Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

2009-08-12 Thread Colin Hales
Hi, I guess I am pretty much over the need for any 'ism whatever. I can re-classify my ideas in terms of an 'ism, but that process tells me nothing extra and offers no extra empirical clue. I think I can classify fairly succinctly the difference between approaches: *(A) Colin* (a) There is a

Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

2009-08-12 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2009/8/12 Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au: My motivation to kill COMP is purely aimed at bring a halt to the delusion of the AGI community that Turing-computing will ever create a mind. They are throwing away $millions based on a false belief. Their expectations need to be

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 12 Aug 2009, at 04:32, David Nyman wrote: 2009/8/11 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Bruno, thanks for your detailed responses which I will peruse closely. Meanwhile, I finally managed to locate on FOR an apparently coherent summary of the MGA (which I understand to be the essence of

Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

2009-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal
Colin, We agree on the conclusion. We disagree on vocabulary, and on the validity of your reasoning. Let us call I-comp the usual indexical mechanism discussed in this list (comp). Let us call m-comp the thesis that there is a primitive natural world, and that it can be described by a

Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

2009-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 11 Aug 2009, at 02:06, ronaldheld wrote: I am behind, because I was away delivering Science talk to Star Trek fans. I am uncertain what to take away from this thread, and could use the clarification. I will think about it. It could help if you were a bit more specific. As an aside,

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-12 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/12 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: The solution then seems obviously to be to throw one or other of these supposed causal principles out, i.e.: 1) either it is the case that consciousness simply supervenes on particular physical activities whose computational status is irrelevant;

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 12 Aug 2009, at 16:38, David Nyman wrote: 2009/8/12 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: The solution then seems obviously to be to throw one or other of these supposed causal principles out, i.e.: 1) either it is the case that consciousness simply supervenes on particular physical

Re: Dreaming On

2009-08-12 Thread David Nyman
2009/8/12 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: I will not stickle on that point :) Can we say that? Sure - why be pointilleux about it? Now, is the ONE a person? I still don't know if that make sense (in machine's theology). Who knows? I suspect we need to interview the One. Maybe Oprah? D

Phd in philosophy of mind in cognitive (neuro)science

2009-08-12 Thread Emanuele Ratti
Hi, I'm from Milan. I'm going to finish my studies in philosophy (of mind) and I'm looking for some phd in philosophy of mind in cognitive (neuro)science...or something that is interdisciplinary. I found some interesting phd in Italy (at the university of In Milan, in Siena, in Turin in

Re: The seven step series

2009-08-12 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 11 Aug 2009, at 22:24, Mirek Dobsicek wrote: Well, A^B is the set of functions from B to A. By definition of set exponentiation. I'd just like to point out that Bruno in his previous post in the seven step serii made a small typo A^B - the set of all functions from A to B. It

Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

2009-08-12 Thread Colin Hales
Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2009/8/12 Colin Hales c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au: My motivation to kill COMP is purely aimed at bring a halt to the delusion of the AGI community that Turing-computing will ever create a mind. They are throwing away $millions based on a false belief. Their

Re: Can mind be a computation if physics is fundamental?

2009-08-12 Thread Colin Hales
Bruno Marchal wrote: Colin, We agree on the conclusion. We disagree on vocabulary, and on the validity of your reasoning. Let us call I-comp the usual indexical mechanism discussed in this list (comp). Let us call m-comp the thesis that there is a primitive natural world, and that it