *Material Semantics for Unconventional Programming*
>
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
>
>
>  
>
>material semantics =
>
>  physical (*incl.* chemical+biological)
>  +
>  psychical (or experiential) semantics
>
>
> That does not assume the existence of an ontological matter. 
>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>
>>
>> As for the ancient Greeks, forget Aristotle and look to Epicurus.
>>
>>
>> I assume mechanism, and I just listen to the universal machine, with 
>> machine taken in the sense of Church and Turing. The notion of matter is 
>> not assumed in such definition, and we know, basically since Gödel, that 
>> they exist in arithmetic (semantically, of course).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Some "offbeat" materialism I just came across that my be of interest:
>>
>> Terry Eagleton 
>> *Materialism*, Yale University Press
>> excerpt 1: https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=PErJDQAAQBAJ
>> excerpt 2: 
>> http://blog.yalebooks.com/2017/02/09/material-theology-and-christian-religion/
>>
>>
>> Very nice. I would not have dare to suggest that christianism is so much 
>> materialist. I am not sure this was true during the five first hundreds 
>> years, but it is dogmatically so after 529 (closure of Plato’s academy).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *Matter is an aggregation of cuisines whose recipes arise and combine to 
>> form the cookbook of nature.*
>>
>>
>> No problem with this, on the contrary. A recipe is another name for an 
>> algorithm, which is typically not made of matter, but exist in arithmetic. 
>>
>> And for the cooking, there is no need distinguish primary matter, which 
>> cannot exist with Mechanism, and matter, which obviously exist 
>> phenomenologically. 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>
>
> Of course all algorithms (technically) are made of matter:
>
>
> I disagree. An algorithm is an immaterial recipe to compute a function, or 
> to implement a process, and you can do that in any universal machinery, 
> implemented in the physical reality or not. The physical reality itself is 
> not produced by an algorithm, but emerges from the first person 
> indeterminacy on all consistent computational histories, structure by the 
> observable mode. That explains quanta and qualia, in a testable (and 
> tested) way.
>

(I'don't know what this test is.)



Some accept the possibility that there can be something that is immaterial.


In philosophy, *antimaterialism* can mean one of several metaphysical or 
religious beliefs that are specifically opposed to materialism 
, the notion that *only matter 
exists*. These beliefs include:

   - • Immaterialism , a 
   philosophy branching from George Berkeley of which his idealism is a type
   - •  Dualism (philosophy of 
   mind) , a 
   philosophy which includes the claim that mental phenomena are, in some 
   respects, non-physical
   - •  Gnosticism 
   , a general class of religious 
   movements which hold that human beings have divine souls trapped in a 
   material world
   - •  Idealism 
   , which holds that the ultimate 
   nature of reality is based on 

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-22 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 21 Feb 2019, at 20:26, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 8:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 18 Feb 2019, at 20:18, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/0SIiavzPI84/jUkaOlUdAwAJ 
>> > 
>> This is the link to the reply in the topic "When Did Consciousness Begin?" 
>> As I have said before, the modal logic and numerical semantics written there 
>> is one way to approach the science of experience. But I think ultimately 
>> this is a logical semantics (not a material semantics), but of course belief 
>> in an actual numerical reality makes a difference.
>> 
>> Here is something more along those lines:
>> 
>> On modal logic and consciousness:
>> 
>> A Modal Logic for Gödelian Intuition
>> Hasen Khudairi
>> https://philarchive.org/archive/KHUAML 
>> 
>> 
>> Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness
>> Jim Cunningham [ https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/ 
>>  ]
>> https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/Cunningham.pdf 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> However I think that there is ultimately a material semantics.
> 
> I can imagine a semantic for some theory of matter, but matter itself cannot 
> be semantical. What would that mean? Even without mechanism, I have no idea 
> what that could mean.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> I define material semantics here:
> 
> Material Semantics for Unconventional Programming
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/
> 
> 
>  
>material semantics =
> 
>  physical (incl. chemical+biological)
>  +
>  psychical (or experiential) semantics
> 
> 

That does not assume the existence of an ontological matter. 



>  
> 
> 
>> 
>> As for the ancient Greeks, forget Aristotle and look to Epicurus.
> 
> I assume mechanism, and I just listen to the universal machine, with machine 
> taken in the sense of Church and Turing. The notion of matter is not assumed 
> in such definition, and we know, basically since Gödel, that they exist in 
> arithmetic (semantically, of course).
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Some "offbeat" materialism I just came across that my be of interest:
>> 
>> Terry Eagleton 
>> Materialism, Yale University Press
>> excerpt 1: https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=PErJDQAAQBAJ 
>> 
>> excerpt 2: 
>> http://blog.yalebooks.com/2017/02/09/material-theology-and-christian-religion/
>>  
>> 
> Very nice. I would not have dare to suggest that christianism is so much 
> materialist. I am not sure this was true during the five first hundreds 
> years, but it is dogmatically so after 529 (closure of Plato’s academy).
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Matter is an aggregation of cuisines whose recipes arise and combine to form 
>> the cookbook of nature.
> 
> No problem with this, on the contrary. A recipe is another name for an 
> algorithm, which is typically not made of matter, but exist in arithmetic. 
> 
> And for the cooking, there is no need distinguish primary matter, which 
> cannot exist with Mechanism, and matter, which obviously exist 
> phenomenologically. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Of course all algorithms (technically) are made of matter:

I disagree. An algorithm is an immaterial recipe to compute a function, or to 
implement a process, and you can do that in any universal machinery, 
implemented in the physical reality or not. The physical reality itself is not 
produced by an algorithm, but emerges from the first person indeterminacy on 
all consistent computational histories, structure by the observable mode. That 
explains quanta and qualia, in a testable (and tested) way.




> 
> They are arrangements of glyphs of ink on paper  (like in a book), or are 
> electronic dots on a screen (like you are looking at right now) or are 
> magnetic polarities stored on a hard drive, etc.

This confuses a bit the truth of “2+2=4” and “”2+2=4””.



> 
> That matter "has" recipes (or algorithms) is the dialectics of Codicalism.


Matter can implement algorithm, with mechanism that is a (non obvious) theorem. 
But that does not make matter primary. It belongs to the sharable dreams of the 
universal machine.

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com 
> 

Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-21 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, February 21, 2019 at 8:23:15 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Feb 2019, at 20:18, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
> On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/0SIiavzPI84/jUkaOlUdAwAJ
> This is the link to the reply in the topic "When Did Consciousness Begin?" 
> As I have said before, the modal logic and numerical semantics written 
> there is one way to approach the science of experience. But I think 
> ultimately this is a logical semantics (not a material semantics), but of 
> course belief in an actual numerical reality makes a difference.
>
> Here is something more along those lines:
>
> On modal logic and consciousness:
>
> *A Modal Logic for Gödelian Intuition*
> Hasen Khudairi
> https://philarchive.org/archive/KHUAML
>
> *Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness*
> Jim Cunningham [ https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/ ]
> https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/Cunningham.pdf
>
>
> However I think that there is ultimately a material semantics.
>
>
> I can imagine a semantic for some theory of matter, but matter itself 
> cannot be semantical. What would that mean? Even without mechanism, I have 
> no idea what that could mean.
>
>
>
>
I define material semantics here:

*Material Semantics for Unconventional Programming*
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/12/14/material-semantics-for-unconventional-programming/


 

   material semantics =

 physical (*incl.* chemical+biological)
 +
 psychical (or experiential) semantics

 

>
>
>
> As for the ancient Greeks, forget Aristotle and look to Epicurus.
>
>
> I assume mechanism, and I just listen to the universal machine, with 
> machine taken in the sense of Church and Turing. The notion of matter is 
> not assumed in such definition, and we know, basically since Gödel, that 
> they exist in arithmetic (semantically, of course).
>
>
>
>
>
>
> Some "offbeat" materialism I just came across that my be of interest:
>
> Terry Eagleton 
> *Materialism*, Yale University Press
> excerpt 1: https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=PErJDQAAQBAJ
> excerpt 2: 
> http://blog.yalebooks.com/2017/02/09/material-theology-and-christian-religion/
>
>
> Very nice. I would not have dare to suggest that christianism is so much 
> materialist. I am not sure this was true during the five first hundreds 
> years, but it is dogmatically so after 529 (closure of Plato’s academy).
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Matter is an aggregation of cuisines whose recipes arise and combine to 
> form the cookbook of nature.*
>
>
> No problem with this, on the contrary. A recipe is another name for an 
> algorithm, which is typically not made of matter, but exist in arithmetic. 
>
> And for the cooking, there is no need distinguish primary matter, which 
> cannot exist with Mechanism, and matter, which obviously exist 
> phenomenologically. 
>
> Bruno
>
>


Of course all algorithms (technically) are made of matter:

They are arrangements of glyphs of ink on paper  (like in a book), or are 
electronic dots on a screen (like you are looking at right now) or are 
magnetic polarities stored on a hard drive, etc.

That matter "has" recipes (or algorithms) is the dialectics of Codicalism.

- pt

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Re: Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-21 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 18 Feb 2019, at 20:18, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/0SIiavzPI84/jUkaOlUdAwAJ
> This is the link to the reply in the topic "When Did Consciousness Begin?" As 
> I have said before, the modal logic and numerical semantics written there is 
> one way to approach the science of experience. But I think ultimately this is 
> a logical semantics (not a material semantics), but of course belief in an 
> actual numerical reality makes a difference.
> 
> Here is something more along those lines:
> 
> On modal logic and consciousness:
> 
> A Modal Logic for Gödelian Intuition
> Hasen Khudairi
> https://philarchive.org/archive/KHUAML
> 
> Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness
> Jim Cunningham [ https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/ ]
> https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/Cunningham.pdf
> 
> 
> However I think that there is ultimately a material semantics.

I can imagine a semantic for some theory of matter, but matter itself cannot be 
semantical. What would that mean? Even without mechanism, I have no idea what 
that could mean.





> 
> As for the ancient Greeks, forget Aristotle and look to Epicurus.

I assume mechanism, and I just listen to the universal machine, with machine 
taken in the sense of Church and Turing. The notion of matter is not assumed in 
such definition, and we know, basically since Gödel, that they exist in 
arithmetic (semantically, of course).



> 
> 
> 
> Some "offbeat" materialism I just came across that my be of interest:
> 
> Terry Eagleton 
> Materialism, Yale University Press
> excerpt 1: https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=PErJDQAAQBAJ
> excerpt 2: 
> http://blog.yalebooks.com/2017/02/09/material-theology-and-christian-religion/

Very nice. I would not have dare to suggest that christianism is so much 
materialist. I am not sure this was true during the five first hundreds years, 
but it is dogmatically so after 529 (closure of Plato’s academy).



> 
> 
> 
> Matter is an aggregation of cuisines whose recipes arise and combine to form 
> the cookbook of nature.

No problem with this, on the contrary. A recipe is another name for an 
algorithm, which is typically not made of matter, but exist in arithmetic. 

And for the cooking, there is no need distinguish primary matter, which cannot 
exist with Mechanism, and matter, which obviously exist phenomenologically. 

Bruno




> 
> - pt
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Modal logic, consciousness, and matter

2019-02-18 Thread Philip Thrift
On Monday, February 18, 2019 at 9:14:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/0SIiavzPI84/jUkaOlUdAwAJ
This is the link to the reply in the topic "When Did Consciousness Begin?" 
As I have said before, the modal logic and numerical semantics written 
there is one way to approach the science of experience. But I think 
ultimately this is a logical semantics (not a material semantics), but of 
course belief in an actual numerical reality makes a difference.

Here is something more along those lines:

On modal logic and consciousness:

*A Modal Logic for Gödelian Intuition*
Hasen Khudairi
https://philarchive.org/archive/KHUAML

*Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness*
Jim Cunningham [ https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/ ]
https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~rjc/Cunningham.pdf


However I think that there is ultimately a material semantics.

As for the ancient Greeks, forget Aristotle and look to Epicurus.



Some "offbeat" materialism I just came across that my be of interest:

Terry Eagleton 
*Materialism*, Yale University Press
excerpt 1: https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=PErJDQAAQBAJ
excerpt 2: 
http://blog.yalebooks.com/2017/02/09/material-theology-and-christian-religion/



*Matter is an aggregation of cuisines whose recipes arise and combine to 
form the cookbook of nature.*

- pt

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