Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-21 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 19 Apr 2019, at 19:42, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, April 19, 2019 at 11:23:40 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 19 Apr 2019, at 14:37, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, April 19, 2019 at 3:18:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 18 Apr 2019, at 21:10, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
> 
> 
>> SNIP
> 
> 
> 
>> The whole point of the fundamental research consists in finding a theory 
>> which account for all theories. The goal is to unify the different 
>> knowledge/belief, without dismissing data (like physics do with respect to 
>> consciousness and qualia).
>> 
>> The laws of nature are reduce to a statistics of number dream, where a dream 
>> is a computation supporting one, or a collection of Löbian machine(s).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> That is sort of a set-up for the the argument of Philip Goff's book.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Galileo's Error
>> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
>> Philip Goff
>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> If we want a science of consciousness, we will have to rethink what 
>> 'science' is.
> 
> 
> I am not sure that makes sense. Unless you are pointing on some misconception 
> of science, like the common belief that “science has opted for materialism, 
> when the filed of theology/metaphysics/philosophy-mind/matter has been 
> artificially separated from science for (bad) political purpose, (like 
> genetic has been in the URSS for awhile).
> 
> I don’t believe in the separation of science and religion. 
> 
> Science is just modesty, never claiming truth, proposing precise enough 
> theory and means of testing them.
> 
> Science does not really exist. What exists is human having a scientific 
> attitude, and this does not depend on any domain investigated, be it 
> gardening or metaphysics, or theology.
> 
> The lasting boring debate “God/Not-God” is almost like a trick to make us 
> forget that the original question of the greek was about the reality of the 
> nature: is reality what we see/observe/measure, or is that observable reality 
> only the border, the projection of a deeper and simpler reality. 
> Mathematics/music was conceived as the concurrent reality of physics, in part 
> to the refutation of the earlier Pythagorean conception of numbers (the 
> arithmetical reality kicks back).
> 
> Science is a fuzzy terms. In the theology of the universal machine, theology 
> itself extends science, but it does it in a justifiable way from a general 
> notion of Truth, itself definable mathematically, when assuming the Mechanist 
> hypothesis, and understanding the need of the act of faith, when saying “yes” 
> to the doctor. The modesty comes from there, notably, and the ethic of 
> mechanism is the right to say “no” to the (digitalist) doctor.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Understanding how brains produce consciousness is one of the great 
>> scientific challenges of our age.
> 
> 
> The mechanist solution is that there is no brain, but a web of computations 
> (which provably exist in the arithmetical reality, or any “Turing-complete” 
> reality).
> 
> Then the appearance of brain is explained by the relative state 
> interpretation of arithmetic, on which all self-referential correct machine 
> can be shown to converge (constructively so at the propositional level, but 
> the general theory is highly undecidable, as we could expect).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Some philosophers argue that the mystery is so deep it will never be solved.
> 
> With Mechanism, this becomes a (meta) theorem, if by “solve” you mean 
> rationally justify. 
> When a (Löbian) universal machine introspect itself deep enough, it can only 
> blow its mind, it is bigger than the transfinite. 
> 
> When the machine pushes reason far away, she discover that, necessarily if 
> she feel to be sound, there has to be a corona of surrational truth, in 
> between the truth which are rationally justifiable (with or without Oracle) 
> and those which are false (irrational). 
> 
> The machine can understand by reason that there is something above reason, 
> and which is also lawful. If we keep modestly the fact that we need some 
> faith, (yes doctor), then from that we can derive a large portion of the true 
> but non rationally derivable truth. Machines have a negative theology, with 
> non communicable parts except by referring to the non rational character of 
> the hypothesis itself. That is why, actually, it *is* a theology, and after 
> all, it is a form of belief in some type of reincarnation (the digital 
> brain/body).
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Others believe our standard scientific methods for investigating the brain 
>> will eventually produce an answer.
> 
> 
> I can explain why, in the Digital Mechanist frame, we get an answer with the 
> standart scientific method, even if a large part of that answer is that the 
> soul, god, 

Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-21 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, April 19, 2019 at 12:42:50 PM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, April 19, 2019 at 11:23:40 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 19 Apr 2019, at 14:37, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, April 19, 2019 at 3:18:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 18 Apr 2019, at 21:10, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> SNIP
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The whole point of the fundamental research consists in finding a theory 
>>> which account for all theories. The goal is to unify the different 
>>> knowledge/belief, without dismissing data (like physics do with respect to 
>>> consciousness and qualia).
>>>
>>> The laws of nature are reduce to a statistics of number dream, where a 
>>> dream is a computation supporting one, or a collection of Löbian machine(s).
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> That is sort of a set-up for the the argument of Philip Goff's book.
>>
>>
>>
>> *Galileo's Error*
>> *Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness*
>> Philip Goff
>>
>> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>>
>>
>> If we want a science of consciousness, we will have to rethink what 
>> 'science' is.
>>
>>
>>
>> I am not sure that makes sense. Unless you are pointing on some 
>> misconception of science, like the common belief that “science has opted 
>> for materialism, when the filed of 
>> theology/metaphysics/philosophy-mind/matter has been artificially separated 
>> from science for (bad) political purpose, (like genetic has been in the 
>> URSS for awhile).
>>
>> I don’t believe in the separation of science and religion. 
>>
>> Science is just modesty, never claiming truth, proposing precise enough 
>> theory and means of testing them.
>>
>> Science does not really exist. What exists is human having a scientific 
>> attitude, and this does not depend on any domain investigated, be it 
>> gardening or metaphysics, or theology.
>>
>> The lasting boring debate “God/Not-God” is almost like a trick to make us 
>> forget that the original question of the greek was about the reality of the 
>> nature: is reality what we see/observe/measure, or is that observable 
>> reality only the border, the projection of a deeper and simpler reality. 
>> Mathematics/music was conceived as the concurrent reality of physics, in 
>> part to the refutation of the earlier Pythagorean conception of numbers 
>> (the arithmetical reality kicks back).
>>
>> Science is a fuzzy terms. In the theology of the universal machine, 
>> theology itself extends science, but it does it in a justifiable way from a 
>> general notion of Truth, itself definable mathematically, when assuming the 
>> Mechanist hypothesis, and understanding the need of the act of faith, when 
>> saying “yes” to the doctor. The modesty comes from there, notably, and the 
>> ethic of mechanism is the right to say “no” to the (digitalist) doctor.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Understanding how brains produce consciousness is one of the great 
>> scientific challenges of our age.
>>
>>
>>
>> The mechanist solution is that there is no brain, but a web of 
>> computations (which provably exist in the arithmetical reality, or any 
>> “Turing-complete” reality).
>>
>> Then the appearance of brain is explained by the relative state 
>> interpretation of arithmetic, on which all self-referential correct machine 
>> can be shown to converge (constructively so at the propositional level, but 
>> the general theory is highly undecidable, as we could expect).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Some philosophers argue that the mystery is so deep it will never be 
>> solved. 
>>
>>
>> With Mechanism, this becomes a (meta) theorem, if by “solve” you mean 
>> rationally justify. 
>> When a (Löbian) universal machine introspect itself deep enough, it can 
>> only blow its mind, it is bigger than the transfinite. 
>>
>> When the machine pushes reason far away, she discover that, necessarily 
>> if she feel to be sound, there has to be a corona of surrational truth, in 
>> between the truth which are rationally justifiable (with or without Oracle) 
>> and those which are false (irrational). 
>>
>> The machine can understand by reason that there is something above 
>> reason, and which is also lawful. If we keep modestly the fact that we need 
>> some faith, (yes doctor), then from that we can derive a large portion of 
>> the true but non rationally derivable truth. Machines have a negative 
>> theology, with non communicable parts except by referring to the non 
>> rational character of the hypothesis itself. That is why, actually, it *is* 
>> a theology, and after all, it is a form of belief in some type of 
>> reincarnation (the digital brain/body).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Others believe our standard scientific methods for investigating the 
>> brain will eventually produce an answer.
>>
>>
>>
>> I can explain why, in the Digital Mechanist frame, we get an answer with 
>> the standart scientific method, even if a large part of that answer is that 
>> the 

Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-19 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, April 19, 2019 at 11:23:40 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 19 Apr 2019, at 14:37, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, April 19, 2019 at 3:18:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 Apr 2019, at 21:10, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>
> SNIP
>>
>
>
>
> The whole point of the fundamental research consists in finding a theory 
>> which account for all theories. The goal is to unify the different 
>> knowledge/belief, without dismissing data (like physics do with respect to 
>> consciousness and qualia).
>>
>> The laws of nature are reduce to a statistics of number dream, where a 
>> dream is a computation supporting one, or a collection of Löbian machine(s).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> That is sort of a set-up for the the argument of Philip Goff's book.
>
>
>
> *Galileo's Error*
> *Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness*
> Philip Goff
>
> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
>
>
> If we want a science of consciousness, we will have to rethink what 
> 'science' is.
>
>
>
> I am not sure that makes sense. Unless you are pointing on some 
> misconception of science, like the common belief that “science has opted 
> for materialism, when the filed of 
> theology/metaphysics/philosophy-mind/matter has been artificially separated 
> from science for (bad) political purpose, (like genetic has been in the 
> URSS for awhile).
>
> I don’t believe in the separation of science and religion. 
>
> Science is just modesty, never claiming truth, proposing precise enough 
> theory and means of testing them.
>
> Science does not really exist. What exists is human having a scientific 
> attitude, and this does not depend on any domain investigated, be it 
> gardening or metaphysics, or theology.
>
> The lasting boring debate “God/Not-God” is almost like a trick to make us 
> forget that the original question of the greek was about the reality of the 
> nature: is reality what we see/observe/measure, or is that observable 
> reality only the border, the projection of a deeper and simpler reality. 
> Mathematics/music was conceived as the concurrent reality of physics, in 
> part to the refutation of the earlier Pythagorean conception of numbers 
> (the arithmetical reality kicks back).
>
> Science is a fuzzy terms. In the theology of the universal machine, 
> theology itself extends science, but it does it in a justifiable way from a 
> general notion of Truth, itself definable mathematically, when assuming the 
> Mechanist hypothesis, and understanding the need of the act of faith, when 
> saying “yes” to the doctor. The modesty comes from there, notably, and the 
> ethic of mechanism is the right to say “no” to the (digitalist) doctor.
>
>
>
>
>
> Understanding how brains produce consciousness is one of the great 
> scientific challenges of our age.
>
>
>
> The mechanist solution is that there is no brain, but a web of 
> computations (which provably exist in the arithmetical reality, or any 
> “Turing-complete” reality).
>
> Then the appearance of brain is explained by the relative state 
> interpretation of arithmetic, on which all self-referential correct machine 
> can be shown to converge (constructively so at the propositional level, but 
> the general theory is highly undecidable, as we could expect).
>
>
>
>
>
> Some philosophers argue that the mystery is so deep it will never be 
> solved. 
>
>
> With Mechanism, this becomes a (meta) theorem, if by “solve” you mean 
> rationally justify. 
> When a (Löbian) universal machine introspect itself deep enough, it can 
> only blow its mind, it is bigger than the transfinite. 
>
> When the machine pushes reason far away, she discover that, necessarily if 
> she feel to be sound, there has to be a corona of surrational truth, in 
> between the truth which are rationally justifiable (with or without Oracle) 
> and those which are false (irrational). 
>
> The machine can understand by reason that there is something above reason, 
> and which is also lawful. If we keep modestly the fact that we need some 
> faith, (yes doctor), then from that we can derive a large portion of the 
> true but non rationally derivable truth. Machines have a negative theology, 
> with non communicable parts except by referring to the non rational 
> character of the hypothesis itself. That is why, actually, it *is* a 
> theology, and after all, it is a form of belief in some type of 
> reincarnation (the digital brain/body).
>
>
>
>
> Others believe our standard scientific methods for investigating the brain 
> will eventually produce an answer.
>
>
>
> I can explain why, in the Digital Mechanist frame, we get an answer with 
> the standart scientific method, even if a large part of that answer is that 
> the soul, god, and all that, are only justifiable through the 
> meta-assumption of mechanism, but the level can be as low as we want, to 
> get the consequences.
>
> It is just that the stander scientific method 

Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 19 Apr 2019, at 14:37, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, April 19, 2019 at 3:18:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 18 Apr 2019, at 21:10, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 


> SNIP



> The whole point of the fundamental research consists in finding a theory 
> which account for all theories. The goal is to unify the different 
> knowledge/belief, without dismissing data (like physics do with respect to 
> consciousness and qualia).
> 
> The laws of nature are reduce to a statistics of number dream, where a dream 
> is a computation supporting one, or a collection of Löbian machine(s).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> That is sort of a set-up for the the argument of Philip Goff's book.
> 
> 
> 
> Galileo's Error
> Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness
> Philip Goff
> https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/111/1117019/galileo-s-error/9781846046018.html
> 
> 
> If we want a science of consciousness, we will have to rethink what 'science' 
> is.


I am not sure that makes sense. Unless you are pointing on some misconception 
of science, like the common belief that “science has opted for materialism, 
when the filed of theology/metaphysics/philosophy-mind/matter has been 
artificially separated from science for (bad) political purpose, (like genetic 
has been in the URSS for awhile).

I don’t believe in the separation of science and religion. 

Science is just modesty, never claiming truth, proposing precise enough theory 
and means of testing them.

Science does not really exist. What exists is human having a scientific 
attitude, and this does not depend on any domain investigated, be it gardening 
or metaphysics, or theology.

The lasting boring debate “God/Not-God” is almost like a trick to make us 
forget that the original question of the greek was about the reality of the 
nature: is reality what we see/observe/measure, or is that observable reality 
only the border, the projection of a deeper and simpler reality. 
Mathematics/music was conceived as the concurrent reality of physics, in part 
to the refutation of the earlier Pythagorean conception of numbers (the 
arithmetical reality kicks back).

Science is a fuzzy terms. In the theology of the universal machine, theology 
itself extends science, but it does it in a justifiable way from a general 
notion of Truth, itself definable mathematically, when assuming the Mechanist 
hypothesis, and understanding the need of the act of faith, when saying “yes” 
to the doctor. The modesty comes from there, notably, and the ethic of 
mechanism is the right to say “no” to the (digitalist) doctor.




> 
> Understanding how brains produce consciousness is one of the great scientific 
> challenges of our age.


The mechanist solution is that there is no brain, but a web of computations 
(which provably exist in the arithmetical reality, or any “Turing-complete” 
reality).

Then the appearance of brain is explained by the relative state interpretation 
of arithmetic, on which all self-referential correct machine can be shown to 
converge (constructively so at the propositional level, but the general theory 
is highly undecidable, as we could expect).





> Some philosophers argue that the mystery is so deep it will never be solved.

With Mechanism, this becomes a (meta) theorem, if by “solve” you mean 
rationally justify. 
When a (Löbian) universal machine introspect itself deep enough, it can only 
blow its mind, it is bigger than the transfinite. 

When the machine pushes reason far away, she discover that, necessarily if she 
feel to be sound, there has to be a corona of surrational truth, in between the 
truth which are rationally justifiable (with or without Oracle) and those which 
are false (irrational). 

The machine can understand by reason that there is something above reason, and 
which is also lawful. If we keep modestly the fact that we need some faith, 
(yes doctor), then from that we can derive a large portion of the true but non 
rationally derivable truth. Machines have a negative theology, with non 
communicable parts except by referring to the non rational character of the 
hypothesis itself. That is why, actually, it *is* a theology, and after all, it 
is a form of belief in some type of reincarnation (the digital brain/body).




> Others believe our standard scientific methods for investigating the brain 
> will eventually produce an answer.


I can explain why, in the Digital Mechanist frame, we get an answer with the 
standart scientific method, even if a large part of that answer is that the 
soul, god, and all that, are only justifiable through the meta-assumption of 
mechanism, but the level can be as low as we want, to get the consequences.

It is just that the stander scientific method apply to mechanism makes the 
hypothesis of materialism/physicalism testable, and without QM, I would say 
that Mechanism would be rightly considered refuted. 



> 
> In Galileo's Error, Professor Philip Goff proposes a third way, arguing 

Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-19 Thread Philip Thrift


On Friday, April 19, 2019 at 3:18:14 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Apr 2019, at 21:10, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 8:56:54 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 Apr 2019, at 12:17, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 4:53:36 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 16 Apr 2019, at 15:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:


 If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics

 *The physics of Game of Thrones*

 https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/



 That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.

 It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. 
 That is not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if 
 that is the case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = 
 phi_u’ extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if 
 mechanism is correct. 

 But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our 
 substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would 
 be the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and 
 physics would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would 
 make Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have 
 for 
 Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.





 in another number?

 Or: Is there a a GoT reality?


 Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining 
 (every)thing.

 Bruno



>>> Assume "our physics" is the Standard Model.
>>>
>>>
>>> I can’t. If that “model” (theory) is the correct fundamental physics, 
>>> then it has to be deduced from arithmetic (and Mechanism).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  Here it is in a few hundred characters (Lagrangian_{SM}):
>>>  
>>>  
>>> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like
>>>
>>> How does one "derive" this Lagrangian_{SM} from the logic of elementary 
>>> arithmetic (Logic_{EA}) -- even given the translation of the language of 
>>> Lagrangians into the language of Logic_{EA}. 
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, formalising a theory is not the same as deriving it.
>>>
>>> How, to derive it? By studying the “material modes of self-reference, 
>>> that the mode of the first person self, or the first person plural self. 
>>> How, and why is explained in most of my papers.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Why should our SM be the one, and not an alternative SM?
>>>
>>>
>>> Because the sum on all computations is unique. 
>>>
>>> That is the nice thing with Mechanism. It justifies why there is an 
>>> apparent physical universe, having the same law for any universal numbers. 
>>> It justify the existence of physics, and its unicity, even if it take the 
>>> shape of a mutilverse, or even some multi-multiverses.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If every SM equation is possible (not just the one equation above), what 
>>> is "explained”?
>>>
>>>
>>> Only one SM equation can be possible (assuming mechanism of course, 
>>> which I do all along).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It makes more sense that Lagrangian_{SM} and Logic_{EA} are completely 
>>> contingent hypotheses written in languages created by us humans to model 
>>> reality.
>>>
>>>
>>> That would identify physics and geography, but with mechanism, we know 
>>> already that geography is contingent, where the physical reality is lawful. 
>>> Would all material mode of self-reference have collapsed into propositional 
>>> calculus, there would be no physical laws, only geographical laws.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> The puzzle is that if one looks at the literal SM formula shown here:
>>
>>
>> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png
>>
>>
>> It is somehow justified by the data, and some theoretical ideas, in the 
>> book by Alain Connes and Matilde Marcolli: Non Commutative Geometry, 
>> Quantum Filed and Motives. That is page 167 of that book, and I am not up 
>> there. 
>> Yet, the main ideas are rather well explained in the more readable book 
>> by Vic. Stenger.
>>
>> But both Alain Connes and Vic Stenger are doing physics, and so they 
>> assumes much more than what is permitted when we assume computationalism, 
>> where even the starting ideas of Vic Stenger have to be derived from 
>> arithmetic (using also the mechanist principle of the invariance of 
>> consciousness for some digital functional substitution made at some level).
>>
>> Now, having said that, it is clear that Alain Connes suspect that 
>> equation to be related at least to the arithmetical reality of the prime 
>> 

Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 18 Apr 2019, at 21:10, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 8:56:54 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 18 Apr 2019, at 12:17, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 4:53:36 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 16 Apr 2019, at 15:06, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift > wrote:
 
 
 If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics
 
 The physics of Game of Thrones
 https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/
  
 
>>> 
>>> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.
>>> 
>>> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. That 
>>> is not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if that is 
>>> the case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = phi_u’ 
>>> extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if mechanism is 
>>> correct. 
>>> 
>>> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our 
>>> substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would 
>>> be the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and 
>>> physics would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would 
>>> make Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for 
>>> Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 
 in another number?
 
 Or: Is there a a GoT reality?
>>> 
>>> Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining 
>>> (every)thing.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Assume "our physics" is the Standard Model.
>> 
>> I can’t. If that “model” (theory) is the correct fundamental physics, then 
>> it has to be deduced from arithmetic (and Mechanism).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>>  Here it is in a few hundred characters (Lagrangian_{SM}):
>>>  
>>>  
>>> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> How does one "derive" this Lagrangian_{SM} from the logic of elementary 
>>> arithmetic (Logic_{EA}) -- even given the translation of the language of 
>>> Lagrangians into the language of Logic_{EA}.
>> 
>> Yes, formalising a theory is not the same as deriving it.
>> 
>> How, to derive it? By studying the “material modes of self-reference, that 
>> the mode of the first person self, or the first person plural self. How, and 
>> why is explained in most of my papers.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Why should our SM be the one, and not an alternative SM?
>> 
>> Because the sum on all computations is unique. 
>> 
>> That is the nice thing with Mechanism. It justifies why there is an apparent 
>> physical universe, having the same law for any universal numbers. It justify 
>> the existence of physics, and its unicity, even if it take the shape of a 
>> mutilverse, or even some multi-multiverses.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> If every SM equation is possible (not just the one equation above), what is 
>>> "explained”?
>> 
>> Only one SM equation can be possible (assuming mechanism of course, which I 
>> do all along).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> It makes more sense that Lagrangian_{SM} and Logic_{EA} are completely 
>>> contingent hypotheses written in languages created by us humans to model 
>>> reality.
>> 
>> That would identify physics and geography, but with mechanism, we know 
>> already that geography is contingent, where the physical reality is lawful. 
>> Would all material mode of self-reference have collapsed into propositional 
>> calculus, there would be no physical laws, only geographical laws.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The puzzle is that if one looks at the literal SM formula shown here:
>> 
>>
>> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png 
>> 
>> 
> 
> It is somehow justified by the data, and some theoretical ideas, in the book 
> by Alain Connes and Matilde Marcolli: Non Commutative Geometry, Quantum Filed 
> and Motives. That is page 167 of that book, and I am not up there. 
> Yet, the main ideas are rather well explained in the more readable book by 
> Vic. Stenger.
> 
> But both Alain Connes and Vic Stenger are doing physics, and so they assumes 
> much more than what is permitted when we assume computationalism, where even 
> the starting ideas of Vic Stenger have to be derived from arithmetic (using 
> also the mechanist principle of the invariance of consciousness for some 
> digital functional substitution made at some level).
> 
> Now, 

Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


> On 18 Apr 2019, at 19:51, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 4/18/2019 2:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.
>> 
>> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. That 
>> is not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if that is 
>> the case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = phi_u’ 
>> extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if mechanism is 
>> correct.
>> 
>> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our 
>> substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would be 
>> the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and physics 
>> would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would make 
>> Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for 
>> Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.
> 
> That is one of my reservations about your theory, that it requires the 
> substitution level to take into account the environment. Not the whole 
> universe, but representative local sample of the universe. 

Yes, but that is what makes “my” mechanist hypothesis weaker than all the 
others (meaning that what is prove for it will be true for all the other). 
Usually, mechanism assumes some high level, like the neuronal net, and nothing 
else. My reasoning, on the contrary, still functions, even if the level is 
string theory applied to the whole physical universe, with 10^(10^100) correct 
decimals, as those approximations are all implemented in the arithmetical 
reality.




> It wouldn't make our biology and physics false, but it might make them what 
> we call "effective theories" in physics, i.e. not fundamental in the 
> metaphysical sense but approximations to an unknown fundamental theory that 
> is effective in the domain where we can test it.

Yes, that was the goal. Biology is still reducible to physics, but physics 
becomes explained by a more fundamental theory given by any Turing 
universal/complete theory.

So here is a theory of everything, explaining both consciousness and the 
appearance of matter:

Classical logic +

0 ≠ s(x)
s(x) = s(y) -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = s(y))
x+0 = x
x+s(y) = s(x+y)
x*0=0
x*s(y)=(x*y)+x

Here is another:

1) If A = B and A = C, then B = C
2) If A = B then AC = BC
3) If A = B then CA = CB
4) KAB = A
5) SABC = AC(BC)

And here is one, on which Number theory might some day provide analytical 
(complex) tools to proceed. It is a Turing Universal system of Diophantine 
equation (worked out by Matiyasevitch and Jones). All the variables are 
integers:

Nu = ((ZUY)^2 + U)^2 + Y 

ELG^2 + Al = (B - XY)Q^2

Qu = B^(5^60)

La + Qu^4 = 1 + LaB^5

Th +  2Z = B^5

L = U + TTh

E = Y + MTh

N = Q^16

R = [G + EQ^3 + LQ^5 + (2(E - ZLa)(1 + XB^5 + G)^4 + LaB^5 + + 
LaB^5Q^4)Q^4](N^2 -N)
 + [Q^3 -BL + L + ThLaQ^3 + (B^5 - 2)Q^5] (N^2 - 1)

P = 2W(S^2)(R^2)N^2

(P^2)K^2 - K^2 + 1 = Ta^2

4(c - KSN^2)^2 + Et = K^2

K = R + 1 + HP - H

A = (WN^2 + 1)RSN^2

C = 2R + 1 Ph

D = BW + CA -2C + 4AGa -5Ga

D^2 = (A^2 - 1)C^2 + 1

F^2 = (A^2 - 1)(I^2)C^4 + 1

(D + OF)^2 = ((A + F^2(D^2 - A^2))^2 - 1)(2R + 1 + JC)^2 + 1


Any such theory will do. The theology (including physics) that is extracted 
from them is the same. Theology, and thus physics is machine-independent, or 
phi_i-independent.

> 
> Brent
> 
> -- 
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Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-18 Thread PGC


On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 3:56:54 PM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Apr 2019, at 12:17, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
> The puzzle is that if one looks at the literal SM formula shown here:
>
>
> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png
>
>
> It is somehow justified by the data, and some theoretical ideas, in the 
> book by Alain Connes and Matilde Marcolli: Non Commutative Geometry, 
> Quantum Filed and Motives. That is page 167 of that book, and I am not up 
> there. 
> Yet, the main ideas are rather well explained in the more readable book by 
> Vic. Stenger.
>
>
> Unfortunately, even if the correct universal quantum field theory is 
> successfully extracted from the elementary arithmetic of the prime number, 
> or other sort of numbers, that would still be not quite satisfactory, for a 
> computationalist, because that theory should still be extracted from 
> arithmetic through the mathematics of arithmetical self-reference to get 
> right the distinctions and the relations between the first person plural 
> quanta and the first person singular quanta, beyond to get right the reason 
> of the physical observations existence.
>

Point taken Russell but I don't believe in age yet ;-). Concerning the 
statement quoted above: Why not reach out to Alain or his followers, get 
together with all the heavy Georgian and Russian folk, Block Esakia 
followers, Brent, Russell, Bruno, Telmo kicking ass, and after everybody 
wrestles to grok the other sides somewhat, see what happens? Maybe the 
thing will prove intractable for the time being or it won't. We never know 
until we try so why not just do that? Sitting around typing and crying 
about it for years won't clarify that: people could. Good faith, proper 
organization, appropriate resources could. PGC  

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Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-18 Thread Russell Standish
On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 05:31:06AM -0700, PGC wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 11:53:36 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 16 Apr 2019, at 15:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift 
> wrote:
> 
> 
> If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics
> 
> The physics of Game of Thrones
> https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-
> tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/
> 
> 
> 
> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.
> 
> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical
> universe. That is not entirely excluded from the mechanist
> hypothesis, but even if that is the case, such an u (and of course
> all the u’ such that phi_u = phi_u’ extensionally) must be derived
> from elementary arithmetic, if mechanism is correct. 
> 
> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would 
> make
> our substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain”
> possible would be the entire physical universe. In that case, most
> of our biology and physics would be false. It is such a weakening
> of Mechanism, that it would make Mechanism wrong FAPP,
> contradicting all the evidences that we have for Mechanism, like
> evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> in another number?
> 
> Or: Is there a a GoT reality?
> 
> 
> Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining
> (every)thing.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Assume "our physics" is the Standard Model.
> 
> 
> I can’t. If that “model” (theory) is the correct fundamental physics, then
> it has to be deduced from arithmetic (and Mechanism).
> 
> 
> Prove this exclusive status.
>  
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>      Here it is in a few hundred characters (Lagrangian_{SM}):
>      
>      https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-
> model-of-physics-actually-looks-like
> 
> How does one "derive" this Lagrangian_{SM} from the logic of 
> elementary
> arithmetic (Logic_{EA}) -- even given the translation of the language
> of Lagrangians into the language of Logic_{EA}.
> 
> 
> Yes, formalising a theory is not the same as deriving it.
> 
> How, to derive it? By studying the “material modes of self-reference, that
> the mode of the first person self, or the first person plural self. How,
> and why is explained in most of my papers.
> 
> 
> Which by now have achieved status of original research, right?
> 
> With everybody cited in it that's dead and their eternal peer support (where 
> we
> are not physicalists, but instead the spiritual-imaterial brothers of Einstein
> and Gödel, kissed by god's gift of the only original contribution on a planet
> full of idiots), I think folks wouldn't do terribly by taking the status of
> "explained" with a grain of salt.
> 
> If things were so clear, why would it require an infinite or 20-year amount of
> posting to justify? Infinite oracle shit is easy, but what you miss for years
> in the catholic "seriousness" dependence of having fundamental certainty in 
> our
> status as Gödel's progeny and architect of the future of science, is that
> support and resources can be obtained from exactly such infinite oracle
> activity. Imagine having poured just a fraction of the 20 year posting oracle
> activity into reaching out to others on their own terms, visiting some
> conferences, and therefore creating funding and peer support for fundamental
> research in less bounded ways.
> 
> Over the years, it becomes more and more evident as I peruse these lists that
> you appear to have little to no genuine interest for fundamental research.. in
> the sense of the kind of seriousness that is willing to absorb genuine risk 
> and
> indeterminacy with people and peers not content to stare into screens and 
> split
> rhetorical hairs. People can improvise with that indeterminacy, and guess 
> what?
> Sometimes they improvise less wrong. PGC
> 

To be fair, in the contemporary crowded and noisy scientific
marketplace of ideas, you do have to continously bang on about your
ideas in order not to be drowned out. It shocked me that I constantly
had to repeat myself, as things that I had realised decades ago are
still widely misunderstood.

One might ask what developments have occurred since Bruno submitted
his thesis (I recall there's been one or two, but not many). The most
fertile period of a scientist's life tends to be eir 20s and 30s,
and none of us are spring chickens any more, which might 

Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-18 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 8:56:54 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Apr 2019, at 12:17, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 4:53:36 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 16 Apr 2019, at 15:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics
>>>
>>> *The physics of Game of Thrones*
>>>
>>> https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.
>>>
>>> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. 
>>> That is not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if 
>>> that is the case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = 
>>> phi_u’ extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if 
>>> mechanism is correct. 
>>>
>>> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our 
>>> substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would 
>>> be the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and 
>>> physics would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would 
>>> make Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for 
>>> Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> in another number?
>>>
>>> Or: Is there a a GoT reality?
>>>
>>>
>>> Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining 
>>> (every)thing.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> Assume "our physics" is the Standard Model.
>>
>>
>> I can’t. If that “model” (theory) is the correct fundamental physics, 
>> then it has to be deduced from arithmetic (and Mechanism).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  Here it is in a few hundred characters (Lagrangian_{SM}):
>>  
>>  
>> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like
>>
>> How does one "derive" this Lagrangian_{SM} from the logic of elementary 
>> arithmetic (Logic_{EA}) -- even given the translation of the language of 
>> Lagrangians into the language of Logic_{EA}. 
>>
>>
>> Yes, formalising a theory is not the same as deriving it.
>>
>> How, to derive it? By studying the “material modes of self-reference, 
>> that the mode of the first person self, or the first person plural self. 
>> How, and why is explained in most of my papers.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Why should our SM be the one, and not an alternative SM?
>>
>>
>> Because the sum on all computations is unique. 
>>
>> That is the nice thing with Mechanism. It justifies why there is an 
>> apparent physical universe, having the same law for any universal numbers. 
>> It justify the existence of physics, and its unicity, even if it take the 
>> shape of a mutilverse, or even some multi-multiverses.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> If every SM equation is possible (not just the one equation above), what 
>> is "explained”?
>>
>>
>> Only one SM equation can be possible (assuming mechanism of course, which 
>> I do all along).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> It makes more sense that Lagrangian_{SM} and Logic_{EA} are completely 
>> contingent hypotheses written in languages created by us humans to model 
>> reality.
>>
>>
>> That would identify physics and geography, but with mechanism, we know 
>> already that geography is contingent, where the physical reality is lawful. 
>> Would all material mode of self-reference have collapsed into propositional 
>> calculus, there would be no physical laws, only geographical laws.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> The puzzle is that if one looks at the literal SM formula shown here:
>
>
> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png
>
>
> It is somehow justified by the data, and some theoretical ideas, in the 
> book by Alain Connes and Matilde Marcolli: Non Commutative Geometry, 
> Quantum Filed and Motives. That is page 167 of that book, and I am not up 
> there. 
> Yet, the main ideas are rather well explained in the more readable book by 
> Vic. Stenger.
>
> But both Alain Connes and Vic Stenger are doing physics, and so they 
> assumes much more than what is permitted when we assume computationalism, 
> where even the starting ideas of Vic Stenger have to be derived from 
> arithmetic (using also the mechanist principle of the invariance of 
> consciousness for some digital functional substitution made at some level).
>
> Now, having said that, it is clear that Alain Connes suspect that equation 
> to be related at least to the arithmetical reality of the prime numbers, 
> and his work is among those work in fundamental physics which illustrates 
> deep relations between physics and number theory.
>
> For a logician, that insight makes sense. Elementary arithmetic is Turing 
> universal, and is thus an acceptable “theory” of Everything. But 

Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-18 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 4/18/2019 2:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.

It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. 
That is not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even 
if that is the case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that 
phi_u = phi_u’ extensionally) must be derived from elementary 
arithmetic, if mechanism is correct.


But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make 
our substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” 
possible would be the entire physical universe. In that case, most of 
our biology and physics would be false. It is such a weakening of 
Mechanism, that it would make Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all 
the evidences that we have for Mechanism, like evolution, molecular 
biology or quantum physics.


That is one of my reservations about your theory, that it requires the 
substitution level to take into account the environment. Not the whole 
universe, but representative local sample of the universe.  It wouldn't 
make our biology and physics false, but it might make them what we call 
"effective theories" in physics, i.e. not fundamental in the 
metaphysical sense but approximations to an unknown fundamental theory 
that is effective in the domain where we can test it.


Brent

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Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 18 Apr 2019, at 12:17, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 4:53:36 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 16 Apr 2019, at 15:06, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics
>>> 
>>> The physics of Game of Thrones
>>> https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/
>>>  
>>> 
>> 
>> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.
>> 
>> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. That 
>> is not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if that is 
>> the case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = phi_u’ 
>> extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if mechanism is 
>> correct. 
>> 
>> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our 
>> substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would be 
>> the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and physics 
>> would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would make 
>> Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for 
>> Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> in another number?
>>> 
>>> Or: Is there a a GoT reality?
>> 
>> Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining (every)thing.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Assume "our physics" is the Standard Model.
> 
> I can’t. If that “model” (theory) is the correct fundamental physics, then it 
> has to be deduced from arithmetic (and Mechanism).
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>>  Here it is in a few hundred characters (Lagrangian_{SM}):
>>  
>>  
>> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> How does one "derive" this Lagrangian_{SM} from the logic of elementary 
>> arithmetic (Logic_{EA}) -- even given the translation of the language of 
>> Lagrangians into the language of Logic_{EA}.
> 
> Yes, formalising a theory is not the same as deriving it.
> 
> How, to derive it? By studying the “material modes of self-reference, that 
> the mode of the first person self, or the first person plural self. How, and 
> why is explained in most of my papers.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> Why should our SM be the one, and not an alternative SM?
> 
> Because the sum on all computations is unique. 
> 
> That is the nice thing with Mechanism. It justifies why there is an apparent 
> physical universe, having the same law for any universal numbers. It justify 
> the existence of physics, and its unicity, even if it take the shape of a 
> mutilverse, or even some multi-multiverses.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> If every SM equation is possible (not just the one equation above), what is 
>> "explained”?
> 
> Only one SM equation can be possible (assuming mechanism of course, which I 
> do all along).
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> It makes more sense that Lagrangian_{SM} and Logic_{EA} are completely 
>> contingent hypotheses written in languages created by us humans to model 
>> reality.
> 
> That would identify physics and geography, but with mechanism, we know 
> already that geography is contingent, where the physical reality is lawful. 
> Would all material mode of self-reference have collapsed into propositional 
> calculus, there would be no physical laws, only geographical laws.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The puzzle is that if one looks at the literal SM formula shown here:
> 
>
> https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png 
> 
> 

It is somehow justified by the data, and some theoretical ideas, in the book by 
Alain Connes and Matilde Marcolli: Non Commutative Geometry, Quantum Filed and 
Motives. That is page 167 of that book, and I am not up there. 
Yet, the main ideas are rather well explained in the more readable book by Vic. 
Stenger.

But both Alain Connes and Vic Stenger are doing physics, and so they assumes 
much more than what is permitted when we assume computationalism, where even 
the starting ideas of Vic Stenger have to be derived from arithmetic (using 
also the mechanist principle of the invariance of consciousness for some 
digital functional substitution made at some level).

Now, having said that, it is clear that Alain Connes suspect that equation to 
be related at least to the arithmetical reality of the prime numbers, and his 
work is among those work in fundamental physics which illustrates deep 
relations between physics and number theory.

For a logician, that 

Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-18 Thread PGC


On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 11:53:36 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Apr 2019, at 15:06, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics
>>
>> *The physics of Game of Thrones*
>>
>> https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/
>>
>>
>>
>> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.
>>
>> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. 
>> That is not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if 
>> that is the case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = 
>> phi_u’ extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if 
>> mechanism is correct. 
>>
>> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our 
>> substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would 
>> be the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and 
>> physics would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would 
>> make Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for 
>> Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> in another number?
>>
>> Or: Is there a a GoT reality?
>>
>>
>> Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining 
>> (every)thing.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> Assume "our physics" is the Standard Model.
>
>
> I can’t. If that “model” (theory) is the correct fundamental physics, then 
> it has to be deduced from arithmetic (and Mechanism).
>

Prove this exclusive status.
 

>
>
>
>
>
>  Here it is in a few hundred characters (Lagrangian_{SM}):
>  
>  
> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like
>
> How does one "derive" this Lagrangian_{SM} from the logic of elementary 
> arithmetic (Logic_{EA}) -- even given the translation of the language of 
> Lagrangians into the language of Logic_{EA}. 
>
>
> Yes, formalising a theory is not the same as deriving it.
>
> How, to derive it? By studying the “material modes of self-reference, that 
> the mode of the first person self, or the first person plural self. How, 
> and why is explained in most of my papers.
>

Which by now have achieved status of original research, right? 

With everybody cited in it that's dead and their eternal peer support 
(where we are not physicalists, but instead the spiritual-imaterial 
brothers of Einstein and Gödel, kissed by god's gift of the only original 
contribution on a planet full of idiots), I think folks wouldn't do 
terribly by taking the status of "explained" with a grain of salt. 

If things were so clear, why would it require an infinite or 20-year amount 
of posting to justify? Infinite oracle shit is easy, but what you miss for 
years in the catholic "seriousness" dependence of having fundamental 
certainty in our status as Gödel's progeny and architect of the future of 
science, is that support and resources can be obtained from exactly such 
infinite oracle activity. Imagine having poured just a fraction of the 20 
year posting oracle activity into reaching out to others on their own 
terms, visiting some conferences, and therefore creating funding and peer 
support for fundamental research in less bounded ways.

Over the years, it becomes more and more evident as I peruse these lists 
that you appear to have little to no genuine interest for fundamental 
research.. in the sense of the kind of seriousness that is willing to 
absorb genuine risk and indeterminacy with people and peers not content to 
stare into screens and split rhetorical hairs. People can improvise with 
that indeterminacy, and guess what? Sometimes they improvise less wrong. PGC

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Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-18 Thread Philip Thrift


On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 4:53:36 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Apr 2019, at 15:06, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>> If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics
>>
>> *The physics of Game of Thrones*
>>
>> https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/
>>
>>
>>
>> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.
>>
>> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. 
>> That is not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if 
>> that is the case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = 
>> phi_u’ extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if 
>> mechanism is correct. 
>>
>> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our 
>> substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would 
>> be the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and 
>> physics would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would 
>> make Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for 
>> Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> in another number?
>>
>> Or: Is there a a GoT reality?
>>
>>
>> Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining 
>> (every)thing.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
> Assume "our physics" is the Standard Model.
>
>
> I can’t. If that “model” (theory) is the correct fundamental physics, then 
> it has to be deduced from arithmetic (and Mechanism).
>
>
>
>
>
>  Here it is in a few hundred characters (Lagrangian_{SM}):
>  
>  
> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like
>
> How does one "derive" this Lagrangian_{SM} from the logic of elementary 
> arithmetic (Logic_{EA}) -- even given the translation of the language of 
> Lagrangians into the language of Logic_{EA}. 
>
>
> Yes, formalising a theory is not the same as deriving it.
>
> How, to derive it? By studying the “material modes of self-reference, that 
> the mode of the first person self, or the first person plural self. How, 
> and why is explained in most of my papers.
>
>
>
>
> Why should our SM be the one, and not an alternative SM?
>
>
> Because the sum on all computations is unique. 
>
> That is the nice thing with Mechanism. It justifies why there is an 
> apparent physical universe, having the same law for any universal numbers. 
> It justify the existence of physics, and its unicity, even if it take the 
> shape of a mutilverse, or even some multi-multiverses.
>
>
>
>
> If every SM equation is possible (not just the one equation above), what 
> is "explained”?
>
>
> Only one SM equation can be possible (assuming mechanism of course, which 
> I do all along).
>
>
>
>
> It makes more sense that Lagrangian_{SM} and Logic_{EA} are completely 
> contingent hypotheses written in languages created by us humans to model 
> reality.
>
>
> That would identify physics and geography, but with mechanism, we know 
> already that geography is contingent, where the physical reality is lawful. 
> Would all material mode of self-reference have collapsed into propositional 
> calculus, there would be no physical laws, only geographical laws.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
The puzzle is that if one looks at the literal SM formula shown here:

   
https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png

what if all the "2"s were changed to "3"s (or any "editing" like that).

One gets from L_{SM(2)}) (the one above) to L_{SM(3)}, where the 2s have 
been replaced by 3s.

Why would L_{SM(2)})  be the "necessary" theory, or could L_{SM(3)} "work" 
as a different physics?

- pt

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Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 16 Apr 2019, at 15:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics
>> 
>> The physics of Game of Thrones
>> https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/
>>  
>> 
> 
> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.
> 
> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. That is 
> not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if that is the 
> case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = phi_u’ 
> extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if mechanism is 
> correct. 
> 
> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our 
> substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would be 
> the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and physics 
> would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would make 
> Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for 
> Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> in another number?
>> 
>> Or: Is there a a GoT reality?
> 
> Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining (every)thing.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> Assume "our physics" is the Standard Model.

I can’t. If that “model” (theory) is the correct fundamental physics, then it 
has to be deduced from arithmetic (and Mechanism).




> 
>  Here it is in a few hundred characters (Lagrangian_{SM}):
>  
>  
> https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like
>  
> 
> 
> How does one "derive" this Lagrangian_{SM} from the logic of elementary 
> arithmetic (Logic_{EA}) -- even given the translation of the language of 
> Lagrangians into the language of Logic_{EA}.

Yes, formalising a theory is not the same as deriving it.

How, to derive it? By studying the “material modes of self-reference, that the 
mode of the first person self, or the first person plural self. How, and why is 
explained in most of my papers.




> Why should our SM be the one, and not an alternative SM?

Because the sum on all computations is unique. 

That is the nice thing with Mechanism. It justifies why there is an apparent 
physical universe, having the same law for any universal numbers. It justify 
the existence of physics, and its unicity, even if it take the shape of a 
mutilverse, or even some multi-multiverses.




> If every SM equation is possible (not just the one equation above), what is 
> "explained”?

Only one SM equation can be possible (assuming mechanism of course, which I do 
all along).



> 
> It makes more sense that Lagrangian_{SM} and Logic_{EA} are completely 
> contingent hypotheses written in languages created by us humans to model 
> reality.

That would identify physics and geography, but with mechanism, we know already 
that geography is contingent, where the physical reality is lawful. Would all 
material mode of self-reference have collapsed into propositional calculus, 
there would be no physical laws, only geographical laws.

Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
>  
> 
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Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-16 Thread Philip Thrift


On Tuesday, April 16, 2019 at 6:39:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
> If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics
>
> *The physics of Game of Thrones*
>
> https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/
>
>
>
> That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.
>
> It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. That 
> is not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if that is 
> the case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = phi_u’ 
> extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if mechanism is 
> correct. 
>
> But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our 
> substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would 
> be the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and 
> physics would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would 
> make Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for 
> Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.
>
>
>
>
>
> in another number?
>
> Or: Is there a a GoT reality?
>
>
> Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining 
> (every)thing.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
Assume "our physics" is the Standard Model.

 Here it is in a few hundred characters (Lagrangian_{SM}):
 
 
https://www.sciencealert.com/this-is-what-the-standard-model-of-physics-actually-looks-like

How does one "derive" this Lagrangian_{SM} from the logic of elementary 
arithmetic (Logic_{EA}) -- even given the translation of the language of 
Lagrangians into the language of Logic_{EA}. Why should our SM be the one, 
and not an alternative SM? If every SM equation is possible (not just the 
one equation above), what is "explained"?

It makes more sense that Lagrangian_{SM} and Logic_{EA} are completely 
contingent hypotheses written in languages created by us humans to model 
reality.

- pt

 

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Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-16 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 15 Apr 2019, at 11:04, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics
> 
> The physics of Game of Thrones
> https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/
>  
> 

That would be the mistake of Dgital Physics/Physicalism.

It is like saying that some program u generate the physical universe. That is 
not entirely excluded from the mechanist hypothesis, but even if that is the 
case, such an u (and of course all the u’ such that phi_u = phi_u’ 
extensionally) must be derived from elementary arithmetic, if mechanism is 
correct. 

But that can be shown to be not quite plausible, as this would make our 
substitution level so low that the only “artificial brain” possible would be 
the entire physical universe. In that case, most of our biology and physics 
would be false. It is such a weakening of Mechanism, that it would make 
Mechanism wrong FAPP, contradicting all the evidences that we have for 
Mechanism, like evolution, molecular biology or quantum physics.




> 
> in another number?
> 
> Or: Is there a a GoT reality?

Sure there is, but not a fundamental one, capable of explaining (every)thing.

Bruno





> 
> - pt
> 
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Universal numbers and Game of Thrones

2019-04-15 Thread Philip Thrift

If our physics is in a number, is Game of Thrones physics

*The physics of Game of Thrones*
https://winteriscoming.net/2017/09/29/neil-degrasse-tyson-cant-stop-talking-physics-game-thrones/

in another number?

Or: Is there a a GoT reality?

- pt

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