On 16 Jun 2013, at 19:31, Roger Clough wrote:
Consciousness in the Materialist, Computationalist and Leibniz models
This image of a man looking out a window represents the Subject/
Object distinction.
<public domain 6_.jpg>
The man represents the subject, which is subjective or inside.
Outside of the window is the objective world.
1) In the materialist model of consciousness there is no subject,
because nothing is subjective-- everything is material or objective.
2) The computationalist or computer model of consciousness is
essentially the same since everything is numbers,
which are objects, being objective. So there is no subject and hence
no consciousnress.
This is not correct. Everything is number, in the ontology, but we
assume not just the numbers, but also addition and multiplication, and
this is enough to get the dreams and the first person subjectivity,
even formally in applying the oldest and best theory of knowledge (the
one of Theaetetus).
You are confusing Bp and Bp & p. It is normal as they are equivalent,
but with comp, the equivalence can be seen by God, and not by the
finite terrestrial creature.
Bruno
3) In the Leibniz model, the window is open so that both inside
subject and outside object are subjective.
In this case we can have consciousness = subject + object,
Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 6/16/2013
See my Leibniz site at
http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough
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