Le 30-juil.-08, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou wrote :
> Yes, I was partially agreeing with you. Psychotic people often still > manage very well with deductive reasoning, but they get the big > picture wrong, obviously and ridiculously wrong. So there must be more > to discovering truth about the world than mere algorithmic shuffling. Deduction and computation are different thing. Computability is closed for diagonalization, and this makes it possible to have an universal notion of computability (Church thesis) Deductibility is not closed for diagonalization, this makes deductibility notions never universal and always incomplete. It is a theorem of computer science that machine learning and discovering truth is beyond deductibility, but not necessarily beyond computability, and still less beyond computability viewed from the first person point of view. Also, assuming comp, the first person associated to the machine, cannot see itself as a machine at all (cf the unawareness of the reconstitution delay in the UDA and its consequences), making any self-aware machine directly connected to non computable entities having indeed the shape, in a first approximation, of many (2^aleph_0) interfering realities. I recall that with the mechanist assumption there are too much non computational entities a priori observable: the white rabbits. I agree with Mark about aesthetics. Platonist have Beauty in high considerations. But given that machine already cannot define truth, it would be weird that we can analyse beauty in term of procedure. On the contrary we have all reasons to believe that the mechanist hypothesis prevent any complete analysis of higher order notion like beauty definable. As I said often the comp or mechanist assumption is, after Godel, a vaccine against reductionism. Even the truth about only the numbers can no more be capture completely in term of numbers. Also, John says: > > Could Bruno imagine to define it [beauty] in numbers? (excuse me > please the humor). I cannot. But I can explain why there exists a lot of things that a machine cannot explain in term of numbers. All this without postulating more than numbers (together with addition and multiplication) at the ontic level. Just remember that having only numbers at the ontic level forces the inside epistemological view to escape the numbers. If not you are collapsing first and third person view, like reducing a human person to her body. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
